


The development of the *polis* in archaic Greece

Edited by Lynette G. Mitchell and P. J. Rhodes



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PREFACE

This collection of essays is based on the papers read at a conference in Durham in September 1995. In planning the conference we wanted to confront from a number of angles the fundamental questions of why and how the *polis* developed and what this development tells us about Archaic Greece. We invited six speakers (John Davies, Lin Foxhall, Mogens Hansen, Stephen Hodkinson, Catherine Morgan and John Salmon) to deal with six themes, and we then issued a general invitation to intending participants to offer shorter papers, as a result of which our repertoire was expanded to include the range which is covered in this book. We should like to thank not only our speakers but all those who participated in the conference and made it such a success.

For financial help we are grateful to the Classical Association, the Society for the Promotion of Hellenic Studies and the Department of Classics at the University of Durham. We thank the Principal and the staff of Colling-wood College, Durham, for the use of their facilities, and the University of Durham for administrative underpinning. Special thanks must go also to James Pile for helping the four days to run so smoothly.

After the conference Routledge agreed to publish our book, and have done so with great efficiency, and our speakers revised their papers with welcome promptness. Finally, we should like to thank the members of the Department of Classics at Durham for their support and encouragement.

L.G.M. and P.J.R.
April 1996

ABBREVIATIONS

Abbreviations for the names and works of ancient authors and for editions of inscriptions and papyri are mostly those used in the 2nd edition of the *Oxford Classical Dictionary* (the 3rd edition had not yet appeared when the book went to press), but note:

<i>Ath. Pol.</i> without indication of author	the <i>Athenaion Politeia</i> attributed to Aristotle
Buck	Buck, <i>The Greek Dialects</i>
Her.	Herodotus
Hes. <i>W.D.</i>	Hesiod, <i>Works and Days</i>
<i>LSAG</i>	Jeffery, <i>The Local Scripts of Archaic Greece</i>
<i>LSCG</i>	Sokolowski, <i>Lois sacrées des cités grecques</i>
Meiggs and Lewis	Meiggs and Lewis, <i>A Selection of Greek Historical Inscriptions</i>

The editions used for the texts of fragments of poetry are specified at the first citation of each poet in each chapter; notice:

<i>CEG</i>	Hansen, <i>Carmina Epigraphica Graeca</i>
<i>LGS</i>	Page, <i>Lyrica Graeca Selecta</i>
<i>PMG</i>	Page, <i>Poetae Melici Graeci</i>

Details of books cited are given in the Bibliography; details of articles in periodicals are given in the Notes at the end of the chapters. Abbreviations for the titles of periodicals are mostly those used in *L'Année Philologique*, with the usual Anglophone divergences (*AJP* rather than *AJPh*, etc.), but notice:

<i>AM</i>	<i>Athenische Mitteilungen</i> (i.e. <i>Mitteilungen des Deutschen Archäologischen Instituts, Athenische Abteilung</i>)
<i>BSA</i>	<i>Annual of the British School at Athens</i>

The following abbreviations are used for volumes of conference proceedings: B' (etc.) Συμ.Πελ.Σπον=Πρακτικά Τον Β' (etc.) Διεθνους Συνεδριον Πελοποννησιακν Σπονδ 2nd symp. *Ship-Construction*= *Proceedings: 2nd International Symposium on Ship-Construction in Antiquity*.

And it should be noted that throughout this volume ancient dates are BC unless otherwise stated.

1

INTRODUCTION¹

P.J.Rhodes

The Greek *polis* has been arousing interest as a subject for study for a long time—the first edition of Fustel de Coulanges' book *La Cité antique* was published in 1864—but recent approaches have shown that it is a subject on which there are still important questions to be asked and worthwhile things to be said. In the conference held in Durham in 1995 our attention was centred on the development of the *polis* in the first few centuries of its existence.

Two of our chapters address questions of fundamental importance for this study. Mogens Hansen asks what the Greek *polis* was. As Director of the Copenhagen Polis Centre he is responsible for a comprehensive investigation into *the poleis* of Archaic and Classical Greece, and here he justifies his decision to base his investigation on the assumption that *poleis* were the communities which the Greeks themselves called *poleis*, rather than on a modern construct such as the 'autonomous city-state', whose properties were not possessed by all communities which the Greeks called *poleis*.

There are, as Hansen is well aware, problems with this approach. Language is often used not neutrally but polemically; language is often used imprecisely. Also, our evidence is far from complete: the fact that a community is labelled *polis* in one text which happens to survive does not guarantee that it will regularly have been labelled *polis* in other texts, even of the same period, which happen not to have survived. It will not be surprising, then, if the concept of the *polis* which we can infer from the use of the word turns out to be fuzzy at the edges, if some communities are attested with the *label* *polis* which seem no more deserving of the term than others which are not. But that is, literally, a marginal problem, and in most cases we do not have serious doubts whether to call a community a *polis* or not.

When we study the Greek *polis* as historians, we have in fact to study a range of citizen communities of which the *polis* was the typical but not the only embodiment: *some poleis* had subsidiary communities within them (like the demes of Athens) or dependent on them (as Mycalessus was probably dependent on Tanagra²); *poleis* could be combined, and could lose varying degrees of independence, in religious leagues (like the Delphic amphictyony) or in alliances (like the Peloponnesian or the Delian League) or in federal states (like Boeotia); in some regions of Greece (like Thessaly to the late fifth century) *poleis* were not important constituents of the region's organisation.³ We should indeed study the *polis*, but we should study it not as an isolated phenomenon but in context; and the work of the Polis Centre will provide us with an excellent body of material on which to base that study.

The importance of context is stressed by John Davies, who asks on another plane how we ought to study the Greek *polis*. When we study the *polis*, he insists, we need to study all the forms of the Greek 'microstate'; and we need to look at the development of similar communities, about the same time, in other parts of the Mediterranean world. Our generation of scholarship is more willing than some previous generations to acknowledge that the Greeks borrowed from their neighbours in other respects, and we should not rule out the possibility that they did so in the organisation of communities. Nor should we exaggerate the uniqueness of the Greek contribution: this volume ends with a chapter by Christopher Smith, who argues that an urban organisation developed in central Italy about the same time as in Greece, as a response to similar problems and similar opportunities.

Davies points us to important approaches which have been opened up by recent scholarship. Archaeology has been emancipated from art history, and can now contribute to our understanding of how the Greek communities developed. Religion has been rescued from its isolation, and the religious arrangements which they made can now be used to throw light on the structuring of these communities. The study of tribes, phratries and the other units through which the citizens of the communities were organised has been liberated from an antiquarian view which saw the units as survivals from an earlier age, and we can now see them as entities with a function to fulfil in the communities in which they are attested. Fruitful questions are being asked about what it meant to be a citizen of a Greek state.

As the Dark Age which followed the Mycenaean has become less dark, the picture of a total collapse from which the Greeks had to make a totally fresh start has been confirmed for some regions but has had to be modified for others. However, it remains generally true that in the Archaic period the Greek communities grew in size from a small basis, and this growth is likely to have affected the ways in which the communities developed. While Snodgrass's arguments for dramatic growth in Attica in the eighth century were vulnerable (as he himself has acknowledged),⁴ a good general case has been made out by

Sallares for an increase, steep at first, from a small beginning at the end of the Dark Age to a peak in the fourth century.⁵ Several contributors to this volume take account of a growth in population in the Greek world, and Christopher Smith points to a comparable growth in central Italy in the same period. Lin Foxhall, however, rejects the picture of increasing hardship which is often seen as a concomitant of that, and argues that, on the whole, the Archaic period was one of rising prosperity, and that the land of Greece was not seriously under pressure until the fifth or the fourth century, when Sallares believes the population was reaching its maximum—but of course the fact that a later generation regards its own situation as desperate and envies earlier generations does not rule out the possibility that an earlier generation may in its time have regarded its own situation as desperate.

Some of our chapters address issues which are common to many *poleis* of the Archaic period. Walter Donlan and Kurt Raaflaub both envisage communities with comparatively few high-ranking members and comparatively few low-ranking, and the majority in the middle—an egg-shaped model, as opposed to the pyramid-shaped model that has been used, e.g., by Forrest.⁶ They suggest that the men at the top were the first to take advantage of the rise in prosperity, but before long that became intolerable to the majority, who brought the leaders under control again and restored the balance of the community. Raaflaub in studying the part played by hoplite warriors in their states joins those who reject the concept of a ‘hoplite revolution’, but shows how the evolution of what we regard as the standard form of hoplite warfare was one aspect of a many-sided development in which we should look for complementary changes on different fronts rather than separate causes and effects. Consistent with that approach is John Salmon’s treatment of the tyrants who ruled for a time in many *poleis*. They emerged from feuding within the aristocracy, but by the weakening of the aristocrats which resulted from their rule, and by their provision of public buildings, public institutions and a sense of civic cohesiveness, they prepared the way for the more democratic regimes which were to follow.

Another development to be found in many *poleis* of the Archaic period was the production of written codes of law. Robin Osborne rescues us from the notion that particular lawgivers simply provided particular cities with a few quaint regulations of the kind that aroused the curiosity of later Greeks, and shows that we can ‘join up the dots’ to produce an intelligible picture of the similar legal developments which took place in different cities in response to similar circumstances.

Several of our chapters are concerned with the two most-studied *poleis*, Sparta and Athens. Stephen Hodkinson has done much in his publications to save the study of Sparta from serious anachronisms. Here he warns us that even in the fifth century the Spartans were reinventing their past as they confronted new problems; much of the apparently antique detail which used to be seen as surviving from early Sparta is not early at all, and the early Sparta to which he directs us is much more credible, at home in the Archaic period if not in every respect typical of it, than the theme park in which scholars used to believe.

Three writers on Athens look at different aspects of the work of Solon. Edward Harris challenges us to interpret the claims which Solon makes in his poetry in the light of contemporary poetry rather than later historical reconstruction. He argues that uprooting the *horoi* is not the literal removal of boundary markers but a metaphor for the elimination of *stasis*; and the *hektemoroi* are to be regarded neither as debt-bondsmen nor as serfs but as men making a payment to local lords who were powerful enough to protect them if they did pay or to harass them if they did not.

Lin Foxhall seeks to place Solon in his context as a member of the Athenian elite, concerned primarily with the problems of the elite and the would-be elite. She argues that the main cause of discontent in Athens in his time was not poverty and growing pressure on a limited supply of land but the dependent state of the *hektemoroi* and limited access to the ownership of land which was essential for full membership of the community. Interpreters of the four property classes have regularly assumed that the *zeugitai* were hoplites and the *thetes* were men too poor to fight as hoplites, but she calculates that even the *zeugitai*, if they were owners of land yielding 200 *medimnoi* of produce, must have been not comfortable peasant farmers but distinctly rich men, and, if the line between *zeugitai* and *thetes* was the line between hoplites and non-hoplites, the hoplites of Archaic Athens must have been limited to an upper stratum of rich men. It is not just a modern assumption that *zeugitai* were hoplites and *thetes* were not;⁷ but we may have to conclude that the qualifications of 300 *medimnoi* stated for *hippeis* and 200 for *zeugitai* (e.g. *Ath. Pol.* 7.4) are not authentic Solonian qualifications and that we cannot tell how, if at all, Solon defined the boundaries of the second and third classes. What is undeniable is that Solon was sufficiently interested in the elite to distinguish from the class of *hippeis* a super-rich class of *pentakosiomedimnoi*.

Lynette Mitchell likewise focuses on Solon’s concern with the elite. She calls on us to look again at his poetry, and to reject the assumption that because Solon liberated the *hektemoroi* and gave political rights to rich non-eupatrids he must be viewed as a reformer on all fronts: he not only thought that the *demos* ought still to follow its leaders but, like Theognis, he tried to preserve the traditional understanding of *arete* and did not believe that wealth made a man *agathos*.

George Robertson also starts from the poets’ views of *arete*. He shows that, whereas public elegy adopted the corporate ethos of the *polis* and emphasised the public cause for which hoplite warriors fought together, private epitaphs conspicuously failed to incorporate that public motif and celebrated the heroism rather than the patriotism of the deceased warriors. He makes the interesting discovery that the virtue *sophrosyne* is overwhelmingly Athenian in its appearances in inscribed epigrams of the

Archaic period, but in the Classical period, when it came to be perceived as a virtue of an oligarchic kind, it disappeared from the Athenian repertoire.

Emma Stafford bridges the gap between poetry and archaeology in her study of Themis ('Right'). Already personified in the poetry of Homer and Hesiod, in the fifth century Themis was being worshipped at Delphi and received a temple at Rhamnous; and she came to be associated with Gaia ('Earth') as Gaia increasingly acquired political connotations.

A good deal of attention has been devoted recently to *polis* sanctuaries, thanks in particular to the work of de Polignac.⁸ Catherine Morgan in her contribution to our volume looks at some examples of sanctuaries which belonged not to *poleis* but to non-*polis*-based *ethne*. Warning us against over-simplification, she shows that there was not a single pattern for a community's involvement with its sanctuaries throughout the world of the Greek *ethne*; and, indeed, that there was not one pattern for the *ethne* and another for the *poleis*.

Our last two chapters take us beyond the Greek mainland. John-Paul Wilson, like other contributors, cautions us against importing into the Archaic period the interpretations of later texts, and urges that the later dichotomy between an *emporion* and a fully-fledged *apoikia* has not yet hardened even in Herodotus, and is inappropriate to the earliest Greek settlements overseas. Christopher Smith brings us back to the warning of John Davies against studying the Greek *poleis* without regard for their neighbours, and, in suggesting that in Greece and in central Italy we can see similar responses to similar circumstances, he compares the new articulation of the Roman citizen body and territory attributed to Servius Tullius with the new articulation of Athens and Attica introduced by Cleisthenes.

Much of our textual evidence for the Archaic period was written in the fifth century or later. A theme common to many of our chapters is the need to explain the history of and the texts written in the Archaic period in terms of that period, and to avoid not only the distortion arising from our own assumptions but also that arising from the assumptions of later periods of antiquity.⁹ Thus we have to guard against what had become the standard view by the fourth century, that tyrants were inevitably cruel and despotic rulers, and against the assumption that the oddities preserved in the biographical tradition about the lawgivers are typical of their work, and not just marginal to their concern with more central problems. Our chapters concerned with Sparta and Athens show the same concern to avoid the distortions of later interpretation: Sparta was reinterpreting its past as early as the fifth century; Solon's claims do not necessarily mean what Classical writers thought they meant, and the qualifications attributed to him for the second and third property classes may be the product of later guesswork. When we turn to colonisation, we find that the notions of *emporion* and *apoikia* developed during the Classical period are not helpful as categories to be imposed on the overseas settlements of the Archaic period.

Another warning to be found in several of our chapters is against misleading simplifications which force the facts to fit a convenient model, for instance that there is one pattern of religious behaviour that is typical of *poleis* and another that is typical of *ethne*; and especially against the temptation to isolate elements of a single complex process and separate them into cause and effect, whether to say that hoplites create tyrants or that tyrants create hoplites.

But we do not need to despair in the face of these warnings: the development of the Greek *polis* is a phenomenon which is worth studying and which can profitably be studied. If we are sufficiently alert to the dangers presented by our own assumptions and our sources' assumptions, we can build up a picture which is not complete and not always certain but is sufficiently extensive and has a sufficient degree of probability. Fruitful generalisations can be made: particular places had their local peculiarities, and not only in the more idiosyncratic pronouncements of their lawgivers—Archaic Sparta was unusual in certain respects, though by no means as eccentric as used once to be believed—but, of course, in a limited area, inhabited by people who spoke versions of the same language and had opportunities for contact with one another, often the challenges and problems were similar and the responses to them were similar too.

Urban society developed in other places, as well as in Greece, when there were sufficient concentrations of population and sufficient levels of prosperity. To end this Introduction I should like to suggest that what still seems to be distinctive of Greece is the early development (and not only in the *poleis*) of a sense of community (*demos*, as applied to the whole and not just to the unprivileged section) and the common interest (*to demosion*), and of a belief that matters which affect the whole of the *demos* are the concern of the whole of the *demos* and should involve the whole of the *demos*.¹⁰ This emerges from several of the points which are mentioned briefly above and treated in more detail in the chapters that follow.

If there were once kings in the Greek communities,¹¹ they were soon set aside by a body of leading men who regarded themselves as aristocrats and who shared power amongst themselves. As the communities developed, there was an increase in the number of men who owned land and who fought for their community, and who claimed recognition in it. In some places the outcome of this tension was the seizure of power by a tyrant, whose rule weakened the aristocrats, and whose exercise of power and glorification of the community in which his power was exercised strengthened the fellow-feeling among the members of the community. In Sparta a minority of the population, but a large minority, was defined as the *demos*, with specified rights and duties. In Athens a body of men who in some sense had been dependants was liberated, and again the *demos* was defined, but this time in strata, with different rights and duties for the different strata. Laws were no longer entrusted to the memories of the leading families, but were brought into the public domain. Sometimes special lawgivers were appointed to formulate the laws, but our earliest surviving inscribed law, from Dreris in Crete in the seventh century, already uses the formula 'Thus

it pleased the *polis*' (*ἀδ' ἑφαδε πόλι*); the Great Rhetra in Sparta provided a decision-making procedure in which the *demos* had a decisive part to play; and Solon in Athens, himself a special lawgiver, insisted that he had enacted laws for *kakos* and *agathos* alike.¹²

These growing-strains are reflected in the poetry of the Archaic period. Tyrtaeus emphasised the common solidarity of the hoplite warriors and the common cause for which they fought, but epitaphs of individual warriors focus on their individual heroism. Theognis expressed horror at the men who claim to be as excellent as those with a traditional claim to excellence, and Solon, though he was prepared to give an improved position in the community to those who lacked that traditional claim, did not think that excellence could be acquired along with wealth and political standing. Religion, as we are frequently reminded, was not a matter of private belief and devotion but was embedded in the life of the community: the gods were the community's gods; the sanctuaries and their officials were the community's sanctuaries and officials; principles underpinning the community, like Justice and Right, were personified in poetry from the beginning, and by the Classical period were recognised as deities to whom sanctuaries could be dedicated.

Recently modern scholars have identified Cleisthenes' reorganisation of the citizen body in Athens as the crucial point on the path to democracy, and have used that as an excuse for celebrating 2,500 years of democracy. Full belief in and commitment to democracy, I believe, came in the time of Ephialtes, half a century later;¹³ but that belief and commitment could only have been achieved in a world in which the consciousness of *to demosion* was already well established, and it is not only the principle of democracy but also the underlying notion of *to demosion* which we owe to the Greek *poleis*.

NOTES

- 1 This Introduction has been revised from the Summary which I gave at the end of the Durham conference.
- 2 It is not among the *poleis* listed in *Hell Oxy.* 19.3 Chambers as represented in the Boeotian federation; but as Hansen points out (in Hansen [ed.] *Sources for the Ancient Greek City-State*, 18–21), it did have a mint of its own. Hansen discusses Mycalessus on pp. 9–10 below.
- 3 See Rhodes, in Hansen (ed.) *The Ancient Greek City-State*, 161–82; Hansen, *op. cit.* (n. 1), 91–112; Hansen, in Hansen and Raafaub (eds) *Studies in the Ancient Greek Polis*, 21–43, and (on *komai*) 45–81.
- 4 Snodgrass, *Archaeology and the Rise of the Greek State*, 10–18; countered by Morris, *Burial and Ancient Society*, especially 72–96, which was accepted by Snodgrass, in Rich and Wallace-Hadrill (eds) *City and Country in the Ancient World*, 14–16.
- 5 *The Ecology of the Ancient Greek World*, especially 86–90, 122–6.
- 6 *The Emergence of Greek Democracy*, 48–9, not directly addressing the question of numbers.
- 7 See, for instance, Thuc. 6.43.
- 8 *La Naissance de la cité grecque*, translated as *Cults, Territory and the Origins of the Greek City-State*.
- 9 As Christopher Smith acknowledges in his chapter, historians of early Rome have a comparable problem, with the added dimension that Roman writers may have reinterpreted their past in the light of what they knew or believed about the Greek past.
- 10 Cf. the reference to the 'common thing' by Davies, pp. 29–30 below.
- 11 It has been argued that there were no kings by Drews, *Basileus*, but his argument depends partly on his setting a standard of kingliness which is inappropriate for Greece at the end of the Dark Age: see my review, *Phoenix* 38 (1984), 180–2.
- 12 Drerus: Meiggs and Lewis, 2; Sparta: Plut. Lyc. 6; Athens: Solon, fr. 38.18–20 West *ap. Ath. Pol.* 12.4.
- 13 See, for example, Rhodes, in *C.A.H.*, 2nd edition, v. 73–4, 87–95.

THE COPENHAGEN INVENTORY OF *POLEIS* AND THE *LEX HAFNIENSIS DE CIVITATE*¹

Mogens Herman Hansen

In 1993 the Danish National Research Foundation set up at Copenhagen University a small research centre devoted to the study of the *polis* in ancient Greece. One of the main objectives of the Copenhagen Polis Centre is to build up an inventory of every single Archaic and Classical settlement which is explicitly called *polis* in contemporary sources. The main purpose of this investigation is to find out what the Greeks thought a *polis* was, and to compare that with what modern historians think a *polis* is.² The concept *polis* found in the sources and in modern historiography ought, of course, to be the same. But that is far from always the case. Let me adduce just two examples. The orthodoxy is that the small Boiotian town Mykalessos was *not* a *polis*; it was rather a *kome*. This is indeed the term used by Strabo, whose classification is cited in, for example, Pauly-Wissowa s.v. Mykalessos, and again in the *Princeton Encyclopedia of Classical Sites*.³ What is passed over in silence in both these articles and in most other studies of the history of Boiotia is that Mykalessos is called a *polis* by Thucydides, not just once, but three times in a passage where he uses *polis* both in the urban and in the political sense of the word.⁴ Similarly, it is commonly believed that a klerouchy was *not* a *polis*.⁵ Nevertheless, the Athenian klerouchies are repeatedly classified as being *poleis* both in literary texts and in inscriptions.⁶

Scores of other examples could be adduced but it would serve no purpose to list them here. In such cases the modern historian's reaction has normally been to admit that these settlements may well be *called poleis* in our sources, but then to imply or to state explicitly that they were not *poleis* in the true sense.⁷ The curious result of such a policy is the view that our sources often apply the term *polis* to a settlement that, according to modern orthodoxy, was not a *polis*. We are faced with a *polis* that was *not* a *polis*.

The contradiction has its root in the fact that modern historians who write about ancient Greece like to use the term *polis* synonymously with the term city-state.⁸ But city-state is a modern historical term which seems to have been coined in the mid-nineteenth century and first applied to the Roman republican concept of *civitas*,⁹ from where it was rapidly transferred not only to studies of the Greek *polis*¹⁰ but also to investigations of Italian city-states from c. 1100 onwards,¹¹ of medieval German *Reichsstädte*, of Sumerian, Phoenician and Etruscan cities and of other city-state cultures as well.¹² Thus, modern historical discussions of the concept of the city-state combine characteristics borrowed from many different cultures,¹³ and therefore the concept of city-state is not necessarily coextensive with the concept of *polis*. Mykalessos may well have been a *polis* in the eyes of the Greeks, although it is not a city-state in the eyes of a modern historian.

In order to avoid paradoxical statements of the type that a certain settlement though called a *polis* was not a *polis*, I suggest that the two terms *polis* and city-state should be kept apart and not used indiscriminately. The term *polis* should be restricted to the Greeks' own understanding of what a *polis* was, whereas the term city-state should be used only when we discuss modern historical analyses of ancient Greek society.

Consequently, instead of saying that Mykalessos, though called a *polis*, was not a *polis* in the true sense, the historian ought to say that Mykalessos, though apparently a *polis* in the age of Thucydides, was not a city-state. In this form the statement makes sense. Whether it is historically true is a different matter. Whenever the city-state is discussed, independence or *autonomia* is singled out as the most important defining characteristic.¹⁴ But a great number of communities, called *polis* in our sources were *not* independent and did not enjoy *autonomia*.¹⁵ Thus Mykalessos was a dependency of Tanagra;¹⁶ the Greeks thought it was a *polis*, but according to modern orthodoxy its lack of independence or *autonomia* indicates that it was not a city-state.

If we establish and acknowledge a distinction between the ancient concept of *polis* and the modern historical concept of city-state, it follows that we can conduct two different investigations of ancient Greek society which may lead to different conclusions. If we study the city-state and apply the modern historians' understanding of what a city-state is, we get one picture of Archaic and Classical Hellas. If we go through the written sources and list all settlements that are actually called *poleis* in contemporary texts we investigate the ancient Greeks' understanding of their own settlement pattern and get a different picture.

It would be wrong to say that one of the two pictures is the right one and that the other is misleading; rather, the two pictures are complementary. It is always legitimate to contrast a culture's perception of itself with an outsider's more detached perception of the same culture.

At the Copenhagen Polis Centre we want to know how the Greeks perceived their own settlement pattern, and therefore our investigation must be based, first of all, on a careful examination of the terminology used and the site-classifications found in our sources. In this type of study it is necessary to describe and define the ancient concept of *the polis* before we begin to compare it with the modern concept of the city-state. So how do we do this? In all literary and epigraphical sources of the Archaic and Classical periods we collect every attestation of the term *polis* in order to conduct two different investigations.

One of our tasks is to examine how the term *polis* is used whenever we meet it. Our sources tell us, for example, that a *polis* waged war, or made peace, or entered into an alliance, or struck coins, or passed a law, or a sentence, or founded a colony, or defrayed expenses, or repaired the walls; and we hear about the territory of a *polis*, or its roads and water supply, or its altars, or its protecting divinity.¹⁷

The other task is to examine every single attestation of the term *polis* referring to a named *polis* such as Korinth, or Melos, or Megalopolis.

In the first investigation we must analyse all the passages we have listed, no matter whether they concern a named *polis* or refer to a *polis* or *the polis* in general; and for this investigation a specific law passed by the *polis* Dreros is just as valuable a source as is a general reference in Aristotle that it is the *polis* which is responsible for passing laws.¹⁸ Conducting the second investigation we must, of course, restrict ourselves to the attestations which contain an explicit reference to a named *polis* and ignore all the passages referring to the *polis* in general.

These two different investigations relate to a very simple, but very important distinction, acknowledged in linguistics and philosophy and applied in that branch of logic which is devoted to the definition and classification of concepts. The meaning of a term is one thing; that which is denoted by a term because it has a certain meaning is another. In linguistics this distinction is sometimes referred to as the distinction between connotation and denotation; in modern logic the two terms used are the intension of a term (that is, its meaning) and the extension of a term (that is, the totality of objects to which the term refers).

For example: the *connotation* (or meaning) of the term 'state' is something like 'a geographically delimited segment of human society united by common obedience to a single sovereign',¹⁹ but the term 'state' *denotes* any existing state, such as Greece, Denmark, Russia or Australia.

The *intension* of the term 'state' is the sum total of all the properties that must be possessed by a community in order to be called a state; the *extension* of the term 'state' is constituted by the total number of existing states.²⁰ If we concentrate on the *connotation* or *intension* of a term we can determine its meaning by listing the essential characteristics which the term connotes, and then afterwards establish a list of the objects which fulfil the requirements of our definition.

If we concentrate on the *denotation* or *extension* of a term we shall do it the other way round: we begin by enumerating all the *denotata*, i.e. all objects to which the term is applied. Next, we look for the essential characteristics which these objects have in common, and finally we establish the meaning of the term by assembling the common characteristics we have found in order to build up a picture of the concept behind the term.

After this digression I will return to my topic and ask the question: what is a *polisi*? Let me subdivide the main question into three questions: do we want to examine the term itself? Or the concept behind the term? Or the objects denoted by the term?

The term. An analysis of the term is principally a linguistic investigation and in a study of ancient Greek history it is relevant only in so far as it can shed light on the meaning and uses of the term. By studying the etymology of the word *polis*, for example, we learn that it is related to Old Indian *púr*, Lithuanian *pilis* and Latvian *pils*, and that these three words originally meant stronghold.²¹ Consequently, the original meaning of *polis* must have been stronghold, and in this sense it may perhaps have been used for the fortified sites in Crete in the tenth century at, for example, Dreros and Anavlochos.²²

The concept. A historian studies a term not for its own sake but in order to grasp the concept behind the term, to determine its essence, to find all the essential characteristics that go with it and transform these criteria into a description or even a definition of the concept. In doing all this the historian is faced with the problem that he has to apply modern terms and concepts in his description both of the ancient societies themselves and of the concepts used by the ancients themselves to describe them. Sometimes the historian prefers in his analysis to use modern terms, such as 'state' or 'settlement' or 'town' or 'village'; but sometimes the historian takes over an ancient term found in the sources and uses it in transliterated form. As pointed out above, *polis* is precisely such a term, and accordingly we cannot conduct our investigation of the term *polis* before we have decided whether we want to study the ancient concept of *polis* as found in our sources or the modern concept of *polis* as we meet it in the nineteenth- and twentieth-century accounts of the history of ancient Greece, where the word *polis* is frequently used synonymously with the modern term city-state.

The objects. The third type of investigation is to focus on the *denotata* and analyse the communities or settlements referred to by the word *polis*. Such a study is not necessarily bound up with a study of the term itself to the same extent as is an

investigation of the concept. It is a commonplace, but nevertheless true, that language is the medium in which concepts are expressed and words are the principal traces which ancient concepts have left behind for the modern historian to study. Symbols expressed in painting or sculpture or architecture, etc. are important accessories, but to conduct an investigation of an ancient concept without focusing first on the words used to express it would be a nonsense.

On the other hand, the *objects* to which a term refers leave many other traces than the term itself. If we focus on the objects rather than on the concept, an examination of the terms used about the objects may be relegated to the background, and that is in fact what has happened in recent studies of ancient Greek society. Inspired by the growing number of archaeological surveys of the Greek landscape, the focus of interest has shifted from the written to the archaeological sources, and from the towns to the countryside. The result has been a rapidly increasing number of what can be called settlement pattern studies. Here the historian starts with the settlement pattern of a landscape, so far as it can be ascertained for macro-periods (Archaic, Classical, Hellenistic, Roman, Late Roman), then the investigation is focused on the actual pattern of the social, economic and political structure of the landscape and its settlements, and only then does the historian start looking at the names given to the various types of settlement and the terms used to describe them.²³ In such an investigation it does not matter very much how the Greeks classified the different types of settlement, and what they themselves thought of their settlement pattern comes second to the study of the settlement pattern itself.²⁴

Prominent examples of such an approach are John Fossey's studies of Boiotia, Lokris and Phokis. Or the Cherry—Davis—Mantzourani investigation of northern Keos. Or Carter's studies of Metapontion.²⁵ And a survey for the general reader, covering the whole of Hellas, is given by Robin Osborne in his *Classical Landscape with Figures*. In this study the settlements under discussion are called either 'cities' or 'towns' or 'villages' (11). A discussion of the Greek terminology as applied to each individual settlement is eschewed. Admittedly, Osborne states in his preface that he will use the English term 'city' synonymously with the Greek term *polis* in its political sense (ibid.). Nevertheless, he sometimes uses the term 'village' about a settlement that, in a contemporary source, is unquestionably called a *polis* in the political sense.²⁶ Such inconsistencies, however, do not necessarily subtract from the value of his book, since the Greek terminology and the Greeks' understanding of their own environment are issues intentionally left out of consideration in this type of study.²⁷

Although such investigations are extremely valuable in their own right they are not designed to answer the question: what is a *polis*? This is nevertheless still an important question, although to some extent it seems to have become a neglected one. That is why we have set up the Copenhagen Polis Centre with the explicit aim of answering that question or at least to shed light on some important aspects of it.

First we collect all attestations of the term *polis* in Archaic and Classical sources in order to analyse and list how the term is used in every single case, i.e. that a *polis* wages war, or strikes coins, or passes a law, or has its walls repaired, or sets up a cult for a protecting divinity, etc. After this first investigation which focuses on the intension of the term we move to the extension and try to build up an inventory of all attested *poleis*.

In our collection of all attestations of the term *polis* we now discard all the instances of the word *polis* being used in a general way without reference to any named *polis*, and in our second investigation we focus exclusively on attestations of the term *polis* being linked to a named locality such as Korinth, or Megalopolis, or Thasos, or Kyrene. Next, for every single locality that is called *polis* in a contemporary source we then attempt to have forty-five other questions answered, e.g. did the *polis* in question possess an *agora* or a *bouleuterion* or a *prytaneion*? Do we know about victors in one of the Panhellenic games coming from this particular *polis*? Did it have a mint? Was its urban centre protected by a circuit of walls? Do we know about citizenship decrees passed by the *polis*? Was the name of the *polis* used in personal names after the patronymic as a kind of city-ethnic, e.g. *Korinthios* or *Thebaios*, or is a citizen of this *polis* designated by e.g. a demotic instead of a city-ethnic? The forty-five questions we ask have, of course, been generated by the first investigation in which we examined the various properties and activities typically connected with the concept of *polis*. When, for example, we ask for a *bouleuterion* it is because we know from our sources that a *boule* and its *bouleuterion* were a characteristic of a *polis* but not to be found in a *deme* or in a *kome*.²⁸

Every attested *polis* is included in our inventory and classified as a *polis* type A. Next we collect information about localities which are *not* actually called *polis* in any contemporary source, but are known for a number of the activities we examined in our first investigation, for example, the community in question may have had an *agora* or a *bouleuterion* or a *prytaneion*; its citizens may have been known as victors in the Panhellenic games; or it may have possessed a mint. Its urban centre may have been protected by a circuit of walls, and a citizenship decree passed by the assembly may be preserved or referred to in a literary source.

If such a community shared a number of properties with the communities actually called *polis*, the presumption is that it was in fact considered a *polis* by the Greeks, and that it is only because of the fragmentary state of our sources that it is not attested directly as a *polis* in a contemporary inscription or in a piece of literature. All such communities are now added to our inventory, but classified as *poleis* type B and C. We choose between B and C according to how certain or uncertain we are that it is only due to lack of sources that the community in question is not actually recorded as a *polis*. We note, of course, if such a community is called *polis* in a later source, especially if the source is retrospective.

Thus our principal criterion for inclusion and classification is the requirement that a locality is called a *polis* in at least one contemporary source, that is, in Archaic and Classical sources down to the death of Alexander the Great in 323. By adopting this method we are faced with a number of methodological problems.

- 1 To what extent was *polis* a loaded term and consequently subject to manipulation?
- 2 To what extent are our sources consistent in their terminology?
- 3 To what extent did the word *polis* denote the same concept in the seventh and again in the fourth century?
- 4 To what extent will the mass of Athenian evidence result in an inventory of *poleis* which reflects the idea of a *polis* in Classical Athens but obscures the complexity of the concept as used in the rest of the Greek world?
- 5 To what extent is our investigation thwarted by the fact that the word *polis* is used not just in one sense but has four different meanings?

Questions 1–4 have been treated in my longer and more detailed account of the inventory of *poleis*,²⁹ and I will devote the rest of this chapter to a discussion of question 5.

The most serious problem we have to face is that the term *polis* has more than one meaning. In fact, it seems to have had four, since it is found in the senses of (1) stronghold, (2) town, (3) country and (4) state. When used synonymously with *akropolis* the term *polis* denotes a stronghold and/or a small hill-top settlement.³⁰ When used synonymously with *asty* the term *polis* denotes an urban centre.³¹ When used synonymously with *ge* or *chora* the term *polis* denotes the totality of town plus hinterland,³² and when used synonymously with a *koinonia* or a *plethos politon* the term *polis* denotes what we today call a city-state.³³

Now, recording every single attestation of the word *polis* found in Archaic and Classical documents and literature must, accordingly, result in an inventory of *poleis* which comprises not only city-states, but also strongholds, towns, and countries. Under such circumstances an inventory of all localities called *polis* is apparently doomed to be a hotchpotch of settlements and of no value whatsoever. In the Polis Centre, however, we think that this problem is much less serious than it appears, and this optimistic view is based on the following observations.

Let me first mention the relative frequency with which the four different senses occur. In Archaic and Classical authors and inscriptions attestations of *polis* in the sense of stronghold amount to less than one per hundred of all attestations, and attestations of *polis* where country is the principal sense or a secondary meaning that goes with the sense of town and/or state amount to less than two per hundred only. In the remaining c. 98 per cent of the attestations *polis* is used either in the sense of town or in the sense of (city)state, or the two senses are combined and indistinguishable. Again, in some authors, such as Herodotos and Aeneas Tacticus, the urban sense is much more common than the political, whereas in Thucydides and Xenophon the sense of political community is about twice as common as the sense of urban centre. In inscriptions the political sense dominates and there are few attestations only of *polis* in the sense of town. Let me offer a brief discussion of the different meanings.

Polis used synonymously with *akropolis* in the sense of stronghold is not only extremely rare, it is also confined to fixed formulas almost exclusively found in public documents, such as the provision that a certain document be inscribed and set up on the *polis*, that is, on the *akropolis*, for everybody to inspect.³⁴ Consequently, it is easy to spot and identify the very few attestations of a locality being called *polis* in the sense of stronghold or small hill-top settlement, and even if we include such sources for the sake of completeness, we shall find only a handful of localities which are called *polis* in the sense of *akropolis* without being a *polis* in the political sense. One such example is the Attic deme Erchia, whose sacrificial calendar has several references to the *polis*, that is, the *akropolis* of the deme, to be distinguished from the *polis* of the *asty*, that is, the *akropolis* of all Athenians in Athens.³⁵

In a number of passages ‘country’ or ‘territory’ is either the principal meaning of the word *polis* or at least a secondary meaning where the principal meaning is either ‘state’ or ‘town’ or both.³⁶ But whenever *polis* occurs in the sense of territory, there is no doubt that the reference is to the territory of a *polis* in the political sense. We have, for example, references to a law or a verdict prescribing that a person be exiled from a named *polis*, or that the corpse of an executed criminal be thrown over the border of the *polis*. In such passages *polis* must denote both the town and its hinterland, but obviously the reference is to the territory of a *polis* in the sense of ‘state’. Consequently, we do not muddle up our inventory of attested *poleis* if we classify such communities as *polis* type A. One of the few exceptions to this observation is the passage in Lys. 6.6 in which Italy, Cyprus and other regions are all called *poleis*.

We are left with two different meanings of the word, namely, first, *polis* in the sense of town denoting an urban centre and, second, *polis* in the sense of political community denoting what we today call a city-state. When constructing our inventory of *poleis* in the Copenhagen Polis Centre we have to face two questions: first, is it possible in our sources to distinguish between *polis* used in the sense of town and *polis* used in the sense of state? and second, what happens if we simply record all attestations of the term *polis* irrespective of whether it means town or state?

Sometimes it is very easy to determine whether an author uses *polis* in the sense of town or state. See for example the following passage from Aeneas Tacticus in which the sense of town and the sense of state, both easily recognizable, appear only two lines apart: ἐτι δέ συνεβούλευε και τό πλήθος τών την πόλιν φυλασσόντων ἀπόμισθον ποιήσαι, ἣν ὡς ἐλάχιστον δηθεν ἀνάλωμα τῇ πόλει ἢ (Aen. Tact. 11.4).³⁷ Here those who guard the town (*polis*) and its walls are juxtaposed with the state (*polis*) providing their pay. But in many other cases it is simply impossible to know which of the two senses an author has in mind, and in such cases the correct answer is that he probably uses the term in both senses without distinguishing one from the other, so that it is simply pointless to try to establish a distinction. When, for example, Herodotos lists the six *poleis* on Athos, it is impossible to decide whether the six names he mentions denote towns or states:

ἐν δέ τῳ ἰσθμῳ τούτῳ, ἐξ τόν τελευτᾶ ὁ Ἀθῶς, Σάνη πόλις Ἑλλάς οἰκεται, αἱ δε εκτός Σάνης, εσω δέ τού Αθῶ οἰκημέναι, τάς τότε ὁ Πέρσης νησιώτιδας ἀντί ἡπειρωτίδων ὄρμηο ποιέειν, εἰσι αἶδε Δίον, Ολόφυξος, Ακρόθων, Θύσσος, Κλεωναί. πόλιες μεν αὐται αἱ τὸν Ἀθον νέμονται.

(Her. 7.22.3).³⁸

Here the word *polis* is probably intended to convey both meanings simultaneously.

One important reason for this ambiguity in the meaning of the term is that in almost all *poleis* the name of the town was the same as the name of the state. In modern Europe there is only one example of the name of a state being identical with the name of the state's principal city, namely Luxembourg. But in ancient Hellas, as we all know, this applied to nearly every *polis*. The toponym *Korinthos*, for example, can denote both the town Korinth and the Korinthian state,³⁹ and the ethnic *hoi Korinthioi* is used to denote both the inhabitants of the town Korinth and the Korinthian citizens. So, when Xenophon, for example, tells us that the Korinthians feared that their *polis* was being betrayed, it is impossible to know whether their concern was for the town Korinth or the entire Korinthian state.⁴⁰

In the case of Korinth this ambiguity does not confuse us because, even admitting that *polis* is used ambiguously in such a passage, we know from innumerable other sources that Korinth was a *polis* in the political sense as well as in the urban sense. Consequently it appears in our inventory as a *polis* type A. But what about all the *poleis* which are attested as *polis* in one passage only? If in this case we are in doubt whether the reference is to the town or the state, are we then, in our list of attested *poleis*, to include or to exclude the *polis* in question?

On the face of it, this ambiguity in the meaning of the term *polis* in our sources seems to be a major threat to our whole investigation, but the difficulty in distinguishing between the sense of state and the sense of town does not make our investigation impossible: quite the contrary; it sheds light on an important aspect of the Greek *polis*.

A closer study of *polis* in the senses of town and state reveals that the term *polis* is not used to denote any town, but only a town that is also the urban centre of a *polis* in the sense of political community. The word *polis* has two different meanings, but its reference, its denotation, seems invariably to be what the Greeks called a *polis* in the sense of a *koinonia politon politeias*, and what we today call a city-state. Exceptions to this rule seem to amount to less than one per cent. So far the investigation has been completed for Herodotos,⁴¹ Thucydides,⁴² Xenophon⁴³ and Aeneas Tacticus, and is being conducted for the Attic orators and for Skylax. The results look very promising, and I shall report them here for the four historians.

Of 159 communities called *polis* in the urban sense in Herodotos 134 are attested either in Herodotos' own work or in some other source as *poleis* in the political sense as well. In twenty-three instances we have no contemporary information about the political status of the urban centre in question, and there are only two exceptions to the rule we have stated, namely the small settlements Anthela and Alpenos near Thermopylai, which are classified both as *poleis* and as *komai*.⁴⁴

In Thucydides seventy communities are called *polis* in the urban sense. In some five cases we are in doubt whether the community was a *polis* in the political sense as well, and there is only one attestation of a *polis* in the urban sense, which seems *not* to have been a *polis* in the political sense, namely Skandeia, the harbour of Kythera, the island south of Lakonia. Skandeia is called *polis* in the urban sense at 4.54.1 although Kythera was a *one-polis* island with the city of Kythera as its political centre.⁴⁵ But even here Thucydides' use of the term *polis* does not necessarily break the rule stated above. A distinction is made between 'the *polis* by the sea', ἡ ἐπὶ θαλάσση πόλις (4.54.1), and 'the upper *polis*', ἡ ἄνω πόλις (4.54.2), which indicates that Thucydides took both Skandeia and Kythera to be one half of a *polis*. So Skandeia can be viewed as a part of Kythera and not as a *polis* in its own right.⁴⁶

In Xenophon's *Hellenika* there is no detectable exception to our rule. In seventy-five out of eighty-six cases we can be fairly certain that a town called *polis* by Xenophon was a city-state as well, in the remaining eleven cases the result is a *non liquet*. But if we extend the investigation to cover the other Xenophontic treatises we find in the *Poroi* Xenophon's proposal to increase the number of mining slaves and to found a new *polis* in the mining district.⁴⁷ Here the word is undeniably used about an urban centre that was not the political centre of a *polis*. This is an exception to our rule, but it is the only one in the entire Xenophontic corpus.

In Aeneas Tacticus' work *polis* in the sense of town obviously prevails over *polis* used in the sense of state, whereas *polis* in the sense of territory is attested in a few passages only.⁴⁸ In most cases the term is used either generally about any town

under siege or the reference is to an unnamed town. But occasionally Aeneas' examples concern named *poleis*, and the towns to which he refers are the following:

Abdera	15.9; 15.10 (<i>bis</i>)
Apollonia (Pontos)	20.4
Argos	11.8 (<i>bis</i>); 17.2; 17.4 (<i>ter</i>)
Chalkis	4.1; 4.2; 4.4
Chios	11.4 (<i>bis</i>)
Himera	10.22
Ilion	24.12; 24.14
Klazomenai	28.5 (<i>ter</i>)
Megara	4.10
Plataiai	2.3 (<i>bis</i>)
Poteidaia	31.25
Sparta	2.2 (<i>bis</i>) (<i>polisma</i>)
Teos	18.13; 18.15; 18.19

The list is short—thirteen entries, that is all—but there is no denying the fact that all the towns called *poleis* by Aeneas were *poleis* in the political sense as well. Furthermore, in several of Aeneas' references to an unnamed *polis* he takes it for granted that the town he describes was also a political community.⁴⁹ Thus in Aeneas' treatise the term has several meanings, and is used most frequently in the sense of town, sometimes in the sense of state and occasionally in the sense of land or country; but the sites called *poleis* in the urban or territorial sense are all known to have been *poleis* in the political sense as well.

To conclude: as is well known, authors like Herodotos, Thucydides and Xenophon did not care much about technical terms. It is unlikely that they spent long hours making sure that in every case they had used the term *polis* in accordance with the rule stated above. In my opinion, their use of *polis* simply reflects the ordinary use of the word in Classical Greek.

Thus, I think that a generalisation is permitted, and let me sum up by stating what we in the Polis Centre propose to call the *lex Hafniensis de civitate*: in Archaic and Classical sources the term *polis* used in the sense of 'town' to denote a named urban centre is not applied to any urban centre but only to a town which was also the political centre of a *polis*. Thus the term has two different meanings, town and state, but even when it is used in the sense of town its reference, its denotation, seems almost invariably to be what the Greeks called *polis* in the sense of a *koinonia politon politeias* and what we call a city-state. The *lex Hafniensis* applies to Hellenic *poleis* only. The references to barbaric communities called *poleis* in the urban and/or in the political sense must, of course, be analysed separately. Whenever a term is transferred from one culture to describe a more or less similar phenomenon in other cultures it is unavoidably twisted, sometimes more, sometimes less according to how remote the other culture is. An obvious example is the term 'state' as applied, for example, by historians to describe ancient Greek *poleis* or by nineteenth-century politicians to describe contemporary African societies.

Consequently, in our inventory of Archaic and Classical *poleis* in the political sense of the term we can register as *poleis* type A not only localities explicitly called *polis* in the political sense but also all the localities explicitly called *polis* in the urban sense, but then implicitly in the political sense since we can infer from this usage that the town in question must have been a *polis* in the sense of state as well.

A further consequence of applying this law is the recognition that the concept of *polis* in the sense of town was much more closely connected with the concept of *polis* in the sense of state than many modern historians are inclined to believe. The prevailing orthodoxy is that there were citystates without an urban centre, or, to formulate the view in ancient terms, that there were *poleis* in the political sense which were not centred on a *polis* in the urban sense.⁵⁰ This orthodoxy is without support in our sources⁵¹ and, in my opinion, it ought to be rejected as unfounded, at least for the late Archaic and Classical periods. In the Copenhagen Polis Centre we expect every *polis* in the political sense to have had an urban centre, perhaps so small that a modern European would call it a village rather than a town; but in this context it is the existence of an urban centre, not its size that is important. Furthermore, we hope that in many cases it is possible to trace the physical remains of these urban centres. And by combining the archaeological evidence of urbanization with the written evidence about *polis* in the political sense we hope to revive the view that in ancient Greece the concept of state, or rather the concept of self-governing political community, was inseparably bound up with the concept of town. The traditional rendering of *polis*, namely 'city-state', is basically correct and not a misnomer as it has become rather fashionable to say. But that is a separate investigation to be developed in future studies.⁵²

NOTES

- 1 We have called it the *lex Hafniensis* on the assumption that the Latinized name of the Copenhagen Polis Centre would be *Institutum de Civitatibus Graecis Hafniense*.
- 2 Hansen, 'Poleis and City-States, 600–323 B.C.: A Comprehensive Research Programme', in Whitehead (ed.), *From Political Architecture to Stephanus Byzantius*, 14–15.
- 3 Strab. 404.9.2.11, 14; Fiehn, *RE* xvi.1 (1935), 1005; M.H.McAllister, in *Princeton Encyclopedia of Classical Sites*, 600–1.
- 4 Thuc. 7.29.3, 5; 7.30.2; see Hansen, in Hansen (ed.) *Sources for The Ancient Greek City-State*, 18–21.
- 5 See, for example, the thorough discussion of klerouchies in Graham, *Colony and Mother City in Ancient Greece*, 166–92; cf. also P.J.Rhodes, in Hansen, op. cit. (n. 4), 94–5.
- 6 *IG* i³ 285.107–10; Hyp. 2.18; Skylax, 57 and 66.
- 7 See, for example, P.J.Rhodes, in Hansen (ed.) *The Ancient Greek City-State.*, 163 (writing about the perioikic towns in Lakonia). Cf. also Rhodes' comments in Hansen, op. cit. (n.4), 91–2. Contrast E.Lévy, *Cahiers du Centre Glotz* 1 (1990), 53–67.
- 8 See, for example, Finley, *Economy and Society in Ancient Greece*, 4.
- 9 Hansen, in Whitehead, op. cit. (n.2), 19–22.
- 10 Gawantka, *Die sogenannte Polis*, 204–6.
- 11 Molho, Raaflaub and Emlen (eds) *City-States in Classical Antiquity and Medieval Italy*.
- 12 Griffith and Thomas, (eds) *The City-State in Five Cultures*. Cf. the list in Hansen, op. cit. (n.2), 10–11.
- 13 P.Burke, in Hall (ed.) *States in History*, 137–53.
- 14 Finley, op. cit. (n.8), 4–5: 'Aristotle...was writing about the autonomous city-state, the *polis* in Greek.... The ancient city was soon to lose its autonomy. The process began soon after Aristotle died.' Murray and Price (eds), *The Greek City from Homer to Alexander*, vii: 'Our focus has been the autonomous Greek city-state or *polis* from its origins in the "Dark Age" until the point at which it was transformed into a basis for world civilization by the conquests of Alexander the Great.' Osborne, *Classical Landscape with Figures*, 195: 'The essential mark of the Greek city is political independence.' (For city=*polis* see Osborne, p. 11.)
- 15 Hansen, in Hansen and Raaflaub (eds) *Studies in the Ancient Greek Polis*, 36. See also Burke, op. cit. (n.13), 137, 140, etc.
- 16 Hansen, op. cit. (n.4), 36–7.
- 17 A *polis* waged war (Meiggs and Lewis, 42.B.31–2, Argos); made peace (Tod, 145.5–6, Argos); entered into an alliance (*Olympia Bericht* 7 [1961], 207–10, Poseidonia); struck coins (*Syll.*³ 218.10, Olbia); passed a law (*Corp. Inscr. Delph.* i 9.2–3, Delphoi; Meiggs and Lewis, 2.1–2, Dreros); passed a sentence (*Syll.*³ 530.4, Dyme); founded a colony (Meiggs and Lewis, 5.37, Thera); defrayed expenses (Meiggs and Lewis, 83.2, Thasos; *I. von Olymp.* 16.7–8, Elis and Skillous); repaired the walls (*CEG* 869, Paphos); organised a festival (*IG* xii.9 189.5, Eretria); *horoi* marking the borders of a *polis* (treaty between Sparta and Argos quoted by Thuc. 5.79.4); the water supply of a *polis* (Heraclides 13–14, *GGM* i. 102–3, Thebes); the altars of a *polis* (*Fouilles de Delphes*, iii.2 18.5–7, Delphoi); the protecting divinities of a *polis* (*IG* xii.8 356, Thasos).
- 18 Law on the proclamation of crowns passed by the *polis* (Dem. 18.120); the passing of laws is one of the principal duties of a *polis* (Arist. *Rhet.* 1.1360a18–23).
- 19 F.M.Watkins, in *International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences*, xvii. 150.
- 20 The connotation versus the denotation of a term: Mill, *A System of Logic*, Book 1, sections 2, 5 and 6. The intension versus the extension of a concept: Rescher, *Introduction to Logic*, 26–7. On the definition (connotation, intension) of the term *polis* cf. now Sakellariou, *The Polis State*.
- 21 See Hansen, op. cit. (n.7), 9–10.
- 22 K.Nowicki, in van de Maele and Fossey (eds) *Fortificationes Antiquae*, 72–3.
- 23 Cf.Hansen, in Hansen and Raaflaub, op. cit. (n.15), 46–7.
- 24 Cf.Fossey, *The Ancient Topography of Opountian Lokris*, 94–5: 'The overall conclusion must be that in this area it is purely an archaeological investigation, almost entirely bereft of written sources, which can reconstruct the history of Opountian Lokris. The primacy of archaeology as our means of investigating the past of this part—and of many others—of Greece, even in the "historical" period is beyond dispute, pace those colleagues in the Classical profession who would see archaeology essentially as an adjunct, or peripheral aspect of their discipline.'
- 25 Fossey, *The Ancient Topography of Eastern Phokis*; Fossey, *Topography and Population of Ancient Boiotia*; for Lokris see preceding note; Cherry, Davis and Mantzourani, *Landscape Archaeology as Long-Term History*; J.L.Carter, in Hackens *et al.* (eds) *The Age of Pyrrhus*, 97–145.
- 26 According to Osborne, Elis is the only 'city' (= *polis*) in the region and other settlements are described as 'villages' (124–7), but in the *Hellenika* Xenophon 6.5.2. repeatedly refers to several of them as being *poleis*: see 3.2.23; 3.2.30; 3.5.12;
- 27 See, for example, Fossey's thorough and valuable studies of the settlement pattern of Boiotia, Phokis and Opountian Lokris, op. cit. (n.23–4), in which he focuses on site location and has no discussion whatsoever of the site classifications found in our sources.
- 28 Her. 1.170.3; Thuc. 2.15.2. See Rhodes, op. cit. (n.5), 102.
- 29 Hansen, in Hansen (ed.) *Introduction to an Inventory of Poleis*, 7–72.
- 30 For example, Horn. *Il.* 4.514; Thuc. 2.15.6; *IG* iv.2 492.3; *IG* xii.9 196.8–10.
- 31 For example, *I. von Priene* 1.6; *GDI* 147.4, 11; Her. 8.35.1; Thuc. 1.10.2; Dem. 18.215–16.
- 32 For example, *GDI* 147.4; Her. 7.58.2; Xen. *Hell* 5.4.49; Din. 1.77.

- 33 For example, Meiggs and Lewis, 2; in the Peace of Nikias quoted by Thucydides at 5.18–19 the term *polis* occurs nine times in the sense of city-state.
- 34 For example, *IGi*³ 46.17–18. The earliest attestation in an Attic decree is in *IG* i³ 4.B.3 (485/4), the latest securely dated attestation is in *IGii*² 17.10 (394/3). For the literary evidence see Wyse, *The Speeches of Isaeus*, 476–7.
- 35 Sacrificial calendar of Erchia: *SEG* xxi 541. Cult of Athena Polias (col. 1, lines 62–6) and of Zeus Polieus (col. 3, lines 59–64) on the *akropolis* of Erchia (distinguished from the *akropolis* in the city of Athens: col. 3, lines 15–17).
- 36 Lys. 6.15: οὗτος μὲν κατὰ τοὺς νόμους τοὺς ἐξ Ἀρείου πάγου φεύξεται τὴν τοῦ ἀδικηθέντος πόλιν. ('He shall be banished, according to the laws of the Areopagos, from the city of the man who has been injured.')
- 37 Whitehead's translation is: 'He also recommended discharging the bulk of the city's guards—on the grounds, of course, of minimizing its expenses.'
- 38 'On this isthmus, which is at the end of Athos, there stands a Greek city, Sane; there are others too seaward of Sane and landward of Athos, which it was now the Persians' intent to make into island and not mainland cities; to wit, Dion, Olophyxus, Acrothoum, Thyssus, Cleonae.'
- 39 Thuc. 2.93.2 (town); Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.6 (state).
- 40 Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.3: Ἀγησίλαος...ἀπεχώρησε μετ' ἀρίστον πρὸς τὸ ἄστυ, ὥς προδοιμένης τῆς πόλεως, ὥστε οἱ Κορίνθιοι δέισαντες μὴ προδοῖτο ὑπὸ τινὸν ἢ πόλιν μετεπέμψαντο τὸν Ἰφικράτην. ('Agesilaos...withdrew after breakfast in the direction of the town, as though the city were going to be betrayed to him; so that the Corinthians, in fear that the city was to be betrayed by some one, summoned Iphikrates.')
- 41 See Hansen, op. cit. (n. 29), 39–54.
- 42 See Hansen, op. cit. (n. 4), 39–45.
- 43 See Th. Heine Nielsen, in Hansen and Raaflaub, op. cit. (n. 15), 83–102.
- 44 Her. 7.176.2 *versus* 7.200.2 (Anthela); 7.176.5 *versus* 7.216.1 (Alpenos).
- 45 Cf. 54.4, where the reference is to Σκάνδειαν τὸ ἐπὶ τῷ λιμένι πόλισμα ('Skandeia the *polisma* at the harbour'). As far as we know, the island Kythera had only one *polis*, viz. Kythera (cf. Skylax, 46; Strab. 363.8.5.1; Paus. 3.23.1), and Skandeia is just the port of Kythera, not a political community in its own right. Cf. Gomme, *A Historical Commentary on Thucydides*, iii. 509.
- 46 See Hansen, op. cit. (n. 4), 43–4.
- 47 In Xenophon the term *polis* is used about the urban centre to be founded in the mining district (*Vect.* 4.50). How strange Xenophon's usage is here is duly noted by Gauthier in his *Commentaire historique des Poroi de Xenophon*, 188–9.
- 48 For example, at 1.1; 7.1.
- 49 For example, at 10.23.
- 50 For example, W.G.Runciman, in Murray and Price, op. cit. (n. 14), 348; Welwei, *Die griechische Polis*, 16; K.Raaflaub, in Latacz (ed.) *Zweihundert Jahre Homer-Forschung*, 241.
- 51 For Archaic and Classical Sparta as a conurbation called *asty* and *polis* (in the urban sense) see Hansen, in Hansen, op. cit. (n. 7), 13.
- 52 Argued provisionally in Hansen, op. cit. (n. 7), 13–16.

THE 'ORIGINS OF THE GREEK *POLIS*'

Where should we be looking?

John K. Davies

Up to a point one has to follow (but not necessarily to trust) the *Zeitgeist*. Ever since Ehrenberg's seminal article 'When did the *Polis* Rise?',¹ various forms of the question have continually preoccupied Greek historians, and the question received a fresh impetus with two books in 1976 and with Moses Finley's 1977 article on 'The Ancient City from Fustel de Coulanges to Max Weber and Beyond'.² The tempo has perceptibly quickened since then, both thematically, and via monographic histories of single cities, and via the resources and discussions which are currently going into the Copenhagen *polis* project. Such activity has been neither frivolous, nor fashion-led, nor repetitive: it seems to reflect, in very varied ways, a perception that Ehrenberg's question is still a real one and still needs an answer.

Only up to a point, for the terms of the discourse have changed, in at least three ways. First, Gawantka has reminded us uncomfortably that '*polis*' as a scholarly term of art is a late nineteenth-century invention, prefigured indeed by Kuhn in 1845 but taken into general use (with a sub-text of its own) only after Burckhardt's *Griechische Kulturgeschichte* of 1898. To use it incautiously, or to assume that its use in Greek sources can always be correlated with a single geopolitical phenomenon, is to elide the potential conceptual differences between '*polis*', 'city', 'city-state', and 'microstate'. Likewise, Roussel and Bourriot between them have made us aware that the use of 'tribe' and '*genos*' as social categories stems essentially from Fustel de Coulanges in 1864 and is vulnerable, not to say self-contradictory, in several ways.³ That is especially so if these terms (and one might add 'phratry') are used to denote not the segmental entities which are visible and safely describable from the Classical period and later, but the literally prehistoric entities which have been deemed to be the precursors of the Archaic and Classical *polis*: even more so if they are used in a primordialist sense⁴ rather than as labels for comparatively late and reshapable social constructs. In other words, our basic vocabulary of description and analysis has itself become the object of scrutiny and of scepticism, even though it derives directly from authors in the Greek historical—antiquarian tradition who were themselves native speakers, knew their institutions at first hand, and had set themselves the scholarly tasks of creating a working model of the development and articulation of their own polities.

The second change has consisted of an awkward enlargement of chronological focus. Against Berve's argument that it was only at the turn of the fifth century, when the preponderant overshadowing influence of dynasts and '*fürstliche Kräfte*' had been eroded, that the *polis* could come into its own, Ehrenberg in 1937 could with good reason point to epigraphic and literary evidence which showed *poleis* already mature and active in the seventh and sixth centuries, even if he did not push the evidence from epic as far as Luce and others did a generation later.⁵ Since Ehrenberg, however, the focus has split. In one direction the decipherment of Linear B fostered the ambition to find in the Late Bronze Age material components of social organization which might have had linear descendants in the Archaic period. Though that initial optimism has faded,⁶ the Mycenaean dimension with its evidence of a continuity of Greek speech remains, prompting the inference that post-Mycenaean processes of state-formation cannot have been a wholly virgin or independent growth. In contrast, the 1960s and early 1970s saw crystallize a picture of the early Greek Iron Age as a period of drastic depopulation, systems collapse, utter poverty, and break-up of the Mycenaean *koine* into a set of isolated regional cells in only spasmodic contact with each other.⁷ Granted, the starkness of that picture is now being tempered. Continuity of settlement and culture is acknowledged for some landscapes (e.g. Attika) and is being cautiously reinstated for others (e.g. Delphi, Miletos), continuity of cult is being seen here and there, and pockets of wealth and social stratification are being identified. All the same, the detailed exploration of other regional landscapes such as Elis or Phokis,⁸ if anything, confirms the picture of near-abandonment and Iron Age resettlement. Regional trajectories of repopulation and development in the Dark Age and after clearly differed so sharply from each other in nature, scale and date that no one model for the 'rise of the *polis*' can possibly be valid.

A third change stems from the transformation in 'archaeology'. Up until perhaps twenty years ago the presentational frameworks of the main synoptic works on the archaeology of the post-Mycenaean, Dark Age and Archaic periods of Greece largely reflected genres of material, principally of course ceramics but also metal objects, etc, as well as the sites themselves.⁹ Such analyses coexisted with, but did not conceptually alter, the portraits of those periods which historians and antiquarians were attempting to construct on the basis of written evidence, literary or other.¹⁰ Such a separation is no longer viable. Perhaps for no other area or period of classical antiquity, save possibly Roman Britain, has the gradual bridging of what has been called

the 'great divide' between archaeology and classical archaeology so rapidly yielded a new interpretative historical framework. Modes of burial above all, but also changes in settlement size and distribution, or systems of artefact creation and distribution, are being confidently used as evidence for the unfolding of social pressures. Already in 1980 Snodgrass could weave descriptions of genres of evidence into a picture of a structural revolution.¹¹ Ian Morris could give his 1987 book *Burial and Ancient Society* the sub-title *The Rise of the Greek City-State*, and could argue in 1992 'that [forms of burial display] offer a framework around which to organize a history of social structure'.¹² James Whitley in 1991 could devote six pages to 'State Formation and the Rise of the *Polis*' as a major part of a chapter on 'Theoretical Perspectives'.¹³ In such a context it is not only older work, such as that collected in Gschnitzer's *Zur griechischen Staatskunde* of 1969, which looks old-fashioned, but also more recent survey articles such as Pečírka's or books such as Tausend's which use textual evidence for the Amphihtyonies far more than evidence for the *aménagement* of sanctuaries.¹⁴ However, diagnosis is easy, treatment another matter: as Renfrew has put it, 'In reality the most difficult task is often that of bringing into meaningful relationship the data from the different categories of evidence.'¹⁵

Other changes in the discourse beyond these three could no doubt be identified. However, my task here is not so much to compile a comprehensive *Forschungsbericht* as to pose helpful questions. The question 'Where should we be looking?' of my title is one; the question 'What would now count as a satisfactory replacement of Busolt and Swoboda's *Griechische Staatskunde*?' is another; the question 'When should we be looking?' is a third, all the more pointed against Parker's recent reminder that 'any attempt to treat the "birth of the *polis*" as a datable occurrence is in danger of compacting a long history into too short a space'.¹⁶ What follows here, therefore, is merely a list of suggested guideposts, offered as a help to debate and maybe as stimuli for whichever chalkentonic scholar eventually constructs a new *Staatskunde*—on, one hopes, generative rather than antiquarian principles. The immediate task is one of disaggregation: that is to say, of separating out the various strands of social process and of interpretative assumptions before trying to put them together again in a new way.

EMANCIPATION

A first move has to be a gentle disengagement from Aristotle, for the influence, conscious or unconscious, of his model of the emergence of the *polis* out of household and village (*Pol.* 1.1252b) has been great but unhelpful. In spite of the supporting material, especially in Book 3, that model is not the historically based generalization which it purports to be so much as Aristotle's riposte at the level of theory to the sophistic argument that social order is artificial, not natural; and by assuming that the only entity deserving consideration as the natural *telos* of development is the small-scale republican *polis*, it sets up unhelpful boundaries between *poleis* and other forms of polity, while any comprehensive theory of state formation appropriate for the Mediterranean Iron Age must keep the latter equally in view.

A similar distance has to be maintained from the antiquarian tradition, learned and intelligent though many of its scholars were. No-one who has worked his or her way through the doxographies provided by Bourriot can retain illusions about the influence on nineteenth- and twentieth-century scholarship exerted by the rationalized reconstructions of Athenian prehistory created by, or reflected in, the *Ath. Pol.* tradition.¹⁷ Indeed, in one sense we may be fortunate not to have Dikaiarchos' *Bios Hellados* preserved to us, for its fragments (frs 47–66 Wehrli²) suggest it included a complex model of the transformations of social development from whose influence it would have been hard to escape. It is not that any study of the development of the *polis* can do without theory: rather, that preconceptions and choices have to be explicit.

'MICROSTATE', NOT 'POLIS'

For two reasons the use of the word '*polis*' must carry a health warning. The first is that, as various recent studies have made clear,¹⁸ its usage represents a compound of different chronological layers denoting a variety of settlements and polities. From epic use, to denote mostly a fortified nucleated settlement seen from outside but sometimes also an unfortified nucleated settlement, it extends through the 'classic' Aristotelian denotation to encompass, in a remarkable Aeschylean image, the whole Persian Empire,¹⁹ while still in certain contexts remaining interchangeable with *kome*²⁰ or remaining embedded in old district names such as the Marathonian *Tetrapolis*. Second, even if such extended uses are pressed to the limit, they do not cover the whole spectrum of the polities which emerged from the Greek Dark Ages. To focus only on those meeting Aristotelian definitions, to sideline *ethne*, monarchies, or areas prevented by external repression from developing their own polities (e.g. S.W. Arkadia till after Leuktra), is to succumb to the metropolitan snobbery of Athens-based writers and to skew the study of *Staatskunde* unacceptably. Indeed, as work for the Leeds and Manchester seminar series 'Alternatives to the Democratic *Polis*' has brought out, the subsequent (and better-documented) development of the '*non-polis*' regions of Greece offers so many helpful models for the study of earlier processes that one ignores them at one's peril.²¹ A term such as 'microstate' (German *Kleinstaat*) begs no questions, includes all Greek polities, and is greatly preferable.

THE PROBLEM OF 'ETHNICITIES'

While Roussel's assault on the inherited notion of 'tribe' cleared much ground, it left untouched—and more prominent—the problem of how to read the 'tribal' or 'ethnic' names of both the supposedly Greek (Dorians, Ionians, Aiolians) and the supposedly non-Greek (Dryopes, Leleges, etc.) populations of Archaic Greece. Herodotos, our best witness, took them as real bounded components of his past and his present. So did all other Greek writers, even if Thucydides, perhaps taking his cue from Antiochos, is exceptional in seeing much of the fifth-century history of the Greek West in terms of Dorian—Ionian tensions. Yet the problem of what they mean has to be faced, at two levels: first, at that of understanding what those involved meant by such identifiers, whether subjectively or as observers, and second, at the level of reconciling such labels with the modern debate about ethnicity. I cite only one non-classical example, John Peel's study of the 'mega-tribal' grouping of the Yoruba in Nigeria. It is, he points out,

a modern category entirely, in that the vast bulk of peoples who now know themselves as Yoruba did not do so in 1900. Originally the word referred to only one Yoruba grouping, the Oyo. Yoruba ethnic identity began to be adopted by other groups (e.g. Ijesha, Egba, Ijebu, Ekiti, Ondo) from the 1920s, as migration, cash-cropping, education and conversion to the world religions drew more people into a Nigeria-wide sphere of social relations. From the late 1930s, when nationalism really began to get underway, the Yoruba began to shape themselves politically against other 'tribes', especially the Igbo in the political crucible of Lagos.²²

The analogy with post-Mycenaean Greece is suggestive, all the more in the light of Peel's further argument against Cohen that ethnicity has to be seen historically, is both a political and a cultural phenomenon, and is 'a process or a project, not a structure'. In a closely similar vein Jonathan Hall's recent study of ethnicity in early Iron Age Greece²³ uses literary, linguistic and archaeological evidence to trace the emergence of ethnic groups as 'social constructions'. Such arguments should give the historian of the early *polis* pause, for the ethnic identifiers used by Herodotos and others for Archaic Greece, so far from reinforcing *polis* identities and ideologies, cross-cut them in various complex ways: what, for example, did it mean for Eetion to be 'by origin *Lapithes* and *Kaineides*' (Her. 5.92.B.1), for Herodotos, for his fifth-century audience, for those who transmitted the story to Herodotos, for the Kypselidai, for the Bacchiadai, or for Eetion himself? We are going to need an approach which recognizes how real such identifiers were felt to be without hypostatizing them as confidently as some recent work²⁴ has done: I have as yet no sense for the long-term solution.

TOWN FORMATION, STATE FORMATION AND *POLIS* FORMATION

The separation of these processes in an Archaic Greek context is probably the most difficult, and yet the most essential, of all the disjunctions that need to be made. They overlap in every possible way: yet not all states were, or became, *poleis* (e.g. Thessaly), not all towns became the centres of *poleis* (e.g. Acharnai, Gonnos), not all *poleis* were towns,²⁵ and so on.

No part of this ensemble can be isolated without the explicit use of theory. Clearest, though still resoundingly controversial, are the notions of 'town' and urbanization, where the post-Weber debate over the pre-industrial city²⁶ has left intact the idea that all or most of a set of observable criteria need to be met for a settlement to be termed 'town', even if Weber's basic conception of the ancient city as 'consumer' has come to be seen as less than satisfactory.²⁷ An explicitly Weberian list of such criteria includes:

- 1 topographical and administrative self-containedness;
- 2 a population of several thousand (those of c. 1,000 being marginal), as a precondition for point 3;
- 3 developed division of labour and social differentiation;
- 4 variety of genres of building;
- 5 urban life-style;
- 6 the settlement functioning as a central place for a hinterland.²⁸

Though the list could be extended,²⁹ it is a sensible enough approach, buttressed by studies on the ground of the gradual consolidation of selected towns: Corinth is the classic Archaic example, with Athens, Argos, and Samos.³⁰ Yet, and crucially, such a topographical—functional specification need say nothing about power distribution, sense of community or degree of independence: a town need not be a state or a *polis*.³¹

In contrast, the problem of state formation is addressed by an entirely different body of theory, mostly dating from the 1970s though profitably called in aid in a recent book on Athenian citizenship.³² Criteria here revolve around the shift from patterns of personal leadership exercised by chiefs, 'big men', etc., towards stabler and more impersonal structures. Land seizure by an invading force is one scenario, since retention and exploitation of the land require an on-going control structure

and collaboration among the invaders (Thessaly certainly, Sparta possibly). The creation of a succession system for a monarchy could be another, as the brutal version practised by the Argeads of Macedon exemplifies.

Different again are the ideas intrinsic to *polis* formation: that executive power should rotate; that the use of executive power should conform to 'law' in some sense, whatever the mode of validation for that 'law' might be; that land-plus-population should be a 'common thing', not a private estate; that part at least of the population should count as the shareholders of that 'common thing'; that no external person should control that 'common thing'; and so on.³³ Early *polis* formation has therefore to be seen as a special subset of state formation, occurring in certain areas of Greece. Only thus can we start to identify the pressures and the needs which forced certain states and certain landscapes to evolve such new and peculiar institutions, even against the inertia characteristic of all socio-political systems. This is not the place to review at length the motors of change which are currently or ought to be called in aid. The hardy perennial among them has been the demographic one, combining the pressures and tensions which led to colonization with the creation of the 'colony' format itself and the feedback of that experience into the colonizing states: others are alluded to below. The debate will plainly continue. It can best proceed if the analysis of *polis* formation is separated from those of town formation and state formation, even though the three processes are unfolding simultaneously.

THE FUNDAMENTALS OF MICROSTATE ARTICULATION

I.

Segmentation

This chapter was written concurrently with one which surveyed the tribes, phratries and *gene* of Archaic Greece.³⁴ The focuses required for it brought home to me the determinative role which the process of fashioning and adapting segmental structures played in creating the Greek microstates. One must not be misled by the endless variety of names used for the various segments, or give way to the temptation to define differences too precisely, for what matters is the basic notion of creating or formalizing a set of segments, of roughly comparable size and standing, which can fulfil a range of functions and can thereby articulate a population in ways independent of fluid, short-term, or personality-dependent agglomerations such as households or chiefs' followings.

One major help towards understanding this process was Roussel's argument that, contrary to long-held assumptions, the 'Ionic' or 'Dorian' tribes of many Greek polities were not survivals of a real 'tribal' society but shallow-rooted social constructs of the Archaic period. Not everyone has been happy with this³⁵ or with Bourriot's simultaneous demolition of the primordial status of *gene*, while phratries and their congeners (*ktōinai*, *syssitia*, etc.) have yet to be tackled genetically in the new climate,³⁶ but overall the two books of 1976 represent a liberation, allowing us to see the creation of political structures in Archaic Greece in a far more realistic light. In fact, the question whether entities such as Hylleis or Boreis or Labyadai or Aithalees were 'really' ancient or recent, 'territorial' or descent-defined, is immaterial: what matter were the decisions to align them into sets and the purposes for which they were needed. Thus, for example, Tyrtaios fr. 19.8 West shows the three Dorian tribes being used by seventh-century Sparta as brigading units for the army. Antiquarian information and survivals show the four Ionic tribes being used in Attika as regiments, revenue-managing units, constituencies for the selection of some officials, and as units active in cult and in at least some aspects of law. Phratries and their sub-groups in Attika and Delphi came to function as the groups which evaluated legitimacy, sponsored the principal *rites de passage*, and thereby in effect regulated inheritance and community membership. Similarly, in central and northern Greece, where *polis* retained its older use, we can trace the creation of a political order via the formalization of segmental 'parts', typically termed *moirai* (Thessaly) or *mere* (Boiotia, Malis, Aitolia), which were functionally comparable, it seems from the skimpy evidence, to the Dorian or Ionic 'tribes' or their replacements. The creation of such 'parts' or segments, themselves the products of necessity as public need and social interaction in war, ritual, law or administration became more complex, transformed a *laos* into a civic society, and turned a chief's *hetairoi* into magistrates.³⁷ If we want to trace the modalities by which the Greek microstates emerged (as distinct from identifying the prime movers), this above all is where we should be looking.

II.

Religion

Some years ago I contributed a chapter on 'Religion and the State [in Late Archaic Greece]' to the new *C.A.H.*,³⁸ written in a period when Greek religion was a minority passion. Since then, for various reasons (gender studies; assimilation of structural anthropology; the emergence of cultural history) interest in it has burgeoned. The focus has shifted, from antiquarian concern with rituals and beliefs to the exploration of social functions and semiotic systems, while the perception that the formation of such systems was an intrinsic and major component of the process of microstate formation has both stimulated books of

importance³⁹ and laid the foundations for a new, far more religion-orientated generation of scholarship. The challenge now is rather to decide what, if anything, will count as a satisfactory narrative-cum-analysis of the roles of cult, ritual and belief in the *Staatskunde* of the Archaic period, given that religion does not intrinsically order itself in microstate format. To take one set of examples: while household religion has to be pieced together from scattered literary sources, the calendars of sacrifices from Attika and elsewhere make clear how much investment (of time and resource) and attention went into observances at the level of village or district or phratry. Festivals and processions which focused on ‘central places’ such as the Athenian Akropolis or the Larisa at Argos will have had a wider radius of attraction, but will have been dwarfed by the sanctuaries and festivals which attracted regional or even wider interest or became the focus of amphiktionic activity. To identify the pros and cons of investments, not just in dedications, but in the creation of command structures for building, maintenance and ceremony at each level, should help to clarify why polities crystallized at some magnitudes of area and population but not at others.

A second example: it is now common coin to see the ninth-century shift from the disposal of selected surplus resource underground, as grave goods, to its display above ground as dedications, together with the essential corollary in the form first of sanctuary and then of temple from c. 800, as seminal steps in the formation of what we know as Greek religion. Yet parallel ways of using surplus resources, e.g. for *eranos* feasts within phratries or Dorian *syssitia*, or as distributions to community members, tend to be seen under different headings. To re-amalgamate the analysis of such forms of behaviour should therefore be also to ask who is making the decisions, and within which frameworks of subordination, and thereby to rejoin the discourse on structures which is basic to microstate formation.

III. Citizenship

Ehrenberg pointed out in 1937 that texts from Archaic Greece reflect a difficulty in finding a single word for ‘citizen’. The downdating of some of the documents he quotes robs them of some significance,⁴⁰ but the tripartite classification *telestas/etas/damos* in the Elis—Heraia treaty still has interest in view of the continued use of *etas* for ‘(private) citizen’ in fifth-century verse and public language.⁴¹ However, his point could be usefully refocused on the dates by which, and the ways by which, the word *polites* or *polietes* moves out from its Homeric use in the locational sense ‘inhabitants of the *polis*’⁴² to encompass the classical meaning ‘citizen’. (It has clearly done so by the time of the Lesbian poets or Theognis, though the latter’s oscillation between *polites* and *astos* would bear further thought.) The move is obviously integral to the process of *polis* formation sketched above, requiring especially the crystallization of the idea of the state as a ‘thing’,⁴³ in the benefits and responsibilities of which inhabitants participate as members, equally or unequally, like shareholders in an unlimited company. The Greek terms used, especially *koinonia*, *politeia* and *metechein tes politeias*, make the ideas clear, but the pressures which led to their emergence are less so. One leading idea for the last thirty years has been that tense border conflicts over land, and the advantage which a massed ‘hoplite’ infantry army conferred in such conflicts, put those enrolled in such armies in a position by the mid-seventh century to press for greater power in a wider ‘franchise’, if need be by force. However, the evidence that such massed armies were no novelty to Homer has sown doubts about the reality of the ‘hoplite reform’,⁴⁴ and we should probably be looking much more broadly. Two topics are salient: first, the emergence or formalization of that notion of a man’s combined rights and duties *vis-à-vis* the community for which Greek came to use the word *telos*, and second, the degree to which, in each community at various times, there came to be a convergence, complete or partial, between the circles of (1) those who could/should fight, (2) those who had direct access to community rather than household justice, (3) those who could own, buy, or inherit land, (4) those who could vote and speak in an assembly, and (5) those who could hold public office or priesthoods. A detailed *logos* constructed on such lines would get us a long way towards understanding the unique quality of Greek citizenship.

WIDER HORIZONS

I. Eastabout

It will be news to nobody that the culture of Archaic Greece was enriched and transformed by influences coming from the eastern Mediterranean. The alphabet itself, substantial components of myth, architectural and sculptural forms, elements of vocabulary, forms of metalwork and ivory-work, styles and motifs in representational art, certain cults and deities, and even such customs as that of reclining on couches, are all widely and rightly seen as having been transmitted to Greece via the migration of persons and via the transport of objects, above all in the ‘orientalizing century’ from c. 750 to c. 650.⁴⁵ Nor is it in the least radical these days to warn both that the processes of transfer are far less those of simple imitation than those of

creative and selective addition or adaptation of new ideas to an existing indigenous tradition, and that such transfers must be seen not as the inevitable outspread of a dominant culture but as the collective product of a series of choices made by the 'recipient' culture (especially by its dominant elite) at particular periods for particular purposes within particular *structures mentales*. What is radical, but ought not to be, is to ask whether the process of selective adaptations included political forms and ideas. Whether influenced adversely by the wilder claims for Phoenicians made long ago by V.Bérard,⁴⁶ or discouraged by the lack of Near Eastern evidence, or simply perpetuating the calamitous cleft between Graeco-Roman studies and Ancient Near Eastern and Semitic studies, scholarly discussion has barely explored the idea.⁴⁷ Yet the known borrowings and influences were being filtered, via patronage choices and prestige mechanisms, by precisely the same elite as was simultaneously constructing the new forms of polity which are our concern. To disjoin the two processes is counter-intuitive. Indeed, two components of the new polities have direct correlates in the relevant areas of the Eastern Mediterranean. First, whatever reality we do or do not, post-Drews, accord to pre-700 kingship in Greece, forms of monarchy closely comparable to those well attested in the Phoenician cities⁴⁸ were palpably widespread in Archaic Greece, from Cyprus and Sparta through the *tagia* of Thessaly to the various 'tyrant' regimes of Ionia, the Aegean, and central Greece. Second, though the evidence for councils of elders in Byblos, Tyre and Sidon is thin and scattered, it suggests institutions not far removed from Gerousia or Areiopagos.⁴⁹ This is not to suggest precise knowledgeable borrowings on the part of Greeks so much as the sort of awareness of institutions in Assyria or Phoenicia or Egypt which mercenaries, craftsmen, and *emporoi* will inevitably have gained and brought back. Nor is it to suggest that models for the third, defining ingredient of the *polis* polity—the assembly of citizens—is an import thence, for congeners in the Eastern Mediterranean are almost impossible to detect.

II. Westabout

Greece is not the only European peninsular landmass to be lapped or surrounded by Mediterranean waters: Italy and Iberia need notice. It cannot be pure chance that the formative period of the Greek *polis* system also saw develop in Latium and Etruria systems which are at least superficially comparable.⁵⁰ Yet, though their contacts with Old and colonial Greece were continuous from an early date, and though their respective Leagues as described in Graeco-Roman sources bear a distinct resemblance to Greek amphiktyonies, it would need virtuoso argument to prove more than parallel development—but even that requires some explanation. For Iberia, though apart from the south-eastern coastal fringe of Phoenician and Greek colonies there can as yet be no talk of city-state systems, none the less the spectacular growth in data, knowledge, and understanding of the social processes at work in pre-Roman Iberia, documented in a recent book,⁵¹ is for the first time allowing us to pose comparative questions about trajectories of urbanization and political development across all three Mediterranean peninsulas. Indeed, the spectrum of comparison could be widened still further if (say) the development of the *Fürstensitze* of Hallstatt Europe⁵² were brought into the discourse, not to mention the endless debate about hill-forts and *oppida*⁵³ or the question (to be posed now in post-Roussel terms) of what one means in a Hallstatt or La Tène context by 'tribe'. I cannot claim more than the most superficial knowledge of such material, but even that level is enough to prompt the question: are the processes of urbanization, social coagulation and state formation in Iron Age Europe comparable enough for us to need to develop a common analytical vocabulary which could be applied as confidently and appropriately to Archaic Greece as to Iberia or the Upper Rhine or Wessex? I have no idea what the answer is, but the question needs to be asked.⁵⁴

III. Cross-cultural comparisons

Some fifteen years ago two US scholars brought out a book which surveyed five city-state systems.⁵⁵ Chapters on Sumerian city-states, on the Greek *polis*, on the Italian city-state, on the Swiss and German city-states, and on the Hausa city-states from 1450 to 1804 were rounded off by a comparative chapter written by the two editors. It was a valuable compilation, both for its terse presentation of much heterogeneous information and for the questions of method and approach which it explicitly or implicitly asked, though since the comparisons were between up-and-running systems rather than with their genesis and emergence its direct value to our present concern is limited. Indirectly, though, their book prompts the question whether it would help or hinder the historian of Archaic Greece to think in much broader and comparativist terms. General instinct may well murmur 'hinder', on the grounds that it is a risky enough job making comparisons even between the institutions and the terminologies of the Greek states themselves, let alone more wide-rangingly, and that both the boundary conditions and the initial impetuses leading to the crystallization of a microstate system are always purely context-specific.

Yet in at least two ways cross-cultural comparisons may help. In the first place they draw attention to the use of the word 'system', which itself is a way of flagging two widespread characteristics of the microstate phenomenon. First, they tend to crystallize in sets:⁵⁶ not universally so, for the 'interstitial'⁵⁷ microstate such as Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Isle of Man, or Hellenistic Rhodes, owing its continued existence to the unstated convenience, mutual hostility or mutual neutralizations of

influence on the part of larger neighbours, is a recurrent phenomenon in itself. Yet they are mostly so, as is observable both in the cultures surveyed by Griffith and Thomas and elsewhere. Second, the interactions at all levels—formal or informal, friendly or hostile, collective or individual—were intense and continuous: Spartan *xenelasia* was exceptional and notorious. Such interactions encouraged a high degree of cultural and institutional uniformity among the units in the set,⁵⁸ and cause one to ask why a common culture could not or did not coalesce at a very early stage into a common polity: an absence of leadership, the absence of a common enemy, or the intrusion of cross-cutting values such as participatory citizenship?

The second use of cross-cultural comparisons is to create a checklist of questions, the answers to which serve to locate individual systems and their component units within a broader spectrum and to reveal which aspects of the behaviour of the units in the system are normal and which are odd. For example, a question about the locations of temples and sanctuaries must be a constant. De Polignac's by now classic analysis of some temples, such as the Argive Heraion, as territorial stake-outs, when complemented by the imposition of others over Mycenaean sites (e.g. the *akropoleis* of Athens or Tiryns) as symbolic repossession, or by the plethora of rural, cave, and mountain-top sanctuaries, gives a context- and culture-specific answer which is the more valuable for allowing direct comparison, while the importance of the sudden popularity of hero cult sites needs no emphasizing these days. Other obvious constants are, e.g., selection and legitimation mechanisms for rulers, office-holders or magistrates, or the degree to which tensions between a town elite and a *contado* emerged and were either managed by force and repression (Thessaly, Lakonia, Siena) or minimized (late Archaic Athens).

In a valuable recent paper, Dick Whittaker asked the question, 'Do theories of the ancient city matter?'⁵⁹ In this *tour d'horizon* I have tried to argue that they do, though the attempt has involved skating a long way, very rapidly, over very thin ice. Space permits no more detail or qualification: the task, of creating a synoptic view of some recent scholarship and of setting out some possible (though radical) guidelines, requires no less.⁶⁰

NOTES

- 1 JHS 57 (1937), 147–59. German version in Ehrenberg, *Polis und Imperium*, 83–97, and in Gschnitzer (ed.) *Zur griechischen Staatskunde*, 3–25.
- 2 *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 19 (1977), 305–27.
- 3 Gawantka, *Die sogenannte Polis*; Roussel, *Tribu et cité*; Bourriot, *Recherches sur la nature du génos*.
- 4 I take this use of the word from J.M.Hall, in Spencer (ed.) *Time, Tradition and Society in Greek Archaeology*, 6–17 at 7.
- 5 J.V.Luce, *PRIA* 78C (1978), 1–15; E.Lévy, *Ktéma* 8 (1983, [published 1986]), 55–73; Scully, *Homer and the Sacred City*; Seaford, *Reciprocity and Ritual*, 1–10.
- 6 Compare the caution of J.T.Hooker, in Powell (ed.) *The Greek World*, 7–26, with the sketch in F.Gschnitzer, *Griechische Sozialgeschichte*, 10–26.
- 7 Coldstream, *Greek Geometric Pottery*; Snodgrass, *The Dark Age of Greece*; Desborough, *The Greek Dark Ages*.
- 8 Cf. Morgan, *Athletes and Oracles*, 49 ff. and 235 ff.
- 9 The format of *Archaeologia Homerica* is eloquent.
- 10 Cf. the survey of Athenian tombs by Bourriot, op. cit. (n. 3), 831–1042, now superseded by work such as that of Whitley, *Style and Society in Dark Age Greece*.
- 11 Snodgrass, *Archaic Greece*, chapter 2.
- 12 Morris, *Death-Ritual and Social Structure in Classical Antiquity*, 128.
- 13 Op. cit. (n. 10), 39–45.
- 14 J.Pečírka, *Klio* 69 (1987), 351–73; Tausend, *Amphiktionie und Symmachie*.
- 15 In Spencer, op. cit. (n. 4), xvi. For the general issue cf. also I.Morris, in Morris (ed.) *Classical Greece: Ancient Histories and Modern Archaeologies*, 8–47; Shanks, *Classical Archaeology of Greece*.
- 16 Parker, *Athenian Religion*, 21.
- 17 Cf. the comments of de Polignac, *Cults, Territory, and the Origins of the Greek City-State*, 2–3.
- 18 Cf. n. 5 above.
- 19 Cf. *Persai* 511–12 and especially 715. Sousa is also, less surprisingly, seen as a *polis* with its *polietai* (lines 117, 219, 534, 556, 730, 761).
- 20 For example, Anthela, *polis* at Her. 7.176.2 but *kome* at 7.200.2; or the *kome* in Lokris called Polis (Thuc. 3.101.2).
- 21 Some fierce words, much à propos, by M.B.Hatzopoulos in Buraselis (ed.) *Unity and Units of Antiquity*, 161–8.
- 22 J.D.Y.Peel, in Tonkin, et al (eds) *History and Ethnicity*, 198–215. Quotations from p. 200.
- 23 Op. cit. (n. 4), 6–17. Cf. also C.Morgan, *PCPhS* 37 (1991), 131–63.
- 24 Notably Tausend, op. cit. (n. 14). More distanced is F.Prinz, *Gründungsmythen und Sagenchronologie*.
- 25 For example, Eutaia in Mainalia (Xen. *Hell* 6.5.12), and cf. Kolb's dampening comment 'Die durchschnittliche griechische Polis war siedlungsgeographisch ein Dorf mit einer Dorfmark' (*Die Stadt im Altertum*, 76). Conspectuses of the problems in Murray and Price (eds) *The Greek City*; in Hansen (ed.) *The Ancient Greek City-State*, and *Sources for the Ancient Greek City-State*; and in Hansen and Raaflaub (eds) *Studies in the Ancient Greek Polis*.

- 26 From Finley, op. cit. (n. 2), one can go backwards through, e.g., Rykwert, *The Idea of a Town*, Sjöberg, *The Pre-Industrial City*, and Weber, *The City*, to F. Tritsch, *Klio* 22 (1929), 1–83.
- 27 A recent review by R. Whittaker in Cornell and Lomas (eds) *Urban Society in Roman Italy*, 9–26, with much further bibliography. Add P. Wheatley, in Ucko *et al.* (eds) *Man, Settlement and Urbanism*, 601–37.
- 28 Kolb, op. cit. (n. 25), 15.
- 29 For example, by the more explicit inclusion of functions such as exchange, display, conflict resolution, resource redistribution, decision-making, and rituals and festivals.
- 30 C. Roebuck, *Hesperia* 41 (1972), 96–127, and C. K. Williams, II, *ASAA* 60= 244 (1982 [published 1984]), 9–19 (Corinth); Kolb, op. cit. (n. 25), 77–92.
- 31 Further examples in H.-P. Drögemüller, *Gymnasium* 77 (1970), 484–507.
- 32 For example, Service, *Origins of the State and Civilization*; Cohen and Service (eds) *Origins of the State*; Claessen and Skolnik (eds) *The Early State*; Manville, *The Origins of Citizenship in Ancient Athens*; I. Morris, in Rich and Wallace-Hadrill (eds) *City and Country in the Ancient World*, 24–57.
- 33 Cf. Rhodes, pp. 6–7 above.
- 34 Forthcoming in Settis (ed.) *I Greci*, ii.
- 35 Cf. Th. Schneider, *Boreas* 14 (1991 [published 1994]), 15–31 (review article of the 'reception' of Roussel and Bourriot).
- 36 Though the debate in the Athenian context has been lively: most recently Lambert, *The Phratries of Attica*, and Parker, op. cit. (n. 16), 104–8.
- 37 Cf. the nine *aisymnetai* appointed to oversee the contests in Phaiakia, who are significantly called *demioi* (*Od.* 8.258–9), not to mention the many magistrates called *damiourgoi*.
- 38 *C.A.H.*, 2nd edition, iv. 368–88: text completed in late 1979.
- 39 A proper list would be gargantuan, but basic orientation from, e.g., Burkert, *Greek Religion*; Sourvinou-Inwood, 'Reading' *Greek Culture*; Bremmer, *Greek Religion*; Parker, op. cit. (n. 16).
- 40 *GDI* 1149=SIG³ 9=Buck 62=LSAG 220 no. 6 with 408=Meiggs and Lewis 17 (treaty between Elis and Heraia, c. 500); *GDI* 1153=Buck 63=LSAG 220 no. 8 with 408 (honours for Deukalion, 500–475).
- 41 Cf. LSJ s.v., II, especially Thuc. 5.79.4.
- 42 *Il.* 15.558 and 22.429 (both of Trojans); *Od.* 7.131 (of Phaiakians). Cf. Scully, op. cit. (n. 5), 54 ff.
- 43 Cf. especially Walter, *An der Polis teilhaben*, and also Manville. op. cit. (n. 32). The text above develops ideas sketched in summary form in *OCD*, 3rd edition, 'Citizenship, Greek'.
- 44 For the controversy, A. M. Snodgrass, *JHS* 85 (1965), 110–22; P. A. Cartledge, *JHS* 97 (1977), 11–27; J. Salmon, *JHS* 97 (1977), 84–101; Latacz, *Kampfparänese, Kampfdarstellung und Kampfwirklichkeit*; H. Bowden, in Rich and Shipley (eds) *War and Society in the Greek World*, 45–63; also Raaflaub, pp. 49–51 below.
- 45 As leads to the topic, Dunbabin, *The Greeks and their Eastern Neighbours*; Burkert, *The Orientalizing Revolution*; Murray, *Early Greece*, 2nd edition, chapter 6, with references, pp. 326–8.
- 46 As Mogens Hansen has suggested to me.
- 47 Robert Drews is an exception: cf. *AJP* 100 (1979), 45–58, and *Basileus*, 81 and 115.
- 48 For an up-to-date survey, cf. S. F. Bondi, in Krings (ed.) *La Civilisation phénicienne et punique*, 291 ff. I am grateful to my colleague Professor Alan Millard for guidance on these matters and for bringing this volume to my attention.
- 49 References in Moscati, *The World of the Phoenicians*, 49 ff. For earlier periods cf. also W. F. Albright, in *C.A.H.*, 3rd edition, ii.2, 520–1, for councils of elders at Arce and Byblos; Buccellati, *Cities and Nations of Ancient Syria*; and Bondi, op. cit. (n. 48), 293–5.
- 50 Cf. Smith, pp. 208–16 below.
- 51 Cunliffe and Keay (eds) *Social Complexity and the Development of Towns in Iberia*.
- 52 Cf. for example Härke, *Settlement Types and Patterns in the West Hallstatt Province*.
- 53 G. Woolf, *OJA* 12 (1993), 223 ff., with earlier bibliography; J. A. Santos Velasco, *Antiquity* 68 (1994), 289–99; M. Almagro-Gorbea, in Cunliffe and Keay, op. cit. (n. 51), 175 ff.; various papers in Hill and Comberpatch (eds) *Different Iron Ages*. More remotely, but valuable for comparison, Bekker-Nielsen, *The Geography of Power*.
- 54 For the amusement of twenty-first-century readers, the resonances of our own culture's debate about a single European currency are not lost on me.
- 55 Griffith and Thomas (eds) *The City-State in Five Cultures*.
- 56 Sets of twelve, indeed, if one believes the over-tidy traditions for the Panionion, pre-Theseus Attika, Latium, and Etruria.
- 57 I owe the use of this word to Dr H. A. Forbes.
- 58 Explorations of various aspects of this in Renfrew and Cherry (eds) *Peer Polity Interaction and Socio-Political Change*, chapters 1 (C. Renfrew) and 3 (A. M. Snodgrass).
- 59 Whittaker, op. cit. (n. 27).
- 60 The revision of this chapter has benefited greatly from comments made at Durham and during the companion conference on 'Archaic Greece: The Evidence' at Cardiff a few weeks later. My thanks to all (too many to name individually) who contributed in such ways. I also thank the successive student members of my third-year class of the 1980s on 'The City State' who first heard, and helped me to hone, some of the ideas presented here. More immediately, my thanks to the Leverhulme Trust for providing the resource of time, to allow me to make a proper job of this paper.

THE RELATIONS OF POWER IN THE PRE-STATE AND EARLY STATE POLITIES

Walter Donlan

I

This chapter discusses the nature and distribution of power and authority in the pre-state period (roughly the ninth century) and in the formational and early developmental stages of the city-states (roughly the eighth and seventh centuries respectively). There are sharp differences of opinion about these things. My reconstruction of social development in post-Mycenaean Greece is briefly as follows.

From the tenth century to the eighth, the regional communities (*demos*= territory and the people in it) were organized as 'simple' or 'low-level' chiefdoms, which replicated themselves from generation to generation with no movement towards greater complexity. The chiefdoms represent a severe devolution from the centralized mini-kingdoms of the Late Bronze Age. The archaeological evidence from sub-Mycenaean to Late Geometric gives us a clear idea of just how severe the civilizational decline was, and how long it took for states to form again in Greece. As in all chiefdoms, unequal power and status arrangements separated the *basileis* (both paramount and subordinate) from the rest of the *demos*, but, typical of low-level chiefdoms, these arrangements gave them little coercive power. During the eighth century, as a result of economic changes triggered by rising populations, the leading families gained differential access to the means of subsistence, which gave them real coercive power. The tribal communities became 'stratified' societies after a long period as 'rank' societies.¹

The distribution of power oscillated during the eighth century through to the sixth century. The changes at the top were particularly dramatic during the formational period. The office of the paramount *basileus* was severely downgraded and its powers and functions were distributed among a number of governmental roles, which were non-hereditary, limited in term of office, and restricted in scope.² The emergence of the city-state aristocracy, which shared the power more or less equally among its members and was unified in protecting its privileges, altered the traditional leader-people relationship. The system of officials and boards, joined to the traditional institutions of the *boule* and the *agora*, was an efficient response to the growing size and complexity of the communities, and also gave the landed nobility a platform for social control that had not been available to the *basileis* of a century earlier.

Ordinary people around 700 experienced considerably less individual autonomy and had less power collectively than their great-grandparents had. A much greater percentage of them than before were economically dependent on elite households, which were much wealthier than they had been before. For a period of several generations (*c.* 750–650) the landlord class enjoyed an almost unrestricted hegemony; yet, by the end of the seventh century, the majority of families (*to plethus*) were reasserting their collective power and reducing the power differential. I will argue that the locus of majority power was the class of middling farmers.

In the view proposed here, the *polis-state* emerged out of established communities of free farmers, with an ancient tradition of citizen rights within the *demos*. The relationship of the families with their local rulers (*basileis*) and, as the *demos*, with the paramount *basileus* was reciprocal.³ This supposes fundamental continuities between the pre-state and the early-state polities. Other scholars see fundamental discontinuity, arguing that strict class stratification existed continuously from the Mycenaean period. Throughout the Dark Age, a closed aristocracy of birth and wealth ruled as masters over a large dependent and economically exploited peasantry. In this view, peasants and serfs transformed themselves by struggle into the citizens of the 'citizen state' during the early developmental period.⁴

Concerning the use of Homer as an historical source for this period, my position has been that the social and political and ideological structures portrayed in the epics belong to around 800, the near past to 'Homer', and that very little of the systemic social changes that occurred in the eighth century leaked into the traditional narrative content.⁵

II

Dark Age leaders had considerable authority but little power. Archaic Age leaders had actual power, that is, they could apply sanctions. Let us be clear in our definitions. By power, I mean the ability, on a continuing basis, to compel compliance with one's wishes. Authority, a more elusive concept, has been defined succinctly as 'the faculty of gaining another man's assent'.⁶ Ideologically legitimated authority, though it cannot force, can command obedience even from the unwilling, at least for a time.

The essential differences between authority and power lie in the ability to control. Authority rules mainly through persuasion and example, and tradition. Power, while not neglecting these, rules by compulsion. The measure of power is the sanctions it can impose. By sanctions is meant the mechanisms of restrictive and punitive social control that are available to the leaders. Rulership of the restrictive and punitive kind, according to sociologists, comes about when, and only when, first of all, the leaders control the *sources and distribution of wealth*, and thus can offer or withhold the means of subsistence, and second, when they possess some organized means of *physical coercion*, and thus can directly force mass obedience. The *ideological acceptance* of the rulers as a special and superior class of persons legitimizes their economic exploitation and use of physical force.⁷

A useful method of illustrating the extent of increase of aristocratic power in early Archaic Greece is to compare 'refusal and compliance costs' in the chiefdom and in the early-state societies with respect to the three forms of sanction. As Jonathan Haas explains it, when people are subjected to demands by a 'power-holder', they ponder the costs to themselves of refusing or complying. Their decision and response, therefore, are a good measurement of relative power at that time.⁸ Here we must remind ourselves that the dynamics of the interactions between individual power-holders and individual 'respondents' are different from those between a power-holder and a mass of respondents, and that the nature of the interactions will differ depending on the social levels of the individuals and groups involved. Epic poetry naturally concentrates on confrontations between high-ranking individuals. Still, Homer gives enough examples of the leader-people relationship to show that refusal and compliance costs to the people (*demos/laos*) were both fairly low in the Dark Age.

Force is the ultimate sanction; its possession assures compliance. There are limits, however, to the application or threat of violence in Homer. While chiefs, backed up by their friends and relations (*philoî*) and retainers (*therapontes*), are able physically to coerce individuals, it is made plain that a chief and his followers, or a combination of chiefs and their followers, could not force the collective people to comply with their will.⁹ The suitors of Penelope take for granted that the Ithacans, if sufficiently aroused, can stop them and their followers from their mission and send them packing from the *demos* (*Od.* 16.370–82). In this situation the compliance costs to the Ithacans were low; it cost them nothing to allow the suitors to consume Telemachus' patrimony and undermine the chiefly line. Plainly, though, they had the power, through sheer numbers and righteousness, to force the leaders to comply with their will. Antinous' father, Eupheithes, was stripped of his leadership authority and threatened with confiscation of his property and death for going against the people's wishes. The powerlessness of the leaders in the face of mass opposition is one of the things that separates chiefdoms from states.¹⁰

Turning now to economic relationships, we read that the *demos* honours the *basileis* 'like gods', with gifts.¹¹ The fact that Homeric *basileis* demand and duly receive gifts from the people is commonly taken to mean that the *basileis* imposed economic sanctions on the populace. We should regard this requirement rather as an ideological sanction. To enrich the *basileus* with gifts was in accordance with the natural order of human society. It was *themis*. There is no hint in Homer that what anthropologists call 'chiefly dues' were excessive or were extorted by threats of violence. As Timothy Earle formulates it, 'in simple chiefdoms the actual amount of labour and goods being mobilized from a dependent population was sufficiently small to present a low cost of compliance [while]...the cost of refusal need be only minimal'.¹² On the other hand, for an individual or *oikos* to refuse to give to a chief was a violation of custom, and the use of force by the *basileus* might well be justified in the eyes of the other *oikoi*.

There is no irony intended in the use of the word *dora* for the people's compliance costs. The givers think of them as gifts; and gifts suppose a reciprocal gift. The chief's obligatory counter-gift to his people was competent and just leadership.¹³ The fact that materially the *basileus* comes out the overall gainer is perfectly right and proper, so long as the profit extracted does not violate the underlying principle of reciprocity, that is, does not degenerate into negative reciprocity, taking without giving back. There is no evidence in Homer that the chiefs either controlled access to the means of subsistence or played a significant role as collectors and redistributors of the people's production. This is what we would expect in Dark Age Greece where, from the eleventh to the eighth century, there was much unused and underused land and few people. This is not a landscape in which to imagine a large portion of the *demos* being dependent on the chiefs for their daily bread. The assumption, on the contrary, is that the member families hold allotments of farmland (*kleroi*) which provide them with an independent living.¹⁴

Why then, if not through force or economic compulsion, do the *laoi* heed and obey the *basileis*, honour them like gods with gifts, treat them with a respect bordering on reverence, and submit to their occasional acts of *hubris*? The answer is that their compliance is rooted in the belief that Zeus has ordained and sustains the office of *basileus*. There is no reason to doubt that the living Greeks of 800, or of 900, or of 1000, for that matter, believed that the right of a *basileus* to rule in the manner of a

basileus was divinely sanctioned.¹⁵ The office of *basileus* embodied what Max Weber called ‘traditional authority’. The Greeks of 800, for whom the chieftdom was an ancient institution, could not have entertained any notion or wish that the system could change. This implies, by the way, that the low-level chieftdom was functional, that is, that it served the practical requirements of government effectively and efficiently until it changed in the eighth century.

The effectiveness of a given leader depended to a significant degree on his ‘charismatic authority’ (Weber again), the belief of the followers in the leader’s special personal qualities and capacities. In Homeric society, charismatic authority is especially connected to military leadership. In the Catalogue of the Ships, Nireus of Syme leads only three ships, fewer than half of the next smallest contingent, because he was ‘a weak man (*alapadnos*) and few people (*pauros laos*) followed him’ (*Il.* 2. 671–5). Nireus was the sanctioned leader of the Symeans because he was the son of the *anax* Charops. He held traditional or ‘patriarchal’ authority but lacked charismatic authority.

A fundamental factor of the instability of chieftdoms is that leadership roles in chieftdom societies are both ascribed and achieved. What gave an ineffectual warrior like Nireus the right to lead the people, and to sacrifice to the gods on their behalf, and to judge their disputes, was the office itself which, by virtue of these functions, endowed the holder with a halo of charismatic authority. On the other hand, it becomes questionable whether the lineage of Charops will keep the power in Syme, since competitiveness and merit by achievement are dominant cultural values. The tension between achievement and position is so prominent a theme of Greek epic that it must reflect the contemporary society’s recognition of this as a social-structural problem.

A charismatic personality would be magnified by the traditional authority of the office and vice versa. A strong leader could make the chieftainship powerful, while a less able leader was protected, or at least cushioned somewhat, from threats to his tenure by rivals or the disgust of the people. Thus, the suitors have severe misgivings about assassinating Telemachus, despite his total lack of power. As Amphinomus says to them, δεινόν δέ γένος βασιλήϊόν ἐστι κτείνειν, ‘it is a dread thing to kill a man of chiefly lineage’—and he warns them that before they act they would first have to consult the will of Zeus (*Od.* 16. 400–5). Let us note that the religious function *per se* was not a source of sanction. In many societies on the way to statehood the religious role of the leaders expands enormously, giving them exceptional ideological power from which they derive economic and political power. There was none of that in Greece. The Homeric *basileus* is not a priest-king; he neither speaks for the gods, nor can he threaten the people with divine punishment if he is disobeyed.¹⁶ As guardian of the *themistes*, the *basileus* possesses something of the Weberian ‘legal-rational authority’; yet this constitutional power is not absolute, but is diffused among the elders in council and assembly.

Thus, in brief, a *basileus* may claim his word and will as law, yet this will be so only if he can make it so, and the structural means available to him to do this are extremely limited. When we add up and average out, so to speak, refusal and compliance costs to both sides in the power equation, we find a rough equivalency. The leaders and the people understood that their relationship was reciprocal. All social relationships were based on the idea of reciprocity, both positive and negative, but the relationship of a *basileus* and a *laos* was a special kind of reciprocity, that had evolved in the post-Mycenaean chieftdoms into a quasi-formal contract expressing the mutual rights and obligations of the abstract ‘people’ (*demos/laos*) and the abstract ‘figure of the leader’ (*basileus*).

III

By 700, power relations had altered considerably in the areas of the emerging city-states. The governing elite were now big landowners who increased their ownership of farmland at a time of rapid population growth.¹⁷ A growing number of land-poor families were dependent on them for their livelihoods, while average smallholders found fewer opportunities for wealth under the aristocrats’ now hereditary monopoly of the best farmland. Tighter economic control was accompanied by tighter political control. Throughout the seventh century, for the most part, oligarchies of wealth and birth retained exclusive control of the positions of authority, the magistracies and the councils, and constricted the power of the assembly to initiate public policy. Governmental power was greatly enhanced by the mighty sanction of the law, which evolved rapidly as an instrument of social control in the seventh century. On both the practical and ideological levels, the costs of refusing to obey the laws and the magistrates were greatly higher than the compliance costs. The evidence shows that the oligarchs successfully used the laws and the law-courts and the power of their offices to commit injustices, as the eupatrid leaders of the people’ did in seventh-century Attica.¹⁸

Yet in all their apparent strengths lay weaknesses. First, the governors of the city-states, lacking a state police force, and with only the resources of their own households and clients, were collectively little better equipped to coerce an unwilling majority by physical force than the Dark Age *basileis* had been. Second, rule by laws that were arrived at publicly and posted in public naturally worked towards levelling the advantages of wealth and birth and curbing aristocratic excesses. By the sixth century, even though the few still controlled the assembly, councils and law-courts, the administration of justice was becoming an agent for restoring balance and reciprocity. Third, the leadership lost ideological authority in the transition from the chieftdom to the city-state. Though the laws had majesty, the magistracies did not. The *polis*-leaders inherited none of the

charisma that had attached to the figure of a *basileus*; the new governmental roles were intentionally depersonalized and functional posts, with no tradition behind them and no association with divine authority.¹⁹

Ideologies, as always in the history of societies, were a major factor in the development of the relations of power in the emerging *poleis*. The fragments of the seventh- and sixth-century poets reveal something of the vigorous debate about ‘class’ that, in retrospect, the aristocrats appear destined to lose. The self-styled *agathoi* claimed that their illustrious ancestry, old wealth, and ennobling *paideia* raised them far above the rest of the people, towards whom they displayed an undisguised contempt, calling them *hoi kakoi* and other words that described their economic, mental, moral, aesthetic, and genetic inferiority. This construction of society, of course, had little legitimacy among the *kakoi*. In the end, the *kaloi k’ agathoi*, as the elite called themselves in the fifth century, were compelled, in order to keep their leadership positions, to adapt to the competing egalitarian ideology.²⁰

On the other hand, aristocratic attitudes and beliefs were conditioned by the ideology of the *polis*, which demanded an even higher degree of tribal loyalty than before, and heightened the traditional expectation that the leaders work for the good of the *demos*. In claiming to be better than the common citizens, aristocrats could ultimately only claim to be better citizens. A key facet of the aristocratic self-presentation was the image of themselves as *hoi chrestoi*, the useful and the capable, in the *polis*, as the rest were *achreioi*, unfit to lead.²¹ Competitive display was as important as ever for acquiring *kleos* and *time*, though, as we would expect, ‘individualising’ displays of wealth give way in the early *polis* to ‘communalising’ consumption of resources for the ‘construction of monuments emphasising the group as a whole’.²²

IV

My argument has been that in the early city-states the refusal and compliance costs to the common people rose, putting them in a much more tense relationship with the leaders than before. Yet the increase of aristocratic power, though significant, was not enough for them to rule unchallenged and unchecked. Only power can curb power. In the seventh century, the checks on aristocratic dominance came from the small-farmer hoplites, the direct descendants of the rank-and-file warriors of the chiefdoms. Even though the old vertical ties still held to some extent, the hoplite farmers were emerging as a distinct social and economic third group, neither the rich nor the poor, and occupying a social level in the society that was ambivalently positioned between the superior and inferior families.

The type of polity will be determined to a great extent by the numbers of people in the three groups. Unfortunately, we have almost no numerical evidence. My guess, which is all one can do, is that in the seventh-century *poleis*, on a rough average, the ruling elite (defined as those whose landholdings afforded them a leisured life-style) made up, *at the very most*, 20 per cent of the families.²³ I have suggested that wealthy landowners possessed the means to employ brute force against the poorest citizens, although, since the legal and economic sanctions available to the *agathoi* made intimidation easy, actual violence, even when legally sanctioned, need not have been usual. My guess is that the exploited group, those with insufficient land to support themselves, or none at all, amounted to 30 per cent of the families at most.

The 50 per cent, or more, of citizens who were neither rich nor dependent tenants or *thetes* ranged in the seventh century from the well-off, though not leisured, families to those who lived at a meagre subsistence level. Assuming that half of all the free men physically able to bear arms met the hoplite requirement (a figure that I consider a minimum, rather than a maximum), then as many as six out of ten of the non-dependent-farmer group fought in the phalanx. If we take the more frequently cited estimate of a third as the maximum, then only one out of five independent farm-families and only about one of eight of all non-elite families furnished hoplites. Three of eight *non-agatboi* seems more reasonable.

I do not hesitate to call this subset the ‘middle group’ in the early *polis*. They were visibly different from the poor, who fought as light-armed troops (*gumnetes*) and were quite possibly excluded from the assemblies at that time. And they were distinct from the rich and well-born *agathoi*, who commanded them in war and peace and had their own social orbit from which the middle group were excluded. There are indications that they had articulated a self-identification as *hoi mesoi* by the sixth century.²⁵ These families, though not immune from aristocratic *hubris*, could not be ruled by force, nor, though they were economically circumscribed, were they dependent on the *agathoi* for their living. When they acted collectively, as in the militia and the assembly, in both of which they were the majority, they made a formidable group, and their opinion was powerful. Paradoxically, the division of the middle mass of Dark Age households into two distinct strata, with different refusal and compliance costs, increased the influence of the hoplite families in the power arrangements.

V

It is historically, and logically, sound to conclude that the *mesoi* were the independent variable in the frequent and extremely rapid constitutional shifts within the Archaic and Classical city-states. Where on the continuum from narrow oligarchies to full democracies a community stood was largely determined by the hoplite-farmer group. If they were content with the narrow distribution of power and agreed to, or were complicit in, the marginalization and exploitation of the weak, oligarchical

regimes reigned secure. If the middle 30 per cent of families opposed the *status quo*, and sympathized with the bottom half of the citizenry, the balance of power shifted from the elite to the mass.²⁶ The common alternative polity in the seventh and sixth centuries of a single strong man was similarly controlled by the non-elite hoplites, whose support, or at least acquiescence, a tyrant needed to seize and keep control of the *polis*. In like manner, these farmer-hoplites could assume an active role in curbing aristocratic in-fighting. The unprecedented concepts of citizen equality and citizen power, which evolved in the city-states, were rooted in an ancient tradition of the worth of the individual and the collective authority of the people, and were realized in the emergence of the unprecedented 'middle class'.

NOTES

- 1 Fried, *The Evolution of Political Society*.
- 2 Van Wees, *Status Warriors*, 56.
- 3 See Raaflaub, pp. 53–7 below.
- 4 Forrest, *The Emergence of Greek Democracy*, chapter 2; Morris, *Burial and Ancient Society*, 93–6 in chapter 10.
- 5 See K. Raaflaub, in Latacz (ed.) *Zweihundert Jahre Homer-Forschung*, 207–15; van Wees, op. cit. (n. 2), ch. 1.
- 6 Fried, op. cit. (n. 1), 13.
- 7 W.G. Runciman, *Comp. Stud. in Soc. & Hist.* 24 (1982), 361.
- 8 Haas, *The Evolution of the Prehistoric State*, 155–8, 168–70, 175–6.
- 9 *Il.* 1.320–5, though it concerns two *basileis*, is evidence of the methods.
- 10 *Od.* 16.418–30; cf. 12.279–97.
- 11 *Il.* 9.154–6; *Il.* 5.78; 10.33; 11.58; 13.218; 16.605; *Od.* 14.205.
- 12 T. Earle, in Earle (ed.) *Chieftoms: Power, Economy, and Ideology*, 8. See Donlan, *CW* 75 (1982), 159–61.
- 13 Finley, *The World of Odysseus*, 2nd edition, 96–7: 'military leadership and protection...and little else' greatly underrates the *basileus*' material and service obligations.
- 14 *Il.* 15.496–9; *Od.* 6.9–10; 14.63–5; Hes. *W.D.* 37, 340–1.
- 15 *Il.* 2.205–6; 9.96–9. See Carlier, *La Royauté en Grèce*, 190–4.
- 16 Carlier, op. cit. (n. 15), 162–5; Arist. *Pol.* 3.1285b10.
- 17 For an attempt to show how they did this, see Donlan, *MH* 46 (1989), 144–5.
- 18 Solon, 4.5–25; 36.5–20 West. Callinus (fr. 1 West) and Tyrtaeus (frs 10, 11, 12 West) put compliance and refusal costs and compliance gains in the context of psychological and symbolic sanctions and rewards from *politai*.
- 19 Officials and colleges continued to bear the title of *basileus*, appropriately, since their responsibilities were judicial and religious. See J. Lenz, 'Kings and the Ideology of Kingship in Early Greece', 198–334.
- 20 Donlan, *The Aristocratic Ideal in Ancient Greece*; Stein-Hölkeskamp, *Adelskultur und Polisgesellschaft*, Starr, *The Aristocratic Temper of Greek Civilization*.
- 21 This kind of social class terminology expanded in the sixth and even more greatly in the fifth century. See Donlan, *QUCC* 27 (1977), 94–111.
- 22 Morris, op. cit. (n. 4), 189–90. Starr, op. cit. (n. 20), 49–51, emphasizes the costs to the aristocrats, 'harnessed within the polis'.
- 23 More likely closer to 15 per cent. The *ruling* families perhaps made up 5 per cent of the population. Van Wees, op. cit. (n. 2), 276, estimates 12 per cent elite; Morris, op. cit. (n. 4), 157, guesses one 'noble' family to five or six 'non-noble households' (i.e. 17–20 per cent).
- 24 Estimates of one-third to less than a half: A.M. Snodgrass, *JHS* 85 (1965), 114; P. Cartledge, *JHS* 97 (1977), 23. V.D. Hanson, *The Other Greeks*, 479, estimates that half the citizens in fifth-century Athens were in the 'hoplite, landowning class'. Morris, op. cit. (n. 4), 94, 206, guesses that the *agathoi* (=the hoplites) varied between 25 and 50 per cent of the adult populations.
- 25 For example, Phocylides, 12 Diehl. Thus of the free families: 20 per cent = cavalry and hoplites = *hoi agathoi* (the top families being a fraction of these); 30 per cent = hoplites = *hoi mesoi* (*hoi kakoi* to the elite); 20 per cent = *gumnetai* = poorer farmers below hoplite census; 30 per cent = landless (many, if not all, would have fought as light-armed or as seamen). Of the Boeotian forces at the battle of Delium (Thuc. 4.93.3) about 6 per cent were cavalry, 39 per cent hoplites, 55 per cent light-armed. See Hanson, op. cit. (n. 24), 210–11. On *mesoi* = *kakoi*, see *ibid.*, 109.
- 26 See J. Holladay, *G&R* 24 (1977), 51; de Ste Croix, *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World*, 291–2.
- 27 The assembly elected Pittacus *aisumnetes* in Mytilene around 600 (Alcaeus, fr. 348 Lobel and Page = 163 *LGS*).

SOLDIERS, CITIZENS AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE EARLY GREEK *POLIS*

Kurt A. Raaflaub

I

INTRODUCTION

Scholarship on 'Homeric Society' is in flux. New approaches to and reinterpretations of well-known evidence have made parts of Finley's long dominant *The World of Odysseus* obsolete. Finley's main point, however, now finds increasing support: 'Homeric Society' is neither a product of poetic fantasy nor an unrealistic amalgam of cultural traits from the Bronze to the Archaic Ages—although both are true to some extent—but a largely consistent depiction of a real society. This society probably should be dated near the poet's own, about a century later than Finley thought.¹ In this society the *polis*—certainly in an early stage of its evolution—was a much more pervasive feature than is usually believed.² The long prevailing view that an elite of *basileis* dominated every aspect of life and that the 'commoners' counted for little has been challenged.³ Focusing primarily on military developments, I shall argue that the role of these commoners in both army and assembly, although for obvious reasons played down by the poet, was essential to society and the *polis*. This has important consequences for our understanding of the evolution of the early Greek *polis*.⁴

II

THE THEORY OF THE 'HOPLITE REVOLUTION'

This theory assumes that in early Greece a 'heroic' mode of fighting prevailed, as it seems to be depicted in the Homeric epics: the battle was decided by the leaders (*basileis*), while the masses of their followers played an inferior role. By contrast, the hoplite phalanx later required the involvement of larger masses of equally equipped and trained soldiers. Thus a new class of citizens, the free farmers who could afford the panoply, were integrated into the *polis* army and eventually achieved political integration as well. This ended the phase of elite domination of the *polis* and ushered in an age of egalitarian constitutions. Essentially, that means, military change caused political change.

This theory has a venerable tradition. Aristotle anticipated it,⁵ Eduard Meyer and Max Weber elaborated and generalized it, and Martin Nilsson formulated its essence eloquently:

Overcome by the new tactic and its demands, the Greek army of knights and the Greek aristocratic state vanished, just as later the army of knights and the feudal world of the Middle Ages were wiped out by the invention of gun powder.⁶

The underpinnings of this theory were strengthened in the 1960s by Snodgrass's seminal work on the evolution of early Greek military equipment and its political consequences. Snodgrass demonstrated that from about 750 the elements of the hoplite panoply, of various origin, were gradually combined and adapted, and by about 650 the equipment, formation and fighting tactics of the hoplite phalanx were fully developed. This evolution, says Snodgrass, took place almost entirely after Homer, and brought about a profound military, political and mental change around the mid-seventh century.⁷ With slight modifications, this theory still is widely accepted.⁸ That one of its presuppositions is untenable, however, was demonstrated almost twenty years ago.

III

MASS FIGHTING IN HOMER AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE PHALANX

Snodgrass' views did not remain unchallenged. On the one hand, Detienne and Cartledge pointed out that the hoplite shield with its double grip must have been created specifically for the needs of a massed formation.⁹ V. Hanson now argues persuasively that battle tactics usually do not follow changes in equipment but equipment develops as a consequence of changing

needs on the battlefield. The hoplite panoply was unsuitable for individual combat, focused uniquely on frontal fighting and depended on a close-ranked formation. Hence it must have been developed precisely to make an existing mode of fighting more effective.¹⁰ Now hoplite shield and helmet are first attested shortly before 700. Accordingly, in the second half of the eighth century, at the latest, fighting tactics must have begun to change in the direction of more densely packed mass formations, and this development necessitated, and in turn was advanced by, the development of armour and weapons that were suited particularly for this type of fighting. Snodgrass now agrees that the long transitional phase of experimentation with new equipment, which he thought preceded the phalanx, in fact was largely identical with the gradual development of the phalanx itself.¹¹

On the other hand, Latacz, Pritchett and van Wees have re-examined the Homeric battle descriptions. Their reconstructions of Homeric battle differ widely, but all have found consistent evidence for mass fighting.¹² For my present purposes, this is all that matters. Despite exaggeration and—unrealistic, but poetically necessary and dramatically effective—focus on the deeds of heroic individuals, enhanced by elite ideology (as it is expressed concisely in Odysseus' rebuke of the commoners in *Il.* 2.200–2), mass fighting in the *Iliad* is indeed of decisive importance. The poet's frequent emphasis on the exemplary and selective function of his descriptions and the importance accorded to all fighters, explicit scenes of mass fighting, the battle exhortations, the similes, and the egalitarian methods of distributing the booty¹³—these and other indications clearly reveal the poet's basic conception of battle: into the framework of two mass armies confronting each other along an extended battle line he fits a kaleidoscope of typical scenes that focus on both individual and collective efforts, switching from a bird's-eye perspective to a close-up view and back. Even Snodgrass and Cartledge now agree that 'mass armies, and not heroic champions, are the decisive element in Homeric battle'.¹⁴ Although crucial technological and tactical changes took place after Homer, what we see in the *Iliad* is thus essentially an early precursor of the hoplite phalanx. In fact, the poet observes that the avoidance of individual exploits and strict adherence to tight formations, 'friend defending friend from headlong slaughter' (17.364), helps secure victory and greatly reduces losses. Such insights must have been at the root of the idea of the hoplite phalanx.¹⁵

That mass fighting is decisive in Homer is of the greatest importance. It eliminates not just a stone in a mosaic but one of the pillars on which traditional views of the evolution of the *polis* and Archaic Greek society have rested. If the elite did not dominate the battlefield and monopolize military power, the entire picture changes.

IV PATTERNS OF WARFARE

In the eighth century, even in an age of burgeoning panhellenism, singers and audiences would have found it difficult to imagine a ten-year war fought abroad by a gigantic army under the supreme command of the king of Mycenae and comprising contingents from many areas in Hellas. In describing this war, the poet naturally utilized phenomena that were familiar to his time. Raiding expeditions by land or sea, carried out by warrior bands of various size under the leadership of one or more nobles, are exemplified by Achilles' forays from the camp at Troy, by Odysseus' stops on his way home, and by the fictitious biography of Odysseus 'the Cretan'.¹⁶ Communal wars between neighboring *poleis* often developed out of such raids. One of the scenes on the shield of Achilles combines several phases of such neighbourhood conflicts (*Il.* 18.509–40); so does Nestor's story of the war between Pylians and Epeians in his youth (11.670–761) and the story of the origins of the Trojan War itself, as it is interpreted by the poet: a private expedition led by a young nobleman yields a beautiful woman and lots of precious objects; ambassadors demand the return of both; their demands are rejected in the Trojan assembly, which thus shares the responsibility for the decision (3.205–24; 11.138–42); the injured party's community then fights a retaliatory war against the perpetrator's *polis*. Quite logically, the Trojan War resembles a war between two neighbouring cities: Troy on one side and the temporary Achaean *polis* on the shore¹⁷ on the other side of a large and fertile plain—a familiar constellation and often a cause of war throughout Greek history. Communal involvement in war is mentioned often in passing and thus was normal.¹⁸

Private and communal forms of warfare equally co-existed throughout Archaic Greek history. The earliest wars between neighbouring *poleis* are attested precisely for, but not earlier than, the last third of the eighth century: the conquest of Messenia, the Lelantine War, and many others. Conversely, naval raids appear on early vases. Herodotus offers stories of private warrior bands roaming the coasts of the Mediterranean. Private or semi-private actions are attested through the early fifth century and may account for much of the early fighting, for example, between Athenians and Aeginetans, Megarians, and Mytilenaeans, which later generations naturally interpreted as communal.¹⁹ Solon's 'law of corporations' includes groups specialized in taking booty (F 76a Ruschenbusch).

Such extensive convergence between the epic world and history is significant. Snodgrass's and Donlan's complementary reconstructions of Dark Age (*pre-polis*) society provide the larger historical context. With few possible exceptions (pointed out by Morris), the population, vastly reduced in numbers compared to the Bronze Age, lived in scattered villages, surrounded by farms and pastures and consisting of small groups of families which engaged in subsistence farming and herding, and

followed the lead of their ablest member, a sort of chieftain.²⁰ Warfare must have consisted of raids and limited expeditions against neighbouring lands and coasts, conducted by warrior bands under the command of local or regional leaders. There simply were not enough bodies and there probably was little need for massed fighting in any kind of close-ranked formation.

From the tenth to the eighth centuries the population grew with increasing speed. Contacts with other peoples broadened. The economy was transformed. Settlements expanded, new ones sprung up, previously unoccupied lands were cultivated. In the course of this process *the polis* ‘crystallized’, often coalescing from several neighbouring villages. As the *polis* territories were filled up, land became precious, resulting in conflicts both within each *polis* and with neighbouring *poleis*. There emerged the notions of ‘territoriality’ and fixed boundaries, often marked by rural sanctuaries.²¹ Wars broke out about the control of land. The citizens thus had to be able to defend their fields. The response was massed fighting in communal armies, made possible and necessitated by increased population densities, increasing and widespread wealth sufficient to afford the necessary equipment, and the new organizational structures of the early *polis*. As fighting for the existential base, if not the existence, of the *polis* became increasingly important, ways were sought to improve the effectiveness of the citizen army: technological and tactical changes interacted with economic and social changes to produce, at the end of a long process, the hoplite phalanx. By the late eighth century, then, mass fighting in communal armies and wars between neighbouring communities had become part of the normal experience of life—so much so that the poet of the *Iliad* naturally incorporated them into his descriptions.

V

SOCIAL AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS: THE PHALANX AND THE EVOLUTION OF THE POLIS

In examining some of the consequences of such experiences, we should begin by expelling from the closets of our textbooks two skeletons that have lingered there far too long. One is the theory that tyranny and hoplite phalanx were directly connected, that is, that tyrants rose to power in Greek *poleis* with the backing—and perhaps in turn promoting the interests—of the ‘hoplite class’ or, alternatively, that they introduced the phalanx.²² Apart from chronological problems, it is clear that the farmers who served in the hoplite army were not a conscious, unified class in economic or political terms, ready to support the highest bidder. With the consensus on a gradual development rather than sudden introduction of the hoplite system, and with changes in our understanding of tyranny, this theory has become untenable.²³ The hoplite-farmers were *the* essential group among the citizens. Those who failed to qualify did not count for much socially and politically. To say that tyrants were supported by hoplites is thus equivalent to saying that they found support among those citizens who mattered. This has nothing to do with the phalanx *per se*.

The other skeleton is the theory of the ‘hoplite revolution’ with which I began. It is not tenable either if for at least a full century before 650 mass fighting had been an integral part of the experience of war and in fact provided the impetus for the development of the phalanx. Instead, I propose, first, the *polis*, the phalanx and the sphere of ‘the political’ in the *polis* evolved in an interactive process over a long period of time; second, the concepts of land ownership and ‘territoriality’ were inseparable components of this interrelated process;²⁴ and, finally, *polis* aristocracies, rather than pre-dating the phalanx and capable of manipulating it, controlling access to it and conceding rights in connection with it, evolved as part of that same process. To emphasize, I do not deny the importance of the military factor but I question its role as sole or primary agent of political change. This is a tall claim. It obviously cannot stand only on the basis of the military evidence discussed so far. Objections will be raised immediately. In the remainder of this chapter, I shall present arguments to support my thesis and refute such objections.

First, Snodgrass had good reasons to date the breakthrough of the phalanx to the mid-seventh century. Around that time, cheap, mass-produced lead hoplite figurines were dedicated in Spartan sanctuaries in rapidly increasing numbers; a seal found in Sparta represents hoplites as well; hoplite equipment was dedicated in other sanctuaries, subsequent to the disappearance of warrior burials with arms; the poetry of Archilochus and especially Tyrtaeus seems to reflect changing fighting modes (although this is contested), and protocorinthian vases show pictures with hoplites and phalanx fighting.²⁵ All this seems to indicate an important shift in public conscience connected precisely with the phalanx. But was it provoked by the *introduction* rather than the *perfection* and *formalization* of phalanx warfare? Even after a long and gradual development, such formalization must have been accompanied by incisive changes in the *polis*. Organizational structures needed to be introduced, definitions (who qualified, who not?) debated and accepted, with possible implications for status and political participation.²⁶ This process roughly coincided with another, more general one, of formalizing political institutions and offices.²⁷ Hence changes in communal consciousness that were at least partly connected with the phalanx are not surprising—even if the phalanx was not entirely new at that time and no new class of citizens had recently been integrated into it.

Second, Cartledge emphasizes a significant point: since hoplites had to provide their own equipment, not only economic capacity but also the will to enroll was required, and that made the hoplites members in a civic corporation and explains the apportionment of political prerogatives in accordance with military function.²⁸ No doubt, the principle of self-equipment was

of decisive importance. The panoply was not inexpensive. To be a hoplite determined status and ‘belonging’ in the community. But questions remain. Did the hoplite-farmers really, as is always assumed, represent only a small segment of the community? I seriously doubt it but cannot discuss this here.²⁹ Was qualification initially determined simply by the ability to own the (or some of the) equipment—and when and why was this criterion changed to that of economic capacity measured in agrarian produce?³⁰ Could the panoply, moreover, be acquired through spoils or passed on through families and generations—fitting being cheaper than buying? If so, even more men could have qualified, and economic capacity might initially have been a relative, not absolute, criterion. And, if being a hoplite determined status, would citizens not be willing to make sacrifices and buy a shield rather than, say, a new coat? At any rate, I object to the assumption, underlying traditional arguments, that hoplites might have been unwilling to serve. If the enemy attacked your fields, you would want to help defend them: the hoplites fought on their land for their land. This determined the social and ideological implications of the phalanx from the beginning and for centuries to come. Nor should the linking of military and political aspects in timocratic systems be overstated. The basic division was threefold: those who owned horses (the status symbol of the elite), those who (depending on which interpretation of *zeugitai* we accept) fought in the phalanx or, perhaps more probably, owned a yoke of oxen (the status symbol of the citizens who mattered), and the rest.³¹

Third, how can a militarily empowered citizen body be compatible with an assembly, such as it appears in Homer, that is usually deemed insignificant because it seems passive and powerless? The fact is rather that the Homeric assembly plays a crucial role. Every action and decision with importance to the community takes place in an assembly, whether at war, on an expedition, or in the peaceful *polis*. The people witness such actions, listen to the debate, express their approval or dissent collectively (by voice or even feet!), and share the responsibility for the outcome.³² In the ancient world the normal assembly model was not that of democratic Athens but that of Sparta, Macedonia and Rome, directly descended from the Homeric version: it lacked initiative and *isegoria*, and it depended largely on elite leaders or officials.

In the interactive model I propose this makes sense. As the *polis* evolved, the men who owned the land fought in the army to defend the territory of the *polis* and sat in the assembly to participate in its decisions. These men were politically integrated all along, to the extent possible and normal at the time. At the same time, the former elite of village heads evolved into a stratified aristocracy. But, under the conditions of Dark Age Greece, these leaders held precarious positions and did not stand far above their men. In the evolving *polis* they lacked opportunities as well to set themselves up as a distant, rigidly separate class.³³ Despite splendour in lifestyle and self-presentation, the elite’s position continued to be precarious; vertical mobility (exemplified by Odysseus ‘the Cretan’, later by Theognis) remained a possibility—downward by those who lost their wealth, and upward by those who did well, for example, by making a fortune in raiding and trading trips abroad.³⁴

Yet essential parts of Archaic poetry reflect elite predominance and show at least parts of the *demos* in various relationships of dependence. Is this compatible in principle with the *demos*’ fighting in the *polis* army or phalanx? The traditional response is negative: Odysseus’ rebuking of the *demos* as worthless in war and council (*Il.* 2.200–2) is widely seen not as an expression of ideology but as reflecting the norm and reality, and Hesiod, to cite Bryant, ‘crystallizes the “moral economy” of a *demos* in dependence’, which is generally taken to be incompatible with a militarily active and politically significant *demos*.³⁵ But is this necessarily correct? Citizen participation in politics, in an elementary but communally important way, involving the same men who served in the army, evidently *was* compatible with elite domination. Elite ideology aimed at enhancing such domination and increasing the distance between elite and masses. Continuing economic and social differentiation would reinforce such trends, resulting in a sense of great superiority and abuses of power on the part of the elite, and, among the commoners, in both real and perceived dependency and powerlessness (as we find it in Hesiod, Solon and the ‘Solonian crisis’).³⁶ The commoners’ military involvement might not in itself suffice to stem this trend, especially if it pre-dated the sketched developments and if the intensity and meaning of hoplite warfare changed over time.

Fourth, this brings up another important point. Contrary to common views, war among Greek *poleis* was endemic but not permanent, and it lost much of its existential threat once the *polis* system was in place and somewhat balanced (roughly by the late seventh century). I do not intend to minimize the seriousness of the wars fought in fairly regular intervals between Hellenic *poleis*. But the impact of such wars seems to have decreased. Phalanx fighting, as Connor emphasizes, was increasingly ‘ritualized’.³⁷ Various explanations have been proposed for this phenomenon: the agonistic spirit of the Greeks, or the function of war to ‘integrate the young into the patriotic community’. As Burkert puts it, each generation had ‘the right and the obligation to have its war’.³⁸ I suggest that such ritualization could evolve only because in the particular world of Greek *poleis* between the late seventh and early fifth centuries the function of war, normally, was to determine the prestige rather than the existence of the community of citizens who formed a *polis*. This explains why later tradition remembered so few destructions and enslavements of cities in the Archaic period.³⁹

The contrast between Rome and Sparta is illustrative: in the latter case, we find an early constitution that instituted regular meetings of the assembly and defined its place in the communal decision-making process. What made this necessary, I suggest, was less the war with Messenia itself than the helotization of the defeated, the existential threat they continually posed to the Spartiate community, and the fact that henceforth the Spartiate hoplites assumed *permanent* military responsibility for the security of their *polis*.⁴⁰ The difference in warfare between ‘permanent and existential or essential’ and

‘occasional and ritual’ was decisive. In *poleis* that were less permanently threatened the military factor might have had less of an impact.⁴¹

If, then, in most *poleis* the *formalization* of egalitarian structures—perhaps quite common by the late Archaic period—was not directly related to the hoplite phalanx, what brought it about? Morris proposes as a cause a major economic change, visible in large areas of the Greek world in the late sixth and early fifth centuries.⁴² For my purpose, this is too late. The process I am interested in began in Athens and other places in the late seventh century. It probably was a difficult process and could only be realized under the pressure of profound changes in society or major threats to it.

If, with few exceptions, not danger from the outside, the decisive factor perhaps was danger from within the *polis*: in-fighting among elite families, their abuse of social and economic power, and severe social conflicts posed existential threats to the *polis* as well. The formalization of institutions, the enactment of written law and the appointment of mediators and legislators with extraordinary power served as means, supported by the entire *polis*, to overcome such crises.⁴³ So too the *formal* political empowerment of the farmers served the purpose of stabilizing the *polis* that was in danger of complete destabilization. As such, it was essentially welcomed and supported by elite and non-elite citizens alike, each for their own good reasons. The fact that these farmers were hoplites was the condition, a necessary but neither a sufficient nor the immediate cause of their integration: membership in the phalanx was one of three interconnected factors (besides ‘citizenship’ and ownership of land) that were crucial in determining membership in the essential part of the citizen body.⁴⁴

VI CONCLUSION

I have argued that, if examined for its effects on the further development of the *polis*, the evidence of Homeric and early Greek warfare leaves no space for a hoplite revolution. The land-owning farmers from the very beginning formed an integral element, both militarily and politically, in the evolving *polis*. Owing to this triple role of landowners, soldiers and assembly-men, they naturally became *the* essential part of the citizen body. Despite such foundations of equality in the early Greek *polis*, economic and social differentiation continued and resulted in elite domination and abuse of power. The farmers, who all along played an essential informal role in the assembly, later on were *formally* integrated in ‘isonomic’ *polis* constitutions, with few exceptions (especially that of Sparta) not primarily as a result of their contribution to the phalanx, but as a result of serious social crisis and in an effort, supported by the entire *polis*, to stabilize the community and set it on a broader base of citizen involvement and communal responsibility.

NOTES

- 1 Finley, *The World of Odysseus*, 2nd edition; cf. I. Morris, *CA* 5 (1986), 81–138; Patzek, *Homer und Mykene*; Ulf, *Die homerische Gesellschaft*; van Wees, *Status Warriors*; Murray, *Early Greece*, 2nd edition, chapter 3; Raaflaub, in Latacz (ed.) *Zweihundert Jahre Homer-Forschung*, 207–15, and in Fisher and van Wees (eds) *Archaic Greece*, with more bibliography on supporters and opponents of this view.
- 2 Van Wees, op. cit. (n. 1), chapter 2; Raaflaub, in Hansen (ed.) *The Ancient Greek City-State*, 41–105.
- 3 Starr, *The Economic and Social Growth of Early Greece, 800–500 B.C.*, chapter 6.
- 4 I use terms such as state, city, or citizens in a loose, non-technical sense. Restrictions of space force me to be very brief. More detailed discussions of the many complex issues involved will be presented elsewhere.
- 5 Arist. *Pol.* 4.1297b16–28. Aristotle’s observation ‘of a strict isomorphism between political power and military function’ (P. Cartledge, in Settis [ed.], *I Greci*, ii. I. 694) certainly is valid but as an evolutionary model applied to early Greece it is probably entirely theoretical.
- 6 Meyer, *Geschichte des Altertums*, iii, 2nd edition, 512–17; Weber, *Economy and Society* iii. 1352, 1359–60; M. Nilsson, *Klio* 22 (1929), 245.
- 7 Snodgrass, *Early Greek Armour and Weapons*; *JHS* 85 (1965), 110–12.
- 8 Cartledge, op. cit. (n. 5); Murray, op. cit. (n. 1), chapter 11; P. Bryant, *Sociological Review* 38 (1990), 484–516.
- 9 M. Detienne, in Vernant (ed.) *Problèmes de la guerre en Grèce ancienne*, 119–42; P. Cartledge, *JHS* 97 (1977), 11–27.
- 10 V. Hanson, in Hanson (ed.) *Hoplites*, 63–84.
- 11 A. M. Snodgrass, *DHA* 19 (1993), 47–61; cf. J. Salmon, *JHS* 97 (1977), 84–101.
- 12 Latacz, *Kampfparänese, Kampfdarstellung und Kampfwirklichkeit*; Pritchett, *The Greek State at War*, iv. 1–33; H. van Wees, *G&R* 41 (1994), 1–18, 131–55.
- 13 Details in the works cited in n. 12. Booty: see M. Detienne, *Annales ESC* 20 (1965), 425–41; Havelock, *The Greek Concept of Justice*, 129–33; Nowag, *Raub und Beute*, 36–50.
- 14 Snodgrass, op. cit. (n. 11), 48; Cartledge, op. cit. (n. 5), 689.
- 15 More bibliography on the nature and evolution of the hoplite phalanx in Raaflaub, op. cit. (n. 2), 53–4, 79–80; see also H. Bowden, in Rich and Shipley (eds) *War and Society in the Greek World*, 45–63.

- 16 *Il.* 1.123–6, 366–9; 2.690–3; 6.414–27; *Od.* 9.39–61; 14.211–75; cf. Nowag, op. cit. (n. 13); A.Jackson, in Rich and Shipley, op. cit. (n. 15), 64–76; T.Rihll, *ibid.*, 77–107.
- 17 Raaflaub, op. cit. (n. 2), 47–8.
- 18 *Od.* 2.28–32; 14.237–9, 16.424–30; 21.15–21 reflect communal efforts to prevent the escalation of private into public warfare.
- 19 Ahlberg-Cornell, *Fighting on Land and Sea in Greek Geometric Art*, the story of the Spartan Dorieus is but one example (*Her.* 5.41–8); Berve, *Gestaltende Kräfte der Antike*, 2nd edition, 232–67; Herman, *Ritualised Friendship and the Greek City*, F.J. Frost, *Historia* 33 (1984), 283–94; Figueira, *Athens and Aigina in the Age of Imperial Colonization*, chapter 5; Humphreys, *Anthropology and the Greeks*, 165.
- 20 Snodgrass, *An Archaeology of Greece*, chapter 6; W.Donlan, *MH* 46 (1989), 129–45; *SO* 64 (1989) 5–29; I.Morris, in Rich and Wallace-Hadrill (eds) *City and Country in the Ancient World*, 25–57.
- 21 De Polignac, *La Naissance de la cité grecque*. See generally Snodgrass, *Archaic Greece*, and in Hansen, op. cit. (n. 2), 30–40; Starr, op. cit. (n. 3), and *Individual and Community*, and the bibliography cited by Raaflaub, op. cit. (n. 2), and in Latacz, op. cit. (n. 1), 239–47.
- 22 Andrewes, *The Greek Tyrants*, 36–8; Andrewes, *The Greeks*, 58; Forrest, *The Emergence of Greek Democracy*, 104–5; see also Cartledge, op. cit. (n. 9), 21–4; Salmon, op. cit. (n. 11), 92–101; de Ste Croix, *The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World*, 280–2.
- 23 A.M.Snodgrass, *JHS* 85 (1965), 116; Starr, op. cit. (n. 3), 178–80; McGlew, *Tyranny and Political Culture in Ancient Greece*; Stahl, *Aristokraten und Tyrannen im archaischen Athen*.
- 24 I cannot discuss this here in detail (see Snodgrass, *Archaic Greece*, 37–40, and in Hansen, op. cit. [n. 2], 37–9) but suggest that the connection, typical of the developed *polis*, between land ownership, military capacity and citizenship or political rights existed already in the Homeric *polis*, albeit in an undeveloped and unformalized way.
- 25 Snodgrass, op. cit. (n. 23), 116; Snodgrass, *Archaic Greece*, 99–100, 105–6; Cartledge, op. cit. (n. 9), 26–7; Salmon, op. cit. (n. 11), 85–92.
- 26 Some thoughts on this in Snodgrass, op. cit. (n. 11), 60–1, and *Arms and Armour of the Greeks*, 61.
- 27 Stein-Hölkeskamp, *Adelskultur und Polisgesellschaft*, 94–103; H.-J.Gehrke, in *Colloquium...A.Heuss*, 49–67.
- 28 Cartledge, op. cit. (n. 5), 105.
- 29 Cf. Donlan and Foxhall, pp. 45–6 above and p. 131 below.
- 30 As reflected in *Ath. Pol.* 7.3–4; cf. Rhodes, *Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia*, 138.
- 31 *Zeugitai*: most scholars now prefer the military interpretation: see Rhodes, loc. cit.; D.Whitehead, *CQ* 31 (1981), 282–6. In favour of the socio-economic interpretation see Foxhall, p. 131 with p. 136 n. 109 below.
- 32 Havelock, op. cit. (n. 13), chapter 7; F.Gschnitzer, in *Festschrift R.Muth*, 151–63, and in Latacz, op. cit. (n. 1), 182–204; Carlier, *La Royauté en Grèce*, part 2; Raaflaub, op. cit. (n. 2), 54–5, with more bibliography.
- 33 This needs to be pursued further: see Starr, op. cit. (n. 3, 21); Donlan, *The Aristocratic Ideal*, chapter 1; Stein-Hölkeskamp, op. cit. (n. 27), chapter 2; Raaflaub, in Latacz, op. cit. (n. 1), 230–8, with more bibliography.
- 34 *Od.* 14.199–234; Theognis 53–8, 173–8, 267–70, 525–6, 667–70; see also 183–96, 1109–14.
- 35 Bryant, op. cit. (n. 8), 492.
- 36 Hes. *W.D.* 33–9, 202–12; Solon, frs. 4.5–14 and 4c West; see also Theognis 39–52, 1081–2b. Solonian crisis: e.g., Rhodes, op. cit. (n. 30), 90–7; T.Gallant, *BSA* 77 (1982), 111–24; A.Andrewes, *C.A.H.*, 2nd edition, iii.3. 375–91; Murray, op. cit. (n. 1), chapter 11. Elite ideology in Homer: van Wees, op. cit. (n. 1). This issue obviously needs further discussion.
- 37 W.R.Connor, *P&P* 119 (1988), 3–29 Cartledge, op. cit. (n. 5), 697–702. Impact of wars: Raaflaub, *Die Entdeckung der Freiheit*, 82–92, and in Eder (ed.) *Staat und Staatlichkeit in der frühen römischen Republik*, 516–31.
- 38 Burkert, *Homo Necans*, 48; recent discussion: C.Meier, *HZ* 251 (1990), 563–78.
- 39 Ducrey, *Le Traitement des prisonniers de guerre*, 112; Karavites, *Capitulations and Greek Interstate Relations*, 33–5, 130.
- 40 On Sparta, see the bibliography cited in Raaflaub, op. cit. (n. 2), 64–8, and Thommen, *Lakedaimonion Politeia*; on Rome: Raaflaub, *HZ* 238 (1984), 552–63, and in *Transitions to Empire...E.Badian*, 273–314.
- 41 Conversely, it played a decisive role, owing to the essential function assumed permanently by the fleet, in Athens' evolution towards democracy after the Persian Wars: Raaflaub, in Kinzl (ed.) *Demokratia*, 35–6, and in Morris and Raaflaub (eds) *Democracy 2500*.
- 42 I.Morris, in Ober and Hedrick (eds) *Demokratia*; Robinson, *Early Greek Democracies Outside Athens*.
- 43 See the bibliography in Raaflaub, op. cit. (n. 2), 68–75; Gehrke, op. cit. (n. 27).
- 44 On early concepts of citizenship, see Walter, *An der Polis teilhaben*; Manville, *The Origins of Citizenship in Ancient Athens*. At least in fifth-century Athens metics too served as hoplites: this poses the question whether and to what extent hoplite status ever was an exclusive citizen privilege.
- 45 On the latter aspect, see Meier, *The Greek Discovery of Politics*, chapters 3 and 4.

LOPPING OFF THE HEADS?

Tyrants, politics and the *polls*

John Salmon

I'm sure that you will all recognise the reference in my title to the story in Herodotus (5.92.ζ.2–η.1): Periander tyrant of Corinth sent to ask Thrasybulus of Miletus how to arrange affairs in the city most safely, and was treated to a performance instead of a spoken answer. Thrasybulus took the messenger into a field of corn, silently cut off the tallest ears and threw them away. The messenger was baffled; but when report was made to Periander, he understood all too well: Thrasybulus had 'urged him to murder those who were outstanding among the citizens'. So, Herodotus continues, 'Periander finished those murders and banishments which Cypselus had left undone.' Aristotle told the same story but reversed the roles of Periander and Thrasybulus;¹ no doubt he assumed that Periander, the typical tyrant, had nothing to learn but much to teach about the techniques of repression.

It is unclear, however, whether the story originally had that repressive implication. Another tale in Herodotus, the escape of the infant Cypselus from his Bacchiad enemies, was plainly once part of a favourable account despite its hostile context;² and the story of the heads of corn can also be given a favourable—or at least a not unfavourable—interpretation. To lop off the outstanding heads, even if it is a metaphor for executions, is not a negative act if the heads are unpopular: those of the Bacchiads certainly were. A further possibility is that the story contains a metaphor for the establishment of equality. Aristotle uses it to illustrate the repression of a typical tyrant;³ but his lengthiest reference occurs in a context in which the point is different: the effect of lopping off the heads is the same as that of ostracism in a democracy—it ensures equality among the remaining citizens (*Pol.* 3.1284a17–37).

However we interpret that story, tyranny played an important part in the political development of a number of *poleis*. But at least for Solon, it was already part of the problem, not the solution: he worked hard to avoid it. Tyranny was never identified in antiquity as a constructive phenomenon, but that is too simple a view. Despite the discouraging judgement of Solon, I shall consider the extent to which tyranny made a positive contribution to political development. I shall not be concerned with why tyrannies arose, but with what they achieved when in power.⁴ Snodgrass has suggested that 'tyrants survived by manipulating an existing system, rather than by setting up a new one'.⁵ I accept what I take to be the intended implication, that tyrants arose in what were already recognisable as *poleis*; but I prefer to put at least the consequence differently: tyrants came to power by manipulating an existing system, but they (or at least some of them) survived by setting up new ones.

It is difficult to identify constructive achievements. For all our sources, tyrant was a term of abuse. It was inevitable that tyrants should get a bad press; what defined them in later periods was their ejection after they had outlived their usefulness. Aristotle already recognised the general principle: 'most of those who gained power themselves retained their control, but those who took it over from others all, so to speak, lost it straight away' (*Pol.* 5.1312b21–3; and cf. 1313a10). In the cities of Asia Minor, the Persians ruled through tyrants, who thus overstayed their welcome for additional reasons.⁶ It did not help that, by soon after the mid-fifth century at the latest, Sparta's claim to predominance was partly supported by an assertion that, never having suffered tyranny herself, she had freed other cities from it (Thuc. 1.18.1); and a new phenomenon, late-fifth- and fourth-century tyranny, made it all too easy to suppose that Archaic tyranny was similar to contemporary examples.

The aspects of tyranny which were later emphasised give little ground for identifying constructive achievement. Various features are already found in Solon. He associated tyranny with violence: fr. 32 West has the pairing *tyrannis* and *bie ameilichos*. That is how Herodotus took the story of the lopping off of heads—and he emphasises (and probably exaggerates) the violence of both Cypselus and Periander (3.49.2–53; 5.92.α.1, δ.2–η.5). An association between tyranny and wealth is found in Archilochus (fr. 19 West), and is further emphasised by Solon (fr. 33): he imagines a critic who sneers at him for not grasping his opportunity, 'If I had the power, I should wish to take great wealth (*ploutos aphthonos*) and be tyrant of Athens for but one day, if I were then flayed alive and my family wiped out.'

A further feature of tyranny was never quite explicitly stated by Aristotle in the *Politics*, but is none the less for him a defining characteristic: it was outside the law. The assumption lies behind many passages;⁷ the absence of an explicit statement is not so much reason for doubt about the connection as evidence for such certainty that Aristotle took it for granted—and could assume his readers would too. Violence and the personal advantage (and the sexual appetites) of the tyrant are

equally prominent; the extra two centuries of experience Aristotle could draw on enabled him to add numerous methods and examples of repression and self-indulgence.⁸

Violence, perks and lawlessness do not read well as part of a citation for a Nobel Prize, or even an Oscar, for political development, and at least some of these characteristics were associated with tyranny from a very early period; but we cannot automatically attribute any of them to the early tyrants. It is not entirely clear that they were known as tyrants to their contemporaries—even to their enemies among them. One of the oracles preserved by Herodotus in his story of Cypselus addresses him as *basileus* (5.92.γ.2). The same title was presumably used by Pheidon, since he was a king of the traditional kind (Arist. *Pol.* 5.1310b16–28); only later experience enabled Herodotus to label him as a tyrant (6.127.3). For Archilochus, the type of the tyrant was the Lydian Gyges (fr. 19); and the Greek tyrant contemporaries of Solon were already of the second or even third generation: Periander of Corinth and Cleisthenes of Sicyon. I do not wish to deny that contemporaries called Cypselus, the early Orthagorids and others tyrants, though I know of nothing to demonstrate that they did; but even if they did, the case of Pittacus shows how misleading the term could be. He was a tyrant to his enemy Alcaeus (fr. 163 Lobel and Page = 163 *LGS*). Aristotle, however, preferred the title of *aisymnetes*, precisely because he recognised that Pittacus was no tyrant according to the definition he knew.⁹ Pittacus was no more a tyrant in that sense than he was *kakopatrides*—which Alcaeus also called him in the same fragment.

We can conclude nothing from a name, especially one which acquired its definition later, and which in any case was not necessarily applied by contemporaries to the reality. The early tyrants must be assessed for what they did, not for what they were later called. There are persistent indications, even in the later sources, of a favourable view of early tyrants which the standard view could not eradicate. Herodotus preserved stories about Cypselus—not to mention other tyrants—which sit very ill with his own hostile attitude.¹⁰ Aristotle has a good deal of information, and even some theory, which run counter to his standard view. Early tyrants were often, in his view, demagogues (*Pol.* 5.1310b14–16, 29–31). That cannot imply anything like what it meant in fifth-century Athens; but it depends on a tradition that they relied to some extent on popular (that is, to put it at its broadest, non-elite) support. Aristotle was plainly embarrassed by the implications of that tradition. In his section on how to preserve tyranny, he begins with an account of how to do so by repressive measures; but suggests that another method is to pretend not to be a tyrant at all, but a popular ruler. That further emphasises that tyrants were often popular; Aristotle could only reconcile the fact with his theory by suggesting that they were so by pretence.¹¹ I shall attempt to interpret tyrants without being distracted by the baggage of later interpretation. A major principle is that anything preserved in the later sources which runs contrary to the standard view of the tyrant is probably accurate, or at least based on accurate tradition, like Aristotle's view that early tyrants were often demagogues. It is most unlikely that favourable stories about tyrants were invented.

Aristotle at least half recognised one of the most important constructive achievements of the tyrants: they acted as champions of the people against the rich (*plousioi*); and they were trusted by the people because they attacked the *gnorimoi* (*Pol.* 5.1305a22–3, 1310b12–16). Tyrants took a step without which development was impossible—they removed aristocracies from power. In this respect, however, they were only examples of a more general trend—they all put an end to the full power of the *basilees* of Hesiod's *Works and Days*, but they were not alone in doing so. Different *poleis* found different means to curb aristocrats, from the *rhetra* in Sparta and the legislation of Dracon and Solon in Athens to Pheidon of Argos who reversed the normal trend of his day by exploiting his position as hereditary king to establish a tyranny, presumably at the expense of Argive aristocrats.

Tyrants provided the least constructive, though sometimes the most complete, even drastic, solution to the problem of aristocratic privilege: aristocrats were under threat not just of restriction, but of elimination. No doubt that is one reason why Solon associated tyranny with violence. Solutions attempted elsewhere, based like those of Solon himself on institutions, were potentially more constructive. None the less, the mere establishment of a tyranny was at least an enabling act: even a regime of the fourth-century text-book tyrant type (if there had been any in the seventh century) would have made an advance merely by removing aristocracies from power and maintaining control itself for a decade or two.

The precise significance of the change, however, depended on circumstances in each city. At Corinth the change was abrupt: Cypselus rested his claims in part on his Bacchiad origins, but many, perhaps most, Bacchiads suffered exile or worse. That may have been necessary precisely because of the unusually narrow nature of the Bacchiad regime.¹² In Argos, by contrast, the change was more limited: Pheidon became tyrant by exploiting his position as hereditary king (Arist. *Pol.* 5.1310b18–20, 25–8), and that may have involved only informal changes in the distribution of power. There is no sign of long-lasting effects on Argive institutions—though since classical Argos retained a *basileus* (Meiggs and Lewis 42.43) that may merely be because we have insufficient information about internal arrangements at Argos. At Sicyon, it may be significant that the changes upon which the sources concentrate were established by Cleisthenes: his predecessors perhaps found extensive change unnecessary.¹³

All tyrants deprived aristocrats of power; they had far more positive achievements to their credit too. Despite the standard later view that tyrants were outside the law, they may often, on the contrary, have been at least partly responsible for the establishment of the rule of law. It was precisely the arbitrary rule of aristocrats (*dorophagoi basilees*, in Hesiod's words)

which tyrants ended; that at least enabled, even if it did not oblige, them to give greater definition to the administration of justice. Stories are preserved about some of the tyrants which suggest that they did exactly that. In Athens, Peisistratus 'did not disturb the *thesmia*' (Her. 1.59.6); under his sons 'the city used the laws which had existed before' (Thuc. 6.54.6). The tyrant established the *dikastai kata demous* (Ath. Pol. 16.5), and even appeared himself before the Areopagus on a charge of homicide (though his accuser lacked the bottle to proceed with the charge).¹⁴

Peisistratus was, however, in this respect as in many others, a special case precisely because his tyranny followed the legislation of Solon. When Peisistratus came to power, there was an already existing pattern of written law, which he followed—but also developed. In other cities, tyrants may well have originated laws themselves. General considerations make that probable enough: tyrants represent a similar stage in the history of their cities to that which Athens reached at the time of Dracon and Solon; they legislated for Athens, so it was appropriate for tyrants to legislate elsewhere. That is never asserted by our sources, but we should not expect it to be: tyranny was later taken to be the antithesis of law. None the less, a good case can be made despite the unsatisfactory state of the evidence. Even Pheidon in Argos, who was perhaps the least typical of the tyrants and the least likely to establish lasting institutions since he already enjoyed the traditional kingship, introduced the measures named after him which were used centuries later (Her. 6.127.3). We cannot tell the purpose of his arrangements, but to establish weights and measures is an act of definition close to the establishment of norms of conduct in laws: law, indeed, is needed to define the measures and require their use. It is significant that the definitions were presumably intended to protect consumers: that was the purpose of *metrologoi* and the like later, and it is difficult to see how such a definition could have benefited the elite.

Pittacus at Lesbos was called a tyrant by his contemporary enemy Alcaeus, and Aristotle gives him as one example of an *aisymnetes*, an office which he defines as that of an elective tyrant; but he was certainly responsible for establishing laws, including the notion that any given punishment for a crime was to be greater if the offender was drunk when committing the act (Pol. 2.1274b18–23).

More generally, the Delphic oracle in favour of Cypselus suggested that he would *dikaiosei de Korinthon* (Her. 5.92.β.2). That does not necessarily imply that he established laws, but in the broadest terms almost any means by which the tyrant might have brought *dike* to the city would have involved some regularisation of its system of justice. There are many details which give reason to think that the tyrants introduced legislation which lasted.¹⁵ There has been some disagreement recently over the details of the eight Corinthian local tribes,¹⁶ but at least there has been general agreement that the system was introduced by the tyrants,¹⁷ who were thus responsible for one of the longest-lasting institutions of the Corinthian *polis*. The future pattern was so heavily based on the tribes that a proverb arose about Corinthian institutions: *panta okto*, eight of everything. It is impossible to be sure exactly what the purpose of the new tribes was, but almost any view would have interesting implications for the self-perception of Corinthians: the new arrangements were locally based, and may have been designed as a conscious change from the hereditary principle. They defined the Corinthian citizen body, and that may indeed have been their main purpose. They may also have defined privileged groups within it. In an important sense, the details do not matter: such a conscious act of definition must have greatly increased the awareness of Corinthians of their identity as citizens, though it naturally still allows for a whole range of hierarchically distinct identities.

Other details suggest that Periander was responsible for sumptuary legislation; that is probably the origin of the story in Herodotus (5.92.η.1–4) that he burned all the fine clothes of Corinthian women, and the notion that he cut the Corinthian elite down to size may lie behind the story of the lopping off of heads. He restricted the ownership of slaves, presumably among the elite and not among ordinary Corinthians. An obscure council is said to have ensured that expenditure by individuals did not exceed their income, and a law with precisely that effect is recorded for fourth-century Corinth.¹⁸

For the Orthagorids at Sicyon, Aristotle is remarkably explicit: 'in many respects they were slaves to the laws' (Pol. 5.1315b15–16: *πολλά τοῖς νόμοις ἐδούλευον*). Similarly, the tribal pattern established by Cleisthenes, whatever its purpose, was retained after the fall of the regime, just like that at Corinth, though it did not last as long (cf. p. 66, below). We have no other evidence; but it is remarkable that we have even that, and it is entirely plausible to suggest that the tyrants, or at least some of them, may have performed similar functions to other Archaic lawgivers. It was the fact that they were tyrants which was remembered, and therefore reached our sources; that edged out their longer-lasting achievements. Tyrants do not bulk large in Hölkeskamp's recent account of Archaic written laws;¹⁹ but he emphasises the particular origin of many codes, and that makes it easy to fit tyrants into the pattern: where the individual circumstances of a *polis* created problems, tyrants acted.²⁰

Tyrants were responsible for other institutions which lasted. It has been suggested, especially in the case of Athens, that tyrants encouraged centralisation: since political life centred on the tyrant, who lived in the central place, the tyranny encouraged all citizens to look towards that central place, and they continued to do so after the fall of the regime. As a general principle, that seems to me doubtful: if the centralising tendency depended on the tyrant, then it lost momentum after his expulsion (or death). If, however, the tyrant encouraged the use of central institutions,²¹ then his encouragement would bear fruit later; that happened in Athens under Peisistratus with the council of four hundred and the assembly, as Cleisthenes (in the end) recognised to his advantage. A comparable pattern can be suggested for Corinth: the *probouloi*, who along with the council were closely associated with the tribal system, were a central institution in Corinthian affairs for centuries after the

tyranny. If we may judge from Aristotle's general remarks about *probouloi*, they were probably responsible for the enviable stability Classical Corinth enjoyed: it is extremely likely that they were introduced by the tyrants.²² Sicyon provides striking confirmation that institutions established by tyrants did not necessarily collapse with the fall of the regime. Herodotus affirms that Cleisthenes' change of tribe names lasted for sixty years after his death: the most likely chronology means that they outlasted the regime by well over a generation.²³ In all these respects, the tyrants created institutions which gave citizens a much clearer view of their identity.

Tyrants were often also responsible for a quite different kind of centralising tendency—an enormous improvement in the provision of public amenities, usually but not always in the central place. This was an aspect of tyrant regimes which Aristotle noted: he recorded the *anathemata* of the Cypselids, the pyramids in Egypt, the Olympieion built by the sons of Peisistratus and the works of Polycrates, as examples of schemes designed to keep subjects at work—and, strangely, poor. Perhaps he thought, most improbably, that work on the schemes was not paid (*Pol.* 5.1313b18–25).

There is some controversy over the chronology of the earliest monumental Corinthian temples, at Corinth itself and at Isthmia, but in my view they are best attributed to Cypselus. Equally, although the archaeology is not clear about the date of what seems to have been the largest temple ever built in the Peloponnese, it is best given to Periander. Later Corinthian regimes were mean by comparison: they replaced buildings as they burnt down (which happened with alarming frequency: the temples of both Apollo at Corinth and Poseidon at Isthmia were constructed for this reason); in neither case was the new building spectacular for its day.²⁴

Chronological uncertainty leaves doubts about the responsibility of the tyrants for Corinthian temples, but they certainly provided extremely impressive utilitarian structures. Cypselus fortified the city—an enormous undertaking, given the exceptionally difficult defensive problems and the hopelessly exposed position; and Periander both excavated an artificial harbour at Lechaum and constructed the *diolkos* for the transport of vessels across the Isthmus.²⁵ All these projects concerned in some way the relationship between Corinthians and the external world: the wall defended Corinth against it, and the harbour and *diolkos* connected the city with it. The purpose of the fortification, at least, was precisely to define Corinth's relationship with others; that was not the purpose of the harbour or the *diolkos*, but it may well have been part of their effect.

In Athens, Thucydides remarked on the activity of the tyrants in embellishing the city.²⁶ The chronology of the buildings on the *acropolis* on which the magnificent sculpture in the Acropolis Museum was displayed is too imprecise to enable us to fix them securely; but most of them were probably built by Peisistratus or his sons. There is no doubt about the responsibility for the Temple of Olympian Zeus which was begun by Peisistratus' sons (and remarked upon by Aristotle), though it was not completed until the time of Hadrian. Utilitarian projects were also provided, as at Corinth: Thucydides remarked on the fountain of Enneakrounos (2.15.5). It is now fashionable to identify the building beneath the *tholos*, in which there is evidence of cooking on a grand scale, as the tyrants' palace; but it makes much better sense of the general building history of this area to identify it as the predecessor of the *tholos* not only in position, but also in function. It served the needs of the members of the council of four hundred, and then that of five hundred, in much the same way as the *tholos* did when it was built after 462. It therefore provides a striking example of both institutional and physical continuity between the period of the tyrants and later Athenian practice.²⁷

Polycrates' *erga* were already famous to Herodotus: they included a harbour mole as well as the famous tunnel for the water supply designed by Eupalinus, and demonstrate concern for merchant vessels, defence and the water supply which we have already seen elsewhere. At Samos, however, unusually, there were impressive buildings, especially at the Heraeum, which cannot be attributed to Polycrates. The significance of that is difficult to determine, since the extent to which he had predecessors in the tyranny remains uncertain.²⁸ Nothing of this kind is clear for Sicyon, but that probably tells us more about the nature of our evidence than about reality. Cleisthenes built at Delphi after his victory in the Sacred War:²⁹ his architects and craftsmen had presumably learned their skills at home and still practised them there, but we have no evidence because the Archaic site of the city is still unknown.

The consciousness of an identity is partly determined by looking at oneself; in the matter of physical amenities, tyrants did more than any others in the Archaic period to create that consciousness and enable citizens to look with pride at their cities.³⁰ Consciousness of self-identity is also determined by looking at others; here too, tyrants established lasting identities for their cities. Lengthy continuity can be observed in Corinthian foreign policy: relations established by the tyrants were still significant in the later fifth century and even beyond. The colonies in north-west Greece were founded by Cypselus and ruled by his bastard sons as tyrants themselves. Whatever the purpose of the foundations, the family ties between the rulers of Corinth and the colonies meant a closer relationship than was normal. Continuity between this period and the fifth century cannot be traced in detail, but it is extremely unlikely that the Corinthian links here which bore fruit in both the Persian and the Peloponnesian Wars were entirely independent of what was established by the tyrants. A similar connection could probably be seen, if only we had sufficient detail in our evidence, between Periander's interests in Epidaurus, where the tyrant was his father-in-law Procles, and the special Corinthian concerns observable here during the period after the Peace of Nicias. Equally the special naval interests of Corinth, still powerful, if embarrassingly ineffective, in the Peloponnesian War, were established by the tyrants, especially of course in exactly these north-western waters.³¹

Similar patterns can be seen elsewhere. Pheidon's achievement for Argos remains uncertain, but there is little doubt that he extended the power of the city at least temporarily, and perhaps for a lengthy period. Cleisthenes enjoyed success in the Sacred War; Polycrates cut a considerable figure in the Aegean world which even his aristocratic enemies took a secret pride in;³² and Miletus, despite the Lydian threat, was able to retain some independence under Thrasybulus (Her. 1.22.4), about whom it would be good to know a great deal more than we do. It is, however, doubtful whether there is anything significant in the fact that Athenian interest in the Hellespont can be traced both under Peisistratus and in the fifth century: not only were fifth-century Athenian concerns here on a totally different scale from what went before; Athenian interest in the region predated Peisistratus, since arbitration by Periander of Corinth himself was part of its history (Her. 5.95.2).

If the early tyrants were so effective in creating an identity for their cities, it might not be unreasonable to ask why Solon, who had observed half a century of their achievements, was hostile. He certainly could have become a tyrant himself, as he admitted when defending himself (fr. 33) against the charge that he had wasted the opportunity. Part of the problem may have been the specifically Athenian experience of the attempt of Cylon on the tyranny and its contentious aftermath; but fragments from Solon suggest other reasons too. The association between tyranny and violence (p. 61, above) justifies Solon's refusal to become a tyrant. Elsewhere he makes the potential character of the violence clear (fr. 37, *ap. Ath. Pol.* 12.5): If some other man...had obtained his position,

He would not have restrained the people, nor have stopped Until he had churned up the milk and taken away its butterfat.

The butterfat of the Athenian milk was the aristocrats: it was they who were under threat of violence. It is almost as if Solon already knew the story of the lopping off of heads and took it in the same way as Herodotus.

What Solon certainly knew is the history of tyranny outside Athens; and his legislation suggests that he recognised both the achievements and the problems it demonstrated. He followed tyrants in defining weights and measures, in sumptuary legislation, and in establishing institutions of government—and probably in many other items for which our evidence does not allow the recovery of precedents in the activities of tyrants; but despite his bitter criticisms of the Athenian elite (fr. 4), he would not follow tyrants in their violence against opponents. Perhaps most importantly, he would not follow them in what was, by his time, an excessive concentration on the person of the tyrant himself. Cypselus had needed no bodyguard (Arist. *Pol.* 5.1315b27–8); but Periander, who when Solon legislated had ruled Corinth for thirty years, employed one,³⁴ and by now the opposition to the regime which led to its fall immediately after Periander's death must have been all too obvious. If there is any truth in the stories in Herodotus of the difficulties he had with his sons (3.50–3), that will merely have emphasised the essential problem with tyranny—its concentration on the person and family of the tyrant. In the first generation, as Aristotle saw, tyrants retained power. He continued to suggest that almost all second-generation tyrants lost it straight away (*Pol.* 5.1312b21–3); that was not true of Periander, but the measures he had to take in order to prevent it no doubt both contributed to his reputation in Aristotle as the typical repressive tyrant, and (much earlier) gave Solon good reason to adopt a different method from what had been tried at Corinth. The same was probably true at Sicyon. We know more about Cleisthenes than about any other member of the dynasty; there is not the same evidence of repression with him as there is with Periander, but we probably hear more of him than of his predecessors precisely because he made a new start in order to justify his hold on power,³⁵ just as we hear more of Periander in power than we do of Cypselus.

That was the problem: it was not the achievements of the tyrants which created the difficulty, but their personal position, which became more difficult to justify as time went by, and which gave rise to the standard tyrant of later theory. Hence Solon legislated, in many respects, in order to achieve what tyrants had achieved elsewhere, and then left Athens to allow his laws to stand for themselves. Had he stayed, his personal position would have created similar problems even if he had positively resisted any attempt made by his fellow citizens to elevate him to a position analogous to that of a tyrant. In those circumstances, his enemies would have called him a tyrant, just as Alcaeus called Pittacus a tyrant. Plutarch reports that Solon said to his friends that tyranny was a good place, but it was a dead end—*οὐκ ἔχειν δ' ἀπόβασιν* (Sol. 14.8); it is unfortunate that we have no fragment to this effect, but it is a judgement which Solon's whole legislative programme implies. He established the rules by which political life was to be conducted, and left the council of four hundred, and the assembly through which the council necessarily worked, to oversee that activity in the way in which tyrants oversaw it elsewhere: at that level, his institutions were a conscious attempt to establish an alternative to tyranny.

It was precisely because of Solon's achievement that tyranny later contributed more in Athens than anywhere else: nothing less than the preparation of Athenians for a democratic future. In a narrow sense, the rise of Peisistratus to the tyranny demonstrated Solon's failure: Solon rejected the opportunity to become tyrant, and his legislation was in part designed to resolve the problems which might have enabled others to do so. The failure, however, was highly constructive—if failure it was. Tyrants arose elsewhere as a result of aristocratic faction disputes which contestants exploited; at least sometimes they took the opportunity to establish institutions of lasting significance, though naturally always with their own interests in mind. In Athens, however, Solon had already established institutions when Peisistratus rose to power; and the method which he

adopted depended crucially on them. The rise of the three *staseis* occurred because after Solon's legislation popular support could be increasingly important for disputing aristocrats. Peisistratus recognised the fact, and exploited it both to establish and to maintain his tyranny. After the fall of his sons, Cleisthenes acted as he did because the tyrants had encouraged broadly democratic trends; they did so precisely because Solon's legislation, and especially the council of four hundred and the assembly whose involvement it encouraged, increased the importance of ordinary Athenians voting in the assembly.

In other cities, tyrants often over-stayed their welcome: by doing so, they encouraged (though hardly deliberately) a feeling of solidarity among their opponents which could outlast the immediate task of removing the last tyrant. A common pattern was probably for that group (or those groups) which had given the tyrants their strength to control affairs afterwards, though the state of our evidence makes that difficult to demonstrate; at the least, McGlew has recently emphasised the fall of tyranny as a defining moment.³⁶ The importance of this issue is emphasised by the Athenian case, where the situation was different. There is no obvious sign of general hostility towards the tyrants. The Alcmaeonid attempt to fortify Leipsydriion, and presumably attract widespread support, was a failure; and the events which led to the fall of the regime do not demonstrate any widespread internal opposition. Cleomenes captured hostages by chance; had he not done so, his invasion might have been no more successful than that of Anchimolius shortly before (Her. 5.62–5).

None the less, the tyranny fell, largely because of the application of Spartan force and much good fortune. Events thereafter moved rapidly towards the reforms of Cleisthenes, and it was not long before Athenians claimed to have ejected the tyrants. Herodotus and Thucydides demonstrate that the essential responsibility was not Athenian, but Spartan; but the popular view, as Thucydides (6.53.3) admitted, concentrated heavily (and misleadingly) on internal opposition and the activity of Harmodius and Aristogeiton, whose statues had already been dedicated on the *acropolis* in time to be taken away by Xerxes in 480.³⁷ For a feeling of self-respect, it was important for Athenians to believe that they had removed their tyrants themselves—even though they showed small inclination in that direction at the time.

I am all too conscious that I have taken most of my evidence from Corinth and Athens. Tyranny was a constructive development in those two cities; but I have hardly even attempted to demonstrate the point elsewhere: our knowledge is inadequate to establish enough either about other tyrannies or about the contexts of the history of other cities in which they must be interpreted. Two points, however, suggest that it is not over-optimistic to extend the general conclusion from Corinth and Athens. First, there is sometimes evidence from other cities which points in similar directions: Sicyon and Lesbos on tyrants and the law, and Samos on the significance of public works. Perhaps more importantly, many of the achievements to which I have drawn attention, while they were undertaken in Corinth and in Athens by tyrants, were also part of the general character of the Archaic age. In many cases, indeed, the Corinthian tyrants were responsible for the earliest examples of which we know. Tyrants did not merely follow the trends: they began them.

I end by returning to the heads of corn. What Herodotus emphasised was the removal of the outstanding heads; one might instead concentrate on what was left afterwards: a field full of the ripe corn of equal citizens. I love Corinth dearly, but I cannot claim that as appropriate to Corinth after the fall of the tyranny, even less that the story was so intended; but a good case could be made that it is appropriate for Athens. Athenians were more than ready for the reforms of Cleisthenes: they defended them, in Cleisthenes' absence, against Spartan threats,³⁸ and were confident enough to reject what was almost certainly, despite Herodotus' silence, Cleisthenes' own advice to submit to Persia shortly afterwards. Tyrants were in two ways responsible for bringing Athenians to that ripe state, ready for an exciting political harvest: Peisistratus and his sons had tended the field recently; the seed-corn had been Solon's legislation, designed to secure the achievements tyrants had won elsewhere without incurring the penalties.

NOTES

1 *Pol* 3.1284a26–33; 5.1311a20–2.

2 5.92.β.1–ζ.1; see Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth* (hereafter=*Corinth*), 186–7, with references.

3 *Pol* 5.1311a20–2; 1313a40.

4 I exclude the tyrants of Sicily from consideration; their circumstances were significantly different.

5 In Hansen (ed.) *The Ancient Greek City-State*, 34.

6 Burn, *Persia and the Greeks*, 194–5.

7 3.1285a18–19; 4.1292a7–30; 1292b5–10; 1295a1–24.

8 Significantly, most of the examples are either not Archaic or not from *poleis* (or, indeed, not Greek): *Pol* 5.1311a36–1313a17.

9 Pittacus' title was probably attested by the tradition, though it may have been a construction of Aristotle: he defines the office as an elective tyranny (*Pol* 3.1285b25–6) shortly after quoting exactly this poem of Alcaeus to demonstrate that Pittacus was elected tyrant (3.1285a29–b1). If there had been no tradition about the title, the evidence would not demonstrate the conclusion which Aristotle drew.

10 Cypselus: see p. 60, above; and cf. the generally favourable account of Nic. Dam. *FGrH* 90 F 57. For others, see e.g. 1.23–4 (Periander and Arion); 59.6 (Peisistratus).

- 11 See further the fragment of the *Corinthian Constitution*, Arist. fr. 611.20 Rose (Teubner)=Heraclides, 20 Dilts.
- 12 Salmon, *Corinth*, 56.
- 13 It is difficult to tell whether Cleisthenes' tribal changes represented a new departure or merely a different emphasis; either way, something new is in question.
- 14 *Ath. Pol.* 16.8; cf. Arist. *Pol.* 5.1315b21–2.
- 15 Two sources, indeed, identify Periander as *aisymnetes*, just like Pittacus: references in Salmon, *Corinth*, 206 n.80.
- 16 N.F.Jones, *TAPA* 110 (1980), 161–93, and *Public Organisation in Ancient Greece*, 97–102; Salmon, *Corinth*, 206–9, 413–19; G.R.Stanton, *CA* 5 (1986), 139–53 (his division of the Corinthia, like the Attica of Cleisthenes, into coastal, inland and city regions is singularly inappropriate to the geography of the territory).
- 17 References in Salmon, *Corinth*, 206 n. 81; Stanton, op. cit. (n. 16), expresses no opinion. P.J.Rhodes, *Phoenix* 45 (1991), 73, is willing to believe the implication of Nic. Dam. *FGrH* 90 F 60.2, that the new arrangements were made on the fall of the tyranny. There can be no certainty in such matters, but the weight of probability is strongly in favour of the tyrants: later Corinthians were reluctant to admit their responsibility.
- 18 For all the details, see Salmon, *Corinth*, 197–205.
- 19 K.-J.Hölkeskamp, *PCPS* 38 (1992), 88–117.
- 20 See now Osborne, pp. 74–82 below.
- 21 Emphasised by Andrewes, *The Greek Tyrants*, 107–15; and in *C.A.H.*, 2nd edition, iii.3. 405–16.
- 22 Salmon, *Corinth*, 207, 231–9.
- 23 5.68.2; on the chronology, Griffin, *Sikyon*, 43–7.
- 24 Salmon, *Corinth*, 59–62 (early temples, Corinth and Isthmia; for recent evidence for the chronology from excavation at Isthmia, see E.R.Gebhard and F.P.Hemans, *Hesperia* 61 [1992], 39); 228 (Periander); 180 (later temples, Corinth and Isthmia).
- 25 Salmon, *Corinth*, 220–1 (fortification); 133–5 (Lechaeum); 136–9 (*diolkos*; see now also G.Raepsaet and M.Tolley, *BCH* 117 [1993], 233–61).
- 26 6.54.5; see in general Andrewes, in *C.A.H.*, 2nd edition, iii.3. 410–14.
- 27 Palace: T.L.Shear, Jr., in *Athens Comes of Age*, 6–7. Building F in its final period was certainly used by the council of five hundred. The main argument against its use by the council of four hundred is that there is no sign of *prytaneis* in that council; but there is no reason why all the members should not have used Building F. All the members of the council of five hundred may well have used it in its final phase.
- 28 Shipley, *A History of Samos*, 70–80.
- 29 Griffin, op. cit. (n. 23), 106–11.
- 30 Nic. Dam. *FGrH* 90 F 58 might suggest a hostile view of the Cypselid building programme: 'he was always finding work for (the citizens) to do'; that tells us more of fourth-century theory than of the facts.
- 31 For the details, Salmon, *Corinth*, 270–80 (north-west); 329–30 (Epidaurus); 223–5 (navy).
- 32 B.M.Mitchell, *JHS* 95 (1975), 75–91; Shipley op. cit. (n. 28), especially 81–99.
- 33 I translate *piar* as butterfat on the advice of Lin Foxhall, to whom many thanks; for a different view, see T.C.W.Stinton, *JHS* 96 (1976), 160; see also Foxhall and Mitchell, pp. 120 and 143 below. Either way, this difficult line refers to the possibility of violence against Athenian aristocrats.
- 34 References in Salmon, *Corinth*, 197 n.39.
- 35 If (as is very likely) the story in Nicolaus of Damascus (*FGrH* 90 F 61) is invented, it remains probable that some form of intrigue, at least, lay behind the rapid transfer of power from Myron through Isodemus to Cleisthenes, even if the brief account of Aristotle (*Pol.* 5.1316a29–31) cannot demonstrate that Isodemus was never tyrant.
- 36 *Tyranny and Political Culture in Ancient Greece*.
- 37 Stanton, *Athenian Politics, c. 800–500 B.C.*, 129 n. 2.
- 38 See the eloquent account of Burn, *Persia and the Greeks*, 180–2; now Ober, in Dougherty and Kurke (eds) *Cultural Poetics in Archaic Greece*, 215–32.
- 39 Her. 5.73; cf. Forrest, *The Emergence of Greek Democracy*, 204.

LAW AND LAWS

How do we join up the dots?

Robin Osborne

Cypriot fire consumed the body of Solon in an alien land;
Salamis holds his bones, now dust and grains.
But the *axones* bore his soul straight to heaven. For well
did he make laws for the citizens, the lightest of burdens.

Lawgivers in the tradition, as in this epigram of his own which Diogenes Laertios modestly quotes,¹ are men of heavenly wisdom. That wisdom consists largely in ingenious, and often surprising, enactments whose content or attached penalties show great insight into human behaviour, and particularly into human weakness.

A further section from Diogenes Laertios, containing laws little discussed in the literature on Solon, illustrates the typical wisdom of the lawgiver:

Solon reduced the rewards to athletes in the games, fixing a rate of 500 dr. for an Olympic victor and 100 for a victor at the Isthmian Games, and analogously for other games. He thought that it was naive to increase the rewards of these; only the rewards of those who died in war, whose children should be publicly reared and educated, should be increased. As a result many were anxious to appear as fine and noble warriors—like Polyzelos, Kynegeros, Kallimakhos, and all the Marathonomakhos; and also like Harmodios, Aristogeiton, Miltiades and ten thousand more. But athletes cost a lot when they are in training, and when they are victorious prove more of a bane than a blessing, crowned more for a victory over their homeland than a victory over their opponents. And when they get old, as Euripides says, ‘they go around like cloaks which have lost their nap’. Solon saw this and gave them only a moderate welcome. Excellent also is his provision that the guardian may not cohabit with the mother of the ward, and that the man who would inherit if the orphans died may not be guardian. And this one too, that a seal-cutter may not keep an impression of the ring he has sold. And if someone knocks out the eye of a man who has only one eye, he shall have both his eyes knocked out. A man who did not deposit something may not take it back, or else the punishment is death. Death is the penalty for a magistrate who is caught drunk.²

Notoriously, such pieces of lawgivers’ wisdom float around in the tradition from one figure to another. The regulation here about deposits is attributed by Aelian (*V.H.* 3.46) to Stageira, and the provisions about eyes and about who can be a guardian correspond with what Diodoros records of the laws of Kharondas (Diod. Sic. 12.15.2, 12.17.4).³ Other elements in lawgiver tradition float about too: just as Periander was variously giver and recipient of the advice to knock off the tallest heads of grain, so Solon makes in Diogenes the observation made to him by Anacharsis in Plutarch, that laws are like the webs of spiders, catching small pests but broken by the powerful.⁴

When, on the other hand, we look at the remarkably rich extant epigraphic remains of early law the picture which we seem to get is very different. Two examples will illustrate this. The first is as early as they come, an extract from the seventh-century laws from Tiryns:

...each to the *platiwoinoi* (pourers of libations of wine?). If he does not pay the fine he is to occur a fine of thirty *medimnoi* to Zeus and Athena
...if the *platiwoinarkhoi* refuse— — —to give to the *hiaromnemon*—The *hiaromnemon* is to exact the fine/ confiscate the property? wherever the people decide to hold the court...
...the community is to provide the penalty to the *platiwoinarkhoi*. But if they do not provide over and above from home, let the *epignomon* impose a fine upon the mob...⁵

The second example is a sacred law from sixth-century Olympia:

If he commits fornication (?) in the sacred precinct, one shall make him expiate it by the sacrifice of an ox and by complete purification, and the *theoros* in the same way. If anyone pronounces judgment contrary to the regulation, this judgment shall be void, but the decree of the people shall be final in deciding. One may make any change in the regulations which seems desirable in the sight of the god, withdrawing or adding with the approval of the whole council of the five hundred and the people in full assembly. One may make changes three times, adding and withdrawing.⁶

The Tiryns example gives endless officials of whom particular duties are required, but penalties which are the very opposite of imaginative—fines all round. In the Olympia example the prime concern seems to be to make the law stick, but the provisions which allow change seem once more to be the very reverse of ingenious: you can change the law as long as enough people are agreed to making the change and as long as you do not do so too many times.

If the picture of early lawgivers and early laws, which I have ascribed to ‘tradition’ and illustrated from Diogenes Laertios, were restricted to such late and unreliable witnesses as Diogenes, then we should have no hesitation in discarding its picture as unlikely to offer much enlightenment. Much recent study of early Greek law does just that: Michael Gagarin’s *Early Greek Law* has a chapter on the literary evidence but no citation from Diogenes in its Index Locorum, and Karl Hölkesskamp’s *PCPS* article on written law in Archaic Greece mentions Diogenes only once.⁷ But the tradition to which Diogenes belongs is already represented in Aristotle, whose discussion of lawgivers gives us biographical snippets (e.g. on Philolaos, *Pol.* 2. 1274a32–42) when we long for quotations from the laws, and there are already traces of the same tradition in Herodotos. We should feel some unease about simply discarding a tradition integral to fourth- and probably fifth-century attitudes to law.

One additional reason for being worried about preferring preserved epigraphic evidence for early law to literary evidence lies in the nature of the epigraphic evidence. Were Greek law, as classical writers not infrequently claim, essentially written law, and were written law essentially law inscribed on stone, then we could probably trust that our epigraphic remains give us a fair sample of Archaic law. But the connection between writing and law has been overplayed, and early inscribing practices varied greatly from region to region.⁸ If we can be confident about anything, it is that our extant early inscribed laws do not represent a typical sample.

The most obvious way in which surviving inscribed early laws are not typical is in their almost universally sacred reference. It is true that my two examples above are not entirely representative, but they do not seriously distort the picture. Even if ‘Drako’s homicide law’ as preserved (Meiggs and Lewis, 86 [Fornara, 15B]) is unlikely to represent the whole of the original enactment on homicide, we nevertheless cannot be sure that it was not the religious overtones of homicide which determined the scope of the legislation. We must allow for the desire to put secular enactments into a sacred context so as to strengthen the spider’s web in the face of the powerful. Such a desire may determine the opening context of the Spartan Rhetra and the display of the Dreros law (Meiggs and Lewis, 2 [Fornara, 11] on the wall of the temple of Apollo Delphinios. But Solon’s *axones* are good evidence that not all laws were inscribed on temple walls, and that even display in a sanctuary might not involve display in imperishable form. Surviving remains are almost certainly biased to sacred law, biased to Crete, and biased to politically central enactments—the Dreros law, again, or the Chios fragments (Meiggs and Lewis, 8 [Fornara, 19]).

If tradition and surviving laws are both selective, and neither on their own can be reckoned to give a full historical picture, is there any way in which we can use them together? To investigate this I turn to the crucial early record of the lawgiver tradition, Aristotle’s *Politics*, and in particular the 12th chapter of Book 2. The legal content is quickly summarised: Aristotle takes it for granted that Solon left a constitution with a Council of the Areopagos, elected magistrates drawn from the top three census classes and subject to popular scrutiny, and a popular court. His argument concerns whether Solon could foresee that this would lead to the state being controlled by demagogues, and he argues that this was a matter of chance (*symptomd*) not choice (*prohairesis*)⁹ Aristotle then mentions Zaleukos and Kharondas, whose only original law is said to have concerned false witness and the invention of *episkepsis* (denunciation), but who is acknowledged to have legislated with unusual precision, and Philolaos’ laws for Thebes, which governed adoption and keeping the number of *kleroi* constant. Phaleas’ originality was in insisting on equality of property distribution, Plato’s communal possession of women, children and property, common messes for women, making the sober symposiarkhs, and encouraging ambidexterity. Drako is mentioned only for the severity of his laws, Pittakos for increasing the fines for offences committed when drunk, Androdamos for laws about murder and inheritance which were not, however, original.

At first sight these, like the laws Diogenes Laertios attributed to Solon in the passage I quoted above, seem a hotchpotch designed to bring out the wisdom of the lawgiver (note especially the explanation for Pittakos’ law about drunken offences). The way Aristotle frames his discussion, his search for original contributions (*to idion*) in each case, implies that he knows much more than he lets on, however, and it is reasonable to ask what his approach, and what the selection of laws which he does mention, imply. Two issues are particularly important: the question of ‘the unity of Greek law’, and the question of law codes.

Within the English-speaking tradition, at least, both ‘the unity of Greek law’ and the idea of early law ‘codes’ are out of fashion. The case against the unity of Greek law made by Finley in reviewing Pringsheim has been restated by Todd and Millett;¹⁰ the case against codes, which Gagarin began with his denial of large-scale enactments in early Crete, has been

extended by Hölkeskamp, who denies that there were any substantial compilations of law.¹¹ Hölkeskamp expressly makes his case with reference to this passage of Aristotle:

What is even more important in this context is that Aristotle and Theophrastus do not suggest that such examples were drawn from a wider context: above all, there is no hint whatever that these *nomoi* were dependent parts of general and systematic laws on inheritance, contract and penal law or fully-fledged comprehensive ‘law codes’.

But, leaving aside Theophrastus, this seems to me to take insufficient notice of the structure of the passage. If Aristotle can really think it reasonable to say that all that was interesting about Kharondas’ legislation was its specificity and its introduction of denunciation for false witness, he must surely reckon on a common structure for law throughout Greece and a parallel scope for Kharondas’ as for others’ laws. Just what that scope may have been we cannot tell, and doubtless it stopped short of being a code both ‘fully fledged’ and ‘comprehensive’, but we must surely be dealing with much more than just single enactments. Hölkeskamp notes that the instances which Aristotle quotes are ‘extraordinarily narrowly defined’; but one should also note that the same is true, for example, of the episode from the *life* of Philolaos which Aristotle chooses to record. The narrowness of the biographical episode does not make us deny that Philolaos led a full and varied life, and the narrowness of the particular illustrations chosen should not lead us to deny a lawgiver a full and varied range of enactments.

The view that early law was a matter of ‘single enactments, independent, complete and self-contained statutes’ (Hölkeskamp, *PCPS*, 91) has gained force from the apparent support afforded by the epigraphic evidence. Until we get to the Gortyn ‘code’, nothing epigraphic clearly extends to more than a single law. But this support is more apparent than real. Quite apart from the odd beginning to Draco’s homicide law—‘And/even if someone kills another without forethought’—it is abundantly clear that the law from Tiryns which I quoted above cannot have stood in isolation. The magisterial paraphernalia which is involved, and the complexity of the relationships between the parties, must imply that parallel procedures were familiar in Tiryns, and if familiar then surely also embodied in other laws.¹² Enforcing a measure which the *platiwoinarkhoi* fail to enforce on the *platiwoinoi* cannot have been the sole duty required of the *hieromnemon*. Similarly, with the measure from Olympia, the idea that the finality of the people’s decree, or the provision about having the council of five hundred and full assembly agree to changes, or the limit on the number of times changes can be enacted, were invented for this one offence is preposterous. Whether or not the laws from Tiryns and Olympia were made at the same time as further laws, and whether or not those further laws were written down, we must think of them as fitting into a much wider structure of legal provisions, not made individually and standing in isolation.

The coincidence between tradition and epigraphic remains over the specificity of the laws should not be seen as a product of there only being scattered specific laws, but of the common character of the laws of Greek states. Aristotle makes the theoretical case for specific laws at the beginning of the *Rhetoric* (1.1354a11–b16); in the *Constitution of the Athenians* 9 [Aristotle] is keen to defend Solon against the charge of being deliberately vague. The single transferable anecdote that tells of both Kharondas and Diokles of Syracuse killing themselves to uphold their own laws, after accidentally entering the *agora* with a sword in time of civil strife, seems to be used to pick out lawgivers who were particularly specific.¹³ Such specificity becomes ridiculous if isolated: laws which make carrying a weapon in the market place at a time of civil strife a capital offence only have a place once direct assault upon magistrates, inciting popular affray, and other such actions have been dealt with, and once the *agora* has been deemed a special space in other ways also.

But we may also feel that specificity itself needs a context. For Hölkeskamp (*PCPS*, 92) the surviving specific laws ‘can hardly be the more or less casual result of a universal movement or process of “codification”’. On the contrary, I would argue that such specific laws presuppose a common structure embodied in further legislation: it is only in the context of a habit of clearly identifying who determines whether the specific offences described have been committed and/or who exacts the penalty for any transgression, that specificity is unproblematic. Clear identification of responsibility, and its limits, is all over the epigraphic remains. We find it in both my examples cited above, but also in the Great Rhētra, with its specifications about setting aside crooked decisions;¹⁴ in the Dreros law, limiting the *kosmos*’s judicial powers to his term of office and identifying those responsible for punishing any breaches;¹⁵ in Draco’s homicide law about the role of the *basileus* and of the *ephetai* and who shall give pardon in what conditions;¹⁶ in the Chios laws;¹⁷ in the Olympia law about prosecution and the limits of responsibility for crime;¹⁸ in the north Arkadian or Akhaian law about women wearing brightly coloured clothing and the responsibility of the *damiourgōs* for seeing that the fine is enforced;¹⁹ and in the late sixth-century or early fifth-century law from Mycenae.²⁰ Such a concern with who can and who cannot do what in the judicial sphere surely lies behind Solon’s basic distinction between *graphai* and *dikai*, and behind the enormous complexity of Athenian homicide courts. A number of Solon’s individual laws mentioned in literary texts manifest similar concerns—for example, the law, not above suspicion, that Athenians could not sell agricultural produce abroad except for olives, is a law that focuses on the responsibility of the archon for enforcement.²¹ Of the laws picked out by Aristotle at the end of *Politics* 2, Kharondas’ law allowing denunciation for false witness certainly, and Pittakos’ law about drunken offences more dubiously, fall into the same category. Hölkeskamp (*Metis*, 58) is right to deny that ‘the diverse and specific provisions’ of early law can be regarded as ‘deliberate and adequate

responses to social unrest', but it is not the specific provisions themselves that are the responses but the identification of responsible magistrates which they involve.

The prominence of officials in early law may well have been reflected in the way in which laws were grouped. Classical Athenian law organised itself according to the magistrate responsible, rather than through some typology of offences, and the same is true elsewhere. Although the evidence amounts to rather less than proof, the apparent order of Solonian laws makes it not unlikely that Solon's laws too were organised by magistrate.²² Such an organisation reflects the 'statelessness' of the Greek city: no agency within the Greek city monopolised legitimate violence.²³ Individual magistrates have individual and very particular powers and duties, and habit, reinforced by fear of divine sanction, not magisterial power, secures obedience to law (see Arist. *Pol.* 2.1269a20–3). To attempt systematically to regulate human behaviour in such a society is both unnecessary and impossible; to define who is responsible for treating breaches of acceptable behaviour is essential.

Many literary references to Solon's and others' laws have no reference to the officials responsible, and here we run into the limits of the usefulness of the literary texts. Literary texts, the product of a biographical tradition not a tradition of legal analysis, are interested in what types of human behaviour lawgivers thought should be regulated, and how they dealt with them; they are not interested in the precise name of the magistrate responsible for action. One could easily summarise the epigraphic evidence, not inaccurately, as being about prohibiting women from wearing brightly coloured robes, couples from fornicating in the sanctuary, and so on. A writer familiar with the absence of a single agency monopolising legitimate violence would take for granted the specification of responsibility for enforcing justice, and without that specification it is the picturesque details that one is left with. That, after all, is where the originality of the lawgiver lay.

It is clear why our literary and epigraphic evidence presents the work of lawgivers as fragmentary. The tradition about lawgivers fails to talk about overall structures and concentrates instead on individual oddities because it is a biographical tradition, more interested in the mutual light shed by lawgiver on laws, and laws on lawgiver, than in the nature of early law. Only when we escape from the purely biographical tradition, as we do to some extent when dealing with Solon, does the full scope of the legislator's activity begin to appear. Epigraphic remains do no justice to the extent of early legislation because specific laws were relevant to and placed at specific locations. If the law about the *gerairai* at the Lenaea ([Dem.] 59.76) which was inscribed in the temple of Dionysos in the Marshes, open only one day a year, had been recovered by archaeologists, it too would appear as an isolated enactment.

The literary tradition is important not because it preserves snippets of genuine early laws: it remains unwise to believe any particular law which tradition ascribes to a lawgiver unless we have external evidence for it. The literary tradition is important because the presuppositions which it makes give a setting for, and bring out the implications of, the epigraphic remains. Inscriptions and literary texts need to be used, and thought about, together, if we are to join up the dots and construct an overall picture of law in early Greece.²⁴

NOTES

- 1 Diog. Laert. 1.63 (*Anth. Pal.* 7.87).
- 2 Diog. Laert. 1.55–7. For Solon and athletic victors see also Plut. *Sol.* 23.1.
- 3 On Diogenes as a source for Solon's laws see Ruschenbusch, Σόλωνος νόμοι 42–5.
- 4 Perianther and the ears of corn: Her. 5.92.ζ.2, Arist. *Pol.* 3.1284a26–33, Diog. Laert. 1.100; the story is told of Tarquin in Livy, 1; cf. Salmon, p. 60 above. Solon and spiders' webs: Diog. Laert. 1.53, Plut. *Sol.* 5.2. For the importance of the absence of any force which could compel obedience to the laws see further 79–80 and n. 22, below.
- 5 SEG xxx 380 (Tiryns, C7). Nos 1–4: ...[τόν]ς πλατιφοίνον[ς | φεκάστε. αἱ μ ἐξσθ [ο]άσσαμεν ὀφλέν εν[ς | Δί]fa κ θανα ἱαν τριαάφοντα μ[ε]δίμνονς α[- | --]ασιον | [...]ποσταντον πλατιφοιναρχον τα δ[---] ...[---] | [ά]ποδόμεν τοι ἱερομνῆμονι τόνς πρα[---]ς. τόν δ ἱερομνῆμον[α---] εν τ | ά δαμόσια ἡό | πui κα δοκεῖ τοι δάμοι ἄλιαιαν θεν No. 7.2: ...[τ]όνς πλατιφοινάρχονς [τά]ν ζαμῖαν παρσῆ[ν] τοον ο | ο[ι]υον αἱ δέ μέ ὑπερπαρσῆ[ο]μεν φοίροθεν ἡο ἐπιγνόμον ἐπελ [ά]στο τογ ὄρλον...
- 6 I. von Olymp. 7 = GDI 1156 = Buck, 64 = SEG xli 392: κα θεαρός εἶε. αἱ δέ βενέοι ἐν τίαιοι, βοί κα θοάδοι καί κοθάραι τελείαι, καί τόν θεαρόν ἐν τ | α(ύ)ταί. αἱ δέ τις πάρ τό γράφος δικάδοι, ἀτελές κ εἶε ἅ δικά, ἅ δέ κα φράτρα ἅ δαμοσία τελεία εἶε δικάδοσα τόν δέ κα γραφείον ὅτι δοκεῖ καλιτέρος ἔχεν πό τόν θ(ε)όν, ἐξαγρέον καί εἰνποῖόν σύν βολαί (π)εν-τακατίον ἀφλανέος καί δάμοι πλεθούντι δινάκοι (δινά)κοι δέ κα (ἐ)ν τρίτιον, αἱ αἱ ἐνποῖοι αἱτ ἐξαγρέοι.
- 7 K.J.Hölkeskamp, PCPS n.s. 38 (1992), 87–117 (=Hölkeskamp, PCPS). Diogenes is better represented in Hölkeskamp's article in *Metis* 7 (1992), 49–81 (=Hölkeskamp, *Metis*), but Hölkeskamp's stress on the variety of laws ascribed to archaic lawgivers fails to allow for the nature of the biographical tradition. Although I am critical of one aspect of Hölkeskamp's position, I regard his papers as the best introductions to early Greek law.
- 8 R.Thomas, *BICS* 40 = n.s. 2 (1995), 59–74; S. Stoddart and J.Whitney, *Antiquity* 62 (1988), 761–72.
- 9 Arist. *Pol.* 2.1273b35–1274a21. For the structure of the argument compare *Ath. Pol.* 9.
- 10 M.I.Finley, *Seminar* 9 (1951), 72–91, reprinted in his *The Use and Abuse of History*, 147–52; S.C.Todd and P.C.Millett in Cartledge *et al.* (eds) *Nomos*, 1–18 at 7–11. As will be seen, I have some sympathy with the arguments of Sealey, *The Justice of the Greeks*, chapter 3.

- 11 Gagarin, *Early Greek Law*, 62; Hölkeskamp, *PCPS*, 90, *Metis*, 55–6, and compare Hölkeskamp, in Gehrke (ed.) *Rechtskodifizierung und soziale Normen im interkulturellen Vergleich*, 135–64. Many sensible observations, making illuminating use of contrasts with Near-Eastern codes, can be found in Sealey, op. cit. (n. 10), chapter 2.
- 12 The extant remains, though too small to allow much sense to be made, in any case imply the existence of other enactments.
- 13 Diod. Sic. 12.19, 13.33.2. With Aristotle on the *akribeia* of Kharondas compare Diod. Sic. 13.35.4 on Diokles.
- 14 Plut. *Lyk.* 6.1–2, 7–8.
- 15 Meiggs and Lewis, 2 (Fornara, 11) (Dreros: 650–600).
- 16 Ibid., 86 (Fornara, 15B) (Athens: 409/8, reinscription).
- 17 Ibid., 8 (Fornara, 19) (Chios: 600–550).
- 18 *I. von Olymp.* 2 = *GDI* 1152 = Buck, 61 = *SEG* xli 391 (Olympia: before 480): ἡ φράτρα τοῖς Φαλείοις. πατριάν θαρρὲν καὶ γενεάν καὶ ταύτῃ. | αἱ ζέ τις καταραύσειε, φάρρην ὅρ Φαλείοι· αἱ ζέ μέ 'πιθείαν τὰ ζῆλκα καὶ ὅρ μέγιστον τέλος ἔχοι καὶ τοῖ βασιλάες, ζέκα μιν αἱ καὶ ἀποτίνοι φέκαστος τὸν μέ 'πιποεόντον καθυταῖς τοῖ Ζῆ || Ὀλυν πῖοι. ἐπενπόι ζέ κ' Ἑλλανοζ'ικας καὶ τάλλα ζῆκα καὶ ἐπενπλέτο ἡ ζαμιοργία· αἱ ζέ μέ 'νπὸι, ζῆφουιον ἀποτινέτο ἐν μαστράαι. αἱ ζέ τις τὸν αἰτιαθεντα ζῆκαϊον ἱμάσκοι, ἐν ταῖ ζεκαμνάαι κ ἐνέχο[ιτ]ο, αἱ φειζὸςμῆσκοι. καὶ πατριάς ὁ γροφεὺς ταύ[τ]α κα πάσκοι, | [αἱ τ]ιν' [ἀζ]ικέο[ι]. ὁ π[ι]ναξ ἱαρὸς Ὀλυνπίαι. ('The law of the Eleans. An accused man's phratry and family and property shall be immune. If anyone brings a charge, he shall be prosecuted as in the case of a citizen of Elis. If he who holds the highest office and the *basileis* do not impose the fines, let each of those who fail to impose them pay a penalty of ten minai dedicated to Olympian Zeus. Let the Hellanodikai enforce this, and let the body of *demiourgoi* enforce the other fines. If he does not enforce this, let him pay double the penalty in his accounting. If anyone maltreats one who is accused in a matter involving fines, let him be held to a fine of ten minai, if he does so wittingly. And let the scribe of the phratry suffer the same penalty if he wrongs anyone. This tablet sacred at Olympia.')
 - 19 *SEG* xi 1112 = *LSCG supp.* 32 (N.Arkadia/Achaia: late C6): [εἶκαν γυ]νῆ φέσεται ζετραῖον λόπος, | [ἱερὸ]ν ἐναι τὰ Δάματρι (τὰι) Θεσμοφόροι | [εἰ δέ] μέ ὑνιερόσαι, δν(σ)μενέζ ἑασα ἐπεφέργῃ ἐκάς ζ' ἐξόλοιν, κά ὅζις τότε δαμιοφοργε | [ἀφάε]σται δαρχμάς τριάκοντα· εἰ δέ μέ ἀφάετοι, | [μεδ' ἰν] τάν ἀσεβειαν ἔχε ὁδε κορος, δέκο φέτεια ἐνα[ι] | ἱναγέζ] τόδε. ('If a woman wears a brightly coloured robe, it shall be consecrated to Demeter Thesmophoros. If she does not consecrate the garment, let her, being unfriendly as regards a sacrificial garment, be outlawed, and let whoever is *damiourgos* pay out thirty drachmas. If the *damiourgos* does not pay, or if he does not have authority over the impious act, ten years shall be the duration of the curse in the latter event.' Trans. A.J.Beattie, *CQ* 41 [1947], 66–72.)
 - 20 *IG* iv 493 = Buck, 81 = *LSAG* Pl. 31.1 (Mycenae): αἱ μέ δαμιοργία εἶε, τὸς ἱερομνάμονας τὸς ἐς Περσεε το<τ>σι γονευσι κριτερας ἐμεν κα<τ>' τὰ φεφρεμένα. ('If there is no body of *demiourgoi*, the temple administrators of Perseus shall judge between the parents according to what has been decreed.)
 - 21 Ruschenbusch, op. cit. (n. 3), fr. 65 (Plut. *Sol* 24.1).
 - 22 Hölkeskamp (*Metis*, 56–7) ignores this organisational feature in denying Solon 'anything like a "code"' as part of his very curious justification for leaving Solon aside.
 - 23 See most recently M.Berent, *Hist. Pol. Thought* 17 (1996) 36–59.
 - 24 I am grateful to participants at Durham for comments, and especially to Mogens Hansen and Peter Rhodes. Moshe Berent kindly showed me unpublished work which encouraged me to take certain ideas further.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF SPARTAN SOCIETY AND INSTITUTIONS IN THE ARCHAIC PERIOD

Stephen Hodkinson

For the conference which gave rise to this volume I was asked to discuss ‘the development of Sparta’s distinctive institutions to the end of the sixth century’.¹ The organisers’ suitably laconic formulation forms a good starting-point for discussion, since it prompts some fundamental questions which might threaten to subvert any discussion of Archaic Sparta. First of all, do we have reliable information about the substance of Archaic Spartan institutions, let alone their development, in the period before c. 500? Secondly, were Sparta’s society and institutions really distinctive compared with those of other *poleis*, or is that just part of the Spartan myth? And, thirdly, even if there was some significant divergence, did it take place in the Archaic period, or only later in response to the very different challenges of the fifth century?

There have of course been studies which have tried to reconstruct the exact course of early Spartan history, relying upon late sources such as the pseudo-historical survey in Pausanias’ *Guide to Greece* (Books 3 and 4).² Such approaches were rightly and roundly condemned over thirty years ago in Chester Starr’s important article on ‘The Credibility of Early Spartan History’, with its ringing comment, ‘We are, I fear, sometimes in danger of becoming Hellenistic rumor-mongering historians’.³ But even Starr’s scepticism appears insufficient for certain more recent scholars, especially with regard to the *Classical* sources. This issue is important because, apart from certain exceptional items of evidence from the Archaic period itself, we are dependent upon Classical writers for our earliest detailed notions of the nature of Spartan society. Starr expressed his doubts about the evidence of Classical writers concerning Spartan *history*. But he was more sanguine about the relevance of their accounts of contemporary Spartan society to understanding her Archaic past, on grounds of their access to ‘information from the living structure of Spartan life and government which had been formed in earlier days’.⁴

This view, however, has recently come under increasing challenge on two basic grounds. The first concerns the well-known phenomenon of the Spartan mirage, that ‘compound of distorted reality and sheer imaginative fiction’, created from the fifth century onwards by non-Spartans of various (not always compatible) persuasions as support for their political or philosophical views of their own societies.⁵ Oswyn Murray has recently put the ancient historian’s problem in a succinct, if perhaps extreme, form:

The Spartan system is known to us only in mythic form and from the outside: it is portrayed by a succession of non-Spartan observers as an ideal construct, heavily contaminated with the typical anthropological failings, of emphasis upon its otherness, its difference from the norm, and of its conformity to a system; there are basic problems in the observer status of everything we think we know about Sparta. As a consequence, we cannot date or follow the development of the Spartan progress towards a distinctive *politeia* or socio-political system.⁶

Several of these ideal constructs were, as I have recently argued, both aided and abetted by the Spartans themselves through their range of official and personal contacts with Greeks from other *poleis*.⁷ And this brings us to the second main ground for scepticism about the relevance of Classical evidence to Archaic Spartan society: the Spartans’ own invention of their past, a phenomenon highlighted in a forthcoming article by Michael Flower.⁸ Flower argues that on a number of occasions in Spartan history supposedly ancient socio-political practices, attributed to the lawgiver Lykourgos, were quite simply invented for contemporary political purposes.

The most systematic invention of an entire new matrix of Lykourgan customs, that of Kings Agis and Kleomenes in the late third century, does not of course affect the validity of the Classical sources, although it does affect the authenticity of information in later sources which has often been regarded as descriptive of Archaic and Classical institutions.⁹ The invention of the Spartan past was, however, by no means restricted to the Hellenistic period. In the aftermath of the hotly contested debate in 404, when it was decided to admit the large amount of foreign currency acquired by Lysander into the *polis* for public use but to prohibit private ownership upon pain of death (Plut. *Lys.* 17.1–4), we can detect the emergence of two competing invented traditions. The first, reflecting the views of the dominant circle around King Agesilaos, associated the newly-established *status quo* with the unchanged laws of Lykourgos. The other, fiercely critical of the decision to admit the currency at all, claimed that Lykourgos had originally prohibited both private *and* public use of foreign coinage; this latter

tradition seems to have originated in the pamphlet written by the exiled former king, Pausanias, the opponent of both Lysander and Agesilaos.¹⁰ Notwithstanding their powerful influence upon subsequent historiography, it should be stressed that both traditions were pure inventions, since it is clear that, in reality, foreign currency had long been in circulation in both private and public hands in the years before 404.¹¹ Nor was this the only example of an influential invented tradition which originated in this period. The tradition that the ephorate was not an original institution of Lykourgos, but a subsequent creation of King Theopompos, was almost certainly another invention by Pausanias (cf. Arist. *Pol.* 5.1301b19–21), and one which quickly found its way into the works of both Plato and Aristotle.¹²

The period of Spartan imperialism in the early fourth century was clearly an era of considerable conflict and transformation when invention of the past was especially likely to flourish. But controversy and change were hardly new factors in Spartan society, and there is every reason to consider the role of invented tradition in earlier periods. Flower asks,

Can we be sure that such typically Spartan customs as the expulsion of foreigners, the bans on manual crafts and foreign travel, wife-sharing, the civil disabilities for not marrying, the annual declaration of war against the helots and the *krypteia*, really predate the fifth century?

He suggests that each of these practices may have originated as responses to novel conditions of the Classical period, but soon became portrayed as elements of the original Lykourgan *politeia*. The disruptive effect of Flower's critique is potentially considerable. As he claims,

if the Spartans engaged in the invention of tradition as often and as profoundly as...suggested, then it is impossible for us to write a history of Spartan institutions which combines evidence from authors who lived in different centuries... because Spartan society was continually in a state of flux and was continually being reinvented. The only kind of Spartan history that one can write is one which traces the stages of development which Sparta went through.

Where does this dual challenge leave the project of analysing the development of Archaic Spartan institutions? Clearly, we must be aware of the possibility, even the likelihood, that information in Classical and later sources may not reflect the situation in the period before 500. Indeed, since much of our source material derives, either directly or ultimately, from periods of great social transformation—from the late fifth and early fourth centuries and from the 'third-century revolution'—it is to be expected that these sources should reflect significant changes in discourse about Spartan affairs. It would, consequently, hardly be surprising if presentations of 'ancient' Spartan institutions differed from the reality of Archaic Sparta. It is clear, therefore, that information in the Classical sources cannot be treated as representing the outcome of some kind of uniform, linear development of Spartan society through the Archaic period. Indeed, since (to anticipate my arguments below) there is no reason to believe that the institutional development of Archaic Sparta somehow proceeded any less episodically, any less in terms of responses to novel situations, than it did in later periods, we should expect even our earliest sources to be subject to the same considerations.¹³ This can be seen even in the evidence of Herodotus, whom Starr wanted to view as a near-pristine source of evidence for early Sparta, but whose writings clearly reflect the crystallisation of several 'traditional' Spartan values in the context of her reaction to the threat from Persia.¹⁴ Our problem is that without detailed evidence for most of the Archaic period we cannot chart the process and timing of the introduction of particular traditions and practices in the way we sometimes can in later times.

Yet the dual challenge of the Spartan mirage and of the invention of tradition need not be regarded as a counsel of despair concerning our capacity to perceive the institutional character of Archaic Sparta. It is important here to make a distinction between the structure of the Spartan system and particular institutions and practices through which it was articulated. Flower has suggested that many of what we regard as typically Spartan practices may have been introduced at a comparatively late stage; but that does not mean that we need view the system in its essentials as a creation of the fifth century. For example, even if it is true that the annual declaration of war and the *krypteia* were new measures reflecting an unprecedented level of mistrust of the helots following the revolt of 464, that does not undermine the idea that Spartan citizen life had been economically reliant on the exploitation of the helots since at least the seventh century. Similarly, even if the Spartiates were not formally prohibited from engagement in manual crafts in Archaic times, as Cartledge has argued,¹⁵ no-one would seriously doubt that their economic support came essentially from their landholdings or that the lives of the overwhelming majority of citizens were devoted principally to civic and military concerns.

A similar conclusion is in fact drawn by Murray, who, despite his doubts about observer status, does not doubt that we can identify the essential structures of the Spartan system or that we can assign the creation of those structures to the Archaic period. Moreover, although detailed institutional changes were undoubtedly made later in response to novel circumstances, what is notable, as he points out, is that the outcome was not dissonance with the existing structures, but an increasing perfection of the original system. Spartan society, in fact, fulfils precisely the conditions of rationality which Murray himself sets out:

If we can detect an increasing degree of coherence in a society through its reforms, and if the principles governing the social system become clearer through change, then we may say that the society itself displays a high degree of rationality, not merely in the sense of internal coherence, but also in the sense of a self-conscious recognition of the reasons for change and the consequences of institutional reform.¹⁶

New introductions of varying dates could all plausibly be attributed, alongside older structures, to the work of Lykourgos, precisely because they shared a common underlying rationality. Hence the fact that Spartan society in the Classical sources increasingly takes on the appearance of an ‘ideal type’.

In this sense, the challenge of the invention of tradition brings us, paradoxically, back to a position not too far from Starr’s, since Sparta’s Classical institutions, even if developed considerably in the fifth century, can be argued to inform us, through the element of common rationality, about the trends inherent in Archaic developments. One might even argue that the conscious search for occasions when the Spartans were impelled to invent new traditions in Classical times could be employed as a positive tool to define the scope and limits of changes in the Archaic period. So, although a systematic account of Archaic Spartan society is clearly impossible, we can, I would suggest, plausibly discuss the overall trends and character of her institutional development. It is these general aspects which I shall address in the rest of this chapter, focusing especially upon issues which have been the subject of recent debate.

I made the distinction earlier between the structure of the Spartan system and the particular institutions and practices through which it was articulated; and it is with the underlying structure that we need to start. I should make clear my opinion that, although several key elements of this structure undoubtedly emerged during the seventh and sixth centuries, profitable discussion of the precise circumstances of their emergence is precluded—at least within the restricted span of this chapter—by our chronic state of uncertainty over the exact chronology, and sometimes even the sequence, of the most basic events in early Spartan history. Similarly, the precise import of the ephorate of Chilon in the mid sixth century seems equally uncertain, despite several scholarly efforts to establish its significance as a period of internal change.¹⁷ Hence I shall concentrate instead on the principles behind the emergence of the structure. This structure consisted of four fundamental aspects. First, a military system according to which full citizenship was extended to all adult male members of the community. That citizenship entailed membership of a guild of full-time hoplite warriors who, as a condition of membership, practised daily commensality in a number of mess groups. Secondly, an economic system which (originally, at least) provided each citizen with a minimum amount of land and an accompanying helot labour force to enable him to fulfil his compulsory mess contributions and devote himself fully to civic and military duties. Thirdly, a political system, promulgated in the so-called Great Rhetra (Plut. *Lyk.* 6), which gave the mass of citizens in assembly a formal role in decision-making, whilst retaining considerable influence in the hands of the kings and Gerousia. And, finally, a social and ritual system which marked out from birth to the grave the common, public way of life which every non-royal citizen was to lead.

These different elements may have had different origins and timetables of development, but they shared some essential common features. Each was created through the transformation of existing institutions. Warrior groups, male commensality and the exploitation of helot labour all predated their extension to the whole community, just as the kingships, Gerousia and assembly were already in existence before the promulgation of the Great Rhetra. Each element, moreover, was the product of conscious design. This is obvious in the case of the Great Rhetra; but it is equally true of the military and economic systems. The move to incorporate all Spartans within the warrior elite, and by implication to provide the poorer among them with sufficient landholdings, must have been a conscious decision. And, although the social and ritual system was clearly not created in its entirety at a single stroke and continued to be developed over the centuries, the act of combining age classes and other elements into a compulsory way of life could not have taken place without clear-sighted planning. The poetry of Tyrtaios also attests an explicit attempt to propound a new ethic which (in fr. 12 West) relates excellence in the phalanx to the life of the community and its common good.

The element of design should not, however, obscure the fact that these changes were conceived in a context of conflict. According to Aristotle, the contemporary evidence of Tyrtaios’ poem *Eunomia* gave evidence that ‘some people were so hard pressed by the war that they demanded a redistribution of land’ (*Pol.* 5.1306b37–1307a2); and, for what it is worth, the idea of conflict is also present in fifth-century sources. Herodotus (1.65) locates the transformation of Spartan institutions in a period of *kakonomia*; and Thucydides (1.18) refers to it as ‘the longest known period of faction’. One corollary is that, since the changes proceeded, as far as we know, by agreement rather than by revolution, they must have entailed compromises by which the changes were limited. We can see this in the Great Rhetra through which the Gerousia and kings retained important powers. We can see it, above all, in the provisions for property ownership and land tenure. Poorer Spartiates may have been given a sufficient minimum of land, but there was no general redistribution. Wealthy citizens retained their large estates, and the character of landholding retained the typical Greek pattern of private tenure and partible inheritance.¹⁸ Compromise is also evident at the cultural level. The poems of Alkman around the end of the seventh century have often been interpreted as evidence for the development of a cultured, ‘aristocratic’ way of life.¹⁹ The great increase in numbers of dedications of cheaper, popular artefacts (such as the lead figurines) at Spartan sanctuaries during the late seventh and early sixth centuries

did not lead to any appreciable decline in the quality and quantity of more expensive dedications.²⁰ These signs of compromise tie in with our earlier observation that Spartan society in general attained increasingly higher levels of overall coherence with the further changes made in succeeding centuries. But in some spheres major anomalies remained throughout: the sphere of land tenure was not subjected to the forces of rationality and brought under direct state control with equal, inalienable *kleroi* until the late third century. Throughout the Archaic and Classical periods the anomaly of private landholdings worked by state-controlled helots remained firmly entrenched.

These observations lead on to the question of the relationship between the institutions characteristic of Sparta's new social system and what are claimed to be comparable earlier institutions. This question has long been an area of considerable controversy, since there has always been a strong trend to regard Sparta's historical institutions in terms of 'survivals' from earlier periods, as somehow more 'primitive' or 'archaic' and less the product of change than the institutions of other *poleis*. In my opinion, this approach should be firmly resisted.

First, there is the issue of the age classes. Robert Sallares has recently argued that the character of the Greek *poleis* was strongly influenced by their development out of what he sees as the age class societies of early Greece.²¹ In Sparta, he argues, the influence was particularly strong, with practices such as wife-sharing and the penalties against bachelorhood originating not in Classical times owing to problems of manpower shortage, but much earlier as part of the exigencies of an age class society. Wife-sharing, he claims, originated as the collective claim of access which unmarried young men had to the wives of their age mates; penalties against bachelors as part of the peer pressure on those unmarried to acquire wives of their own. I find this most improbable, even if we were to grant, for argument's sake, that early Sparta had once been a genuine age class society,²² in that it ignores the difference between social pressure and the state-imposed penalties of Classical times. Moreover, unless we are to believe that these age class practices somehow lingered on, devoid of their original context, the implication must be that the age class system remained so influential within the new social structures of Archaic Sparta as to maintain the original rationale behind these practices. In reality, however, the very form of her historical age class organisation was the product of the remodelling of Spartan society. Whereas true age class systems typically operate in acephalous societies in which the age classes themselves act as self-regulating entities which set their own behavioural norms,²³ every aspect of Sparta's Classical age classes was determined by the sovereign *polis*. Indeed, age was given a strictly limited role as a principle of organisation, being mainly operative only during a Spartiate's youth and during adulthood becoming attenuated to the point of insignificance and superseded by other, competing principles of organisation embodied in the messes and the army.²⁴ Rather than a case of the surviving impact of an age class society, this seems to be a matter of informal age groupings being institutionalised by the *polis* as just one of several cohesive principles of organisation.

A similar case in point is the institution of pederasty. A number of scholars have argued that the practice of pederasty in Archaic Greece reflected its origins in a system of initiation procedures which were part of the Indo-European inheritance of prehistoric Greece and which involved the insemination of a youth by his adult lover.²⁵ On this view, whilst initiation procedures lapsed in most Greek states in historical times, in Sparta the connection between pederasty and initiation remained strong in the context of the upbringing, within which pederasty was given an institutionalised role. The local Spartan term for the elder lover, *eispnelas* (Theokritos, 12.13; Kallimachos, fr. 68.1), is interpreted, following a passage of Aelian,²⁶ as meaning someone who breathed into his beloved, a practice regarded as analogous to insemination. There are two main problems with this view.²⁷ First, there is of course no hard evidence for early Greek initiation procedures involving pederastic insemination. Indeed, the *overt* practice of pederasty is not definitely attested in Archaic Greece until the end of the seventh century, being absent from both Homer and Archilochos. From seventh-century Sparta, some lines of Tyrtaios (fr. 10.27–30), concerning the attractive qualities of a youth, ignore pederastic desire to focus on his desirability to women. There is a strong case to be made that overt male pederasty was a development of the years around 600 in parallel with the rise of the sexually exclusive phenomena of the athletic *agon*, the *gymnasion*, *palaistra* and *symposion*.²⁸ In Sparta itself there are indications of the connection between pederasty and the symposion in the poetry of Alkman (fr. 17 Page).²⁹ Secondly, the local Spartan terminology and the critical passage of Aelian have recently been reinterpreted as signifying that, far from breathing into his beloved, the *eispnelas* was regarded as someone who himself *inhaled* inspiration generated by the beauty of his beloved and the *eros* which it aroused.³⁰ The notion that historical Spartan pederasty derived from early initiation rituals therefore collapses on all sides. There can be little doubt that by the Classical period pederasty was institutionalised within the upbringing.³¹ But the probability is that its institutionalisation was a work of the late Archaic or early Classical period, a typical example of the way in which the Spartans systematised contemporary Greek practices for the purpose of state control.

A comparable transformation of a contemporary Archaic institution can be seen with the common messes, the *syssitia*, although again this has been somewhat obscured in recent scholarship. Oswyn Murray has argued that the historical practice of male commensality had its origins in the feasts of warrior groups, or *Männerbunde*, evident in the Homeric epics. Following the hoplite reform, the warrior group was in most *poleis* transformed into an aristocratic leisure group, and its feasts into the *symposion*, or drinking party. Drawing upon Murray's views, Jan Bremmer has argued that, whereas the *symposion* is the successor of the common meal of the Archaic warrior clubs, 'we can still observe these meals as a living institution in Doric Sparta and Crete'.³² This view seems to be misguided. For a start, it has recently been shown that the

participants in Homeric feasts do not constitute a warrior group or *Männerbund*. Most warriors were tied to their leaders by bonds other than mutual hospitality; the claimed connection between feasting and military organisation is tenuous. If it is true that in historical Sparta *syssitia* and army structure were closely linked, this is not an extension of Homeric practice but ‘the introduction of an entirely new way of structuring military organization’. As a leisure pursuit which created a social, not a military, group, the Homeric feast stood closer to the *symposion* than to the Spartan *syssition*.³³

Secondly, the implication that Sparta moved directly from Homeric feast to Classical *syssition*, never experiencing the *symposia* of other *poleis*, is clearly mistaken. Here it is important to remember, as Mario Lombardo has demonstrated, that neither in the Homeric epics nor in historical times was there ever a single, archetypal mode of commensality, but rather a variety of practices operating in different contexts.³⁴ Massimo Nafissi has recently noted a similar variety of convivial customs in early Archaic Sparta.³⁵ Fragments of poems by Alkman, in particular, provide both the earliest literary description of the physical scene of a *symposion* (fr. 19) and indications of one type of shared meal (fr. 17) in which one person acts as host, in complete contrast to the Classical *syssition*. A relict of such personal hospitality remained evident in Classical times in Herodotus’ list of the traditional privileges (*gereia*) of the kings, which refers to the double portion they received at private dinners (Her. 6.57). The evidence then supports the view expressed by Ewen Bowie that ‘Sparta will have had *symposia* comparable to those in other Greek states’ and that it was these which ‘will have been refashioned into messes of *homoioi* in the 6th cent.’ [sic].³⁶ The *syssition*, indeed, shows clear signs of sympotic influence, being both taken in the reclining position and divided into two parts, like the *symposion*.³⁷ Bowie, moreover, makes a case for the continuation of a sympotic tradition at Sparta, in order to explain the survival of Tyrtaean elegy down to the late fourth century, when evidence attests sympotic-style, competitive individual singing of his poems in the royal *syssition* on campaign (Philochoros, *FGrH* 328 F 216; Lykourgos, *Against Leokrates* 107). Despite these continuing influences, one must nevertheless emphasise the radical nature of the transformation involved in the extension of the messes to the entire citizen body, their relocation to the public space of the Hyakinthian Way and the linkage of compulsory, monthly contributions to the retention of citizenship, each a reflection of the extension of state control over the sphere of male commensality.

Transformation can also be seen in other spheres, for example, in the *krypteia*. The common view that it was originally a typical initiatory *rite de passage* in which young men were sent temporarily into the wilderness, if correct, simply points up the extent of its historical transformation. By the fourth century, as Edmond Lévy has recently shown, it had bifurcated into two separate (though possibly sequential) institutions: a longer period of furtive hiding and endurance, which may not have been undertaken by all youths; and a shorter, commando-style operation against the helots conducted by only a select elite.³⁸ Similarly, the supposed conservatism of the Lakonian dialect, previously regarded as a ‘fossil survival of the ancient Doric dialectal basis’ consequent upon the region’s isolation, has recently been reinterpreted as the product of conscious policy involving the deliberate retention of archaisms (combined with a few unusual innovations) to affirm Lakonian distinctiveness and Sparta’s true Dorian identity.³⁹

Transformation is even evident in the case of the dual kingship, whose hereditary holders would be expected to guard their privileges jealously. In his classic article Finley expressed his disagreement with the general tendency to view the kings’ powers as survivals from Homeric times, asserting the hypothesis that they were rather the product of Archaic developments.⁴⁰ More recently, Pierre Carlier’s detailed study suggests that Finley somewhat overstated his case: the official list of the privileges of the Spartan kings (Her. 6.56–8) displays such exact parallels in vocabulary and content with those of Homeric kings as to denote the inheritance of past privileges.⁴¹ Carlier nevertheless agrees with the thrust of Finley’s argument that the function and role of Homeric and Spartan kings were so different that to talk of ‘survival’ is insufficient; and his study reveals many respects in which royal powers were greatly reduced, sometimes under the smokescreen of the official list of privileges whose ambiguous formulation could conceal major changes of substance. One related change was the dramatic rise of the ephorate, which either did not exist or did not rank a mention at the time of the Great Rhetra, but which figures prominently from the mid sixth century.⁴²

Archaic Spartan society then was far from static. It was changing fast, partly under its own internal dynamic, partly in line with contemporary changes elsewhere. This leads us to the question broached earlier: how distinctive was Archaic Spartan society? In answering this question, we must recognise that every *polis* varied from its neighbours in certain respects, without necessarily being qualitatively different in nature. Certainly, in some respects Sparta was singular, especially at the level of inter-state relations. At its creation in the later sixth century the Peloponnesian League was a unique phenomenon, the first hegemonic, multi-state, political organisation in Greek history. Its success and part of its rationale—namely, Sparta’s guarantee of support for oligarchic regimes—depended on two distinctive features of her society: her unusual capacity to avoid tyranny and her unique, full-time hoplite citizen body. Sparta’s leadership of the League, however, also highlights both the common ideological commitments she shared with other *poleis* and the relationships of *xenia* between leading Spartiates and their oligarchic friends which underpinned them.⁴³ Whatever effect internal changes had upon the lifestyle of leading Spartiates at home, there was no detectable impact upon their social relations abroad. Recent research has demonstrated that leading Spartiates played as prominent a part in relations of *xenia* as did other Greeks.⁴⁴ In the late Archaic and early Classical periods the personal relationships which underlay Sparta’s expedition against Samos, the range of *poleis* whose

intimate links engendered fictitious claims to be Spartan colonies, and the number of ‘special relationships’ between states whose common denominator is a close connection with Sparta,⁴⁵ show that leading Spartiates stood at the centre of a network of *xeniai* which gives a real meaning to Irad Malkin’s recent phrase, ‘the Spartan Mediterranean’.⁴⁶

An important aspect of this interaction of elites was their participation in agonistic competition. Here there are signs of Spartan idiosyncrasy which can be related to her concern with military training: the unusual prominence of team games and, within individual athletic contests, an especial concentration on wrestling and the stade race.⁴⁷ But extant victory dedications at Spartan sanctuaries attest participation in a wide range of standard athletic events.⁴⁸ There is even some evidence for participation in boxing and the *pankration*. Although there was clearly some stigma attached to these events, their supposed official prohibition is now seen as an exaggerated claim of later sources.⁴⁹ There is, it is true, the problematic decline of Spartan athletic victories at Olympia in the later sixth century.⁵⁰ It is sometimes suggested that the Spartan authorities adopted a hostile attitude towards athletic competition abroad; but this does not square with the privilege given to Olympic victors of fighting in the kings’ bodyguard (Plut. *Lyk.* 22A; *Quaest. Conv.* 2.639e). Scholars have often dismissed the decline as a by-product of a lifestyle concentrating upon military skills and general fitness rather than the specialized training required in an age of increasing professionalism.⁵¹ Nafissi has recently argued for a strong element of conscious policy behind the avoidance of professionalism. But, even on this reading, the prioritisation of civic and military achievements is not unparalleled elsewhere in Greek thought, and before long Sparta reverted to a more traditional stance whereby Panhellenic victories brought honour to the *polis*.⁵² In the early fifth century the Spartans commemorated the achievements of several earlier Olympic victors through the erection of public monuments and official approbation of athletic activity at home is demonstrated by the public display and preservation of local victor lists. Similarly, Spartan attitudes to chariot racing do not seem greatly different from those of other *poleis*. The Olympic victories of Euagoras and of King Damaratos during the sixth century provide evidence of Spartan involvement at the highest level. Euagoras, at least, celebrated his victory with a victory monument at Olympia. Chariot victories and monuments, of course, continued throughout the fifth century.⁵⁴ It was only in the early fourth century that King Agesilaos, fearful of a rival source of prestige, tried to discredit chariot racing and the making of personal statues as inappropriate to Spartan values (Xen. *Ages.* 9.6; 11.7). The sphere of the *agon*, then, is also one in which we can detect some variation of approach, but not one which was qualitatively different from the practices of other *poleis*.

A similar situation is evident in the sphere of material culture.⁵⁵ Earlier this century the British excavators of the sanctuary of Artemis Orthia, impressed by the contrast between literary images of an austere Sparta and the wealth of artefacts found at pre-Classical levels, wrote of a ‘complete abandonment of artistic development’ in the second half of the sixth century. In their view, the decline of artistic production was to be associated with the growth of the austere, closed society of the Classical period depicted in the literary sources; and they ascribed it to a carefully considered act of state policy, attributed to the ephor Chilon.⁵⁶ Few students would now accept this thesis in its simplest form. The theory of a sudden cultural break has now generally been abandoned as distinctions have been drawn between the varying timetables of the decline of different types of artefact.⁵⁷ Cook, moreover, has pointed out the basic difficulty that, for the most part, the Spartiates themselves were not directly responsible for the artistic production whose decline is used as the index of their social and economic arrangements.⁵⁸ What we are dealing with is not ‘Spartan art’—as the excavators tended to call it—but *Lakonian* art, produced at workshops at various places within the region.⁵⁹ Nevertheless, several recent discussions continue to support the idea of a singular, if gradual, decay of Lakonian art resulting from a decline in patronage associated with a progressive transformation of Spartan society into a unique barrack-like culture.⁶⁰

There are problems, however, with this hypothesis. Some of the most important forms of production (for example, the black-figure pottery and large bronze vessels, both of which died out in the years between *c.* 530 and *c.* 515) are mainly found abroad and their decline seems unlikely to have been significantly affected by a decay in patronage from a minority clientele inside Lakonia.⁶¹ The decline of Lakonian black-figure pottery is hardly a unique phenomenon, but parallels the fate of Corinthian painted pottery which similarly declined at a slightly earlier period under the effect of Attic competition.⁶² It is notable that these export-orientated products largely declined before those more geared to local consumption. One of the products most patronised by the Spartiates themselves, the bronze statuettes (see Table 8.1), reached a peak in the later sixth century; and, even during the early fifth century, they continued at a higher level of production than a century earlier, at a time when several other centres of manufacture seem to have been in decline.⁶³

Another approach is to consider statistical patterns of dedications at Spartan sanctuaries in comparison with sanctuaries elsewhere. Table 8.2 presents the figures for published bronzes from Spartan sanctuaries between *c.* 650 and *c.* 350. The current state of the published evidence is clearly unsatisfactory, owing to the inadequate specification of numbers of finds in the excavation reports and the large number of items only vaguely dated or completely undated. Although the present figures, such as they are, suggest an overall decline in dedications during the late Archaic and early Classical periods, they provide little support for the idea of a general increase in austerity. The figures suggest divergent trends between different Spartan sanctuaries, with dedications on the Acropolis actually increasing in the later sixth century and continuing strongly into the

early fifth. Fifth-century bronze votives at Spartan sanctuaries, indeed, show a greater openness to outside influences, several of them being imports or local imitations

Table 8.1 Datable numbers of Lakonian bronze statuettes

<i>Date</i>	<i>Number</i>
<i>c.</i> 650– <i>c.</i> 600	1
<i>c.</i> 600– <i>c.</i> 550	11
<i>c.</i> 550– <i>c.</i> 500	48
<i>c.</i> 500– <i>c.</i> 450	17
<i>c.</i> 450– <i>c.</i> 400	6
<i>c.</i> 400– <i>c.</i> 350	2

Table 8.2 Published bronze finds at Spartan sanctuaries, *c.* 650–*c.* 350

<i>Date</i>	<i>Orthia</i>	<i>Acropolis</i>	<i>Menelaion</i>	<i>Amyklaion</i>	<i>Total</i>
<i>c.</i> 650– <i>c.</i> 600	40+	3	24+	5+	72+
<i>c.</i> 600– <i>c.</i> 550	22	7–8	22+	3+	54+
<i>c.</i> 550– <i>c.</i> 500	6	15–18	6+	8–9	35+
<i>c.</i> 500– <i>c.</i> 450	2	10–14	2+	1–2	15+
<i>c.</i> 450– <i>c.</i> 400	1	5–7	ind	0–1	7+
<i>c.</i> 400– <i>c.</i> 350	—	1	—	—	1
Early Archaic	1	—	—	—	1
Archaic	13	—	ind	5	19+
Late Archaic	—	—	—	3	3
L. III–V and later	—	—	11 +	—	11 +
Date not given	3	74+	3+	115+	195+

Note: The entries ‘+’ and ‘ind’ signify the existence of an indefinite number of artefacts whose limit is not specified in the relevant excavation reports.

of foreign work, thus contradicting the frequently expressed view that the growth of austerity in this period is proven by the cessation of imports and of foreign influences.⁶⁴ There is, moreover, no reason to think that Spartan dedication patterns were particularly unusual. Drawing upon evidence from a range of Greek sanctuaries, Anthony Snodgrass has shown that the years around 500 witnessed major changes in the nature and role of votive offerings, involving a general decrease in surviving dedications.⁶⁵ The detailed changes in types of votive offerings which lie behind the global Spartan statistics in Table 8.2—namely, a decline in jewellery offerings and in bronze vessels after *c.* 550, but an increased level of votive statuettes until *c.* 450—are broadly in line with the situation at other Greek sanctuaries.⁶⁶ Although it would be unwise to deny that there are any distinctive features in the character of bronze dedications at Spartan sanctuaries, in general Spartan developments reflect and exemplify those taking place within the wider Greek world.

This conclusion concerning votive expenditures may be extended to the general role of wealth within Spartan society. Once again there are respects in which Sparta was different from many *poleis*. The underlying socio-economic arrangements of Archaic Sparta were such as to limit or exclude opportunities for certain uses of wealth common in other *poleis*. One thinks particularly of practices like the performance of liturgies, the private provision of public facilities—such as Kimon’s reconstruction of the Academy (Plut. *Kim.* 13)—or the deployment of material patronage towards poorer citizens (who in Sparta were, originally, at least, provided with sufficient economic resources). Sparta was also somewhat unusual, though not unique, in not producing her own coinage. However, the celebrated image of Sparta as a state in which wealth was of little use, with equal, publicly controlled *kleroi* and a prohibition of foreign coinage, was, as I have argued elsewhere, a construct of much later periods.⁶⁷ Even in fifth-century sources, images of the general role of wealth show few differences from other *poleis*. In Herodotus’ *Histories* Spartans exchange gifts, cheat each other in the *agora*, and receive both bribes and distributions of booty in the same way as other Greeks.⁶⁸

As Finley has noted, most Spartan institutions were in themselves far from rare within the Greek world.⁶⁹ This applies even to the phenomenon of helotage, which scholars have often wanted to see as the unique driving force explaining her supposedly unique society.⁷⁰ The ascription of Sparta’s transformation solely to the helot problem is too extreme. The communal enslavement of a native population was not unique to Sparta;⁷¹ and, although the helots were unusual in being Greek and were perhaps particularly numerous, they had no monopoly on attempts at liberation, as we know from examples

of the Kyllirioi at Syracuse and Penestai in Thessaly (Her. 7.155; Xen. *Hell.* 2.3.36). There was nothing inherent in the helot problem which demanded the radical transformation of Spartan society, had it not also been desirable in its own right, as a response to internal conflicts.⁷² The extension of full citizenship and economic security to the entire community as a means of establishing internal solidarity, with all that followed in the growth of a common, public disciplined lifestyle, was no doubt influenced by the helot problem; but it was nevertheless a logical, if extreme, development within the terms of Greek values. For the Spartans, in Redfield's words, 'their system was acceptable to them, was tried and proved habitable'.⁷³

I end with the one institution which even Finley regarded as unique, as the pivotal mechanism which linked Sparta's institutions into a singular structure: the *agoge*. Like several other institutions, the *agoge* of Classical Sparta has often been seen as an amalgam of primitive customs and rituals whose purpose could be illuminated by anthropological evidence of the fossilised cultures of African tribal systems.⁷⁴ It was partly in reaction to this survivalist approach that Finley expressed his contrary view that

of all the elements in Sparta the *agoge* is the one of which it is most impossible to find traces in our earliest Greek records or traditions.... Therefore, I am driven to the inference that...the [Classical] *agoge* was a late invention, however old some of the initiation rites and other external aspects of it may have been.⁷⁵

The latest research suggests that even Finley's approach exaggerates the antiquity and singularity of the rituals of the Classical Spartan upbringing. As Nigel Kennell has convincingly shown, the Spartan *agoge*, as traditionally understood, was in fact a post-Classical creation.⁷⁶ The term *agoge* is never used of the Classical upbringing (Xenophon uses the general Greek word, *paideia*: e.g. *Lak. Pol.* 2.1), appearing only in the third century. This is no mere matter of terminology: the upbringing had no specialised name in Classical times because it was not a discrete institution, but an integral part of the entire Spartiate way of life. Only when that way of life fell into decay did the upbringing come to be seen as a separate institution and acquire a distinct name. As such, it was regarded in the Hellenistic and later periods as synonymous with the 'ancient traditions' of Sparta, and was 'revived' and recreated both by Kleomenes III and in Roman times in line with contemporary inventions of the Classical Spartan past. Most of the post-Classical evidence, including much in Plutarch's *Lykourgos*, therefore bears no relation to the Archaic or Classical upbringing. Most of the supposedly primitive ritual elements described by these late sources were recent inventions. This conclusion matches the latest findings of Africanist anthropology that the supposedly fossilised tribal customs so often treated as primitive comparisons were in reality modern constructions of societies asserting their cultural identities in the face of Western colonialism and modernisation. Kennell argues that the historical Spartan upbringing was first created in the early sixth century, contemporaneously with the remodelling of the sanctuary of Artemis Orthia, as part of the transformation of the Spartiate way of life. But he agrees that, since our earliest substantial source is Xenophon (*Lak. Pol.* 2–4) in the early fourth century, 'it is impossible to use the extant evidence as a basis for reconstructing Spartan educational rituals in the Archaic period, since changing historical circumstances must inevitably have had their impact on the system well before Xenophon's time'.⁷⁷ Xenophon's evidence must even be treated with caution concerning the upbringing of his own day, since his claim for its supposed uniqueness is overdone. The general stages of the Classical upbringing, its commencement at age 7, the liminal status it gave to the *hebontes* in their twenties and even its cycle of rituals were not too dissimilar from practices in other *poleis*. What was distinctive was the direct control exercised by the state and the collective identity of the youth which resulted from the institutionalisation of educational practices which remained voluntaristic in other states.

The upbringing then, far from being an exceptional institution, fits neatly into the pattern of Spartan society observed throughout this chapter: a society distinctive in the pervasiveness of its collectivity and in the application of state control over institutions and practices which were, in other respects, not qualitatively different from those of other Greek states; a society which we may view as standing at one end of the spectrum of Greek *poleis*, somewhat extreme, perhaps—but no more so than democratic Athens standing equally firmly at the other extremity. This society and its historical institutions were the product not of conservatism or of primitive survivals, but of continual change and adaptation throughout the Archaic period in response to new historical circumstances. The very problems we encounter in our attempt to detect the character of Archaic Spartan institutions and to trace their development are the clearest testimony of all to the ongoing transformations which characterised both Spartan society and the invented images of its past.

NOTES

- 1 Much of the research incorporated in this paper was undertaken during my tenure of a Nuffield Foundation Social Science Research Fellowship in 1993/4.
- 2 For example, Huxley, *Early Sparta*.
- 3 C.G. Starr, *Historia* 14 (1965), 257–72 at 258–60.

- 4 Ibid., 263.
- 5 Quotation from Cartledge, *Agasilaos and the Crisis of Sparta*, 416. The basic studies of the ‘mirage’ are Oilier, *Le Mirage spartiate*; Tigerstedt, *The Legend of Sparta in Classical Antiquity*.
- 6 O.Murray, in Murray and Price (eds) *The Greek City*, 1–25 at 9.
- 7 Hodkinson, in Powell and Hodkinson (eds) *The Shadow of Sparta*, 183–222 at 211–16.
- 8 M.A.Flower, ‘The Invention of Tradition in Classical and Hellenistic Sparta’, a paper originally given at the University of Liverpool in May 1994: I am grateful to the author for permission to cite his paper in advance of publication. The term ‘invention of tradition’ is borrowed from Hobsbawm and Ranger (eds) *The Invention of Tradition*; but, whereas they restrict the scope of ‘invented tradition’ to recently established practices of a purely ritual and symbolic nature (see especially pp. 1–4), Flower applies the term in the sense of the image of their past which the Spartans created for themselves as justification for substantive socio-political innovations.
- 9 As has been shown by recent studies of land tenure and the upbringing: Hodkinson, *CQ* n.s. 36 (1986), 378–406; Kennell, *The Gymnasium of Virtue*, especially 98–114.
- 10 The first tradition appears in Xen. *Lak. Pol.* 7.5–6; 14.1–3; the second in Plut. *Lys.* 17.3; *Lyk.* 9.1–2; 30.1; Diod. 7.12.8. The accounts of Plutarch and Diodorus drew directly upon the works of the fourth-century writers Ephoros and Theopompos. For the probable influence of Pausanias’ pamphlet (Ephoros, *FGrH* 70 F 118, *ap.* Strab. 365–6.8.5.5) on Spartan historiography, cf. Tigerstedt, *op. cit.* (n. 5), 111; E.David, *PP34* (1979), 94–116; Hodkinson, *op. cit.* (n. 7), 200–1.
- 11 Michell, *Sparta*, 298–303; MacDowell, *Spartan Law*, 119; K.L.Noethlichs, *Historia* 36 (1987), 129–70; Hodkinson, in Rich and Shipley (eds) *War and Society in the Greek World*, 146–76 at 150–2.
- 12 Tigerstedt, *op. cit.* (n. 5), 110–11; Oliva, *Sparta and her Social Problems*, 123–5; David, *op. cit.* (n. 10); Plato, *Laws* 3.691d–692a; Arist. *Pol.* 5.1313a26–33.
- 13 The meagre information we have about the context of the period of Tyrtaios (Arist. *Pol.* 5.1306b37–1307a2), for example, suggests a society in crisis faced with the need to make radical decisions.
- 14 Cf., especially Her. 7.102–4, 134–6, 228.
- 15 P.Cartledge, *LCM* 1 (1976), 115–19.
- 16 *Op. cit.* (n. 6), 8–9.
- 17 See, most recently, Nafissi, *La nascita del kosmos*, 124–38. For a recent exposé of the uncertain chronology of the Messenian wars, V.Parker, *Chiron* 21 (1991), 25–47. The uncertainty of the sequence of the Second Messenian War and the Great Rhetra is noted, *inter alia*, by Forrest, *History of Sparta*, 56–8; Parker, *op. cit.*, 41.
- 18 Hodkinson, *op. cit.* (n. 9).
- 19 For example, Murray, *Early Greece*, 2nd edition, 171–2; C.Segal, in *Cambridge History of Classical Literature*, i.179.
- 20 G.Dickins, *Burlington Magazine* 14 (1908), 66–84; Dawkins (ed.) *The Sanctuary of Artemis Orthia at Sparta*; Fitzhardinge, *The Spartans*.
- 21 Sallares, *The Ecology of the Ancient Greek World*, 160–92.
- 22 The following criticisms have already been aired in my review in *CP* 87 (1992), 376–81, especially 380–1.
- 23 Bernardi, *Age Class Systems*.
- 24 See, generally, Eisenstadt, *From Generation to Generation*, 204–12; and on the competing principles: Hodkinson, *Chiron* 13 (1983), 239–81, especially 251–60.
- 25 E.Bethe, *RM* 62 (1907), 438–75; J.Bremmer, *Arethusa* 13 (1980), 279–98; Patzer, *Die griechische Knabenliebe*; Sergent, *L’Homosexualité dans la mythologie grecque*.
- 26 *V.H.* 3.12: Spartan *eromenoi* (‘beloveds’) asked their *erastai* (‘lovers’) to εἰσπνεῖν
- 27 Much of my critique draws upon the excellent study by Dover, *The Greeks and their Legacy*, 115–34.
- 28 Murray, *op. cit.* (n. 19), 215.
- 29 And also on sixth-century Lakonian black-figure pottery, if indeed the subject matter is Spartiate-based: Nafissi, *op. cit.* (n. 17), 211–13.
- 30 Dover, *op. cit.* (n. 27), 123–4.
- 31 Cf. P.Cartledge, *PCPS* n.s. 27 (1981), 17–36, and N.R.E.Fisher, in Powell (ed.) *Classical Sparta*, 26–50, at 46 n.37, as against the view of MacDowell, *op. cit.* (n. 11), 61–5, that it was largely a voluntary arrangement.
- 32 O.Murray, in *Concilium Eirene XVI*, i.47–52; O.Murray, in *Tria Corda...A. Momigliano*, 257–72; O.Murray, in Hagg (ed.) *The Greek Renaissance of the Eighth Century B.C.*, 195–9; J.N.Bremmer, in Murray (ed.) *Symptotica*, 135–48 at 136.
- 33 H. van Wees, in Crielaard (ed.) *Homeric Questions*, 147–82, especially 173–4 and 177–9; quotation from 178 n. 66. The suggestion of a link between the *syssitia* and the army has frequently been made: cf. Hodkinson, *op. cit.* (n. 24), 258 n. 55; for some doubts, Lazenby, *The Spartan Army*, 13.
- 34 M.Lombardo, *ASNP* 3rd series 18 (1988), 263–86; van Wees, *op. cit.* (n. 33), 165–71.
- 35 Nafissi, *op. cit.* (n. 17), 206–24.
- 36 E.Bowie, in Murray (ed.) *Symptotica*, 221–9 at 225 n. 16.
- 37 Murray, *op. cit.* (n. 19), 177; Nafissi, *op. cit.* (n. 17), 178–80.
- 38 E.Lévy, *Ktema* 13 (1988), 245–52.
- 39 J.M.Hall, *PCPS* n.s. 41 (1995), 83–100 at 90; quotation from Bartoněk, *Classification of the West Greek Dialects*, 186.
- 40 Finley, ‘Sparta’, in his *The Use and Abuse of History*, 161–77 at 176. (This was originally published in Vernant [ed.] *Problèmes de la guerre en Grèce ancienne*, 143–60; it is also reprinted in Finley, *Economy and Society in Ancient Greece*, 24–40.)
- 41 Carlier, *La Royauté en Grèce*, 240–324.

- 42 Even if one is disinclined to accept the claims of later sources (Diog. Laert. 1.68; *P.Ryl.* 18; Paus. 3.16.4) that the mid-sixth-century ephor Chilon was a figure of major importance, on grounds of the absence of political references from Herodotus' information about the man (1.59; 7.235), the ephors are clearly prominent in the affair of Anaxandridas and his wives (5.39–40).
- 43 Cartledge, *op. cit.* (n. 5), 243–6; C.J.Tuplin, *LCM* 2 (1977), 5–10.
- 44 Herman, *Ritualised Friendship and the Greek City*. In his catalogue of explicit references to *xeniai* in Appendix A, twenty-three out of just over 100 historical, pre-Hellenistic entries involve Spartiates.
- 45 Sparta and Samos: P.Cartledge, *CQ* n.s. 32 (1982), 243–65, especially 244 and 249. Fictitious 'colonies': Knidos (Her. 1.174); Thera (Her. 4.145–50; Pindar, *Pyth.* 5.256–9); Melos (Thuc. 4.112); Kythera (Thuc. 7.57.6). 'Special relationships': Knidos and Taras; Thera and Samos; Kyrene and Samos (Her. 3.138; 4.152).
- 46 Malkin, *Myth and Territory in the Spartan Mediterranean*.
- 47 Team contests: cheese-stealing contests at Artemis Orthia; the *sphairomachia* (Xen. *Lak. Pol.* 2.8–9; 9.5); massed unclad battles at the Gymnopaïdiai (Plato, *Laws* 1.633b–c). Wrestling and the stade account for the vast majority of Spartiate Olympic victories: N.B.Crowther, *AC* 59 (1990), 198–202.
- 48 Cf. Lazzarini, *Leformule delle dediche votive nella Grecia arcaica*, 45–354: nos. 830–1, 834; 849–50; and the evidence of the Damonon inscription (*IG* v.1 213).
- 49 Crowther, *op. cit.* (n. 47), with references.
- 50 Twenty-seven known Spartan athletic victors between 720 and 552; only six or seven over the following two centuries: Moretti, *Olympionikai*, 53–198.
- 51 For example, Höhle, *Olympia in der Politik der griechischen Staatenwelt*, 131–5; Finley and Pleket, *The Olympic Games*, 74.
- 52 Nafissi, *op. cit.* (n. 17), 167–70, comparing Tyrtaios (fr. 12) with Xenophanes (fr. 2 West) and Solon's limitation of athletic prizes (Diog. Laert. 1.55; Plut. *Sol.* 23.3; Diod. Sic. 9.2.5). Cf., generally, P.Angeli Bernadini, *Stadion* 6 (1980), 81–111.
- 53 Commemorative monuments: Paus. 3.13.9, 14.3, 15.7; 6.13.2, 15.8. The early fifth-century dating is clearest in the case of the six- or seven-times Olympic victor, Chionis (668/664–656), whose statue at Olympia was commissioned from the famous Athenian sculptor Myron to stand beside and rival that of Astylos, the six-times Syracusan victor of the 480s. The bronze statues of other early victors must likewise post-date late sixth-century developments in bronzeworking techniques. Local victor lists: Jeffery, *The Local Scripts of Archaic Greece*, 201 nos 44–7; in the fifth century Hellanikos of Lesbos could compile a list of victors in the Karneian games.
- 54 Victories of Euagoras (Moretti, *op. cit.* [n. 50], nos. 110, 113, 117: dated 548, 544 and 540); Damaratos (no. 157: dated 504). Euagoras' victory dedication: Paus. 6.10.8. The fifth-century evidence is summarised by Hodkinson, in Powell *op. cit.* (n. 31), 96–9.
- 55 For fuller exposition of the following comments, cf. my forthcoming articles in Fisher and van Wees (eds) *Archaic Greece*, and in Walker and Cavanagh (eds.) *Sparta in Lakonia*.
- 56 Dickins, *op. cit.* (n. 20), 67; Dickins, *JHS* 32 (1912), 1–42, especially 17–19.
- 57 Cf. especially C.Rolley, *Ktema* 2 (1977), 125–40.
- 58 R.M.Cook, *CQ* n.s. 12 (1962), 156–8. Cook's basic point is not undermined by the plausible argument of Cartledge, *op. cit.* (n. 15), that *some* Spartiates may have engaged in artistic production in the period before the fifth century. As already noted, this would not affect the fact that most production was in non-Spartiate hands and that most Spartiates, especially the richest and most powerful landowners, would not have been involved.
- 59 Cf. regarding the bronzework C.Leon, *AM* 83 (1968), 175–85. Although 'Lakonian art' is now the established term, the continuing tendency to view it in specifically Spartan terms is indicated by the title *The Spartans* given to Fitzhardinge's recent art-historical book, *op. cit.* (n. 20).
- 60 For example, A.J.Holladay, *CQ* n.s. 27 (1977), 111–26; Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 154–7.
- 61 For a statistical analysis of the production and distribution history of Lakonian black-figure and other pottery, Nafissi, *op. cit.* (n. 17), 236–53. Earlier versions were published in Pompili (ed.) *Studi sulla ceramica Laconica*, 149–72, and (most conveniently for English-speaking readers) in C.M.Stibbe, *Laconian Mixing Bowls*, 68–88. The precise terminal date of Lakonian bronze-vessel production is uncertain, depending as it does on the disputed attribution of several vessels between Lakonian, Corinthian and South Italian workshops: cf., recently, Rolley, *Les Vases de bronze de l'archaïsme récent en Grande-Grèce*, 75–6, with P. Cartledge's review in *JHS* 105 (1985), 238–40.
- 62 Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth*, 109–16.
- 63 Lamb, *Ancient Greek and Roman Bronzes*, 145 and 150–1.
- 64 For this view, cf. especially Holladay, *op. cit.* (n. 60), 115 and 117. On fifth-century imported and foreign-influenced bronzework at Sparta, see generally Rolley, *Greek Bronzes*, 113.
- 65 A.M.Snodgrass, in *Science dell'Antichità* 3–4 (1989–90), 287–94.
- 66 On jewellery votives, note the dramatic contemporary decline at Olympia: Snodgrass, *op. cit.* (n. 65), 288, based on Philipp, *Bronzeschmuck aus Olympia*. On the increasing non-votive use of bronze vessels, which in part reflects the development of large votive statuary: Rolley, *op. cit.* (n. 64), 169; Mattusch, *Greek Bronze Statuary*, 58–118. On the late fifth-century decline in votive statuettes: Lamb, *op. cit.* (n. 63), 106; Rolley, *op. cit.* (n. 64), 169.
- 67 Hodkinson, *op. cit.* (n. 7 and 9).
- 68 Her. 1.153; 6.62; 9.81, with Hodkinson, *op. cit.* (n. 7), 185–6; cf. the numerous references to bribery discussed by Noethlichs, *op. cit.* (n. 11).
- 69 Finley, *op. cit.* (n. 40), 174–5.
- 70 For example, de Ste Croix, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War*, especially 91.

- 71 Cf. the *penestai* in Thessaly and numerous native populations enslaved by Greek settlers in Magna Graecia, Asia Minor and around the Black Sea; for a succinct survey, Garland, *Slavery in Ancient Greece*, 101–6.
- 72 Andrewes, *The Greek Tyrants*, 66–77; J.Redfield, *CJ* 73 (1977/8), 146–61; Ducat, *Les Hilotes*, 152–3; M.Whitby, in Powell and Hodkinson op. cit. (n. 7), 87–126 at 89.
- 73 Op. cit. (n. 72), 161.
- 74 Jeanmaire, *Couroi et courètes*.
- 75 Finley, op. cit. (n. 40), 175–6.
- 76 Kennell, op. cit. (n. 9).
- 77 Ibid., 143.

A NEW SOLUTION TO THE RIDDLE OF THE *SEISACHTHEIA*

Edward M. Harris

Solon's reform known as the *Seisachtheia* occupies a prominent place in most accounts of Archaic Athens. Scholars by and large agree that the reform, which probably occurred in 594, was a crucial step in the long transition from the aristocratic society of the early Archaic period to the democratic society of the Classical period.¹ M.I. Finley, for instance, believed the reform was responsible for the development of a slave society.² Despite the general consensus about its importance for Athenian history, there has been little agreement about the nature of the *Seisachtheia*. Some are content to follow the interpretation of the reform found in the Aristotelian *Constitution of the Athenians* (12.4) and Plutarch's *Solon* (15), where the reform is described as a cancellation of debts.³ Others point out various objections to this view and interpret the reform as the abolition of a type of feudal relationship.⁴ Yet all scholars tend to assume that, whatever the precise nature of the reform, the *Seisachtheia* had a significant effect on the control of land in Attica.

The aim of this chapter is to propose a new solution to the mystery of Solon's enigmatic *Seisachtheia*. The first part will argue that it is necessary to abandon the traditional assumption that the reform concerned control over land. This assumption rests on an anachronistic interpretation of lines 5–7 of fragment 36 West of Solon's poetry. In my opinion, the lines are better interpreted as a metaphor for Solon's suppression of *stasis* in Attica. The second part will advance a new interpretation of the reform drawing on evidence from Homer, Hesiod, Herodotus, and Thucydides. It will argue that the *Seisachtheia* abolished a system of payment for protection and maintenance of internal order well attested in the Homeric poems as well as in other areas that did not develop institutions characteristic of the later *polis*. The new interpretation of the reform puts Peisistratus' rule in a different light and tentatively suggests a revised model for the development of Athenian political institutions.

I

To the ancient historian searching for clues about Solon's mysterious *Seisachtheia*, lines 3–7 of fragment 36 of the lawgiver's poetry appear initially to offer a valuable hint. In the passage Solon boasts of removing from the land the *horoi*, which had been planted far and wide (ὄρους ἀνείλον πολλὰ χί πεπηγότας). As a result, the land, once enslaved, is now free (πρόσθεν δὲ δουλεύουσα, νῦν ἐλευθέρη). The author of the *Constitution of the Athenians* (12.4), followed by Plutarch (*Solon* 15), used these lines to support the view that the *Seisachtheia* was in effect a cancellation of debts. These authors obviously thought that the *horoi* mentioned here were not boundary-markers, but stones set up to indicate that the land to which they were affixed had been pledged as security for a debt or other obligation, a practice widespread in Attica during the fourth century and later.⁵ Since it was customary to remove these *horoi* upon cancellation of the obligation, both authors interpreted Solon's assertion 'I removed the *horoi*' (ὄρους ἀνείλον) to mean that he had carried out a cancellation of debts. Those modern scholars who have not accepted this interpretation have still shared their basic assumption that these lines somehow refer to the *Seisachtheia*.⁶

There is an insurmountable objection to this interpretation: the word *horos* in early Greek literature always means boundary marker (Horn. *Il.* 12.421; 21.405; Solon fr. 37; Solon apud Gaius *Dig.* 10.1.3). The earliest use of the word *horos* to refer to a security-marker occurs in 364 (Is. 6.36). Moreover, the word *horos* is never to my knowledge used in poetry in any period to refer to a security-marker. The epigraphical record speaks with the same voice: all of the *horoi* found in L.H. Jeffery's collection of Archaic inscriptions are boundary-markers.⁷ The earliest dated *horos* of the security-marker type comes from the year 363/2 (*IG* ii² 2654). Of the undated *horoi* marking a security obligation, not one is dated earlier than the fourth century.⁸ It is clear that here as elsewhere the author of the Aristotelian *Constitution of the Athenians* has introduced anachronistic ideas into his account of Archaic history.⁹ The *horoi* mentioned in line 6 of Solon fragment 36 must therefore be boundary-markers. Nor should one hypothesize a meaning for the word *horos* that has no parallel in any Archaic source and then use this invented meaning to interpret these verses.¹⁰ That would be to explain *ignotum per ignotius*. All the Archaic evidence firmly indicates that Solon must use the word *horos* in the sense of boundary-marker.

A new approach to reading the passage is clearly required. There are two choices: one can interpret the lines literally and believe that Solon boasted about tearing up boundary-markers, or one can interpret the lines metaphorically. A literal reading

of the passage can safely be ruled out. The act of removing boundary-markers was considered a serious crime. *Horoi* that marked boundaries to private land were expected to remain fixed and enjoyed the protection of Zeus Horios ([Dem.] 7.39–40). Plato in the *Lam* (8.842e–843b) condemns their removal as an act of sacrilege, the crime of ‘moving what must not be moved’. Other sources reveal that in several *poleis* magistrates could punish this crime with severe fines.¹¹ Are we to believe that Solon in fr. 36 was boasting about committing a crime?

This leaves us with no choice but to interpret these lines metaphorically. This approach has much to recommend it. After all, the lines in question are poetry, not prose, and Solon, though not one of the most elegant Archaic versifiers, did possess a certain talent for creating bold metaphors and striking similes. For instance, in fragment 37, Solon sings about the man who would not have restrained the people nor stopped them ‘before he had churned up the milk and taken away the butterfat’ (πρὶν ἀνταράξας πῖα ἐξεῖλεν γάλα: trans. L. Foxhall). Here Solon gives us an effective metaphor for seizing the property of the wealthy. In fragment 5 Solon speaks of his concern for both the common people and the wealthy alike and describes how he ‘held a mighty shield over both sides and did not allow either side to enjoy an unjust triumph’ (ἔστην ἀμφιβαλὼν κρατερὸν σάκος ἀμφοτέροισι, ἡ νικάν δ’ οὐκ εἶας οὐδετέρους ἀδίκως). In fragment 4, line 4, Solon says that oppressive slavery ‘rouses war from its slumber’ (πόλεμόν θ’ εὐδοντ’ ἐπεγείρει).¹²

In fragment 37 Solon actually compares himself to a *horos*. He contrasts his own conduct with the behaviour of an imaginary oppressor of the rich. ‘I stood’, Solon declares, ‘like a *horos* in the middle ground between them’ (ἐγὼ δὲ τούτων ἐν μεταχμῷ | ὅρος κατέστην). The simile evokes Solon’s impartiality in the midst of *stasis*. Solon compares the two opposing sides to a piece of property separated by a boundary marked by a *horos*. The lawgiver joins with neither side, remaining in the centre like a *horos*. What is significant for the interpretation of fragment 36, lines 5–7, is that the *horos* is closely linked with *stasis*. The *horos* is placed in the middle (ἐν μεταχμῷ) to show that the two areas are not joined together as one property. The *horos* divides the earth into two different parts and thus signifies the presence of division and the absence of unity.

It was also division, *stasis*, that afflicted Attica in Solon’s time. In fragment 5, lines 7–16, Solon reports that the leaders in their greed and violence have offended justice, who in time will come to exact retribution. Solon likens the plight of Attica to an inescapable wound, another bold metaphor, that has come upon the community and driven it into base slavery. Note the use of the term *doulosyne*, slavery, applied to the general situation in Attica. Although literal slavery is referred to below, the word is used figuratively here to describe the oppression into which Attica has fallen as a result of violence. This oppression leads to strife and bloodshed (lines 19–20). *Stasis*, in turn brings slavery to the poor, who are no longer protected by respect for justice and are seized by the powerful and sold into slavery.

The entire passage is valuable for revealing the close connection in Solon’s poetry between *stasis* (discord) and *doulosyne* (slavery). The passage does not describe the economic exploitation of dependent labour in some kind of quasi-feudal system. The enslavement of the poor comes about from a breakdown of law and order described in lines 5–22. It is not the cause of *stasis* nor is it linked to any failure of the *hektemoroi* to make payments to their lords or to the foreclosure of mortgages on land held by poor farmers. The breakdown of law and order (line 31: *dysnomia*) has produced the kind of raids for plunder and slaves found throughout the *Odyssey* and *Iliad*.¹³

It is time to return to fragment 36. In this passage Solon looks back on his achievements. He begins by asking, ‘What of those things for which I brought together the people have I left undone?’ (lines 1–2). Solon is obviously proud of his success in unifying the people after the *stasis* that was the root cause of the troubles he laments elsewhere in his poetry. To lend weight to his boast, Solon calls on the ‘dark Earth’, invoking her with the respectful title ‘greatest and best mother of the Olympian gods’. Why does Solon call on Earth as a witness? Because it was from her that Solon ‘removed the boundary-stones that had been planted far and wide’. Just as the *horos* in fragment 37 was associated with the presence of division in Attica, the removal of the *horoi* in fragment 36 ought to symbolize the expulsion of *stasis* from the land. That fits in well with the phrase ‘I brought the people together’ (ξυνήγαγον δήμον) in lines 1–2 and with the general thrust of Solon’s description of the crisis in Attica. The removal of *horoi* was also used to symbolize the unification of two previously separate communities (Xen. *Hell.* 4.4.6; Plut. *Arist.* 11.8). It is therefore not surprising that Solon should use this image to express the idea of unifying Attica after it had been divided into different factions.

And just as *stasis* was accompanied by *doulosyne*, oppression, in fragment 4, the end of *stasis* had made the land free once more (νῦν ἐλευθέη). There can be no question that Solon employs figurative language in these lines: the phrase ‘Earth... formerly a slave, now free’ makes this certain. The end of *stasis* has also enabled Solon to free men who were seized during the previous turmoil and either sold abroad or enslaved in Attica. There is the same close thematic connection between slavery in both its manifestations and *stasis* as there is in fragment 4. In fragment 36, however, the theme is inverted: the ending of *stasis* has brought an end to *doulosyne* both for the land as a whole and for individuals.

The new interpretation of fragment 36, lines 5–7, has several merits. Above all, it permits us to σαφηνίζειν Σόλωνα ἐκ Σόλωνος, to explain Solon from what we know about Solon’s poetry. The proposed reading is consistent with what is known about Solon’s poetic technique, with the themes developed elsewhere in his poems, and with the contemporary meaning of the word *horos*. Second, it is unlikely that Solon would have dealt with the particulars of his lawgiving in his verses. The poetry

found in the preserved fragments always deals with general moral aspects of his reforms, never with the specifics of individual laws. On the other hand, a metaphorical allusion to the effects of his reforms is precisely what one would expect in his poetry. Third, the new interpretation enables us to toss off the burden of searching for some imaginary system of land tenure or conjuring up an agricultural crisis.¹⁴ An interpretation that explains Solon's verses in terms of what his poetry says is certainly superior to one that forces us to resort to guesswork about economic conditions in Archaic Attica.

II

So far we have discovered that fragment 37 is a false clue for solving the mystery of the *Seisachtheia*. Before proceeding to search for an answer, a general observation is necessary: if we are going to search for clues about the status of the *hektemoroi*, which the *Seisachtheia* aimed to eliminate, we ought to look to pre-Solonian or contemporary Greece, or to societies that were comparable to Homeric society and did not develop the institutions that characterized the democratic *polis*. Whatever the status of the *hektemoroi*, it was abolished by the *Seisachtheia* and remained extinct during the Classical period. Hence the problems of interpretation about the term that led to the debate between Androtion (*FGrH* 324 F 34) and the author of the *Constitution of the Athenians*, who proposed radically different explanations of the reform. Hence also the tendency to put forward anachronistic explanations of the Solonian reforms in terms of the fourth-century slogans 'cancellation of debts' and 'redistribution of land'.

What we are basically left with after clearing away the accretions of later scholarship is the word *hektemoroi*, those who are subject to a payment of one-sixth part. To begin with, this term makes little sense as a term for debtors. Farmers do not fall into debt at a uniform rate. Those who are unluckier (or lazier) fall into debt more rapidly and in greater amounts; others fall into debt more slowly and in smaller amounts. But would all debtors in Attica have fallen into debt at exactly the same rate, so that the repayment on their debt was in each and every case equivalent to one-sixth of the annual yield of their farms? Such a scenario would be extremely implausible.

On the other hand, one-sixth makes good sense as payment for services or a kind of tax or tribute. In fact, the *Constitution of the Athenians* (2.2) links the term *hektemoroi* with the term *pelatai*, a status that was later compared with that of the Roman *clientes*.¹⁵ As is well known, *clientes* were expected to perform favours for their *patroni* in return for help and protection. Are there parallels for this kind of arrangement in pre-Solonian Greece? Yes, in the Homeric poems, which reflect the social practices of the eighth century, the period a little more than a century before Solon's reforms.¹⁶ In both Hesiod and Homer we find an arrangement whereby the lords of the community receive gifts from local inhabitants in exchange for protection against outside aggressors and for maintaining order internally.

The practice is attested in several passages. The first comes from *Iliad* 9.149–56=291–7. Agamemnon is making Achilles a generous offer of rewards in hope of persuading him to return to battle. Among his rewards is control over seven well-populated towns. In these cities, Agamemnon reports, are men who will honour him like a god with gifts (δωτίνῃσι) and who will carry out his commands (τελέουσιν θέμιστας). To judge from his language, Agamemnon is not offering Achilles ownership of these towns. Rather, he proposes to yield to Achilles his jurisdiction over the area. As a result of the proposed transfer, Achilles will become entitled to the gifts their inhabitants normally hand over to the lord who protects them and maintains order in their territory. The inhabitants of the towns will not become Achilles' tenants or his debtors, but rather his subjects or something akin to clients, who are dependent on him for protection and resolving their disputes, but are otherwise independent as long as they obey his commands (θέμιστας). Achilles would thus receive gifts by virtue of his military and political position, not because of his control over resources such as land or labour.

The next passage is from 12.310–21. Sarpedon asks Glaukos,

Why are we two honoured greatly in the seating arrangements, with gifts of meat, and with full cups at public feasts?
and all men look upon us as gods and we have received as our portion (νεμόμεσθα) a large enclosure of lands by the banks
of the Xanthus river, fine with orchard and wheat-bearing field?

The reason why they receive the honours, Sarpedon explains, is that they fight among the first of the Lycians and join in battle. They do this so that any one of the Lycians may say of them, 'Our kings who rule over Lycia are not without fame (ἀκλῆεις), and they eat the rich sheep and drink the choice honey-sweet wine.' In standard Homeric fashion the style is paratactic—our lords rule and they eat—but the causal nexus is obvious—our lords are honoured with gifts of food at our feasts and with a plot of land because they fight on our behalf in battle and gain glory in war. Once again we find the same arrangement whereby lords receive gifts, this time food and land, in return for fighting on behalf of local inhabitants. In both cases the lords receive the gifts as a reward for political and military responsibilities. Glaukos and Sarpedon are given land, but this is separate from the gifts of food and drink they receive at feasts. Their ownership of land is a reward for service; it does not explain why they receive the gifts of food.

There are two more allusions to the arrangement in Book 17 of the *Iliad*. In one passage, Hector says how he ‘wears down the people with gifts and eating’ (*Il.* 17.225–6). In another passage from the same book, Menelaus calls on the leaders of the Argives, who drink the provisions provided by the people (δήμια πίνουσι) and give orders to the people. Once more there is the same connection between the leadership of the lords over their communities and the honour of receiving gifts from the people.

There are two examples of this type of gift-giving I have found in the *Odyssey*. The first comes from 13.13–15. As Odysseus is about to leave the Phaeacians, Alcinoos invites the other leaders of the community each to give their guest a great tripod and *lebes*. Since it is irksome for an individual to do a favour without recompense, Alcinoos suggests that they pay themselves back (τισόμεθ) by collecting (ἀγειρόμενοι) from the community (κατά δήμον). As in the previous examples, the leaders of the community, both the *anax* and the *basileis*, collect contributions from their subjects. Unlike the previous passages, however, we are not informed here why they have the right to exact these contributions, but that is not relevant in this context. Alcinoos is speaking to his equals, all of whom take for granted their right to these contributions; he is not concerned with justifying their right to collect.

The other example from the *Odyssey* is found in the Cretan tale Odysseus, disguised as a beggar, tells to Penelope in 19.194–8.¹⁷ Odysseus claims to be the son of a Cretan king, who once entertained her husband and his followers for twelve days in lavish style. The guests were given grain, wine, and cattle for sacrifice, all of which had been collected from the people by their host (δημόθεν...ἀγείρας). The practice described here is slightly different. Alcinoos ordered his companions to give Odysseus gifts immediately, then to pay themselves back by exactions from their subjects. In the Cretan tale the host collects produce and cattle from the people first, which is then given to the guests. But the basic structure of the arrangement is the same as that found in the previous examples: the lords collect gifts from the people.

The practice is also attested in Hesiod’s *Works and Days*. Hesiod and his brother are in dispute about a plot of land which they have received (κλήρον ἔδασσάμεθα). Hesiod is angry because his brother has seized control over most of the land by winning over the lords (βασιλήας) who wish to judge the case. The *Basileis* in the *Works and Days* receive gifts for judging cases in the same way as Achilles would receive gifts for maintaining order in the seven cities over which Agamemnon proposes to grant him jurisdiction. But here the system has gone awry. Hesiod strongly believes that they have not done their job properly. Instead of rendering justice for the gifts they receive, they have done him an injustice. In this case, it appears that the man who has given more gifts has received more justice. But Hesiod lived several generations before the Golden Age of *Isonomia*, when all enjoyed equality before the law.

In Homer and Hesiod there is evidence for an informal arrangement of gift-giving based on mutual understanding and an exchange of goods for services. Here we have a close parallel for the payment of one-sixth by the *hektemoroi*. The payment has nothing to do with land tenure; it is a payment for protection against outsiders and for maintaining internal order. One might object by pointing out that in Homer there is a system of gift-exchange whereas the *hektemoroi* paid a fixed percentage, presumably on a regular basis. For instance, P.Millett sees a vast difference between the two kinds of systems.¹⁸ On the one hand, there is the system of gift-exchange animated by the spirit of reciprocity; on the other, there is the formalized type of exchange that is potentially exploitative. My answer to this objection is that there is no wide gap or clear dividing line between the two systems. The same principles of reciprocity underlie both systems, which may in fact overlap or comfortably co-exist.

Far from being incompatible, gift-giving could also comfortably co-exist with the payment of tribute. For instance, Thucydides (2.97) reports that, in the reign of Seuthes, the barbarian and Greek cities made payments of tribute in gold and silver to the Thracian king worth roughly four hundred silver talents, and at the same time contributed gifts of textiles, plunder and other items worth as much as the precious metals received as tribute. The evidence from Thucydides also provides us with another parallel to the arrangement found in the Homeric poems, this time from a community in a later period that did not develop the political institutions characteristic of the Classical *polis*.

Gift-giving could also develop into the payment of tribute. According to Herodotus (3.89) in the Persian Empire under the rule of Cyrus and Cambyses there was no fixed arrangement concerning tribute (ἤν κατεστηκός οὐδέν φόρου πέρι); instead, the subjects used to give gifts (δῶρα ἀγίνεον). Under Darius, however, the various parts of the Persian Empire were given fixed amounts to pay on either the Babylonian standard or the Euboean standard. The same process of formalizing a previously informal process appears to have taken place between the Homeric period, when the leaders received gifts, and the seventh century, when the *hegemones* received a fixed percentage of the harvest. The transition is probably connected with the development of fixed weights and measures during this period.²⁰

But there is an even closer parallel to the payments of one sixth made by the *hektemoroi* in the period shortly after Solon’s reforms. Both Thucydides (6.45.5) and the *Constitution of the Athenians* (16) report that Peisistratus imposed payments on all the citizens of Attica. The two authors differ on the amount of the payment, but both sources concur that it was a fixed percentage, similar therefore to the one-sixth paid by the *hektemoroi*.²¹

Besides providing a close parallel to the payments made by the *hektemoroi*, this system of tribute places Peisistratus’ actions in a new light. First of all, it is now apparent that Peisistratus was not an innovator, but rather attempted to extend the

old system of payment in return for protection and maintaining internal order to cover all of Attica. Far from advancing the progress of democratic institutions, Peisistratus adhered to a system that had its roots in the Homeric period. In the period before Solon, the arrangement appears to have operated on a regional basis in the Attic countryside. It was probably the way Megacles held power over the Plain, Lycurgus over the Shore, and Peisistratus over the upland area (Her. 1.59.3; *Ath. Pol.* 13.4). Once in power, however, Peisistratus undercut his more expensive rivals, who demanded one-sixth or 16⅔ per cent, by charging only 10 per cent or, more likely, 5 per cent for his services. No wonder Peisistratus enjoyed widespread popularity during his reign, which Thucydides reports was a Golden Age (Thuc. 6.54.5–6; cf. *Ath. Pol.* 14.3; 16.2). After the domination by the local lords, the tyranny of Peisistratus was a bargain.

The conclusions of this chapter can be summarized briefly. First, scholars should not use fragment 36.5–7 to argue that the *Seisachtheia* was a cancellation of debts aimed at solving an economic crisis or the abolition of a quasi-feudal system of land tenure. Second, it is more likely that the *Seisachtheia* was the abolition of payment for protection money to local lords. There are several parallels for such a system in the Homeric poems, Hesiod, contemporary Attica, and in fifth-century Thrace. The reform ought to be seen in the political context as an attempt to weaken the regional leaders who dominated the Attic countryside. This corresponded to Solon's attempt to strengthen the powers of the elected officials and the formal institutions operating in the center of Attica in Athens (*Ath. Pol.* 7–8). Solon was attempting to combat the centrifugal tendencies of elite competition, which led to the dissension in the countryside described in his poems, especially in fragment 4. He was not an economic reformer concerned with the problems of land tenure and agricultural conditions.

Despite Solon's conspicuous pride in his achievements, the *Seisachtheia* was to a certain extent a failure. Instead of long-term unity, *stasis* returned to Attica in the 560s as a result of elite competition between regional leaders (Her. 1.59.3; *Ath. Pol.* 13.4). The formal institutions located at the centre appear to have survived intact (*Ath. Pol.* 16.8), but they were dominated by a local leader who emerged from the countryside to establish himself as tyrant over Athens. It was left to Cleisthenes to create the council of five hundred and to devise the system of demes, *trittyes*, and tribes, which finally broke the power of the regional leaders in the countryside and established the stability that lasted until the revolution of 411. But that is the subject of another paper.

NOTES

- 1 For the date of Solon's reform see the convincing arguments of R.W. Wallace, *AJAH* 8 (1983), 81–95.
- 2 Finley, *Ancient Slavery and Modern Ideology*, 86–9. For brief, but forceful, criticisms of Finley's views, see T.E. Rihll, *JHS* 111 (1991), 102 n. 6. I find Rihll's interpretation of the reform unconvincing for two reasons: first, her assumption about the existence of large tracts of public land in 594 is questionable, and second, her view that Solon fr. 36.5–7 refers to the *Seisachtheia* is in my opinion incorrect.
- 3 For instance, see Hignett, *History of the Athenian Constitution*, 106: 'The farmers threatened with expropriation were determined not to submit tamely to their fate, so Solon cancelled their debts.'
- 4 For instance, see Fustel de Coulanges, *The Ancient City*, 253–7 at 253: 'Possession of lots of land on the single condition of paying a rent which was fixed at one-sixth of the harvest.' Fustel's position has been followed in recent years by Murray, *Early Greece*, 2nd edition, 189–94.
- 5 For a brief description of these *horoi* and a discussion of their function see Finley, *Studies in Land and Credit*, 10–21.
- 6 For a valuable review of recent theories about the status of the *hektemoroi* and the nature of the *Seisachtheia* see Rhodes, *A Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia*, 90–7. See also F. Cassola, *PP* 19 (1964), 26–34; Foxhall, pp. 113–18, 122–9 below.
- 7 See Jeffery, *The Local Scripts of Archaic Greece*: Aegina 3 (p. 110); Corinth 37 (p. 129); Megara 7 (p. 136), 12; Mycenae 4 (p. 173); Aitolia 5 (p. 227); Ithake 17 and 18 (p. 233); Lemnos 58 (pp. 299–300); Chios 48 (p. 338); Cos 39 (pp. 352–3). Epidaurus 13 'must be either a small altar or a horos' (p. 180), but Ithake 16 is probably not a *horos* (p. 233 n. 3).
- 8 For the dates of the security *horoi* see Finley, *op. cit.* (n. 5), 7.
- 9 See for example *Ath. Pol.* 13.4, with Rhodes, *op. cit.* (n. 6), 185–6.
- 10 The act of removing the *horoi* cannot therefore allude to the abolition of some quasi-feudal arrangement whereby *hektemoroi* held possession of inalienable tracts of land in return for an annual payment. There is no evidence that *horoi* were ever used for this purpose. This view also rests on the dubious assumption that land in Attica was inalienable during the Archaic period: see M.I. Finley, *Eirene* 7 (1968) 25–32.
- 11 See Daverio Rocchi, *Frontiera e confini nella Grecia antica*, 87–9.
- 12 For other similes and metaphors in Solon's poetry see fragments 4.26–9; 33.
- 13 See for example Horn. *Il.* 6.23–7; 9.328–36, 664–8; 11.623–6; 18.28–31; 20.191–4; 21.40–1; *Od.* 3.105–6; 7.7–11; 9.40–2; 15.27–9. Enslavement remained a serious threat into the Classical period: see (Dem.) 53; and the serious penalties for *andrapodistai* (enslavers): *Ath. Pol.* 52.1; Din. 1.23 with Harris, *Symposion* 1993, 182 n. 29.
- 14 This mistake is made by A. French, *CQ* 6 (1956), 11–25, and T. Gallant, *BSA* 77 (1982), 111–24.
- 15 For the meaning of the term *pelates* see Rhodes, *op. cit.* (n. 6), 90–1.
- 16 For the historicity of the social practices found in the Homeric poems see I. Morris, *CA* 5 (1986), 81–135.

17 I would like to thank Roger Brock for drawing my attention to this passage.

18 Millett, *Lending and Borrowing in Ancient Athens*, 219–20.

19 Harris, *CR* 43 (1993), 106.

20 For weights and measures in Archaic Athens see *Ath. Pol.* 10.1–2 with Rhodes, op. cit. (n. 6), 164–8.

21 For discussion of the conflict between the two sources, see Rhodes, op. cit. (n. 6), 215.

10

A VIEW FROM THE TOP

Evaluating the Solonian property classes

Lin Foxhall

INTRODUCTION

Solon and his reforms have fascinated many generations of scholars, as a puzzle with many critical pieces missing, and we have all been keen to exercise our ingenuity in restoring them. But the picture on it is vitally important, for it flashes by at a crucial moment in Athens' development, essential to our understanding of her subsequent history, politics and institutions. How we perceive the constitutional, economic and political formation of the Athenian *polis* depends heavily on how we reconstruct what Solon did, and to or for whom. And how we interpret Solon depends most on what we think the Athenian *polis* was in the early sixth century.

In this chapter I will start by reviewing what I hope is a representative selection of the vast scholarship on Solon and his city. Next I will explore what exactly the *polis* might have been in the late seventh to early sixth century. I will then move on to the agricultural economies and settlement data for Archaic Greece in general, with the aim of contextualising what little we know of the agrarian economy of Athens in the context of a human landscape. Finally, I will focus on the system of property classes (the *tele*) attributed to Solon in the setting of the agricultural economy, and the view they offer us from the top of Athenian society.

PERSPECTIVES ON EARLY ATHENS

The problems with the sources for this early period of Athenian history are well known.¹ The extent to which Herodotos or Aristotle understood Solon's verse, or his motivations, or the world in which he lived, is questionable. For most of our Classical (fifth- and especially fourth-century) sources Solon and his laws were a political football which belonged to their own times. By Plutarch's era Solon was part of a world that was lost. Whatever 'truths' may be preserved in these later sources, they cannot be reliably extracted from the later moral and political contexts in which they are expressed. Solon's own poetry, quoted only in decontextualised fragments, is probably our best source, however inadequate. The *tele*, Solon's property classes, remained a living (though not unchanged) institution at least into the fourth century,² though it is hard to be sure how accurately later tradition represents the way they worked in Archaic times. The poetry and the inscriptions provide perhaps the clearest insights into what or who the Athenian *polis* was early in the sixth century, while the broader context is illuminated by the archaeological record. These sources do at least have the advantage of being mostly contemporary with the events and come, as it were, from the horse's mouth, even if it is not always clear what they are telling us.

The Solonian *polis* (like Archaic Greece in general) has been a prime testing ground for many different approaches to reconstructing the overall development of Greek society: variations on 'primitivist', 'modernist', formalist and substantivist theory have all been tried.³ Most have been evolutionist to some degree, by which I mean they have typologised Archaic Athens as a stage, usually a fairly early one, in a general schematic framework of social development widely applicable to many societies. The idea that societies go through some predetermined succession of set stages is highly problematic and deeply questioned by current social theory.⁴ An evolutionist perspective is certainly implicit in the categorisation of Dark Age and Archaic Greek societies as, for example, 'simple societies',⁵ 'chief-doms',⁶ 'tribal',⁷ 'small sovereignties',⁸ 'primitive society without strong central authority'.⁹ I am dubious whether such developmental typologising is helpful for understanding early Greece.

A related problem is that the evolutionary impetus behind many studies has encouraged teleological thinking. We all know that Athens eventually became a democracy, and modern scholars have often been tempted to fix on Solon as the 'father of Athenian democracy'.¹⁰ This idea is also linked to the assumption that Solon was a revolutionary, at the head of a revolt generated from the bottom end of society.¹¹ Although Solon may have triggered off political processes which eventually led to the emergence of Athenian democracy, it seems to me ludicrous that Solon had any inkling of this—it is just that we know

the end of the story. Indeed, in recent writing on the earlier (eighth-century) emergence of the *polis* there is a tendency to perceive the seeds of democracy, or at least some kind of broadly based egalitarian spirit, behind the notion of *polis* itself.¹²

The truly remarkable aspect of the *polis* was the notion that the state should be autonomous from dominant-class interests. The ideal of the *polis* was almost a classless society, where the state and the citizens were identical, protecting one another's positions. The direct democracy as found in classical Athens was possible only in a society where such a notion of the state was widely accepted.¹³

I have quoted Morris as a particularly clear example of this line of thinking, but it is implicit in the work of many scholars.¹⁴ Surely this must be at least partly a mirage arising because we know the Athenian end of the story. It is demonstrable that neither Archaic nor Classical *poleis* were inherently egalitarian (much less democratic). In most, even amongst the citizen body (the only arena in which any notion of equality might be postulated), some citizens were always 'more equal' than others.

Focusing on the Solonian scholarship, generally (though this is an over-simplification), older scholarship tends to be 'modernist' in tone (even if that entails seeing Solon as a 'modern' statesman confronting an archaic and 'primitive' political system), whilst more recent scholarship, depending more heavily on ethnographic comparisons and substantivist-influenced approaches, frames Solon in the context of 'simple' societies.¹⁵

Chrimes,¹⁶ for example, envisaged Solon as an informed politician, perhaps carrying out an ancient version of the modern Greek agricultural census in order to establish criteria for the *tele*, implying a fully developed state bureaucracy. Woodhouse perceived the political economy of seventh-to sixth-century Attica as one dominated by 'the aristocratic capitalist... out...to absorb the peasant and his land'.¹⁷ Though Woodhouse's Archaic Attica was not straightforwardly modern, it was unashamedly British mediaeval (e.g. the title of Chapter 12: 'From Yeoman to Villein'), and its 'primitive' elements (e.g. the 'underdeveloped' concept of private land ownership¹⁸) were implicitly part of this mediaeval/pre-modern character. French carried this line of analysis to a crude extreme, hypothesising a kind of pro to-industrial revolution in the early sixth century on the basis of ill-informed macro-economic analysis of Attic agriculture (see below). With Solon's reforms, he argues, an out-dated system of feudal patronage in which peasant-serfs no longer obtained security in return for the bondage of patronage was eliminated in one fell swoop.¹⁹ This change also benefited landlords, for:

The Hektemor would thus become a free labourer, with all the advantages and disadvantages that this implies. It would be an advantage not only to the olive and vine-growing industry, but also to the merchant and shipping interests to have a pool of casual labour, to be employed when the needs of harvest or business required, and dismissed when they were not required.²⁰

In a less extreme way, Andrewes,²¹ Forrest²² and Starr²³ all interpret the period as a time of 'agrarian crisis' solved by Solon, who incorporated the discontented poor into the privileges of the Athenian state. Starr most closely follows a formalist/modernist line similar to French. The *tele* have been generally perceived as the means by which the poor could claim a share of power.²⁴

Finley represents a new departure, working under the influence of Polanyi's substantivist body of economic theory. However, he was most interested in illuminating the nature of the debt bondage which might have existed in Archaic Athens, and contextualising it within a much broader picture of dependent statuses and the socio-economic and political relationships implied by debt bondage, which characterised the societies of classical antiquity and the ancient Near East (though he was well aware that such features could be documented in modern, non-western societies as well). For all that Finley's approach, particularly his use of comparative economic and social theory, has had a tremendous impact on the most recent studies of Archaic Greece, Finley himself was not very interested in the broader agrarian picture: his focus was firmly on status rather than on agro-economic conditions, and on land tenure over the long term rather than on systems of cultivation.²⁵ Finley was still working within an evolutionist framework, regarding debt bondage as 'an age-old principle common to both Graeco-Roman and Near Eastern societies in their early stages, and to many other civilisations as well'.²⁶ These 'many other civilisations' are non-modern and non-western—'them', not 'us'.²⁷ Finley also drew an interesting (though I think misguided) distinction between systems of dependency and debt bondage in the Graeco-Roman world and those of the Near East: in the former, he maintained, 'abolition came...as a direct consequence of struggle from below, at times reaching genuinely revolutionary proportions'.²⁸ Though he is by no means the only scholar to uphold such a rosy view of Solon's reforms, Finley's formulation has probably had the greatest impact on current scholarship, especially the notion that Solon's reforms reflected 'struggle from below'.²⁹

Much recent work, as Murray³⁰ has also noted, has been influenced by the demographic conclusions developed from the archaeological record by Snodgrass, who long upheld the view that during the eighth century huge population increases occurred throughout Greece, the immense impact of which heralded the rise of the *polis*. Although many criticisms have been

levelled at Snodgrass's conclusions (based largely on numbers of datable graves), the basic premises are still generally followed.³¹ Indeed, it has been widely accepted that population pressure, 'land hunger', pressure on agricultural resources, and similar eco-demographic causes played a significant part in the troubles which afflicted Attica at Solon's time. It will become clear below why I do not believe this.

The most recent studies have attempted to take more 'anthropological' approaches, though these have not been without their pitfalls.³² Gallant³³ has drawn heavily on development economics, notably the theories of Boserup and Sahlins. The result, ironically, has been a conclusion very similar to the work he sees as diametrically opposed to his own—that of French. Gallant argues that because of population pressure elite farmers appropriated uncultivated land which was then worked by poor farmers at peak periods seasonally (at sowing and harvest) in return for one-sixth of the crop. The poor farmers, however, also worked their own land as well for subsistence. Both parties benefited while the system worked, the poor obtaining access to extra resources and patronage while the rich acquired labour, but the system 'got out of hand' and broke down.³⁵ All of these processes are envisaged as taking place within 'simple', village-based societies.³⁶ Most of the theoretical underpinning is based on African and South-East-Asian case studies.

Rihll's discussion is a variation on the same theme. She focuses much more on the problem of land tenure—another leitmotif in Solonian studies. Rihll too assumes a fairly 'simple' society—her comparisons are largely based on 'non-state' societies, and again most of the anthropological studies she cites are African.³⁷ Her central proposal is that the land taken over by the rich is 'public' land—on the grounds that ownership of land in 'archaic', 'simple' societies is grounded in the community and that private land ownership was not yet fully established in Archaic Athens. This idea, though interestingly argued, seems problematic on two counts: first, it is not at all clear what exactly 'public' means in this period—almost certainly not exactly what it meant in Classical Greece (and most of her secure examples of public land are Classical or later),³⁸ and second, it is unquestioningly evolutionist, and quite unjustified, to assume that the public (or kin-group) ownership of land represents a more primitive social stage and therefore pre-dates private ownership in Greece (or anywhere else).

Similar criticisms can be levelled at Manville's analysis, the most recent large-scale treatment of Solon and his reforms in the context of the development of citizenship in Athens.³⁹ Like Rihll he seizes on land tenure as the core of the problem for Archaic Athens in the wake of population increases, changing crops and agricultural techniques (e.g. the introduction of tree crops), and concomitant pressure on agricultural resources necessitating even the import of grain for food.⁴⁰ Oddly, though he argues against Snodgrass's assertion that population increases played a major role in the 'rise of the *polis*' in the eighth century, he envisages population pressure as a critical factor in Athens' problems during the seventh century.⁴¹ He draws heavily on the literature of development economics and cultural and social anthropology, largely from African chiefdoms and other kinds of 'stateless' societies.⁴² And, like Rihll, he maintains that much land was 'held in common by kinship and regional associations, controlled by powerful elites in each organisation',⁴³ and was fundamentally 'public'.⁴⁴ Although he is sensitive to the complexities of land tenure, his fundamental premise is that a move toward more 'private' ownership and less 'public/communal' ownership characterises the development of Archaic to Classical Greece.⁴⁵ None the less, a view of seventh-century agriculture which sounds suspiciously modern and almost industrialised creeps in, within a bleak agrarian outlook in line with the traditional views about the agricultural economy at this time:

Thus market producers were now investing much more capital to develop their lands than were subsistence farmers.... The greater risks taken by these entrepreneurial farmers would have made them more eager to secure title to their properties. Among this group private ownership was growing...⁴⁶

Older and traditional common lands were slowly broken up; fields became more fragmented as successive generations of fathers divided them among sons who worked smaller and smaller plots more intensively.... Marginal lands were opened up for cultivation; other plots were abandoned as unproductive...⁴⁷

Manville's picture of Solon's reforms is also typical in its depiction of the *tele* as 'an all-inclusive legal hierarchy that embraced the entire community' on the grounds of wealth, not birth, incorporating even the poor *thetes*.⁴⁸ Assessment in wet and dry measures, he argues, reflects the importance of oil and wine in the economy.⁴⁹

Even more recently, Victor Hanson's attempt to trace the history of the *polis* as the history of its small and medium-scale farmers bound together in an ethos of 'agrarianism' takes refuge in many of the traditional views of Archaic Greece.⁵⁰ Solon, he maintains, is one of those in the middle (*mesoi*) of the socio-economic scale, whose reform measures reflect the growing power of this group of egalitarian, 'middling' farmers in a time of agrarian crisis.⁵¹ He envisages its ultimate cause as population pressure, as Greece emerges from a Dark Age characterised by pastoralism practised by dominant aristocrats,⁵² hence smaller farmers became 'homesteaders',⁵³ moving out of valley bottoms and onto more 'marginal' hill-slopes.⁵⁴ This process, he argues, coincides with the invention of grafting and the introduction of vine and olive cultivation on a substantial scale.⁵⁵

WHO WAS THE ATHENIAN *POLIS* IN THE SIXTH CENTURY?

Who or what is the Athenian *polis* of Solon's time, and what *comparanda* can help us visualise it? As noted, most studies from Finley onward have looked to anthropology for help in invoking Archaic Athens. This is not to say that social theory is not valuable, indeed I am certain it is essential, but ethnography needs a health warning for ancient historians. Anthropologists have never studied a society like the Greek *polis* which is neither a kingdom nor a chiefdom, a state which is not a modern state, a society not 'primitive', nor yet linked into any global system dominated by powerful modern nation-states (as most 'primitive', 'simple' societies have in fact been since the nineteenth century). Undoubtedly Archaic Greece has features in common with many non-modern, non-western societies, and comparisons are illuminating when they are controlled and contextualised. But typologising antiquity into societies of 'big men', 'shame cultures', gift-giving societies, rank/order cultures, or whatever does not explain it.

Moreover, when we look at the *comparanda* most often used for the agrarian economy of Archaic Attica, the methodology appears alarmingly shaky. Most of the ethnographic case studies drawn on by Rihll, Manville, Gallant, Finley and others have come from tropical environments, usually Africa, South-East Asia, and the South Pacific. Generally they are societies which, though they may in themselves be 'stateless', have been studied at historical moments when they were either part of nation-states or the colonial possessions of large and powerful European empires. Not only are they linked into global systems, the like of which did not exist in the ancient world,⁵⁶ but the agrarian and environmental conditions are totally different. For a start, many operate various kinds of tropical shifting-cultivation systems based on largely non-storable staples such as root crops. As used by Gallant, Rihll and Manville to understand early Attic land tenure, I would doubt that such analogies reveal much of the picture we aim to reconstruct.

I would argue that generally the *poleis* of Archaic Greece were little more than a stand-off between the members of the elite who ran them. The real question seems to be who constituted this elite and how did its make-up change over the course of our period? Obviously, individual cities and regions developed differently. And it is clear that in many parts of the Greek world we have good evidence of formalised magistracies, crystallising laws and other features of 'state' bureaucracies by the seventh century.⁵⁷ But, even in Athens down into the fifth century, to what extent were offices differentiated from office-holders, and how much did particular office-holders shape the duties and privileges of the office they held?⁵⁸

Magistracies and other state institutions might in many cases be little more than a means by which the elite took turns at power, giving some other group or person of equivalent status a turn, in order that they themselves might be guaranteed one later. Such groups might most likely be kin-, clan-, fictive-kin- and/or regionally-based, but the details for ancient Attica are lost in the mists of time and it is difficult to push the information which has come down to us about *gene*, *phratries*, *orgeones*, and *phylai* too far. However, the burial plots of competing groups (however they were constituted) scattered across the Greek countryside might also suggest such regional-/kin-based configurations of power.⁵⁹ There is evidence (despite the unsatisfactory state of publication) for what seem to be such family-/kin'-based tomb groups in use throughout the Archaic period, not only in the large cemetery of the Kerameikos in Athens, but also throughout the rural landscape (e.g. at least two in Vari).⁶⁰ The ethos of 'the community of the *polis*' perceived by Morris and others in early Greece might be only this: the egalitarianism of the equally powerful. The earliest known law, from seventh-century Dreros,⁶¹ seems to indicate precisely this sort of turn-taking amongst wealthy equals—no one is to be *kosmos* more than once in ten years. Even the later sixth-century archon list we possess from Athens,⁶² on which the surviving names date to well after Solon's time, looks like rivals on the playground taking turns. Many more examples could be cited.

Such competing elite groups are pulled two ways at once: on the one hand, they aim to outdo their rivals, but, on the other hand, they share interests of group (virtually 'class') solidarity with them. Concomitantly oppressed groups of dependants are well documented in Archaic and Classical Greece. At one level the ragged bundle of institutions we call the 'state' in Archaic Greece is little more than the concrete outcome of the attempt to resolve these tensions.⁶³ Tyranny is one logical outcome of such a system, for if one group becomes sufficiently more powerful than the others, then they can override the system: hence the tyrant Peisistratos was able to monopolise power by monopolising the archonship. Other members of the elite were most disadvantaged for their access to power was blocked.

Most early magistracies are non-specific in their duties, allowing considerable scope for office-holders to shape them according to their means and resources. Power, in these circumstances, represents a discourse between the expectations and threshold of toleration of peers, on the one hand, and the resources (in all senses) and cunning of the incumbent. Solon's own poetry suggests that the man shaped the office:

Solon was not by nature a man of deep plots and clever counsels; when the gods gave him wonderful things he did not accept. He surrounded his prey but was so gobsmacked that he did not pull the great net to, and failed, stumbling in spirit and in sense. I wish I were strong and could seize wealth beyond the dreams of avarice and be tyrant of the Athenians for one day only, later to be skinned to make a wine-bag and my lineage wiped out.⁶⁴

But another than I taking the goad, an avaricious man of bad judgment, he would not have checked the *demos*.⁶⁵

...for if someone else chanced on such an office as this, he would not have checked the *demos* nor stopped it, before he had churned up the milk and taken away the butterfat, but like a boundary stone I stood fast in the disputed territory between them.⁶⁶

Another man, says Solon, might have behaved differently when he had his turn at power at a critical moment.

The specific details of the changing social and political circumstances in seventh- and sixth-century Athens are beyond our reach. Solon's poetry is enigmatic, and later commentators are muddled and meddling with the past for their own ends. Nonetheless, it is broadly agreed that Solon is portraying himself as, in his own words (fr. 37), the boundary stone (*horos*) between factions which he seems to categorise as men of means on the one hand and the *demos* on the other hand. This does, of course, make Solon look good—was this part of the aim, and can we therefore take this at face value? Most commentators, citing Solon's own poetry, placed Solon firmly on the side of the *demos*: casting him as a revolutionary leader championing the cause of the poor.⁶⁷ Exactly where in the socio-economic spectrum Solon himself originated is much debated and depends heavily on the theoretical perspectives of particular scholars: some kind of 'middle-class' birth is often postulated.⁶⁸ However, the poetry can as easily be read as a viewpoint from firmly inside the elite, but with some sympathy (though I think he is rather patronising) for those outside the power-holding clique.⁶⁹ Solon himself expresses the traditional values of the elite, for example: 'Prosperous is he who has dear children, whole-hooved horses, hunting hounds and a guest-friend abroad.'⁷⁰ This could have come straight out of Homer, and Xenophon, that landed gentleman of the fourth century, still felt much the same two hundred years later. On the other hand, many of his views of the *demos* could be read as positively paternalistic:

For I gave the *demos* as much reward as was sufficient for them, neither taking away privilege nor offering more.⁷¹

So best would the *demos* follow the leaders, neither let loose too much nor yet wreaking violence, for excess breeds insolence when much wealth follows for men whose mind is not perfect.⁷²

For what reason did I gather up the *demos* only to stop before it happened?⁷³

If it is appropriate to rebuke the *demos* openly, they have things now which they only saw in their dreams.⁷⁴

The last is surely an echo in reverse of Macmillan's 'you never had it so good'. Indeed, fr. 24 offers a variant on this attitude, and mystifies the significance of wealth for wielding power, expressing the sentiment that 'really, it's just as nice to be poor if you are attractive':

The one who has much silver and gold, plains of wheat-bearing land, and horses and mules is equal in wealth to the one who has this alone: that he is graceful in belly and ribs and feet. These things are resources for mortals, for no one with countless things ever came to Hades with them, nor paying a price could he flee death nor burdensome illness nor the evil onset of old age.⁷⁵

I do not expect the bulk of *hoipolloi* would have agreed, then or now. This is a view from a comfortable house at the top.

Who exactly he means by the *demos* is not at all self-evident. We have a reasonable idea what the term meant in fifth- and fourth-century Athens, but this does not guarantee that it meant the same thing in the seventh or sixth century, though many commentators assume it does.⁷⁶ That it represents the poor in any kind of absolute sense, or even simply 'the lower orders', or (with Hanson), those of middle rank, cannot be securely ascertained. After all, we have evidence of the term *demos* in Mycenaean Greek, probably meaning something like 'village', but no one would claim that the meaning remained unchanged in historic times. Nor need the term *demos* in Solon's time carry the same significance for the concept of 'public' which it does later on—indeed, the whole question of what 'public' might have meant in the early sixth century is problematic if I am right that offices and office-holders are not fully separable—if so, the 'state' certainly does not belong to the '*demos*' as it did under Athens' radical democracy of the fifth and fourth centuries. It is suggested by Solon's poetry that at least part of the cause of strife is something to do with access to land, whatever the practical details of removing the *horoi* and freeing the black Earth might have entailed.⁷⁷ What or whose land remain largely unanswerable questions.

AGRICULTURAL SYSTEMS IN EARLY GREECE: A REASSESSMENT

Solon's arbitration of the troubles of his time must have amounted to (re)defining who the elite were so that the comfortable turn-taking of power might be re-established on a 'new' basis. This is epitomised by the *tele*. Why his 'reforms' were needed remains problematic: although many attempts have been made to outline detailed scenarios of the contemporary political situation, our information is inadequate for analysis at the level of historical event. On the other hand, the economic foundations and the agrarian structures of Archaic Greece can be profitably explored.

The archaeological record provides the most useful source material for this period, though it is by nature largely unsuitable for reconstructing political history. The evidence of increasing numbers of sites from the eighth century has generally been interpreted as a demographic phenomenon: it is also, of course, an economic one. We are, after all, talking about identifying datable graves and significant amounts of datable sherd material on surveyed sites, sanctuaries, and so forth (and Late Geometric pottery even in very small fragments is easily datable compared to Early Geometric, Middle Geometric and even most Protogeometric). Increased levels of material prosperity, whether or not this accompanies substantial population increase, will produce such an archaeological record. And the increase in datable material does not stop in the eighth century. Though firmly dated seventh-century graves are less numerous than eighth-century ones in Attica,⁷⁸ there is abundant evidence for the production and export of seventh-century pottery (notably SOS amphorae), even if Protoattic fine-ware is problematic.⁷⁹ There is plenty of activity at sanctuaries.⁸⁰ In the absence of systematic intensive surface survey, difficult in much of Attica, I think it is impossible to determine whether the decrease in the number of non-burial sites in Attica between the eighth and seventh centuries⁸¹ genuinely results from economic or demographic phenomena, or whether it disguises some other political or demographic process (e.g. increasing nucleation, changes in the use of sanctuary sites, or whatever). By the early sixth century (whether before or after Solon is impossible to tell—the pottery dates cannot provide that level of fine tuning), black-glazed and black-figure Athenian pottery is everywhere.

Attica is a difficult area for multi-period archaeological survey. Much of the landscape close to the heart of Athens has been heavily developed from the Classical period onward. Lohmann's survey work in a dry, indeed marginal, part of south-west Attica (the territory of the Classical deme Atene) reveals much Classical and Late Roman use of the landscape, but very little Later Bronze Age, Dark Age, and Geometric through Archaic exploitation. There is no evidence here for seventh- or even sixth-century expansion into the less productive parts of the Attic countryside: the exploitation of this area peaks in the fifth and fourth centuries.⁸² Nonetheless, comparative use of the archaeological record suggests Athens and the Attic plains were at least as heavily populated in the seventh and sixth centuries as other regions of Greece; and despite regional variations, overall trends in settlement and land use are reasonably consistent across southern Greece on the basis of survey evidence. Generally, it is fair to say, between the eighth and sixth centuries settlement sizes gradually increased along with the general level of material prosperity, but were not yet at the high level attained in the fifth and fourth centuries.

A brief overview of areas bordering Attica and the Saronic Gulf, where intensive archaeological survey has been carried out, indicates some interesting general patterns (see [Figure 10.1](#) and [Table 10.1](#)). Elsewhere in Greece, Archaic activity is best documented on nucleated 'village' or 'city' sites not scattered throughout the countryside. So, for example, in the southern Argolid, after a rise in site numbers in the eighth century, the seventh and sixth centuries witness a consolidation of primary site centres and second-order (village/hamlet) sites. There is no evidence for dramatic changes in cultivation practices and most sites seem to be situated near the areas of best agricultural land. Nor is there evidence for the plethora of

Table 10.1 Exploitation of the countryside in Archaic and Classical Greece: comparative survey results

<i>Kea</i>		<i>S.Argolid</i>		<i>Atene, S.Attica</i>		<i>Methana</i>	
Geometric	odd sherds, no certain sites except for Aghia Irini (major excavated prehistoric site)	8th–7th century	9 nucleated sites, all settlements			E.I.A. (1050–700)	4 nucleated settlement sites, only 1 possible outlying 'farmstead'
Archaic	29 (4.4=adjusted figure for major components standardised by length of period, no. of components per century)	Archaic	3 Archaic centres, each with a few secondary sites	Archaic	a few sherds on Classical sites; earliest Archaic pottery is 7th century, sanctuary site	Archaic	3 nucleated settlement sites with 2 possible outlying 'farmstead' sites
Classical	40 (10=adjusted figure for major components standardised by length of period, no. of components per century)	Classical (480–350)	37 smaller sites, mostly second-order settlements	Classical	30+ 'farmsteads'	Classical (480–323)	19 (+ 5 possible) outlying 'farmstead' sites at all altitudes, in addition to <i>polis</i> site and 2 'village' sites




Figure 10.1 Site densities and distribution in *a* Kea, the *b* S. Argolid and *c* Methana between the Early Iron Age and the Early Hellenistic periods

Kea	S.Argolid	Atene, S.Attica	Methana
	Late Classical – Hellenistic (350–250)	98 ‘farmstead’ sites, proliferation of these third-order sites in this period	

small isolated rural ‘farmstead’ sites which characterise some later periods (notably the Classical and Late Roman).⁸³




Figure 10.1 Site densities and distribution in *a* Kea, the *b* S. Argolid and *c* Methana between the Early Iron Age and the Early Hellenistic periods

In Kea, the real boom in the exploitation of the countryside seems to come in the sixth century, though not at as high a level as in the Classical period. There is little evidence of expansion into the countryside in the eighth or seventh century.⁸⁴

On Methana, Geometric and Archaic settlement is centred largely on the *polis* and two 'village' sites. The pattern of dispersed small 'farmsteads' exploiting the upland sector of the peninsula belongs to the Classical period (and the Late Roman, but that is another story).⁸⁵

Finally, in Boeotia, the same general trend is evident. On the urban sites surveyed, the peak expansion was during the Classical period: Geometric and Archaic levels of occupation are much more restricted. This trend complements the evidence for the intensive exploitation and occupation of the countryside in the Classical period, notably during the fifth and fourth centuries.⁸⁶

This pattern hardly suggests over-population or a landscape approaching its carrying capacity in the Archaic period. The assertions that this is a period of extensification into marginal agricultural lands, or Hanson's elaboration, that farmers in Archaic and Classical times lived largely on isolated 'homesteads', receive little support from archaeological survey evidence.⁸⁷ Rather, such extensification seems to start no earlier than the late sixth century, and is more generally a fifth- and fourth-century phenomenon across Greece, obviously with local, regional variations, but dating to roughly the same time as the Classical literary sources which postulate an Archaic period agrarian crisis. The evidence of survey suggests anything but an overcrowded countryside in the Archaic period. There is little Archaic evidence in Attica or elsewhere for the small isolated rural sites which characterise the more densely populated and intensively farmed countrysides of Classical Greece.⁸⁸

Such an assessment does not tally with the bleak picture of Attic agriculture generally presented. Looking closely at the landscape of Greece as it might have been farmed in the seventh and sixth centuries, the available archaeological evidence suggests that the basic techniques of cultivation and the core crop plants were fully established in Greek agricultural systems in the Bronze Age and, I have argued elsewhere, continued in use throughout the Dark Ages and into the Archaic period.⁸⁹ This does not mean there were no changes in farming systems and practices, nor that crops were not grown in different ways at different times by different farmers. But the fundamental repertoire of crops and techniques available to farmers in the Late Bronze Age was also there in the eighth century and the sixth century and the fourth century, and many variations and combinations were possible. Farming systems are highly flexible and resilient, and very sensitive to changes in the socio-political and economic environments.

It is unnecessary to postulate some kind of large-scale agricultural or economic catastrophe,⁹⁰ or to seek recourse to major innovations in technologies or crops⁹¹ to explain the agrarian conditions and the political history of Archaic Greece.

Over the course of the Archaic period, we see wealth increasing throughout Greece, despite local hiccups. I would guess that in Athens by the early sixth century not only were the wealthy wealthier, but more people might have had a claim to taking turns at power on the basis of newly acquired wealth (however that wealth was acquired)—others have certainly suggested this.⁹² These processes might have germinated the seeds of discontent which we find in Solon's poetry.

The archaeological evidence suggests farmland was not under pressure in any absolute sense during the Archaic period, but relationships to land are mediated by social and political systems. Land was always the primary means of production in classical antiquity, but the social and political channels of access to it were frequently disputed. Whatever the terms of those disputes in early Athens, the cause was not overpopulation, exhausted soils, deforestation, a transition from pastoralism to arable agriculture, or the introduction of arboriculture. In any case, as Gallant has asked,⁹³ if the land was depleted in the seventh century, how did it support later, higher levels of population and farming?

The question of land tenure raises interesting issues which cannot be fully resolved. But there is no *a priori* reason for asserting the primacy of some kind of 'communal' ownership of land over private land ownership of individuals within families, except that evolutionary logic has suggested that it 'ought' to be the case. In fact, most of the available evidence suggests that some notion of private property was at the heart of Greek concepts of land tenure well back into the dim and distant past—but how far back is anybody's guess.⁹⁴ Homeric kings and heroes seem to think they own their land and can pass it on to their offspring,⁹⁵ in ways which would have been comprehensible to Classical Greeks. Hesiod's *Works and Days* focuses on a dispute over land ownership which plainly concerns 'private', heritable land.

In the mixed agricultural regimes of southern Greece dry-farmed cereals and legumes, a range of permanent tree crops, and animal husbandry have been bound together and set within a diverse landscape in varying combinations since the Early Bronze Age. The notion of private, heritable tenure, especially for land permanently planted in trees, is perhaps a logical outcome, especially in tandem with a bilateral kinship system. This does not mean that systems of land tenure do not vary over the course of Greek history, nor that private tenure always means the same set of relationships to a piece of property, nor that all land has the same status *vis-à-vis* individuals and communities in any particular period (let alone over time). Perhaps we should not be looking for 'the emergence' of private land tenure in Archaic Greece, because it was always there as a fundamental principle in some form or other. Certainly there is nothing in Greece comparable to the shifting cultivation systems of Africa and the South Pacific, under which notions of the community as a whole 'owning' the land fulfil the logic of agrarian regimes where individuals and households do not permanently occupy or work the same plots for a lifetime, nor pass the right of permanent tenure on to their children.

So what is the problem for Solon's Athens? My guess is that 'privately owned' land (whatever that meant at the time, and however one acquired the right to 'own') was essential for partaking in the *polis* and sharing in its power (however exactly political processes operated). In other words, membership of the elite group which constituted the state was synonymous with the land-holding group. Those outside this circle, at any socio-economic level, gained access to land only through them, via the dependency relationships for which so much confused evidence abounds in the classical sources (the *hektemoroi* and all that).

If I am right, the *tele* and the 'land reforms' may well represent a formalisation of access to land for those with sufficient wealth, circumventing any dependency relationships. This need not entail the 'democratisation' of land-holding to any significant extent, though a broadening of the land-holding base has generally been assumed.⁹⁶ The name of the top class

unquestionably implies the possession of agricultural produce (and therefore access to the primary means of production and labour), and the rest of the quantitative qualifications passed on to us, and perhaps invented, by later writers do as well.⁹⁷ Does this then mean that partaking in the *polls* and its power structures was entangled with land ownership from the start? I think they were. It may be that the *thetes* who counted as part of the *polis*, at least at the beginning of the system, were those with at least some land: the landless citizen may well be a later development (he did not exist at all in the cities where there was always a land-owning qualification for citizenship).

THE SOLONIAN TELE: A VIEW FROM THE TOP

Finally, I will examine the economic implications of the Solonian property classes: an exercise also attempted by others.⁹⁸ In fact, Starr's calculations are not wildly different from mine, though I think mine have a stronger basis:⁹⁹ the information and assumptions Starr was using were old and flawed even when he was writing.¹⁰⁰ However crude the figures, this exercise puts the quantitative assessment of the *tele* in an interesting perspective, and highlights implications which the evaluations of Starr's figures have not explored.

In Table 10.2 the figures given by Aristotle and Plutarch for the different assessment levels of the *tele* have been converted into grain equivalents. The question of how the quantitative assessments actually operated either in the

Table 10.2 Property requirements and subsistence potential of the Solonian property classes

Solonian property classes	Wheat	Barley Meal
<i>pentakosiomedimnoi</i> = 500 <i>medimnoi</i>	48 X 1.087 X 0.772 = 20140 kg / 200 = potential to feed c. 100 persons per year: c. 20+ – 34+ ha land minimum holding	48 X 1.087 X 0.643 = 16775 kg / 200 = 84 people fed: c. 17–28 ha land
<i>hippeis</i> = 300 <i>medimnoi</i>	12084 kg / 200 = 60 people fed: c. 12–20 ha land	10065 kg / 200 = 50 people fed: c. 10–17 ha land
<i>zeugitai</i> = 200 <i>medimnoi</i>	8056 kg / 200 = 40 people fed: c. 8–13 ha land	6710 kg / 200 = 34 people fed: c. 7–11 ha land
<i>thetes</i> => 200 <i>medimnoi</i>	Attic measures and grain equivalents 48 <i>choinikes</i> = 1 <i>medimnos</i> 1 Attic <i>choinix</i> = 1.087 litres 1 litre naked wheat = 0.772 kg 1 <i>medimnos</i> naked wheat = 40.28 kg 1 litre barley meal (<i>alphita</i> equivalent) = 0.643 kg 1 <i>medimnos</i> barley meal = 33.55 kg 'Average' per capita grain consumption was probably c. 200 kg per person per year,¹ Foxhall and Forbes, op. cit. (n. 99). A very rough near-maximum productivity estimate for land would be 1000 kg per ha (1 ha = 2.2 acres); Sallares² suggests a maximum of 650 kg per ha. Of the estimated land area figures above, those for barley are likely to be near the bottom of the possible range, and those for wheat near the top, since barley is generally likely to produce better than wheat under southern Greek growing conditions. Modern Greek subsistence farmers on Methana work on average 3.5 ha total holding, usually producing between 1000 and 3000 kg wheat per year, destined for household consumption not sale. There is some input of nitrate fertiliser and sometimes weed-killer. Cultivation is unmechanised, using mule and ard plough. Normally wheat production is surplus to subsistence requirements and households aim to store a year's supply of grain over and above the current year's needs.³	

Notes: 1 Foxhall and Forbes, *Chiron*, 12 (1982), 41–90

2 Sallares, *The Ecology of the Ancient Greek World*, 389

3 Forbes, 'Strategies and Soils', 361–2, 366, 381–4

Archaic period or later has been much debated: the arguments are nicely summarised by Rhodes,¹⁰¹ and his conclusion has been generally accepted¹⁰² that no one normally bothered to measure produce, but households classed themselves in an atmosphere of competitive peer pressure, so that measurement might take place if status were challenged.

It is very likely that the *tele* might have been based originally on straightforward grain measures. Cereals were the major staple in all periods and how much a household produced and/or stored would probably be the most obvious reliable indicator of their wealth and standing in a non-monetary economy. The notion of 'wet and dry measures' mentioned in Aristotle,¹⁰³ like other elaborations of and speculations on the system in later writers and lexicists, might perhaps be either a confusion or a later development.¹⁰⁴ The name of the *pentakosiomedimnoi* suggests grain was intended as the measure or standard.¹⁰⁵ It may well be that the numbers associated with the three bottom classes were inventions of Classical times, extrapolated from the name *pentakosiomedimnoi* (see note 97). Even if that is right, the number 500 is embedded in the name, which seems to be genuinely Archaic. Moreover, it must certainly refer to dry weight, for which *medimnoi* were always reserved. In ancient Greece wine and oil were never measured in *medimnoi*, but in liquid measures (*choai*, *amphorai*).

Land areas are difficult to determine from production figures, since productivity is highly variable both inter-annually and in different locations (they probably did not think in terms of land areas anyway). Hence the use of a high productivity figure

per hectare in Table 10.2: the aim is to determine near-minimum land holdings, since the use of a lower productivity figure would suggest larger holdings of land.

What emerges strikingly is that the top three classes must have been very wealthy indeed, if these are the levels to which they produced and stored cereals in most years.¹⁰⁶ These figures also suggest that they not only have good land available, but also that they could mobilise the labour to work it. Such households would have been rich even in Classical Greece. Even after Solon's reforms, office holding, restricted to the top two classes for the most part, must still have been limited to a very narrow elite. What the formalisation of the *tele* must have achieved was to fix rules for belonging to that elite, perhaps along new lines. That the system was in any sense 'egalitarian', or that it allowed those at the bottom greater access to land and power, I think must be highly questionable.

So, if, as is generally accepted, hoplites were from the zeugite *telos*,¹⁰⁷ we are hardly seeing a broadly based military force composed of sturdy yeoman peasants or free farmers. Whatever hoplites became by the middle of the fifth century, in this period they were something different. The most likely possibility is that they were wealthy in relative terms in comparison with their socio-economic position in the fifth century.¹⁰⁸ If the name refers to the ownership of a yoke of cows or oxen, this would suggest that the category covers comfortable, rather than poor farmers: draft animals were expensive to own and maintain even in Classical times.¹⁰⁹ Another possibility is that in some circumstances their armour was supplied by another party in this early period.

And what of the *thetes*? The most striking thing is that, at least in this early period, this *telos* must have covered most of the population. Is this what Solon meant by the *demos* in his poetry?¹¹⁰ If so, then a goodly chunk of the *demos* may have been 'poor' only in relative terms, and their poverty was very much a perspective from the top looking downward. Clearly the *thetes* must have included everyone from those with a tiny scrap of garden to substantial kulak-like landholders, and the odd hoplite. To show these are not unrealistic numbers pulled out of thin air, I have included figures (in Table 10.2) on the subsistence production of wheat on Methana in the 1970s. Methana farmers produce much more than just wheat on their average holdings of 3.5 ha: this includes the land used for other arable crops, fallow and trees. If they grew barley, productivity would be even higher: they have the luxury of being able to grow all wheat because of the use of chemical inputs. Though Methana has good moisture-retentive soils, the peninsula, on the western side of the Saronic Gulf, has rainfall as low as Attica and is much steeper. Productivity on average to good land in Attica would be at least as high as on Methana, and it is largely this better land which was farmed during the Archaic period. A modern Methana household would be somewhere near the bottom of *thetes*, on the basis of the figures which have come down to us.

The *tele*, then, offer a view of the Athenian *polis* conceived from the top. Whether the full range of numerical assessments is genuinely Archaic, or a later invention, does not alter the fact that some kind of measured 'yard-stick' for membership related to food production, probably grain, is embedded in the very name of the top class. The amount highlights the considerable agrarian wealth of this group even by Classical or modern Greek standards. The Solonian 'system' most probably reflects the contests for access to power within a very small elite, entangled with the contest for access to land, and perhaps also the ability to mobilise labour. Solon's 'mythical democracy', as Mogens Hansen¹¹¹ reminds us from the point of view of the fourth century, was a democracy of the lawcourt, the magistracies and the Areopagos, it was not 'an assembly democracy in which power was exercised directly by the *demos* in the *ekklesia*', like the fifth-century democracy of Perikles. And for those at the top, including Solon himself, the great heap of *hoi polloi* at the bottom was largely irrelevant.

NOTES

- 1 For example, Murray, *Early Greece*, 2nd edition, 184; Hansen, *The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes*, 296–300.
- 2 Rhodes, *Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia*, 142, 145–6; Hansen, op. cit. (n. 1), 88.
- 3 For a good summary see T.W. Gallant, *BSA* 77 (1982), 111–24.
- 4 Fabian, *Time and the Other*.
- 5 Start, *The Economic and Social Growth of Early Greece*, 161.
- 6 Starr, *Individual and Community*.
- 7 Snodgrass, *Archaic Greece*, 28.
- 8 T.E. Rihll, *JHS* 111 (1991), 114–15.
- 9 Manville, *The Origins of Citizenship in Ancient Athens*, 67.
- 10 For example, Murray, op. cit. (n. 1), 199–200; Woodhouse, *Solon the Liberator*, Forrest, *The Emergence of Greek Democracy*.
- 11 Forrest, op. cit. (n. 10), 150–1, 160–1, 168–74; Andrewes, *The Greek Tyrants* (hereafter=Andrewes, *Tyrants*), 85, and in *CA.H.*, 2nd edition, iii.3, 387; Finley, *Economy and Society in Ancient Greece*, 162.
- 12 For example, Morris, *Burial and Ancient Society*, 3–8.
- 13 *Ibid.*, 216.
- 14 Forrest, op. cit. (n. 10); Starr, op. cit. (nn. 5, 6); Snodgrass, op. cit. (n. 7), 91, 93–4; Hanson, *The Other Greeks*, 27, 45 and *passim*; cf. I. Morris, in Doukellis and Mendoni (eds) *Structures rurales et sociétés antiques*, 49–53.

- 15 Gallant, op. cit. (n. 3), categorised the work on Solon as formalist-Marxist, formalist-capitalist, substantivist: overlapping but not fully congruent categories. Hanson, op. cit. (n. 14), idiosyncratically modernising, goes against this general trend.
- 16 K.M. T.Chrimes, *CR* 46 (1932), 3.
- 17 Woodhouse, op. cit. (n. 10), 155–6.
- 18 Ibid., 83–4.
- 19 A.French, *CQ* n.s. 6 (1956), 19–20.
- 20 Ibid., 20.
- 21 Andrewes, *Tyrants*, 84–9; *CA.H.*, 2nd edition, (n. 11).
- 22 Forrest, op. cit. (n. 10), 150–64, 168–74.
- 23 Starr, op. cit. (n. 5), 180–6; Starr, op. cit. (n. 6), 77–9.
- 24 Andrewes, *Tyrants*, 87–9, *CA.H.*, 2nd edition, (n. 11), 384–8; Forrest, op. cit. (n. 10), 161–3, 168–70; Starr, op. cit. (n. 6), 78–9; Starr, op. cit. (n. 5), 185; more recently restated by Murray, op. cit. (n. 1), 194–5 and Hanson, op. cit. (n. 14), 111–12, 122–5, who also takes a traditional line on the ‘agrarian crisis’ of Solon’s time, but sees the *tele* as benefiting ‘successful *mesoi*’ who were ‘middling farmers’, 123–4.
- 25 Finley, op. cit. (n. 11), 62–3, 76, 156–60; *The Use and Abuse of History*.
- 26 Finley, op. cit. (n. 11), 160; similarly see on the evolutionary development of the alienability of land, Finley, op. cit. (n. 25), 158–9.
- 27 For example, Finley, op. cit. (n. 25), 161 cites Apa Tanis, ‘who live in a secluded valley in the eastern Himalayas, untouched by European administrative intervention when they were first studied in 1944 and 1945’.
- 28 Finley, op. cit. (n. 11), 162.
- 29 Snodgrass, op. cit. (n. 7), 124–5; Gallant, op. cit. (n. 3); Morris, op. cit. (n. 12), 216; Morris, op. cit. (n. 14); Rihll, op. cit. (n. 8); Manville, op. cit. (n. 9); Hanson, op. cit. (n. 14), xi.
- 30 Murray, op. cit. (n. 1), 191–2, and see, most recently, Hanson, op. cit. (n. 14), 82–5 and *passim*.
- 31 Hanson, op. cit. (n. 14), presents the most recent recycling of Snodgrass’s ideas, see also Morris, op. cit. (n. 12); Manville, op. cit. (n. 9), 89–92; Foxhall, *BSA* 90 (1995), 239–50. For Snodgrass’s most recent views, see his paper in Hansen (ed.) *The Ancient Greek City-State*, 30–40.
- 32 Even Starr, op. cit. (n. 6), 42–6, by 1985 felt the need to incorporate ‘anthropological models’.
- 33 Gallant, op. cit. (n. 3).
- 34 Ibid., 122–3.
- 35 Ibid., 124.
- 36 Ibid., 119–rank/order cultures driven by reciprocity.
- 37 Rihll, op. cit. (n. 8), 105 and n. 23.
- 38 Ibid., (n. 8), 104–10.
- 39 Manville, op. cit. (n. 9).
- 40 Ibid., 121.
- 41 Ibid., 89–92, 119–20, 122.
- 42 Ibid., 96–105.
- 43 Ibid., 112.
- 44 Ibid., 108–11; for an earlier version of the argument see N.G. L.Hammond, *JHS* 81 (1961), 76–98.
- 45 Manville, op. cit. (n. 9) 109–10, 119, 123, 129.
- 46 Ibid., 119.
- 47 Ibid., 123.
- 48 Ibid., 144–6.
- 49 Ibid., 119 n. 81.
- 50 Hanson, op. cit. (n. 14), 7–8, 108–12, 126.
- 51 Ibid., 112, 123.
- 52 Ibid., 28–9, 32–3, 36–40, 113–14.
- 53 Ibid., 49, 52–5, 96–7.
- 54 Ibid., 40–1, 79–85.
- 55 Ibid., 41–2, 78–9, 123.
- 56 There were global systems, but unlike modern ones, they were not dominated by powerful nation-states: cf. Champion (ed.) *Centre and Periphery*; Rowlands, Larsen and Kristiansen (eds) *Centre and Periphery in the Ancient World*.
- 57 Although establishing a fixed threshold between ‘states’ and ‘non-states’, and the existence (or not) of a ‘state’ is probably not crucial for interpreting and understanding societies like those of Archaic Greece.
- 58 For Classical Greece the case of Perikles, repeatedly elected to the generalship, comes to mind. Even in highly institutionalised and formalised modern bureaucracies, whether governmental, industrial or whatever, there is a considerable amount of flexibility in how different individuals fill specific posts—more than we recognise most of the time.
- 59 Documented for Athens in the seventh century: R.Osborne, *BSA* 84 (1989), 297–322; Morris, op. cit. (n. 12); S.C.Humphreys, *JHS* 100 (1980), 96–126; cf. Lefkandi: Popham, Sackett and Themelis, *Lefkandi*, i; M.R.Popham, P.G. Calligas and L.H.Sackett, *AR* 35 (1988/9), 117–29.
- 60 Humphreys, op. cit. (n. 59), 105–10.
- 61 Meiggs and Lewis, 2.

- 62 A fifth-century copy, *ibid.*, 6.
- 63 For similar discourses of elite power cf. M.Gilsenan's work on the elite in the Lebanon from the Ottoman to the present, in Gellner and Waterbury (eds) *Patrons and Clients in Mediterranean Societies*, 167–83.
- 64 Solon, fr. 33 West. All translations of Solon's poetry are mine.
- 65 Solon, fr. 36.20–2.
- 66 Solon, fr. 37.6–10. On this fragment see also Salmon and Mitchell, p. 68 with n. 73 above and p. 33 below.
- 67 For example, Forrest, *op. cit.* (n. 10), 168–74; Andrewes, *Tyrants*, 84, *C.A.H.*, 2nd edition, (n. 11), 377; Starr, *op. cit.* (n. 5), 173–85; Murray, *op. cit.* (n. 1), 186–95.
- 68 See citations in n. 67, and Hanson, *op. cit.* (n. 14), 112, 123, 125, who argues that Solon was a man of middle rank working in the interests of 'middling' farmers.
- 69 Cf. Mitchell, pp. 137–47 below.
- 70 Solon, fr. 23, assuming it is correctly attributed to Solon; an identical couplet is preserved in the Theognidea, 1253–4.
- 71 Solon, fr. 5.1–2.
- 72 *Id.*, fr. 6.
- 73 *Id.*, fr. 36.1–2.
- 74 *Id.*, fr. 37.1–3.
- 75 *Id.*, fr. 24.
- 76 For example, Forrest, *op. cit.* (n. 10), 168–74; Starr, *op. cit.* (n. 5), 181–5.
- 77 Solon, fr. 36; and see Harris, pp. 104–7 above, and Stafford, p. 164 below.
- 78 Morris, *op. cit.* (n. 12); Osborne, *op. cit.* (n. 59), 299–303.
- 79 Osborne, *op. cit.* (n. 59); S.Morris, *The Black and White Style*.
- 80 Osborne, *op. cit.* (n. 59), 307–9.
- 81 From 19 to 11 according to *ibid.*, 305–6 maps 3 and 4.
- 82 H.Lohmann, *Jahrbuch Ruhr-Universität Bochum* (1985), 74, in Wells (ed.) *Agriculture in Ancient Greece*, 29–57, and his *Atene*.
- 83 Jameson, Runnels and van Andel, *A Greek Countryside*, 372–7.
- 84 Cherry, Davis and Mantzourani, *Landscape Archaeology as Long-Term History*, 331–3, 339–40.
- 85 Mee and Forbes (eds) *A Rough and Rocky Place*.
- 86 J.Bintliff and A.Snodgrass, *JFA* 12 (1985), 123–61; *Antiquity* 62 (234) (1988), 57–71.
- 87 Gallant, *op. cit.* (n. 3); Manville, *op. cit.* (n. 9), 123. Hanson, *op. cit.* (n. 14), 52–4, attempts to use survey data to prove the ubiquity of isolated residence for farmers. However, he has not fully understood, first, that many of the small rural 'farmstead' sites which crop up in survey (and excavation) are occupied only for very short periods, sometimes with long gaps in occupation; second, that the vast majority are fifth- to fourth-century or Late Roman in date; and, finally, that there is no reason to assume that all were occupied simultaneously, indeed, there is every reason to think that only a relatively small proportion were inhabited at any given moment (in which case the absolute numbers of the rural population for most *poleis* was probably quite low). For more detailed analyses of these issues see Foxhall, Appendix 1 in Mee and Forbes, *op. cit.* (n. 83); T.Whitelaw, in *Proceedings of the International Scientific Symposium: Kea—Kythnos*.
- 88 Indeed, there is considerably more evidence for the exploitation of the Greek countryside in the Late Roman period than in the Archaic.
- 89 Foxhall, *op. cit.* (n. 31).
- 90 For example, French, *op. cit.* (n. 19); Starr, *op. cit.* (n. 5), 156–60; Forrest, *op. cit.* (n. 10), 151.
- 91 For example, Sallares, *The Ecology of the Ancient Greek World*, 406–8.
- 92 Cf. Forrest, *op. cit.* (n. 10), 154; Murray, *op. cit.* (n. 1), 192, on the basis of Fustel de Coulanges, *The Ancient City*; Hanson, *op. cit.* (n. 14), 123, 125.
- 93 Gallant, *op. cit.* (n. 3), 116. Cf. Foxhall, in Shipley and Salmon (eds) *Human Landscapes in Classical Antiquity*, 44–67; Foxhall, *op. cit.* (n. 31).
- 94 Fustel de Coulanges argued this long ago albeit it via a rather skewed reading of the Classical textual sources and from a completely different political point of view from mine (*op. cit.* [n. 92], 251–7); Hanson's agenda of 'agrarianism' also highlights private property as a core feature but dates the rise of private ownership to the eighth century: *op. cit.* (n. 14), 39–40.
- 95 For example, Alkinoos, *Od.* 7.105–33; Odysseus' estate from his father, Laertes, 24.336–44, which he will pass on to his son Telemachos, 23.138–9.
- 96 Manville, *op. cit.* (n. 9), 145–6; Forrest, *op. cit.* (n. 10), 168–9; Murray, *op. cit.* (n. 1), 193–4; Andrewes, *C.A.H.*, 2nd edition, (n. 11), 382; Rihll, *op. cit.* (n. 8), 124–5; Hanson, *op. cit.* (n. 14), 114–19.
- 97 Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 7.3–4; Plut. *Sol.* 18.1–2; see also Rhodes, *op. cit.* (n. 2), 137–8. I am grateful to Robin Lane Fox for the suggestion that later writers extrapolated the quantitative qualifications for the bottom three classes from the name (*pentakosiomedimnoi*) of the top class.
- 98 Starr, *op. cit.* (n. 5), 154–6; cf. Murray, *op. cit.* (n. 1), 194.
- 99 L.Foxhall and H.A.Forbes, *Chiron* 12 (1982), 41–90.
- 100 A.Jardé, *Les Céréales dans l'antiquité grecque*.
- 101 Rhodes, *op. cit.* (n. 2), 141–2.
- 102 For example, Manville, *op. cit.* (n. 9), 144–5 n. 53.
- 103 Arist. *Ath. Pol.* 7.4.

- 104 Cf. Manville, *op. cit.* (n. 9), 144–5 n. 53; Rhodes, *op. cit.* (n. 2), 141.
- 105 Generally assumed to be one class which was added as part of ‘the Solonian reforms’, for example, Forrest, *op. cit.* (n. 10), 161; Manville, *op. cit.* (n. 9), 145 n. 54; cf. Andrewes, *C.A.H.*, 2nd edition, (n. 11), 385.
- 106 Did criteria for the *tele*, or *telos*, if we are only talking about a one-class system, include stored cereals, if a household’s assessment were challenged? Cf. Rhodes, *op. cit.* (n. 2), 142.
- 107 For example, Andrewes, *Tyrants*, 88; Murray, *op. cit.* (n. 1), 194; Hanson, *op. cit.* (n. 14), 111–12.
- 108 This might be analogous to the way in which features of economic well-being such as house and car ownership have trickled down the class system since World War II, as standards of living have risen and western societies have become more prosperous overall. On this point, that *zeugitai* do not represent subsistence peasants, but comparatively well-off farmers, I am broadly in agreement with Hanson, *loc. cit.*
- 109 The derivation of the term has been much debated in the scholarly literature. That *zeugites* refers to the owner of a yoke (*zeugos*) of oxen is most generally accepted, but a popular alternative still upheld by Hanson, *loc. cit.*, is that it was a military designation, referring to men ‘yoked together’ in the phalanx. See D.Whitehead, *CQ* n.s. 31 (1981), 282–6; and Raaflaub, p. 55 with p. 59 n. 31 above.
- 110 Forrest, *op. cit.* (n. 10), 168–74, and see above.
- 111 Hansen, *op. cit.* (n. 1), 299.

11
NEW WINE IN OLD WINESKINS
Solon, *arete* and the *agathos*

Lynette G. Mitchell

Solon was elected archon with full powers in 594 to cope with the social, political, and economic crisis in Athens. He was said to be the first champion of the people by the author of the *Ath. Pol.*,¹ and from the late fifth century he was labelled the 'father of democracy'.² While Solon is no longer viewed as being consciously democratic, most modern commentators agree that his political agenda was intended to upset the old social and political order and to create a new order in which all had some access to the political processes.

It is this view that I wish to modify. It is indeed true that Solon did relieve the immediate economic difficulties of the poor and that he did give a share in political power to those who had been excluded. Nevertheless, the author of the *Ath. Pol.* himself says that Solon did not consistently support the many against the few, but encouraged them to reach a reconciliation,³ and in the *Politics* Aristotle says that Solon only gave to the *demos* the very minimum of power.⁴ I wish to argue that Solon was being much more conservative than is generally allowed, and that, rather than looking forward to the creation of a new social order through his reforms, he was in fact looking backwards to the maintenance of an older order, even if this was at the cost of allowing some sections of the community access to political power which they had previously been denied.⁵

First of all we need to consider the nature of the crisis in Athens in the late seventh and early sixth centuries. The *Ath. Pol.* says that tension arose out of the friction between the notables (*hoi gnorimoi*) and the multitude (*to plethos*), that the poor were enslaved to the wealthy, that the land was in the hands of the few, but that the harshest aspect of the constitution for the many (*hoi polloi*) was their enslavement: 'notwithstanding they also had grievances on other grounds; for they, so to speak, did not happen to have a share in anything'.⁶ Plutarch adds that Draco's laws were too harsh,⁷ and, although he mistakenly refers here to the groups of the time of Peisistratus, that there was also rivalry between competing political groups.⁸

In addition to these late sources, we also have the testimony of Solon himself through the fragments of his poetry.⁹ In these, Solon points to another problem which in some ways sits oddly beside the picture of economic depression: wealth and its corrupting influence.¹⁰ Wealth, Solon says, is the heart of the evil that is afflicting Athens, since it corrupts the leaders of the *demos*, who grow rich by unjust deeds and

...sparing neither sacred nor public property
they steal by plunder, one from one place, one from another,
and they do not guard the holy foundations of Justice (*Dike*),
who, though silent, knows what is and what was before,
and who assuredly comes in time to seek retribution.¹¹

This is not to say that Solon objected to wealth itself. He himself was of good birth, and at least desired wealth,¹² despite the *Ath. Pol.*'s and Plutarch's assertions that he was a man of the middle order.¹³ He says:

I desire to have possessions, but I do not wish to partake of them
unjustly; for truly justice comes later.
Wealth which the gods give is certain for a man
from the very bottom to the top,
but wealth which men honour out of arrogance comes not in an
orderly way,
but, having succumbed to unjust deeds,
does not attend willingly, but swiftly gets mixed up with infatuation:
from a small beginning it is like a fire,
a small thing at first, but troublesome in the end.¹⁴

For Solon, to have wealth was good, if it came from the gods, though even then it was not sure.¹⁵ The wealth Solon objected to was that which was ‘lusted after’, or led to unjust deeds. Even the poor were susceptible to this criticism, because they wanted a redistribution of land and a share in the wealth and reproached Solon when they did not get it.¹⁶ It is this obsession with the acquisition of wealth, he implies, which has led to *Dysnomia*, Disorder.¹⁷

The *Dysnomia* has not only found its expression in the distress of the *hektemoroi* and the enslavement of the poorer Athenians, but also it has caused *stasis*.¹⁸ This was not only between the *gnorimoi* and the *plethos*, but also between competing political groups,¹⁹ who probably found their leaders not only among the notables but also among those who had wealth but lacked political power.²⁰ This was symptomatic of the social crisis which had sprung out of the political crisis.

Traditionally, social status was a corollary of political power. *Arete* (excellence) had been the mark of the noble (*agathos*), who because of his nobility had also held political control.²¹ Those with *arete* were *agathoi*; those without *arete* were of lower social status (*kakoi*).²² In the Homeric world, the most powerful words of commendation were *agathos* and *arete*, and they described the most highly sought values in society.²³ To have *arete*, in the Homeric context, was to be good at something,²⁴ and the Homeric *agathos* was good at war, and it was his job to protect the interests of the *oikos*. The ethos of the Homeric *agathos* was individual and competitive: his main role was to defend his household, and it was in this way that the *agathos* maintained his position.²⁵ Although the emphasis tended to be upon his military prowess, the *agathos* was also a man who was successful in peace as well.²⁶ he looked after his *oikos*, and he, for the most part, made decisions for his *oikos* and determined justice within it.²⁷ The *agathos* was also, by nature, a wealthy man, and his material possessions were part of what defined his position in society.²⁸ The *agathoi* were those with power within the community; those that had the rights to the greatest *time* (honour) because they were the protectors of society in war and peace.²⁹ *Arete* was theirs by god-given birth-right, but it was also something they had to strive for.³⁰

However, important political, economic and social changes beginning in the eighth century meant that the *polis* rather than the *oikos* became the most important organising principle in society.³¹ Nevertheless, success in war was still important, and Tyrtaeus considers that the *agathos* is the man who holds firm in the front-line of battle.³² But although *arete* is achieved through valour, and ‘the cowardly man has lost all *arete*’,³³ military success is linked to the hoplite phalanx and the interests of the corporate *demos* rather than the individual warrior.³⁴ In addition, other activities had also now acquired value for the community.³⁵

Hesiod also reflects these developments. He points to the fact that *arete* could now be obtained by the acquisition of wealth (albeit a god-given wealth rather than wealth that is seized violently),³⁶ but the important point was that wealth was no longer seen as intrinsic to *arete*, but could be a pathway to it; *arete* was linked to wealth and wealth could be achieved through hard work:

Through work men become both rich in flocks and wealthy;
and, in working, they are much better loved by the immortals.
Work bears no reproach, but idleness does bear reproach.
If you were to work, the idle will soon envy you
since you have grown rich. *Arete* and fame attend wealth.³⁷

Hesiod’s *arete* is accessible to all who work hard. It is an *arete* propelled by *eris*, strife—not the strife that leads men to make war upon each other, but the competitive strife which stirs up the lazy to work, and makes neighbour vie with neighbour in his eagerness for wealth.³⁸ For Hesiod, it is just for a man to earn his living by honest work, and not by cheating, and the observance of justice brings prosperity to the *polis*.³⁹

That *non-agathoi* now had access to wealth had serious social and political implications to which Hesiod appears oblivious but which Solon had to deal with in very real terms. If one could attain *arete*, however defined, then surely one also had the right to political power. It was this equation that had given the Homeric heroes the right to their political stranglehold. In Hesiod’s world order, there was still a clear-cut division between the *basileis*, who had the right to power and the dispensation of justice—albeit a crooked justice—and his own class, who must obey. Although Hesiod redefined the basis of this division, he did not question the division itself.

The body of work attributed to Solon’s near-contemporary Theognis of Megara reflects similar themes. The Theognid corpus is not always consistent in its response to the new wealth, and this is indicative of the social upheaval that was taking place. On the one hand, it is claimed that there is an *arete* for the multitude, and that this is wealth;⁴⁰ but, on the other hand, money can belong to many, but *arete* belongs to few;⁴¹ and elsewhere *arete* is contrasted with prosperity given to ‘useless’ men, and ascribed to the warlike man who saves the city.⁴² In the seventh century, Alcaeus claimed that a man is what he owns, and that no poor man is noble (*esthlos*) or honoured (*timios*).⁴³ However, this inevitably produced complications in a world where the nobility can be poor, and the *kakoi* rich, if that is what the gods decree:

Do not be too worried about difficulties nor rejoice too much in good things,
 since it behoves an *agathos* to bear everything.
 And it is necessary not to swear this: 'This thing will never be.'
 For the gods are angered by it, by whom the issue is fixed.
 And they do indeed act: something becomes *esthlos* from *kakos*,
 and *kakos* from *agathos*, and at once a poor man becomes very rich,
 and he who had many things
 suddenly loses it all in one night.
 A prudent man errs; expectation is often fulfilled for the witless;
 and a *kakos* obtains a share of *time*.⁴⁴

As a result of this confusion of position and wealth, the *agathoi* and the *kakoi* were inter-marrying.⁴⁵ The traditional values of *arete* and the definition of the *agathoi* and *kakoi* were under review, and the line that divided the two socially was becoming blurred only to sharpen into a new wealth-based focus.

Ironically, perhaps, it is at Sparta that we first find a solution to this problem, though Tyrtaeus does not spell it out. Herodotus,⁴⁶ Thucydides⁴⁷ and Aristotle⁴⁸ all attest to civil unrest in Sparta in this period, which almost undoubtedly arose out of the tension between those in the *polis* with power and those without. As we have already seen, in the Homeric period political control had been in the hands of the *agathoi*, and at Sparta, in an admittedly difficult passage of Plutarch quoting the Great Rhetra,⁴⁹ the 'Lycurgan' reforms⁵⁰ appear to have given formal sovereignty in the state to the *demos* (although with significant limitations).⁵¹ Tyrtaeus appears to confirm this when he says that the *demos* are charged with making straight responses.⁵² It was from these constitutional developments that the ideology of equality evolved in Sparta. The *demos* was vindicated in its corporate claim to be *agathos*. Just as all Spartan hoplites could attain *arete*, so all Spartan hoplites participated in the decision-making processes and were given the responsibility of maintaining 'straight responses'.

The same social strain is apparent at Athens, and Solon's property-classes were aimed at the politically impotent *nouveaux riches*.⁵³ In order to allow these people a share in political power, Solon reconstructed the political system so that qualification for office was by wealth rather than by birth. Now any man could hold the archonship and enter the Areopagus if only he was rich enough. However, although Solon gave the *nouveaux riches* access to political power as a matter of expediency, this did not necessarily mean that he approved of them or thought himself one with them. In fact, although he was forced to make political concessions to this group, he did not make social concessions; and this brings us to the question of Solon's intentions when he instituted his reforms.

The main thrust of Solon's reforms, he tells us, was with the help of *Dike*, Justice, to create *Eunomia*, Good Order, out of the *Dysnomia*. *Eunomia* for Solon, as Ostwald has argued, was 'the state of affairs which he hoped to create by means of his legislation'.⁵⁴ The 'state of affairs' Solon hoped to achieve was civic harmony:

Eunomia produces good order and every perfect thing,
 and often encircles the feet of the unjust.
 It smooths the rough, puts an end to excess, effaces insolence,
 withers the growing blooms of infatuation,
 straightens crooked judgements, and soothes out-cropping deeds.
 It stops the acts of sedition,
 and puts an end to the anger of painful envy, and makes possible by itself every perfect and prudent thing among men.⁵⁵

Solon's legislation and reforms have often been interpreted as forwardlooking and intentionally revolutionary, if not radically so.⁵⁶ Some of his reforms, such as the *seisachtheia* and the ban on slavery for debt,⁵⁷ were obviously intended to relieve the condition of the poor and to bolster their position in society. Likewise the institution of the council of four hundred,⁵⁸ if it can be believed,⁵⁹ the introduction of a new law-code,⁶⁰ public prosecutions⁶¹ and the right of appeal against magistrates' verdicts⁶² all meant that the members of the *demos* had a share in public affairs that they could not have dreamt of before.⁶³ Nevertheless, while rescuing the poor from their immediate dire circumstances, however the *seisachtheia* is interpreted,⁶⁴ Solon did little to prevent them falling into debt again.

In his social views Solon was conservative and resisted any alteration in the *status quo*.⁶⁵ He, like his aristocratic predecessors, saw the world as divided basically into two groups, the lower classes (*kakoi*) and the notables (*agathoi*), and he made laws the same for each.⁶⁶ But he did not think that the *kakoi* should have equal shares in the land with the *esthloi* (nobles).⁶⁷ While granting the *demos*, of which the *nouveaux riches* were a part, certain political privileges, he did not seek to change their social position but to restore order. He only gave them as much as was sufficient,⁶⁸ and seems to have thought them incapable of being trusted with too much wealth and power.⁶⁹

In this way the *demos* would best go along with its leaders,
neither being given too much rein, nor being forced too much.
Excess breeds arrogance, whenever great wealth attends such men as do not have sound intent.⁷⁰

The term *demos* is used ambiguously in Solon's poetry, sometimes referring to the whole people, but sometimes referring to the poor and sometimes simply to those who are *not gnomimoi*.⁷¹ Here he appears to be using it in this last sense, and makes it clear that his support is not for the *demos* but for those who have to handle them.⁷² Solon, like many aristocrats, had a poor opinion of the *demos* and their judgement, an opinion in which he claims he is vindicated by events:

If you have suffered misery through your own baseness (*kakotes*),
do not lay the blame for your share of these things upon the gods,
for you raised them up, giving them protection,
and because of this you have base slavery.
Each one of you comes with the marks of a fox,
but in all of you put together there is but empty wit;
you look to the tongue and words of a wily man,
but see nothing of the deed which is being done.⁷³

Diodorus⁷⁴ and Plutarch⁷⁵ believed that Solon was referring to Peisistratus' tyranny,⁷⁶ but he is at least probably referring to the *demos*' demands for land redistribution, lust for wealth, and lack of judgement.

Playing on similar themes, many poems in the Theognidea also reflect an anxious aristocracy whose social position is being undermined. One of the responses was to divorce *arete* from wealth and define it purely by birth.⁷⁷ *Arete* is not what a man owns, but who he is. It is the moral force that drives him, and this is a quality lacking in the *kakoi*. Therefore, Theognis says, it is fitting for an *agathos* to have wealth,⁷⁸ since he will not abuse the privilege. Wealth is dangerous for the *kakoi*; it is too heady a wine, and will drive them to excess and injustice:

Cyrnus, an *agathos* always has presence of mind,
and is able to hold firm both in bad times and in good;
but if god gives livelihood and wealth to a *kakos*,
being silly, he is not able to restrain his inferiority.⁷⁹

Like Solon, Theognis believes that the true *agathos* has a moral fibre and stamina lacking in the *kakos*.

A number of poems in the Theognidea make particularly vitriolic attacks on the integrity of the *kakoi*. Although 'all *arete* is summed up in justice, and every man is *agathos* who is *dikaios*',⁸⁰ elsewhere the *kakoi*, like the Homeric Cyclops, know neither justice nor established customs (*nomoi*), and this is the cause of all the problems of the *polis*:

Cyrnus, this *polis* is still the *polis*, but there are other people,
who previously knew neither justice nor established customs,
but who used to wear goat skins on their sides,
and lived like deer outside this city.
And now they are *agathoi*, Polypaides, and those who before were *esthloi*
are now *deiloi*. Who could endure looking on these things?
And they deceive each other and mock each other,
not able to distinguish the principles of the *kakoi* or the *agathoi*.⁸¹

Although they are to a large extent the bitter murmurings of a disillusioned man, these poems do present us with a picture of the *agathoi* under threat in their role as the exclusive guardians of society. For Theognis, the *agathos* was becoming increasingly divorced from the traditional qualities that defined him.⁸² The instinct of self-preservation demanded that in order to retain their position of supremacy in society, the aristocracy had to redefine *arete* and the *agathos* in a way that made *arete* exclusive to the *agathos* and so gave him a social and moral superiority.⁸³

Solon, like Theognis, is a member of an aristocracy under threat. In his reforms, he was prepared to give a certain amount away so that he could obtain civic harmony, but he still tried to preserve the old social order:

(For if another man had obtained this office)

he would not have restrained the *demos*, nor would he have stopped
before he churned the milk and lost the cream,
but like a *horos* in the middle I stood between them.⁸⁴

Solon is concerned with balance within the *polis*; a balance that ensures that the *demos* do not encroach too far. He says:

If another had taken the goad as I had,
and he had been a man of bad counsel and covetous,
he would not have restrained the *demos*; for if I wished
for those things which were pleasing to my opponents then,
or again for those things which the others devised for them,
this city would be bereft of many men.
For these reasons I made a defence on every side,
and I turned like a wolf among many dogs.⁸⁵

He did this by separating social class—defined by *arete* and therefore exclusive to the nobility—from political power which he defined by wealth.⁸⁶ Although he allowed the *kakoi* to have a share in political power through the property classes, he did not allow them to become *agathoi*. Those who had wealth did not necessarily have *arete*, just as those who had *arete* did not necessarily have wealth:

For many *kakoi* are rich, and many *agathoi* are poor,
but we would not exchange with them
wealth for *arete*, since *arete* is always sure,
but one man has money at one time, and another at another time.⁸⁷

Arete transcends wealth and is something which only *agathoi* can truly obtain. For Hesiod, *arete* attended wealth; for Solon wealth may attend *arete*, but equally it may not.

In Solon's Athens, to all appearances the social order was to remain the same: the *agathoi* were still *agathoi* and the *kakoi* were still *kakoi*, but this was no longer the basis for political power. For Solon, *arete* again becomes the exclusive possession of the noble. Effectively, he gives the nobility *arete* and the *kakoi* a share in political control in order to create civic harmony.

Yet, as the turn of events was to show, *arete* could not be reinterpreted so narrowly. The Theognid corpus adds depth to the hints of social upheaval we can detect in the poems of Solon. Contrary to the usual interpretations of his work, Solon was simply trying to patch up a social order that was already broken, not create a new one. But it is small wonder that his reforms ultimately failed. *Eunomia* could not be obtained until the line between the noble and non-noble was broken. The problem was finally eased in Athens, as in so many other Greek states, by the popularly established tyranny, which naturally mixed up the social classes as all become subjects of one master.⁸⁸ 'Neither do men pour new wine into old wineskins. If they do, the skins will burst, the wine will run out and the wineskins will be ruined. No, they pour new wine into new wineskins, and both are preserved' (Matt. 9.17).

NOTES

1 2.2.

2 For example, Isoc. 7.16; cf. Arist. *Pol.* 2.1274a1–3.

3 *Ath. Pol.* 5.2.

4 2.1274a15–18.

5 Cf. Foxhall, pp. 120–2 above.

6 *Ath. Pol.* 2.2–3; cf. Plut. *Sol.* 13.2. See also Rhodes, *Commentary on the Aristotelian Athenaion Politeia*, 90–6.

7 Plut. *Sol.* 17.1.

8 *Ibid.* 13.1.

9 Herodotus in the fifth century says only that Solon was a wise man and a lawgiver (1.29–33), while Thucydides does not mention him at all.

10 Cf. *Ath. Pol.* 5.3.

11 Fr. 4.12–16 West.

12 Fr. 13.7–8, 71–3.

13 *Ath. Pol.* 5.3; Plut. *Sol.* 2.1–3.2; see Rhodes, *op. cit.* (n. 6), 123–4.

- 14 Fr. 13.7–15.
- 15 Fr. 13.41–56.
- 16 Frs 33–4; cf. Plut. *Sol.* 15.1; see also Rhodes, *op. cit.* (n. 6), 124.
- 17 On *Dysnomia* in Hesiod (*Theog.* 226–32) as the daughter of Strife, and as the sister of Toil, Forgetfulness, Famine, Afflictions, Fights, Battles, Murders, Manslaughters, Quarrels, Lies, Disputes, Fatuousness and Perjurious Oath, see Ostwald, *Nomos and the Beginnings of Greek Democracy*, 66–7.
- 18 Fr. 4.18–20.
- 19 Cf. *Ath. Pol.* 13.4.
- 20 Cf. fr. 4.6. Compare Cylon and his political group in the seventh century (Herodotus [5.71.1] suggests the importance of political groups in this coup) and the evident tension that existed after Solon's reforms (*Ath. Pol.* 13.3–4). In addition, it appears that the division into political groups cut across class boundaries. This is suggested by those who allegedly joined Peisistratus' 'democratic' group. These, the *Ath. Pol.* says, included those who were in difficulties after being deprived of their debts through Solon's reforms and those who were not of pure Athenian descent (*Ath. Pol.* 13.5).
- 21 Cf. Robertson, pp. 152–4 below.
- 22 Cf. Finley, *The World of Odysseus*, 2nd edition, 53. See, however, Starr (*The Economic and Social Growth of Early Greece*, 119–20; *The Aristocratic Temper of Greek Civilisation* [henceforth=*Aristocratic Temper*], 7–15) who argues that the category 'aristocrat' is inappropriate for Homeric society, followed by Donlan (*The Aristocratic Ideal in Ancient Greece*, 19–25), who argues against the appropriateness of *kakoi* as a Homeric status indicator. On the function of *kakos* and *agathos* and their synonyms (e.g. *deilos*; *esthlos*) as indications of social status, see Adkins, *Merit and Responsibility* (henceforth=*M&R*), 30–40, 75–7; *Moral Values and Political Behaviour in Ancient Greece* (henceforth=*Moral Values*), 12–15, 23–30, 35–57.
- 23 Adkins, *M&R*, 30–4.
- 24 Lloyd-Jones, *The Justice of Zeus*, 2nd edition, 158.
- 25 Finley, *op. cit.* (n. 22), 116–17.
- 26 *Ibid.*
- 27 On the *oikos* as the most powerful organising principle in the Homeric world, see Finley, *op. cit.* (n. 22), 105.
- 28 *Ibid.* (n. 22), 120–3; Adkins, *M&R*, 33, 160; *id.*, *BICS* 7 (1960), 23–32.
- 29 Adkins, *M&R*, 35–6; Finley, *op. cit.* (n. 22), 97; cf. Donlan, *op. cit.* (n. 22), 4–25.
- 30 Donlan, *op. cit.* (n. 22), 15–18.
- 31 Cf. Finley, *op. cit.* (n. 22), 105–7.
- 32 Tyrtaeus, fr. 12.10–20 West; cf. 10.1–2.
- 33 *Id.* fr. 11.14.
- 34 Jaeger, *Paideia*, i. 84–90; Bowra, *Early Greek Elegists*, 65; Adkins, *Poetic Craft in the Early Greek Elegists*, 78; but contrast Lloyd-Jones, *op. cit.* (n. 24), 45, who argues that Tyrtaeus' definition of *arete* was essentially an expression of the Homeric ethos of *arete*, which sees that 'the supreme kind of *arete* is martial valour'.
- 35 See Donlan, *op. cit.* (n. 22), 89–95, who discusses the equation of *arete* and the 'quiet' virtues by which the aristocracy defined their social superiority in the seventh and sixth centuries.
- 36 *W.D.* 320–41, 352.
- 37 *Ibid.* 308–13.
- 38 *Ibid.* 11–24.
- 39 *Ibid.* 213–47; cf. Lloyd-Jones, *op. cit.* (n. 24), 32.
- 40 Theognis, 699–700.
- 41 *Id.*, 149–50.
- 42 *Id.*, 865–8.
- 43 Alcaeus, fr. 360 Lobel and Page=169 *LGS*.
- 44 Theognis, 657–66.
- 45 *Id.*, 193–6.
- 46 1.65.2.
- 47 1.18.1.
- 48 *Pol.* 5.1306b29–31.
- 49 *Lyc.* 6.1.
- 50 Cartledge, *Sparta and Lakonia*, 135; cf. Forrest, *History of Sparta*, 2nd edition, 48–9.
- 51 Cartledge, *op. cit.* (n. 50), 133–5. 52 Fr. 4.5–7, in which West combines the texts of Plutarch (*Lyc.* 6.10) and Diodorus (7.12.6): see Adkins, *op. cit.* (n. 34), 69.
- 53 *Ath. Pol.* 7.3–4; Plut. *Sol.* 18.1–2; cf. Arist. *Pol.* 2.1274a18–21; Hignett, *History of the Athenian Constitution*, 102–5; Rhodes, *op. cit.* (n. 6), 95–6. On the property classes, see also Foxhall, pp. 129–32 above.
- 54 Ostwald, *op. cit.* (n. 17), 68 and n. 3 (for a critique of A. Andrewes [*CQ* 32 (1938), 89–102, especially 90 and n. 2], who defines *eunomia* more narrowly as the keeping of the laws themselves); cf. Ehrenberg, *Aspects of the Ancient World*, 81–6; Adkins, *Moral Values*, 51–7. Tyrtaeus in the seventh century also wrote a poem about *eunomia* at Sparta, although it is only known from brief notices in Aristotle (*Pol.* 5.1306b36–1307a2) and Strabo (362.8.4.10). It was said to be concerned with the demands for redistribution of land after some people became excessively poor and others excessively rich during the Messenian war.
- 55 Fr. 4.32–9.

- 56 Linforth, *Solon the Athenian*, 46–90; Hignett, op. cit. (n. 53), especially 102–9; Forrest, *The Emergence of Greek Democracy*, 160–74; Ehrenberg, *From Solon to Socrates*, 2nd edition, 56–73; Donlan, op. cit. (n. 21), 68–74; Murray, *Early Greece*, 2nd edition, 181–200, especially 188–9.
- 57 *Ath. Pol.* 6.1; Plut. *Sol.* 15.3.
- 58 *Ath. Pol.* 8.4; Plut. *Sol.* 19.1.
- 59 For a summary of the arguments, see Rhodes, op. cit. (n. 6), 153–4.
- 60 *Ath. Pol.* 6.1; Plut. *Sol.* 16.3–17.1, 20–4.
- 61 *Ath. Pol.* 9.1.
- 62 Ibid. 9.1; Plut. *Sol.* 18.2.
- 63 See fr. 37.1–2.
- 64 For a survey of the problems concerning the *hektemoroi*, see Rhodes, op. cit. (n. 6), 125–7. For recent views on the *seisachtheia* and the *hektemoroi*, see T.E.Rihll, *JHS* 111 (1991), 101–27, and Harris and Foxhall, pp. 103–11 and 113–32 above.
- 65 Adkins, *Moral Values*, 52. However, Adkins (50) does not think that Solon was concerned with *arete* and the *agathos*, or the new wealthy.
- 66 Fr. 36.15–20.
- 67 Fr. 34.8–9.
- 68 Fr. 5.1–2; cf. fr. 4c: see Stanton, *Athenian Politics, c. 800–500 B.C.*, 43 n. 4.
- 69 Cf. Starr, *Aristocratic Temper*, 23.
- 70 Fr. 6.
- 71 Rhodes, op. cit. (n. 6), 172.
- 72 See Stanton, op. cit. (n. 68), 43 n. 4.
- 73 Fr. 11.
- 74 9.20.
- 75 *Sol.* 30.2.
- 76 Despite the reference to ‘them’ (τούτους) in l. 3: see Linforth, op. cit. (n. 56), 207 n. 3.
- 77 Theognis, 149–50.
- 78 Id., 523–6.
- 79 Id., 319–22; cf. 441–6.
- 80 Id., 147–8; cf. 465–6.
- 81 Id., 53–60.
- 82 See ibid., 233–4.
- 83 Donlan, op. cit. (n. 22), 77–95.
- 84 Fr. 37.7–10: see also Stanton, op. cit. (n. 68), 48 n. 2. On this fragment see also Salmon and Foxhall, p. 68 with p. 73 n. 33 and p. 120 above.
- 85 Fr. 36.20–7.
- 86 Compare Adkins, *Moral Values*, 50.
- 87 Fr. 15. Plutarch (*Sol.* 3.2) uses this fragment wrongly to prove that Solon classed himself among the poor: see Stanton, op. cit. (n. 68), 53–4 n. 7; cf. Linforth, op. cit. (n. 56), 213–14. Adkins (*Moral Values*, 50) thinks that this fragment belongs more properly among the Theognidea, where it also appears at ll. 315–18.
- 88 On the effects of tyranny cf. Salmon, pp. 63–6 above.

EVALUATING THE CITIZEN IN ARCHAIC GREEK LYRIC, ELEGY AND INSCRIBED EPIGRAM

George I.C. Robertson

Archaic poets were clearly concerned with the behaviour of their fellow citizens, but their opinions often do little to help those who would reconstruct or trace the development of a clear and unambiguous system of evaluation. The picture is further clouded by the fact that Archaic verse includes not only literary but also epigraphic material; the restricted quantity and scope of this evidence limit the uses to which it can be put, but it can prove valuable when studied alongside the literature, in that it seems to reflect more private concerns. From this perspective, a survey will be made here of some of the virtues which the composers of Archaic verse considered useful in a civic context, beginning with martial valour and patriotism in war. This was one type of *arete* ('excellence') which was important in a *polis*, but there were others, and the attempts by some poets to assimilate the various *aretai* into one general *arete* (and the attempts by others to resist this assimilation) will then be examined. Finally, another virtue which some poets considered significant in the *polis* will be discussed.

I

Arkhilokhos refers twice, apparently in exhortations (frs 110, 111 West), to the idea that all men must die, and therefore must fight; Sarpedon's exhortation to Glaukos in the *Iliad* (12.310–28) involved both this argument and a reminder that the two of them were honoured at home in Lykia and were obliged to fight to earn that honour. More common in the lyric and elegiac poetry of the Archaic age, however, are references to the importance of patriotism and defence of the *polis* (an argument not relevant to the Lykian Sarpedon, but important to Hektor: 12.243, 24.500), and while reminiscences of the other Homeric considerations can be found, they tend to relate to this particular concern more than they do in the *Iliad*. Defence of the homeland may become so important, indeed, as to override all other motives for fighting. Where these patriotic motives do not apply, there is apparently no reason to fight, as in this somewhat anti-heroic couplet from the Theognidea (887–8): 'Don't pay too much attention to the loud-shouting herald; it's not for our native land that we're fighting.'

Kallinos also refers to the fact that all men are destined to die: 'Death will come when the Fates have spun the thread' (fr. 1. 8–9 West). This assertion, however, is only made after the poet has emphasized the importance of fighting 'for land and children and wedded wife' (7), and here the language is different from the Homeric formulations. In the *Iliad*, heroes are exhorted to fight in the terminology of obligation, often using *khre*, 'must': 'For we must not stay here and spin out time or delay, for there is still a great task undone' (19.149–50). Again, Sarpedon encourages Glaukos: 'And so we must stand in the forefront of the Lykians and take part in the raging battle' (12.315), and 'now most of all you must be a spearman and brave warrior' (16. 492–3). Kallinos, rather, points out (fr. 1. 6) that to fight for one's country is *timeen* ('honourable') and *aglaon* ('splendid'), both of which adjectives deserve comment: fighting is never described as *aglaos* in Homer, and it is the sackers of cities who win *time*, while the defenders fight for their lives. Here glory is put at the service of patriotism, which has itself been called 'splendid'. This is the carrot, as it were, and ten lines later the poet wields the stick: the man who does not fight will be 'not at all loved or missed by the people' (16). The rest of the poem is devoted to a description of the glory that awaits the man who fights for his *polis*.

In Tyrtaios, too, we see a great deal of the carrot and relatively little of the stick. Near the beginning of fr. 10 West, after the initial statement that 'it is a fine thing (*kalori*) for a good man (*andr' agathori*) to die, falling in the forefront while fighting for his homeland' (1–2), there is a brief description of the life of a man whose home has been sacked by the enemy. Later in the poem, Tyrtaios writes of a grizzled old man who, having fallen in battle, rolls in the dust clutching his 'bleeding genitals' (25). The emphasis on this detail and the later reference to his naked skin have a point, for this tableau is a foil for another incentive for men to fight: this is the declaration that a young man who was 'handsome for men to look upon and lovely (*eratos*) to women when living' (29–30) will remain *kalos* ('beautiful') when he has fallen in battle (30). Fighting and dying for one's country, then, are not only metaphorically *kalon* ('fine') but literally *kalon* ('beautiful'). Elsewhere in Tyrtaios' poems of martial exhortation, negative incentive appears only in the middle of fr. 11, where there is a description of a warrior who flees battle and is struck in the back. The emphasis is generally on the rewards for the man who fights 'for his homeland' (10.2), thus providing a 'common good for the *polis* and the whole *demos*' (12.15).

Parallel to Tyrtaios' erotically-charged picture of a dead patriotic warrior in fr. 10 is his reference to the 'desirable (*himeroessa*) polis of Sparta' (fr. 4.4). Such language used of one's home country is found in Homer (e.g. *Il.* 2.751; *Od.* 11.275) and seems to have become hackneyed enough for Arkhilokhos to grumble (fr. 22) that Thasos 'is not at all a beautiful (*kalos*) or desirable (*ephimeros*) or lovely (*eratos*) place'. Again the Theognidea has an apparently tongue-in-cheek use of this motif, as with 'native land' in 888 above: 'Let's sleep; the guards will take care of guarding the *polis*, our own lovely fertile homeland' (1043–4). Here the overloaded-sounding pentameter (ἀστυφέλῃς ἐρατὴς πατρίδος ἡμετέρης) might be placed in inverted commas, notwithstanding van Groningen's solemn assertion that the couplet is perfectly appropriate, say, to an official who wants to reassure the citizens.¹ Van Groningen states that the sentiment in these verses differs from those in 887–8 (above) and 763–4 ('Let's drink, and talk pleasandy amongst ourselves, fearing nothing of the war with the Medes'), but the lines could easily be read in such a sense. Solon uses this motif skilfully when he exhorts the Athenians to fight for possession of Salamis, which is of course not their homeland, but must none the less be portrayed as something worth fighting, and dying, for: Solon accomplishes this by twice referring to the island as 'desirable' (frs 1.1 and 3.2 West).

It is remarkable, on the other hand, that there are no extant verse epitaphs for fallen warriors datable certainly before the Persian Wars which mention that the deceased fell fighting for his country. There were certainly literary models for patriotic representations of combat, and concern for one's homeland is shown in some early epitaphs for people who died away from home but not in war, as in *CEG* 66 and 143.5. One reason why patriotic language does not appear could be that the battles in which these men died were not fought to protect their own soil, and the use of phrases like 'died fighting for his country' would be less appropriate. But the Corcyrean epitaph *CEG* 145 seems to refer to a clash between Corcyra and her parent state Corinth, in which case the Corcyreans were probably defending themselves against Corinthian aggression.² This would have justified the use of the patriotic *topos*, but the language of patriotism is nevertheless absent. Similarly, *CEG* 136 commemorates one Hysematas from Argos, who died in war; the battle in which he was killed was most likely that of Sepeia in 494, where the Argives were defeated by Spartan invaders led by Kleomenes,³ but once again no patriotic language is used.

In the Planudean Anthology, the following epigram is ascribed to Simonides (26):

Under the fold of Dirphys we were defeated, and the state set up our grave marker near the Euripos, not unjustly: for we lost our lovely youth when we faced the harsh cloud of war.

In his discussion of this epigram,⁴ Page tentatively suggests that it may be a genuine inscription from Simonides' period, referring to the battle between the Athenians and the Euboians in 507/6. Page finds the 'apparent admission of defeat' striking, and remarks on the fact that there is 'not even a palliative *πατρίδα ρυσάμενοι* ("saving their homeland") or the like'. While it is true that the verb *edmethemen* ('we were defeated') is, in Page's words, 'uncommonly pessimistic',⁵ comparison with other Archaic verse epitaphs reveals that the absence of 'a palliative *πατρίδα ρυσάμενοι* or the like' is not unusual; this detail may, in fact, strengthen the case for believing the epigram to be a genuine Archaic inscription.

Herodotos (5.77) records an inscription accompanying the Athenian dedication of the Euboian prisoners' chains after their victory on the same occasion; this inscription has been partially preserved on two stone bases, the earlier of which appears as *CEG* 179: 'In (?) painful steel chains the sons of Athens extinguished insolence, after defeating the Boiotians and Chalkidians in the labours of war. From a tithe of the ransom they made these [bronze] horses and dedicated them to Pallas.' In this case, in fact, both sides would have been justified in claiming that they were defending their respective homelands against enemy attack, if the account in Herodotos is true: the Boiotians and Euboians attacked Attica when the Athenians were defending themselves against Sparta; the Spartan advance was aborted, and the Athenians routed the Boiotians, crossed to Euboea and defeated the Euboians on their own territory. In *CEG* 179 it is said that the victors 'extinguished the insolence' of their enemies but, as in the losing side's epitaph for those fallen in the same campaign, no mention is made of patriotic motives for fighting, which is consistent with the spirit of other Archaic verse inscriptions relating to war.

This observation indicates an important divergence between the tradition of literary elegy and that of funerary epigram at this stage. Murray writes that martial elegy as exemplified by Kallinos and Tyrtaios represents a conscious attempt to provide a new style of military poetry, in contrast to epic. With the development of hoplite warfare, the 'warrior class' became wider to the point where, particularly at Sparta, it was 'identified with the citizen body itself; military elegy is public poetry, strengthening the bonds that keep the warrior class (and, therefore, the state as a whole) together.'⁶ Despite its prominence in the literary tradition, this aspect of martial endeavour is, as has been shown, absent from verse epitaphs of the Archaic period; instead, prominence appears to be given to the warrior as an individual. His valour in battle ensures the survival of his memory after death, and this is a more important consideration in these epitaphs than the fact that he may have contributed to the salvation of his *polis*. This is somewhat surprising, given that the fallen soldiers commemorated in these epitaphs were, presumably, precisely that class of men to whom sympotic martial elegy was addressed. But in the epitaphs, which are public expressions of private mourning, the soldiers' status as citizens, so important to poets like Kallinos, Tyrtaios and Solon, takes second place to their status as heroes.

II

The exhortation in Tyrtaios 10 is directed at men who would call themselves *agathoi*. Martial *arete* is not only an individual but also a social virtue, as is made clear in Tyrtaios fr. 12, a poem which praises martial *arete* above all other *aretai* and includes the following passage (13–15): ‘This *arete*, this prize is the best among humans and the finest (*kalliston*) for a young man to win. It is a common good for *polis* and the whole *demos*.’ This is not, as it was once thought to be, a declaration that to be valiant in battle is to possess the whole of *arete*; such an interpretation, held by Bowra, Jaeger, Snell⁷ and others, has been abandoned. What Tyrtaios means is that a man who has this particular *arete*, bravery in battle, is truly *agathos* in war (10, 20). ‘In Tyrtaios ἀρετή has not moved further towards its later meaning of “moral virtue” than it had in Homer: in both writers it refers to particular forms of excellence.’⁸ When exactly *arete* did take on ‘its later meaning of “moral virtue”’ is not an easily answered question; here, some observations will be made about what it means, in Archaic poetry and inscribed epigram, to be *agathos* in a civic context; what virtues make an *agathos* citizen, and whether having *arete* is enough to make one *agathos*.

Although words like *agathos* and *kakos* appear frequently in the poetry of Solon, the criteria being used to distinguish the ‘good’ citizens from the ‘bad’ ones are not clear; ‘Solon seems little concerned with the problems of defining *arete* and the *agathos*.’⁹ *Arete* meaning ‘excellence in a specific field’ can often be found in Solon and others, but it also begins to carry a more general sense of overall excellence, and this general excellence sometimes, but not always, bears a moral significance. There are thus two broad distinctions to be drawn between uses of *arete*: that between a specific and a general sense, and that between a moral and a non-moral sense.

At Solon, fr. 27.7–8, *arete* requires an interpretation such as ‘achievement’, referring to the strength of young men to win acclaim: in the fourth seven-year cycle of a man’s life, ‘each is at his best in strength, with which men achieve *arete*’. And since old men can presumably be as morally virtuous as younger men, *arete* in lines 15–16 (‘in the ninth age...his tongue and skill are weaker when it comes to great *arete*’) must have a similar meaning. No specific field of *arete* is indicated, and so this may be a use of the term in a general but not a moral sense. Solon can thus use *arete* to mean physical strength in line 8, and then refer to a more general *arete* in line 16.

In the Theognidea, there are several instances of the word with the meaning of excellence in particular areas: 30 (the plural *aretas* implies different types of excellence or achievement), 624 (‘all kinds of *aretai*’), and 654 (where the expression ‘any other *arete*’ again implies the existence of several types of *arete*). The qualifying *mia* (‘one’) in 699 and the superlative *kudisten* (‘most glorious’) in 904 also point to a variety of different *aretai*. But at 129–30, for example, a different kind of *arete* appears: ‘Don’t pray to be pre-eminent in *arete*, Polypaides, or in wealth; all a man needs is luck.’ The use of *arete* here falls into the ‘general’ category, but there is nothing to indicate that it is to be thought of as carrying any moral weight, and, indeed, the sense of the couplet suggests otherwise.

Particularly in the Theognidea, this general type of *arete* can be seen to take on moral significance: at line 147 ‘every *arete*’ is equated with *dikaiosune* (‘righteousness’), and in 1177–8 the poet says that a man who does not involve himself with ‘shameful deeds’ (*aiskhra erga*) will attain *arete*: both of these are clearly moral uses. A use of *arete* that is both general and moral, and combines *dike* and *aiskhros* from these two passages, can be found in the anonymous couplet 465–6: ‘Strive for *arete*, love what is just (*ta dikaia*), and do not be won over by any shameful profit (*kerdos...aiskhron*).’

The difference in outlook between Solon and the aristocratic composers of the Theognidea is reflected in the fact that *arete* is used far more often in the Theognidea with a general meaning, and the moral and social connotations become explicit: the word is beginning to be adopted by the nobility to assert their superiority. *Arete* in its sense of general excellence is equated with general moral virtue and claimed by the old aristocracy as their own. In contrast, Solon (34. 9–10) says that it was not his intention that the *agathoi* and the *kakoi* should have equal possession of the fertile *patris*. This is not a ‘social’ application of the terms to ‘upper’ and ‘lower’ classes; rather, the *kakoi* are either corrupt aristocrats by birth or corrupt *nouveaux riches*. As Rosivach has pointed out,¹⁰ the beginning of the fragment describes a group of men attempting to enrich themselves, hoping for ‘much wealth’, which suggests not a democratic uprising but rather the hope harboured by wealthy and powerful *kakoi* who supported Solon’s reforms that he might then reward them as a tyrant might be expected to do. These are presumably the same *kakoi* referred to in fragment 15: ‘Many *kakoi* are rich, and *agathoi* are poor; but we shall not exchange our *arete* for their riches, since the former is always secure, but money belongs now to one man, now to another.’ This fragment, importantly, is one of only two passages from Solon that passed into the Theognidea (315–18) without significant alteration (the other is Solon, fr. 24=Theogn. 719–28). It is also the only extant fragment of Solon in which the noun *arete*, as opposed to the adjective *agathos*, is apparently used in a general and moral sense. This is consistent with the more frequent uses of the noun in this sense in the Theognidea (e.g. 465–6 and 149–50), where its association with qualities like *dikaiosune* draws it into the political or social sphere (147–8).

A similar asymmetry in the use of the noun and adjective exists in the verse inscriptions of this period. When *arete* appears on its own, it refers to martial valour, but its exact significance becomes more difficult to determine when it is found in conjunction with other virtues such as *sophrosune* (‘prudence’). The adjective *agathos* (and its near synonym *esthlos*),

however, does appear in the inscriptions to signify a more general type of virtue: *CEG* 14, 42. But there are two exceptions to this asymmetry concerning *arete*: these are *CEG* 380 and 416. In each case *arete* occurs alone, designating some sort of general virtue, as opposed to its usual meaning in verse inscriptions, and in each case *arete* may carry not only a general but also a social meaning. *CEG* 416 is a dedication by a man who held the archonship (*erkhsen*) in both Thasos and Paros. *CEG* 380 (i), preserved on the remains of a five-block marble base for a large votive group, contains the conjunction of *esthlos* and *arete* in its final verse. *Esthlos* in the Archaic verse inscriptions is not only always used in a general sense, but is also linked with family concerns—in *CEG* 380 (i) and in its two other applications to men in inscribed epigrams (*CEG* 154 and 195), parentage is important. Friedländer and Hoffleit remark that the phrase ‘son of an *esthlos* father’ in *CEG* 195 reflects ‘the excessive pretension of an Athenian aristocrat shortly before the establishment of democracy’ and, citing Sophokles, *Phil.* 96, ‘child of an *esthlos* father’, suggest that ‘this formula was almost an aristocratic catchword at Athens’.¹¹

III

And so Solon and the Archaic verse inscriptions are allied in opposition to the Theognidea in the matter of the social relevance of *arete*; but this alliance is itself disrupted by another virtue of civic significance. For Theognis, the citizens of his *polis* should be *saophrones* (e.g. 41=1082, 453–6), and *sophrosune* is given emphasis throughout as an essential quality. Wherever it occurs in the Theognidea, it appears on its own, not linked explicitly to another virtue, as it is in the apparently formulaic phrase ‘of an *agathos* and *sophron* man’ in *CEG* 34, 36 and (?)16. *Sophrosune* never appears on its own as a term of praise in the epitaphs of this period; it evidently cannot stand alone as a virtue and must be linked with other qualities. There is only one verse inscription, from the end of the Archaic period, where *sophrosune* appears alone; this epigram and its own peculiarities will be discussed below.

All of the Archaic inscribed epigrams which mention *sophrosune* are Attic, with one exception (*CEG* 136). This apparent regional emphasis led North to assert that ‘in the Archaic age sophrosyne had already begun to be, not just the most Hellenic virtue,...but the most Athenian as well’.¹² But Wallace disagrees, arguing that ‘when the word itself, rare in our Homer... and absent from Hesiod and Solon, becomes common about the middle of the sixth century, it shows no particular regional affinities’.¹³ Wallace notes that the root of the word appears in much non-Attic poetry, and concludes that ‘neither idea nor word has specifically Athenian origins’. But although the word’s origins may not be Attic, the fact that only one surviving non-Attic epitaph from this period mentions *sophrosune* as one of the dead man’s virtues suggests that the Athenians laid greater emphasis on this quality than did other Greek states.

If this is the case, why does the word not appear in Solon, whom one might expect to have been concerned with *sophrosune*? North suggests that Solon’s ‘adoption of the Mean in political life marks him as the first spokesman for Athenian sophrosyne’,¹⁴ but this does not explain why the word itself, which was current in inscribed epigram contemporary with Solon, is absent from what we have of Solon’s poetry. One possibility is suggested by Theognis, 41–2: ‘These citizens are still *saophrones*, but the leaders are poised to fall into great evil.’ With the deictic *hoide* (‘these’) the poet attributes *sophrosune* particularly to the members of his own circle at the *sumposion*; if *sophrosune* was being claimed by the aristocracy as a sort of catchword, Solon might well have avoided it deliberately because of these connotations. Anhalt has discussed Solon’s rejection of the aristocratic sympotic model for society,¹⁵ and to her observations might be added the conspicuous absence of *sophrosune* in Solon’s poetry. As Anhalt notes, *Eunomie* (‘good order’) stops the insolence which threatens the banquet at Solon, frs 4.9–10 and 32–4; the association of *Eunomia* with festivity is also made by Bakkhylides (13.186–9) and Pindar (fr. 52a.9–11), with the significant inclusion of *sophrosune*. Furthermore, seven of the nine Archaic Attic epitaphs that mention the dead man’s *sophrosune* come from within Athens itself (*CEG* 30, 34, 41, 58, 69, probably 16, possibly 22); this suggests that *sophrosune* was given more emphasis in the urban environment than in the country.

North writes that ‘the bulk of our evidence for Attic sophrosyne belongs to the period after the Persian Wars’,¹⁶ but this statement is not in fact true of the appearances of *sophrosune* in verse inscriptions: of the thirteen certain or probable occurrences of the root up to the end of the fifth century, ten (of which nine are Attic) pre-date the Persian Wars. The dates of the Attic epitaphs suggest that *sophrosune* began commonly to be praised under the tyranny, and continued into the democratic period with a somewhat reduced frequency. North argues that although *sophrosune* in the sixth and fifth centuries was an element of ‘the aristocratic Dorian ethical tradition’, ‘the potentialities of sophrosyne were so great that it did not remain frozen in the Dorian ethical system but continued to develop...and always kept in close touch with the evolution of the Athenian *polis*’.¹⁷ But this last statement, however ‘keeping in close touch’ is defined, is surely inconsistent with the fact that *sophrosune*, despite its frequency in Attic verse inscriptions of the middle and late sixth century, all but disappears from inscribed epigram after the Persian Wars.

Hansen justifies his opinion that *CEG* 81 is a private rather than a public epitaph with the assertion that an incomplete word which is paired with *aretas* in the first verse must be either *sophrosunes* or *dikaiousunes*, neither of which would be expected in a public epitaph.¹⁸ The extant epitaphs universally attribute *sophrosune* to individuals rather than groups; in contrast, *sophrosune* appears as a collective virtue at Theognidea, 1138, as it does in the speech of Arkhidamos at Thucydides, 1.80–5,

where the speaker is introduced as appearing to be wise (*xunetos*) and *sophron*, and in which he emphasizes *sophrosune* at 84.1–3. (The Corinthians appeal to this Spartan virtue at 68.1, and aristocracy itself is called *sophron* in a list of political catchwords at 3.82.8.) In this context the inscription CEG 440, which mentions *sophrosune* in its first verse, appears unusual. Hansen cites several ‘Simonidean’ epigrams (8, 10, 15, 34, 54 Page) and Timotheos (PMG 788) in support of his contention that the sense of the damaged second verse is ‘Greece possesses the beautiful crown of freedom’. Dover comments that ‘the point of the graffito as a whole is not very clear’, to which it might be added that if the supplement ‘Greece’ is correct or at least reflects the sense of the inscription, then this late Archaic epigram is the only verse inscription of the period to present *sophrosune* as a collective virtue.

IV

As was seen to be the case with patriotic motives for heroism in battle, in the presentation of other civic virtues there are significant distinctions to be drawn between literary verse and inscribed epigram of the Archaic period. Both are essentially public forms: inscriptions are directed at passers-by, and although the immediate audience for sympotic poetry, such as that of Tyrtaios or Theognis, was restricted to those at the *sumposion*, this material was intended to pass from one *sumposion* to another. These two traditions existed side by side, but each could resist influence from the other when evaluating the citizens of an Archaic *polis*.

NOTES

- 1 Van Groningen, *Theognis: le premier livre, commentary ad loc.*
- 2 Friedländer and Hoffleit, *Epigrammata*, 29; Pfohl, *Poetische Kleinkunst auf altgriechischen Denkmälern*, 14.
- 3 W.Daly, *Hesperia* 8 (1939), 169.
- 4 Page, *Further Greek Epigrams*, 189–91.
- 5 The private epitaph CEG 114 has the phrase ‘defeated at the Asopos’, but the same sentiment in a public epitaph such as *Anth. Plan.* 26 (without some qualifying phrase such as ‘by Ares’) is more forceful, implying total defeat for the side.
- 6 O.Murray, in Slater (ed.) *Dining in a Classical Context*, 95–8. On the warrior class cf. Raaflaub, pp. 45–7 above.
- 7 W.Jaeger, *SPAW* 23 (1932), 537–68; Bowra, *Early Greek Elegists*, 62–70; Snell, *The Discovery of the Mind*, 174.
- 8 Campbell, *Greek Lyric Poetry*, 2nd edition, 177–8.
- 9 Adkins, *Moral Values and Political Behaviour in Ancient Greece*, 50.
- 10 V.J.Rosivach, *JHS* 112 (1992), 153–7.
- 11 Friedländer and Hoffleit, op. cit. (n. 2), 51.
- 12 North, *Sophrosyne*, 14.
- 13 M.B.Wallace, *Phoenix* 24 (1970), 101 n. 7.
- 14 North, op. cit. (n. 12), 14–15.
- 15 Anhalt, *Solon the Singer*, 93.
- 16 North, op. cit. (n. 12), 13–14.
- 17 Ibid. (n. 12), 13.
- 18 P.A.Hansen, *CEG*, i, p. 48.
- 19 Dover, *Aristophanes: Clouds*, p. 222.

Emma J. Stafford

INTRODUCTION

Personification cults have often been assumed to be primarily a feature of the Hellenistic period, but abstract ideas are deified in our earliest literature and there is in fact ample evidence for a good number of pre-Hellenistic personification cults.¹ For the Archaic period, the few personifications reliably attested in cult are mostly at the ‘less abstract’ end of the scale—by which I mean those who have some mythological role to make them seem thoroughly anthropomorphic. Arguably, characters like Themis, Eros and Hebe are so well established on Olympos that they hardly count as personifications, but, unlike the names of Zeus, Hera and the rest of the Olympians, *themis*, *eros* and *hebe* are used as abstract nouns throughout antiquity, from Homer onwards.² Two factors make Themis particularly relevant to the theme of this book. First, a study of the abstract noun in Homer and later literature suggests *themis* initially signified the right that every man has to speak freely in the assembly, then came more generally to indicate the established customs upon which a political community is based; *athemistos* is used of a man who does not recognise this moral principle (*Il.* 9.63), while the construction θέμις ἐστὶ indicates the norm, the law which naturally rules a determined social group.³ If Themis is the personification of such ‘right’, ‘established custom’, ‘social order’, her cult has obvious potential ethical and political implications. Secondly, Themis seems in some locations to be closely associated with Gaia, at first sight an unlikely combination—what has Order to do with the Earth? This association has given rise to the hypothesis that she may have originated as an epithet of Gaia, representing a particular aspect of Earth’s influence,⁴ following what we might call the ‘epithet theory’, which explains the personifications of cult as off-shoots of personal deities, developing from their cult titles.⁵ If Themis did indeed start life as an aspect of Gaia, her gaining of autonomy could be understood as a reflection of a shift in emphasis, from an agrarian concern with fertility to an increasingly urban concern with law and political order. Here I shall re-examine the case for the antiquity of Themis’ cult and her association with Gaia.

From the fourth century or later we have scattered epigraphic evidence for cults of Themis in Thessaly, Boiotia and on Rhodes, and literary attestations for Macedonia, Epiros and the Argolid, but whether any of these cults pre-dates the late Classical period is open to question.⁶ An Archaic Themis is often posited for Delphi, where, with Gaia, she is one of the mythical ‘previous owners’ of the oracle, but our best archaeological evidence for the Archaic Themis is from Rhamnous, while Athens is the only place where Themis is actually attested as an epithet of Ge.

THEMIS IN ARCHAIC LITERATURE AND ART

The goddess Themis appears in literature long before we have more direct evidence for her cult. In Homer she is very much a personal deity, described as ‘fair-cheeked’ (καλλιπαρῆς, *Il.* 15.87) like any other female character, and sympathising with Hera who has fallen out with Zeus (*Il.* 15.90–1). Hera’s injunction to her, however, to ‘rule over the gods in their house at the fairly divided feast’ (*Il.* 15.93–5), does suggest the imposition of order in a social context. This is further apparent in her function as summoner of assemblies, both divine (*Il.* 20. 4–6) and mortal, as when Telemachos appeals to the assembled Ithacans ‘in the name of Olympian Zeus and Themis, who both convenes and dismisses the assemblies of men’ (*Od.* 2.68–9).⁷ A similar role as facilitator of decision-making is apparent in Proklos’ summary of the *Kypria* (*EGF* p. 31, 5–6), where it is Themis who advises Zeus on how to punish the corruption of mankind by means of the Trojan War. As adviser to Zeus, Themis adds a moral aspect, and her position as *paredros* to the king of the gods is confirmed in the *Homeric Hymn to Zeus*, where he ‘conspires in close conversation with Themis, sitting inclined towards him.’ (23.2–3).⁸

Hesiod places Themis in the generation of Rhea and Kronos, as one of the daughters of Earth and Heaven (*Theogn.* 132–8), but he links her even more firmly to Zeus: ‘Next (after Metis) he married bright Themis, who bore the Seasons, Lawfulness (Eunomia), Justice (Dike) and luxuriant Peace (Eirene), who watch over the works of mortal men, and the Fates...’ (*Theogn.* 901–4). This makes explicit Themis’ association with law and order, in both political and natural spheres, and reflects the

very ‘morally correct’ Zeus of the *Works and Days*, where he is again father of Dike (*W.D.* 256). After Homer, the abstract *themis* tends to be replaced by *dike*,⁹ and the same trend can be seen with the goddesses; it is usually Dike rather than Themis who features in extant Archaic lyric poetry,¹⁰ but Hesiod’s allegorical linking of the two is taken up in the first half of the fifth century by Bakchylides (fr. 15.53–6 Maehler) and Pindar. In *Olympian* 13, Pindar attributes Corinth’s prosperity to the city’s law and order: ‘In her dwell Lawfulness and her sisters, firm foundation of cities, Justice and Peace, who is reared with her, guardians of wealth for men, golden children of wise-counselling Themis’ (6–8). Elsewhere Pindar completes the Hesiodic genealogy by referring to Themis as wife of Zeus and mother of the Seasons (fr. 30 Snell-Maehler), although she returns to her Homeric place as adviser to the Olympians in *Isthmian* 8, where she warns Zeus and Poseidon against pursuing Thetis (32).

In the visual arts of the Archaic period Themis rarely appears. We hear of a chryselephantine statue of Themis by the mid-sixth-century sculptor Dorykleidas in the temple of Hera at Olympia, beside a group of seated Seasons (Paus. 5.17.1, 3), and she is among the many deities who attend the wedding of Peleus and Thetis on the well-known Sophilos dinos of around 580, where the sceptre she carries may be a reference to her Homeric connection with the assembly.¹¹

THEMIS AT RHAMNOUS

The literary record, then, presents Themis as a subsidiary character, with little independent standing, and gives no indication of any specific local cult. Let us now turn to archaeological and epigraphic sources for the Archaic Themis, beginning with the case for her presence in the sanctuary of Nemesis at Rhamnous, where more dedications have been found to Themis than at any other site.

As it stands today, the site is dominated by the remains of two temples standing close together: a Doric peripteral temple of around 430, identified as that of Nemesis, and a smaller structure consisting of simply a *cella* and porch.¹² The smaller temple seems to have been built on a virgin site, but the date of its foundation has not been established more exactly than ‘early fifth century’, or ‘the beginning of the fifth century’.¹³ Various inscriptions found inside the temple record dedications to Themis, notably an early-third-century statue and base dedicated by Megakles of Rhamnous to Themis, and made by the local sculptor Chairestratos.¹⁴ Wilhelm’s analysis of the inscriptions demonstrates the existence of two separate offices for priestesses of Nemesis and of Themis at the sanctuary, so it seems likely that the smaller temple was sacred to Themis.

How early the cults of each of the two goddesses were established, however, remains open to question. The Nemesis temple of the 430s was preceded by two successive structures of the sixth century, material from which was used to fill the artificial terrace upon which the extant temples stand. All that survive from the early-sixth-century building are some Lakonian roof-tiles and a terracotta sphinx head, but the construction dating from the end of the century was a Doric temple, with a *distyle in antis* façade, which Petrakos suggests was probably destroyed by the Persians in 480–479 and left in ruins until the current temple was built.¹⁵ In addition to these structures there are plentiful finds of pottery to indicate some sort of cult activity on the site from the early sixth century, but nothing positively to identify the deity or deities worshipped in the Archaic period. The earliest votive which can unequivocally be connected with either of our abstract goddesses is a fragment of a Corinthian helmet inscribed: ‘The Rhamnousians who were in Lemnos dedicated me to Nemesis’.¹⁶ This is probably to be associated with a party of Rhamnousians who served under Miltiades in the Lemnos campaign of 499 (Her. 6.137–40), though it need not have been dedicated immediately after the campaign.

Was the Archaic sanctuary sacred to Nemesis, and the worship of Themis an addition in the early decades of the fifth century, when the smaller temple was built? Burkert takes this line, explaining the addition in conceptual terms, ‘since taking offence plays an immensely important role in preserving social order’.¹⁷ Such a conceptual link between Nemesis and Themis can certainly be argued for generally, but does not help with a relative dating of their cults. Alternatively, we could just as reasonably think of the sixth-century buildings as sacred to Themis, her cult moved to the small temple to make way for Nemesis, newly important in the wake of the battle of Marathon as defender of civilisation against the barbarians.¹⁸ However, the theory that either Nemesis or Themis was sole owner of the sanctuary before the fifth century suffers from a lack of parallels: a whole sanctuary dedicated to a deified abstraction is otherwise unheard of before the Hellenistic period, and even then a personification usually plays a subsidiary role to a more major deity. In the absence of conclusive evidence, I should like to suggest that the sanctuary was originally sacred to some more personal goddess;¹⁹ the addition of the temple to Themis might reflect an aspect of this deity, indicating that her role as defender of social order had gained in importance as the town of Rhamnous grew during the sixth century, and the original deity’s identity was finally subsumed in the fifth century by the rapid rise to prominence of Nemesis.²⁰

DELPHI, THEMIS AND ORACLES

Traditionally Themis and Gaia are both associated with Delphi, as ‘previous owners’ of the oracle before Apollo. The Previous Owners myth is first attested by the prologue to Aeschylus’ *Eumenides* (of 458), which opens at Delphi, with the Pythia praying: ‘First of the gods I honour in my prayer is Earth, the first prophet; after her, Themis, who was second to hold

her mother's oracular seat, as the story goes' (*Eum.* 1–4). Themis willingly handed the oracle on to the Titan Phoibe, who in turn gave it to Phoibos Apollo as a present on his birth.²¹ Christiane Sourvinou-Inwood has convincingly demonstrated that this myth cannot be taken to reflect any real cultic history of the oracle, but rather expresses certain perceptions about it, from the fifth century and later, especially its civilising, order-creating function.²² Examining the case for any historical predecessors of Apollo at Delphi, she points out that even were there to have been a Mycenaean cult of Gaia there, as has sometimes been posited, the absence of any evidence of continuity in cult activity between the Mycenaean period and the late ninth century argues against connecting the hypothetical Mycenaean shrine with the Previous Owners myth. Since the Apolline oracle is referred to in Homer (e.g. *Od.* 8.79–81), it must have been well established by the eighth century, i.e. soon after the beginning of cultic activity in the sanctuary, which leaves little room for a previous cult of Gaia or Themis.

Leaving aside the myth, then, what positive evidence is there for the presence of Gaia/Themis at Delphi? Themis has only fairly recently been identified as one of the participants in the Gigantomachy depicted on the north frieze of the Siphnian Treasury at Delphi, c. 530–525.²³ Before the discovery of the inscription naming her as Themis, the figure in the lion-drawn chariot, wearing an animal skin over her chiton, had usually been assumed to be Kybele, in her aspect as Mistress of Animal. But now it would appear that the lions belong to Dionysos, who has dismounted to fight, to the left, while Themis is acting as his charioteer.²⁴ Themis' unusual inclusion *could* be explained as a reference to a local cult, but is certainly not evidence of such by itself; at a symbolic level her presence could be seen as an indication of the scene's message, the victory of order over chaos. The earliest literary evidence for worship of Themis at Delphi comes in an ode of Pindar, of 474, where the victor's compatriots are exhorted to come 'so when night falls you may hymn sacred Themis and Pytho and the right-judging navel of the earth' (*Pyth.* 11.9–10). Also from the first half of the fifth century are a pair of statue bases inscribed with the names Themis and Ga respectively, found near the Kastalian Spring.²⁵ We have little further information on Themis, but from a fourth-century inscription and Plutarch's description we know that Gaia had a shrine south of the temple of Apollo.²⁶

Our earliest evidence for the Previous Owners myth and for the historical worship of Themis and Gaia at Delphi, then, dates from the first half of the fifth century. If there was no historical tradition for the myth to be based upon, how did it arise, and gain currency? The answer surely lies in the conceptual links which both Gaia and Themis have with the oracle, vague associations which the myth systematises. The *omphalos* in Apollo's *adyton* symbolised Delphi's position as the centre of the earth, the meeting-point of the mythical eagles of Zeus sent from furthest east and west (Pindar fr. 54 Snell-Maehler); the term 'navel' inevitably suggests Earth in anthropomorphic form.²⁷ According to Pausanias (5.14.10) Earth also had an oracle at Olympia, possibly again linked with a cult of Themis, and oracular powers are often associated with chthonic cults,²⁸ so the idea of an Earth oracle at Delphi would be in keeping with Gaia's cult in general. Themis' association with the oracle is most straightforwardly explained by the usage of the plural *themistes* for 'oracles' and *themisteuein* 'to give an oracle', from Homer on. The oracle's role as adviser to individuals and states is paralleled by Themis' role as adviser to Zeus, and the goddess is explicitly represented as Delphic adviser in the tondo of the Kodros Painter's cup in Berlin (440–430).³⁰ The Athenian king Aigeus stands in a temple opposite a female figure in the guise of a priestess, sitting on a tripod and holding a laurel branch and a phiale in her hands. Iconographically, she is clearly the Pythia, but an inscription identifies her as Themis, the personification of the Pythia's utterances.

ATHENS AND GE THEMIS

Aischylos' genealogy for the Delphic Themis follows Hesiod in making her daughter of Gaia; in the *Prometheus Bound*, produced around the same time as the *Oresteia*, the two are identified as the same deity, Prometheus speaking of 'My mother Themis, and Earth, of many names but one form' (*P. V.* 21 1–13).³¹ This close association between the two goddesses finds expression in the cult of Ge Themis, attested only at Athens, alongside a number of other incarnations of Themis.

In the Theatre of Dionysos seats are reserved for a number of religious officials who have Themis' name in their titles. There is possibly a straightforward 'priest of Themis', although most of the name is missing (ἱερέως], *IG* ii² 5109), an 'Olephoros of Athena Themis' (*IG* ii² 5103), a 'priestess of Ge Themis' (*IG* ii 5130), and 'two Hersephoroi of Chloe. Themis' (*IG* ii² 5098). The priest-seat inscriptions date at the earliest to the theatre's refurbishment in the late fourth century, but there is no way of determining, without external evidence, whether the offices mentioned are of long establishment or recent innovation. Dating aside, though, the inscriptions may give us some indication of the Athenian Themis' character. I am inclined to be sceptical about the reconstruction which gives us a 'priest of Themis', since, although the rule that female deities have female attendants has plenty of exceptions, our only other information on the subject with regard to Themis gives her a priestess at Rhamnous (the Chairestratos statue base, *IG* ii² 3109). The 'Olephoros' inscription is our only evidence for an Athena Themis. The title of the office gives us little further information about the cult, since an *olephoros* is simply the bearer of the *oulai*, the barley-corns to be sprinkled on the sacrificial victim and altar prior to the slaughter, part of the standard procedure for blood sacrifice.³² That this particular barley-bearer should have a theatre seat of her own, though, would indicate unusually high status for such an attendant. The 'two Hersephoroi of Chloe Themis' are more revealing. *Hersephoroi* is an alternative spelling for *arrhephoroi*, the best known being the two young girls who lived on the Akropolis

for a year, then carried the secret symbols of Athena in procession from and back to the temple of Athena Polias (Paus. 1.27.4). It is not clear what the Arrhephoroi of Athena actually carried, but the literal meaning ‘dew-bearers’ seems appropriate for Chloe Themis, an otherwise unattested ‘Verdant Order’. There was an Attic spring festival called the Chloaia, ‘the shooting of the stalks’,³³ but otherwise Chloe is only known as an epithet of Demeter.

An explanation of both the Chloe Themis and the Ge Themis inscriptions is perhaps to be sought in the light of a seat ‘for the singer-priestess of Child-nurturing Demeter (and) of Peitho’ (*IG ii²* 5131), together with a passage in Pausanias. Walking along the south slope of the Akropolis, from the Theatre of Dionysos and the sanctuary of Asklepios towards the Beulé Gate, Pausanias records three shrines in quick succession: one of Themis, one of Aphrodite Pandemos and Peitho, and one of Ge Kourotrophos and Demeter Chloe (1.22.1–3). This is the only sanctuary of Themis of which we hear in Athens, possibly to be associated with our priestess of Ge Themis; the Olephoros of Athena Themis surely belongs to a more major sanctuary, perhaps that of Athena Polias on the Akropolis. Price notes the problem of lack of punctuation with regard to the theatre-seat inscriptions and, adducing the Pausanias passage, argues that 5131 is shorthand for ‘the singer-priestess of (Ge) Kourotrophos, Demeter (Chloe), and Peitho’, quite reasonably envisaging one priestess as serving two neighbouring small shrines.³⁴ Could a similar argument perhaps be extended to explain our two Hersephoroi as serving another pair of neighbouring sanctuaries, one of Ge Themis and one of Ge Kourotrophos and Demeter Chloe? This must remain speculative, but the conceptual association between Chloe and Ge as deities of agricultural fertility is clear; not so immediately obvious is the association between Chloe/Ge and Themis.

We have seen intimations of Themis’ link with the natural world in the Hesiodic genealogy which makes her mother of the Seasons, and a general association with prosperity, which in any pre-modern society is closely tied up with agricultural fertility. Conversely, Earth can be demonstrated to have her political side. One of the *Homeric Hymns* is addressed to ‘Earth Mother of All’, and although it is mostly concerned with agricultural fertility, those who are blessed by Gaia ‘rule orderly in their cities of fair women’ (30.11–12). Burkert comments on the occurrence in philosophical speculation of the worship of Gaia ‘as a prototype of all piety’, despite the relatively modest place of the Earth in actual religious practice, and notes Gaia’s political aspect.³⁵ This can be seen in a specifically Athenian context in Solon’s celebration of his own reforms: ‘May the mighty mother of the Olympian gods bear witness in the court of Time, noblest black Earth, from whom I once lifted the boundary-stones planted in many places; then enslaved, now she is free’ (fr. 36.1–5 West). Whatever the historical accuracy of the poem,³⁶ it demonstrates Earth’s involvement in political propaganda, as she is appealed to by Solon as witness to his establishment of social justice via redistribution of land.³⁷

CONCLUSION: THEMIS AND THE ARCHAIC *POLIS*

To sum up. About the early history of the extra-urban sanctuary at Rhamnous we can only really speculate, but the worship of Themis there from at least the early fifth century suggests an interesting articulation of the link between town and countryside, a cult of civic order observed in the city’s liminal territory. At Delphi it is again unclear whether Themis had any pre-fifth-century presence, but an early conceptual connection between Themis and oracles is apparent in the use of the word *themistes*; the concept of ‘order’, at least, is implicated in Delphi’s legitimisation of the laws and cults of developing *poleis*. At Athens, Themis’ conceptual association with Gaia, explicit in literature from the fifth century, becomes enshrined in cult at a later date, quite possibly in the context of the Lykourgan religious revivals and refurbishment of the Theatre of Dionysos in the late fourth century.

I began with the theory that Themis originated as an epithet of Gaia. While it is not inherently implausible, it would be difficult to prove, as the process of separation would have to have taken place before Homer. Themis’ complete independence from Gaia throughout the Archaic period would rather suggest that the reverse process took place. Gaia’s increasingly political aspect led her to be associated with Themis, the personification of right and social order, because of a perceived communality of interests. While this association is attested in literature from Aischylos on, the only actual evidence for a Ge-Themis is in the Athenian theatre-seat inscription. Like a number of other personifications, then, I would suggest that Themis begins life as a literary figure, mediating between the mythical gods and everyday morality.³⁸ Her cult developed towards the end of the Archaic period, reflecting the rationalising trend begun as early as Hesiod, and an increasing scepticism about the gods of poetry. The cult of Themis represents a compromise between the demands of an anthropomorphically inclined polytheism and the recognition of the rational principle of social order essential to the prosperity of the *polis*.

NOTES

1 See Hamdorf, *Griechische Kultpersonifikationen der vorhellenistischen Zeit*.

2 On problems of definition see my dissertation, ‘Greek Cults of Deified Abstractions’. Also Shapiro, *Personifications in Greek Art*, 14; Burkert, *Greek Religion*, 185.

- 3 For example, *Il.* 9.134, *Horn. Hymn to Apollo* 541. See Vos, *Themis*, 1–38, for a thorough study of the noun and cognates (reviews: J. Defradas, *REA* 60 [1958], 203–6, and M. van der Valk, *Mnemosyne* 12 [1959], 144–7); also Lloyd-Jones, *The Justice of Zeus*, 2nd edition, 1–54, and Murray, *Early Greece*, 2nd edition, 58–60.
- 4 Farnell, *Cults of the Greek States*, ii. 459 n. b and iii. 12–15; Reinhardt, in *Vermächtnis der Antike*, 26; K. Latte, *RE* v.2 (1934), 1626–7.
- 5 M. P. Nilsson, *Eranos* 50 (1950), 31–40; L. Deubner, in Roscher, *Ausführliches Lexikon der griechischen und römischen Mythologie*, iii. 2069–70. On this as part of the more general question of the development of personal gods' names: Burkert, op. cit. (n. 2), 184; B. C. Dietrich, *Kernos* 1 (1988), 19–28; Shapiro, op. cit. (n. 2), 13–14.
- 6 See Hamdorf, op. cit. (n. 1), ch. 12, for references, which I discuss in my dissertation (n. 2). On fifth- and fourth-century Themis/themis, see Corsano, *Themis: la noma e l'oracolo nella Grecia antica*.
- 7 See Vos, op. cit. (n. 3), 42–7, on the Homeric goddess.
- 8 See *ibid.* (n. 3), 53–6, on Themis as Zeus' adviser.
- 9 Vos, op. cit. (n. 3), 32–5.
- 10 For example, Solon fr. 4.12–16 West.
- 11 British Museum 1971.11–1.1; Shapiro, op. cit. (n. 2), no. 141 fig. 179. See for example, *Il.* 2.279 for the sceptre held by a speaker in the assembly.
- 12 For general accounts of the site see Petrakos, *Concise Guide to Rhamnous*, and *id.*, *AE* 126 (1987), 265–98. M. M. Miles, *Hesperia* 58 (1989), 131–249, discusses the temple of Nemesis in detail, making a convincing case for dating the sanctuary's major refurbishment to 430–425.
- 13 *Blue Guide: Greece*, 6th edition, 166; Petrakos, *Concise Guide* (n. 12), 11. Other offers: 'archaic', Miles op. cit. (n. 12), 139; 'post-Persian-War', *AR* 32 (1985/6), 17. For a detailed discussion of the smaller temple see Petrakos, *PAAH* (1982), 142–53.
- 14 Statue: Athens NM 231; inscription: *IG ii²* 3109. A. Wilhelm, *JÖAI* 32 (1940) 200–9.
- 15 *AR* 31 (1984/5) and 30 (1983/4); Petrakos, *PAAH* (1982), 135–6.
- 16 *PAAH* (1984) no. 706 pl. 122b.
- 17 Burkert, op. cit. (n. 2), 85. See Vos, op. cit. (n. 3), 70, for the linguistic case for *themis* 'being an older concept than *nemesis*.
- 18 I discuss Nemesis and Marathon further in my dissertation (n. 2).
- 19 Farnell, op. cit. (n. 4), ii. 495, posits a development of Nemesis here from an Artemis Nemesis.
- 20 On the town see Pouilloux, *La Forteresse de Rhamnonte*; and *AR* 37 (1990/1) and 38 (1991/2) for recent excavations.
- 21 Elsewhere the transfer of the oracle is violent, for example, Pindar fr. 55 Snell-Maehler, *Eur. IT.* 1242–82.
- 22 C. Sourvinou-Inwood, in Bremmer (ed.) *Interpretations of Greek Mythology*: see 235 n. 1 for sources for the myth, n. 2 for modern believers in Gaia and/or Themis as oracular divinities at Delphi. I am indebted to Mike Chappell for a clear account of the myth surrounding Delphi's history in his paper, 'Delphi and the *Homeric Hymn to Apollo*' (Institute of Classical Studies, London, 1994: unpublished).
- 23 Identified by V. Brinkmann, *BCH* 109 (1985), 77–130: Dionysos inscription = N 16, figs 63–4; Themis inscription = N 17, figs 65–6. Shapiro, op. cit. (n. 2), no. 143, fig. 180; Schefold, *Gods and Heroes in Late Archaic Greek Art*, fig. 67.
- 24 Schefold, op. cit. (n. 23), 59–62, explains Themis here as 'in the guise' of Kybele.
- 25 Delphi inv. 4286; F. Courby, in *Fouilles de Delphes*, ii.2. 163–4, fig. 126; P. de la Coste-Messelière and R. Flacelière, *BCH* 54 (1930) 289, 294; Shapiro, op. cit. (n. 2), 221 no. 144. Sourvinou-Inwood, op. cit. (n. 22), 221, suggests that these can be seen as a response to the myth.
- 26 Plut. *Pyth. Orac.* 402c-d. Sourvinou-Inwood, op. cit. (n. 22), 221 and n. 29.
- 27 The stone may be considerably older than this interpretation of it: Sourvinou-Inwood, op. cit. (n. 22), 225 and n. 47, 233–5.
- 28 Cf. the Oracle of the Dead at Ephyra and that of the hero Trophonios at Lebadeia.
- 29 Vos, op. cit. (n. 3), 17–22, with van der Valk, op. cit. (n. 3), 145.
- 30 Berlin F2538; Beazley, *Attic Red-Figure Vase-Painters*, 2nd edition, 1269.5 and 1689; Shapiro, op. cit. (n. 2), no. 146, fig. 182.
- 31 See Bees, *Zur Datierung des Prometheus Desmotes* for extensive discussion of the *PV*'s date and attribution to Aischylos.
- 32 Burkert, op. cit. (n. 2), 56.
- 33 *Ibid.* (n. 2), 265 and n. 19.
- 34 Price, *Kourotrophos*, 8 and 101–32.
- 35 Burkert, op. cit. (n. 2), 175.
- 36 Cf. Harris and Foxhall, pp. 104–7 and 129 above.
- 37 Murray, op. cit. (n. 3), 181–200.
- 38 Burkert, op. cit. (n. 2), 85 and 246–50.

THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF SANCTUARIES IN EARLY IRON AGE AND ARCHAIC *ETHNE*

A preliminary view¹

Catherine Morgan

If it seems perverse to discuss *ethnos* sanctuaries in a volume devoted to the development of the *polis* in Archaic Greece, I beg two excuses. The first is that some of the richest bodies of sanctuary data from mainland Greece deserve centre stage. The extent of discoveries in a number of *ethne*, especially since the late 1970s, amply justifies a preliminary evaluation, risky as this is where excavation continues. To put this into perspective, in the three regions central to most discussions of *early polis* religion, Argos, Corinth and Athens, only the Athenian *acropolis*² and the Argive Heraion³ have produced a range and volume of votives to compare with, for example, eighth-century Tegea, Pherai or even Kalapodi. In the Corinthia, one might expect the near-complete disappearance of grave offerings between 750 and 600 to release goods for dedication,⁴ yet the flow is meagre. Evidence from Isthmia is relatively slight before the construction of the first temple around the mid-seventh century,⁵ and while Perachora is richer in votives, the real escalation only begins in Early Protocorinthian and continues through the first half of the seventh century.⁶ In terms of architecture, two cult buildings at Asine date to the second half of the eighth century, but there is little else before the first temple of Apollo at Corinth (c. 680) followed by the temple of Poseidon at Isthmia.⁷ In these latter cases, the principal innovation is the use of cut stone, and although this implies refinement of technique, it is hardly revolutionary in a region where stone sarcophagi had been common for over fifty years.⁸ At Perachora, the eighth-century 'temple' of Hera Akraia may be an Early Helladic house, and it seems unwise to date the building described by Payne as the temple of Hera Limenia (but probably a *hestiatorion*) much before the end of the seventh century, since earlier seventh-century bases are re-used in its hearth. Instead, as Blanche Menadier has recently argued, a few, probably late seventh-century, architectural remains from the area of Payne's third temple of Hera probably belong to the first cult building.⁹ Assessment of the eighth-century origins of mainland religious architecture thus draws increasingly on evidence from outside *polis* territory. This is not to imply an unduly negative view of *polis* evidence, merely to stress that, from the viewpoint of cult archaeology, the extent to which the *polis* continues to dominate analysis of the role of cult in the representation or creation of group identity is disappointing.

Second, and more seriously, the clarity with which distinctions between *ethne* and *poleis* are sometimes drawn may foster simplistic perceptions of the role of shrines within each. It is often noted that many sanctuaries become archaeologically visible from the eighth century onwards, supposedly coincident with the emergence of the *polis*.¹⁰ An increase in sanctuary numbers is indisputable, although one should not pass over earlier evidence, much of which comes from *ethne*, nor ignore the impact of previous practice upon eighth-century innovation.¹¹ Nonetheless, in developing this link, emphasis has been placed on historical ties between *poleis* and their territories, with the implication that the gods of the political community are also tied to the spot.¹² The developing social and political geography of the *polis* thus offers a direct lead into the material development of shrines. The observation that every sanctuary belonged to a community is unexceptionable; more problematic is the fact that the idea of community tends, implicitly or explicitly, to be conceived in *polis* terms as a community of citizens. If one couches this more broadly, in terms of the development of interest enactment through time, the results may be relevant to a wider range of political communities. The contribution made by *polis*-based studies is, of course, considerable, but it must be understood in a broader political context, recognising that *ethnos* data can also produce observations of general relevance.

At present, *ethnos* shrines of purely local significance most often appear in synthetic discussions of Greek cult during the Early Iron Age, receive little direct attention during the Archaic and early Classical heyday of the *polis*, and return to the fore only in the context of later Leagues. The major exceptions are inter-state shrines which attracted a variety of non-local interests via their roles as meeting grounds, landmarks etc., as well as serving local communities.¹³ The complex processes of evolution involved are not of primary concern here, however.¹⁴ More serious than the omission of *ethnos* data is the structuring of interpretative schemata from a *polis* viewpoint, which is at best one-dimensional, at worst distorting, since it creates bias and neutralises *ethnos* data as an independent control.

Very few scholars have considered early *ethne* as phenomena in their own right, let alone examined the role of religion within them. However, a summary of implicit and explicit impressions might run as follows: in its purest form the *ethnos* was the survival of the tribal system into historical times; a population scattered over a large and flexibly defined territory was united politically in customs and religion, normally governed by some periodic assembly, and worshipped a tribal deity




Figure 14.1 Early Iron Age Thessaly

at a common religious centre.¹⁵ There are two obvious difficulties here: first, this is a timeless abstraction, and second, as has long been recognised, the pure *ethnos* is just as elusive as the pure *polis* (neither ‘tribalism’ nor urbanisation are adequate indices). From the late fifth or fourth century onwards, certain *ethnos* shrines did host major regional gatherings; hence Polybius’ (5.7–8) description of Thermon as the *acropolis* of all Aetolia, an ideal location for meetings for cult, politics and trade. But to treat this as a constant or basic function is an assumption and a simplification. The processes by which federal organisations drew upon and manipulated earlier cult orderings are fascinating, but proper reconstruction of individual cases must rest upon close phase-by-phase study. To illustrate the difficulties involved, we may consider the development of the principal shrine at Pherai, on the border of the eastern Thessalian plain, northwest of Volos.

PHERAI

Ancient Pherai lies mostly under the modern town of Velestino, on an important junction of roads between Larisa, Pharsalos, Phthiotic Thebes and the Gulf of Pagasai (see Figure 14.1). Most public building dates from the fourth century onwards, but there is evidence of continuous settlement from Palaeolithic times. Among extensive traces of Early Iron Age activity (see Figure 14.2),¹⁶ the cemetery to attract most scholarly attention lies partially covered by the foundations of a monumental temple built c. 300 BC and probably dedicated to Enodia (a local deity later linked with Hekate and Demeter) and perhaps also Zeus Thaulios. This was not the first monumental temple; its foundations include elements of a late sixth-century structure, the site of which is unknown.¹⁷ Only forty cist inhumations contingent upon the temple were excavated, and much remains uninvestigated. Most graves contained few or no offerings, and despite later disturbance the impression of poverty is probably accurate.¹⁸ Of interest, however, is the placing of a shrine to a deity comparable to an Olympian (not a hero or ancestor), who came to share the *temenos* and perhaps the temple with Zeus, within a cemetery which may have had a tumulus still standing to mark the place.¹⁹ This is, however, highly appropriate for Enodia with her underworld connections. As her name suggests, she was also linked with roads, and in later times, the Thessalian practice of burying beside roads leading from settlements makes her attributes doubly appropriate. During the eighth century, however, Enodia’s cult was local to Pherai.²⁰

Early votives, found redeposited in two favissae dug west and south of the temple during later cleaning operations, consist mainly of bronze and iron objects, mostly dating to the eighth and early seventh centuries, plus terracottas (largely female subjects) from the seventh century onwards.²¹ Setting aside material of uncertain provenance, Imma Kilian-Dirlmeier notes some 3,739 metal items as reasonably securely linked to cult. These include bracelets and rings plus bird and horse figurines, but almost half are fibulae,²² which imply concern with dress (since they largely replaced pins in Thessaly) and, given their use for fixing funerary clothing, may also have cult significance. The balance of items is echoed at Philia, the other major Thessalian eighth-century sanctuary, although with barely a third as many pieces over the same period, but the only other shrines to show the same pattern are distant Emborio and Lindos.²³ At Pherai, therefore, a distinctive pattern may reflect cult




Figure 14.2 Protogeometric and Geometric remains in Pherai (modern Velestino)

needs. Similar bronzes occur in contemporary local cemeteries, but apart from a few rich, mainly child, burials, grave offerings are rare.²⁴ There are thus symbolic links between the two contexts, reinforced by the character of Enodia, but an apparent bias in investment towards the shrine.²⁵

The shrine's foundation date is controversial, but the most economical and widely accepted explanation remains primary deposition of votives somewhere within the earlier cemetery from *c.* 750 onwards. If the excavated sample of graves is representative, then unlike other city plots the cemetery may already have been abandoned for some 50–100 years (from *c.* 850–800, Thessalian Early Geometric). Allowing approximately 25–30 years per generation, this fits a three- to four-generation span of ancestral memory, and so the cemetery may have retained meaning for the living community. Were the unexcavated area to produce later graves, or the shrine to begin earlier, the association between cult and community ancestors would be yet more potent.²⁶

Perhaps inevitably, given the quantity of votives and the later popularity of Enodia, the cult has been seen as holding pan-Thessalian or even international significance from its inception. Certainly, by the fourth century Pherai was the centre of a cult attested across Thessaly, Macedon and beyond. Enodia appears on fourth-century Pherai coin issues, for example, and was later worshipped at the altar of the Six Goddesses.²⁷ Yet there is little to suggest that the earlier cult was of more than local significance,²⁸ and its establishment is readily comprehensible in terms of regional settlement. Excavation and survey data from the southern part of the eastern Thessalian plain indicate activity at least from the eighth century onwards at the main city locations of later historical significance, and the spacing of these sites carries clear territorial implications (see Figure 14.3).²⁹ This may, therefore, have been a time when reinforcement of local identity could appear advantageous; Arne (Philia) and perhaps Phthiotic Thebes³⁰ also established or expanded their shrines at this time, and despite similarities in votives, local differences are strong. At the sanctuary of Athena Itonia at Philia, for example, evidence of sacrifice and dining and the sustained wealth of votives through the Archaic period contrast with the extant record of Pherai.³¹ The settlement structure within which these shrines operated remained largely unchanged until the fourth century, and until then significant developments concern fluctuations in investment between graves and shrines.

The idea that the quantity and variety of metalwork imply an international role from the outset is also untenable. Quantity alone is no argument: Geometric Pherai was a big town (Argos may be an appropriate comparison), but it is hardly sensible to match levels of dedication to population. More pertinently, Imma Kilian-Dirlmeier's analysis of the style of eighth- and seventh-century metal votives shows that only 2 per cent are non-Thessalian, and of these half are Macedonian or Balkan (the remainder range from Italy to Egypt); the contrast with, for example, Olympia is striking.³² The presence of imports is predictable; they occur at most Greek shrines, however local, and finds at Pherai are readily explicable in terms of contacts along major neighbouring land routes or via Euboea. In the case of Thessalian votives, it is impossible to prove their precise origin or that of their dedicators; many fibulae probably came from a local workshop, perhaps linked to the shrine, but this




Figure 14.3 Theoretical territories of *poleis* on the eastern Thessalian plain

need not imply a closely defined style or local clients.³³ Their likely context is, however, suggestive. Allowing for post-depositional disturbance and the circumstances of excavation, there is no clear evidence for dining.³⁴ The deposition of small objects, many linked with dress, perhaps around an altar among the graves of community ancestors, must therefore have formed a key act of worship. This would make a strange regional *panegyri*, and, if the shrine played a wider role, one would have to assume the acceptance of a distinctive practice across Thessaly, yet no other manifestation for over two hundred years.

In short, the shrine of Enodia at Pherai was probably a local cult place belonging to a large and rich settlement, closely related in its material development to local needs and values. From the late fifth century, the spread of the cult through Thessaly and beyond reflects Pherai's contemporary political role. It is, however, interesting that the two principal cults later to play a pan-Thessalian role, Enodia and Athena Itonia, are the earliest archaeologically attested, and it may be that perceived 'tradition' influenced their subsequent development. Clearly, Pherai's development sits ill with simple characterisations of a tribal state and over-rigid distinctions between *poleis* and *ethne*. There are indeed points of contrast. *Ethne* rarely express identity via strong regional boundaries, for example, and evidence for sacral marking of state and local territory is often complex. In general, though, Greek state organisation reveals a spectrum of strategies through space and time; most *ethne* saw synoicisms, dioicisms, the politicisation of tribal or urban identities, and domination and subordination within regions and in relation to neighbours. One might therefore expect a complex of shifting personal and communal statuses to be reflected in group representation at an ideological level. Sanctuaries are logical places to look for this, yet in certain regions, such as Achaia, they played a relatively small role during our period,³⁵ and the decision to enact aspects of personal and communal identity through cult is but one of a range of possible strategies. In order to trace this process of choice region by region, one must set cult alongside mortuary and settlement evidence, considering such traits as the nature and role of iconography and the disposition of artefact types and media, to assess shifts in the balance between contexts and their attendant interests. Here archaeology offers a level of contextual and chronological control rarely available in literary sources. In the case of Kalapodi in Phokis, for example, literary evidence dating back to the fifth century has been used to great effect by Pierre Ellinger,³⁶ but in Arkadia, as in neighbouring Achaia, we are heavily reliant on Strabo and Pausanias, and although both are fully exploited by Madeleine Jost and Athanassios Rizakis respectively, with the late exception of Megalopolis, real time depth is lacking.³⁷ Two contrasting case studies, Kalapodi and the regional cult system of Arkadia, illustrate the potential of this approach.

KALAPODI

The sanctuary of Artemis at Kalapodi, the longest-lived of all mainland shrines, was founded in L.H.IIC and continued into the fourth century AD. Strategically located on the border of Phokis and Lokris, it was controlled in Classical times by Hyampolis (see Figure 14.4).³⁸ From later Archaic times onwards, the shrine's pan-Phokian status was expressed in what is




Figure 14.4 The location of the sanctuary of Artemis at Kalapodi aptly dubbed the Phokian National Saga, recounting the often savage events of the Thessalian occupation of Phokis in Archaic times.³⁹

In the Saga's final act, the 'Phokian despair', the Phokians, faced with Thessalian threats to enslave their women and children and kill their men, threatened to burn their wealth (women and children included) on a vast pyre. Meanwhile, their men left to fight a final battle against the Thessalians at Kleonai near Hyampolis, their victory being marked by the celebration at Kalapodi of the Elaphebolia, the greatest festival of all Phokis. Archaeologically, evidence of Phokian domination of the shrine by the time of the Phokian League is plain,⁴⁰ yet given Kalapodi's marginal location, it is unclear whether this was always so, or whether it is even legitimate to speak of pan-Phokian interests before the sixth century, or of Kalapodi as a Phokian meeting place during the Early Iron Age. In order to explore these questions, it is necessary to work forward phase by phase through the shrine's history.

The first period of activity spans the life of the first altar, from L.H. IIIC Early until c. 950 (see Figure 14.5). Stratified deposits of sacrificial debris surrounding this altar contained votives (mainly seals, beads, and terracottas) and pottery, open shapes for drinking and dining, plus storage and cookwares, and miniatures. These deposits were dense and extensive from the beginning—the L.H. IIIC shrine probably covered some 400 square metres.⁴¹ The establishment of such a shrine at this time is comprehensible in terms of regional settlement. During L.H. IIIB, the surrounding area was densely inhabited, with, for example, numerous chamber tombs around the Exarchos valley.⁴² During L.H. IIIC, however, sites are fewer and are mostly extensive chamber tomb cemeteries (see Figure 14.6).⁴³ These do, however, indicate that Kalapodi had a constituency on either side of the later Phokian border; and the presence of, for example, L.H. IIIC pictorial pottery may indicate links with Lokrian production centres (noting the rich collection discovered at Pyrgos).⁴⁴ Furthermore, by contrast with the Peloponnese, the twelfth to tenth centuries in central Greece saw steady burial numbers and a peak in the wealth and diversity of offerings. Analysis of local cemeteries would allow comparison of the structure and manner of communal representation in burial and cult, but this must await the excavation of larger samples of extensive sites and the final publication of work in progress. At Elateia, for example, chamber tomb construction continued beyond Protogeometric times, with multiple burials of up to sixty individuals, perhaps in family tombs.⁴⁵ Here classic Mycenaean-style chamber tombs with mass burials can be distinguished from smaller, less orthodox ones with one or two burials and poorer goods, but we cannot yet move beyond the obvious inferences. Certain comparisons can be made, however. Metalwork, for example, although present at Kalapodi, is concentrated in tombs; this bias affects the volume of material, especially weapons, and also the distribution of certain artefact types, such as extra-long 'status' pins, and is echoed in imported exotica such as scarabs.⁴⁶

It therefore seems that when grave display was at its height, local communities within a restricted area set up a ritual meeting with sacrifice and dining. Noting the variety of grain types and quantity of pithos sherds present, Rainer Felsch suggested that the early celebration had an agricultural aspect,⁴⁷ and the dominance of bulls among the figurine assemblage also implies economic interests and perhaps animal sacrifice.⁴⁸ So far, the picture resembles that at other early shrines, notably the Amyklaion and Isthmia.⁴⁹ Yet the focus on wild animals (especially deer) in the Kalapodi bone assemblage is less




Figure 14.5 The sanctuary of Artemis at Kalapodi

usual than sheep, goat, or cattle. If deer relate to Artemis Elaphebolos, this may be a matter of cult.⁵⁰ But especially as animal sacrifice also occurs at the Elateia cemetery, the cult itself may reflect local hunting practice, perhaps linked to status.⁵¹ In short, the local rationale for Kalapodi's establishment is clear; central Phokis has as yet produced no contemporary evidence, and nothing in the early material record of southern Phokis indicates the existence of social or political ties with the north.⁵² Equally, the extent and nature of local cemetery continuity make it unlikely that the new shrine marked the arrival of newcomers.⁵³

A new phase of activity began c. 950 with the reorganisation of the shrine and the extension of the *temenos*. During the eighth century, two small mud-brick temples were built, one to the south by the previous cult centre, and one further north, on virgin soil, with a hearth altar which was to become a focus of future building.⁵⁴ Among the votive assemblage, there was an increase in metal dedications, although the most dramatic escalation only began in the last quarter of the eighth century, when items such as arms and armour (paralleled in graves), tripods, and phalara became popular. Jewellery is most common, especially pins but also Thessalian fibulae; bronze figurines include bird pendants, horses, deer and lions appropriate to Artemis.⁵⁵ From the second half of the eighth century there is also evidence of bronze-working on site, for the production of functional items, such as weapons, as well as votives.⁵⁶ A further change concerns the bone assemblage, now dominated by sheep, goat and pig.⁵⁷ The structure of the pottery assemblage remains the same; stylistically, Euboian connections are indicated by, for example, pendent semi-circle skyphoi, but eighth-century imports also include Cycladic and Early Protocorinthian wares.⁵⁸

Equally striking are developments in the archaeology of the surrounding region. Later graves are found at or near a number of earlier cemeteries (Agnandi and Amphikleia, for example), but as yet, perhaps through a chance of excavation, only Elateia




Figure 14.6 Principal sites in the vicinity of Kalapodi

shows complete continuity.⁵⁹ Here a few, tiny Geometric chamber tombs were built in the traditional way, and burials of all kinds continue into the early Classical period, but the focus of the Archaic and Classical cemetery probably lay elsewhere.⁶⁰ Elsewhere in Phokis, Protogeometric and Early Geometric sites are few and widely spread (see Figure 14.7).⁶¹ In Lokris, activity now focused along the coast and on and around the Atalante plain, where cemeteries with a proportion of rich graves appear from Protogeometric onwards.⁶² The majority of *acropoleis* which continued into, or were occupied from, Archaic and Classical times are in this area, although many of the eight Lokrian cities mentioned in the Catalogue of Ships (*Il.* 2.531–3) remain to be found (see Figure 14.8).⁶³ The attraction of connections with Euboea may have been important here, and this may also account for certain of the imports found at Kalapodi.

In Phokis, by contrast, slower settlement change may reflect more complex links between north and south; none the less, by the late eighth century a chain of sites extended to the south coast, and the basis of the Archaic city structure was established (see Figure 14.9).⁶⁴ Links between north and south are reflected in ceramic imports and in the balance of central and southern bronze styles at Kalapodi and in graves (e.g. at Amphikleia and Polydrosos).⁶⁵ This structure was consolidated through the Archaic period, and by the sixth century at latest is reflected in a network of shrines, notably at Elateia,⁶⁶ Polydrosos,⁶⁷ Exarchos,⁶⁸ Kirrha,⁶⁹ the Corycaean Cave and Delphi,⁷⁰ which vary in their physical appearance and patron deities.

In short, one can understand how, in terms of local Phokian and Lokrian settlement, Kalapodi could come to be perceived as a frontier shrine, especially when one considers possible Thessalian hostilities in Phokis, the main ‘event’ distinguishing the Archaic history of the two regions. Parallel strands in local myth-history may reflect aspects of this process. Strabo (424–5.9.3.17) preserves a tradition whereby the settlement of east Lokris was attributed to Phokian expansion northwards from Elateia towards Daphnous. By contrast, the Lokrian king lists emphasise local (specifically Opountian) toponyms, and a border dispute between the Hyampolitans and their Lokrian neighbours is reported in scholia to the *Iliad* and Euripides’ *Orestes*.⁷¹




Figure 14.7 Protogeometric and Early Geometric settlement in Phokis

During the first half of the seventh century, Kalapodi underwent a major, probably Phokian-initiated, building programme. Two new temples and an outside altar were erected, and terracing provided a larger assembly area to the east.⁷² This was a substantial aggrandisement, although the dubious conjecture that it could not have been undertaken by Hyampolis alone is hardly evidence for a religious proto-league.⁷³ The later Phokian League was intimately connected to independence from Thessaly, and as Ellinger argues, the 'Despair' bonfire, which symbolically incorporated the wealth of the nation, was central to its myth-charter. Equally striking, however, is the poverty of votives and the shortage of imports,⁷⁴ which Ellinger tentatively relates to Thessalian occupation.⁷⁵

Further expansion during the second quarter of the sixth century saw the construction of a still larger terrace plus two peripteral temples. Pottery imports reappear, but metal votives related to dress cease almost entirely, being replaced by weapons, body armour, and solid bronze rings.⁷⁶ Felsch plausibly links these changes to the liberation of Phokis (dated, albeit controversially, around the time of the battle of Keressos *c.* 571), and the foundation of the Phokian League and the Elaphebolia.⁷⁷ From this time onwards, Kalapodi's place in Phokian history and national identity is clear, and materially, the shrine far outstrips the Phokikon, the physical centre and communal hearth of the Phokians (although limitations of excavation must be noted).⁷⁸ There is, however, one footnote. Early in the fifth century Kalapodi was again ravaged by fire, perhaps by the Persians in 480 (Her. 8.32–3).⁷⁹ After the Greek victory, a temporary cult structure with a hearth altar and a votive bench was built in the ruins of the north temple. Such was the desire for physical continuity that the Classical temple, begun in the mid-fifth century, physically entombed this building, which as a final act was burnt and the debris capped beneath the temple floor. Indeed, as the excavators note, some of the votives found *in situ* on the bench are types more common as grave offerings, effectively tributes to the entombed building.⁸⁰ This is a remarkable sequence of events: continuity of altars is well attested in the Greek world, but the treatment of the temporary temple is exceptional.⁸¹

In summary, only relatively late in its history was Kalapodi adopted as the national, ancestral shrine of Phokis, stressing the liminal role of Artemis. It is possible to understand how and why the shrine was founded, to relate changes in votive offerings to circumstances in Phokis and Lokris, to see how a border might become meaningful through the eighth and seventh centuries, and to trace the politicisation of Phokian control from the seventh century. But this may only have been in place for




Figure 14.8 Protogeometric and Early Geometric settlement in Lokris

a century at most before victory over the Thessalians fossilised the shrine in Phokian consciousness, and from this point we find a mania for continuity and tradition.⁸²

In considering Kalapodi, I have chosen to set a single sanctuary within its regional context, and to consider how developments in group representation among its likely constituency fit those at the site itself. Here we have the advantage of the *tongue dur  e*, but Kalapodi is not unique in this respect, and comparable study of, for example, Isthmia, within the more stable ambit of Corinth, presents a different picture.⁸³ A parallel approach, relevant where continuity is lacking, is to examine regional systems in terms of shrine location, votive practice and local differentiation. Here we may consider evidence from Arkadia.

ARKADIA

By the fourth century at the latest, the Arkadian federation encompassed communities which, although distinct in their development and form, were in many cases explicitly described as *poleis*.⁸⁴ Arkadian tribes are also attested,⁸⁵ but although there is scant evidence for their political role during the Archaic period, it was probably not great. As Thomas Heine Nielsen has shown, only in three minor cases do Classical historians report tribal affinities,⁸⁶ and the majority of Roman attestations occur in Pausanias' report (8.27.3–4) of the Arkadian Confederacy decree listing participants in the synoicism of Megalopolis. Major *poleis* such as Tegea usually stood alone as primary points of identification, and there is much to recommend




Figure 14.9a Eighth-century settlement in Phokis

the view of Nielsen and Mauro Moggi that in Arkadia *poleis* did not develop within early tribal states but rather the reverse (a view which accords with the strong local focus of the archaeological record).⁸⁷

Shrines are particularly important contexts for material display in Arkadia, since by contrast with most other regions of Greece, Early Iron Age and Archaic graves are few.⁸⁸ Although large cemeteries may remain undiscovered, burial customs probably did not emphasise material marking and formal burial of any sort may have been unfashionable. The main exception is Kynaithon, where burials around the Manesi and Kalavryta plains continue from the late eighth century into Classical times. But Azania was perceived as wild and remote, and as will be shown, connections with Achaia may be significant here.⁸⁹

From the sixth century onwards, the material expression of cult across Arkadia appears increasingly uniform, with, for example, architectural emulation between temples, the assimilation of local deities to Olympians, and greater similarity in votives.⁹⁰ Local identity could still be expressed within this framework; hence, for example, literary references to tombs of local heroes, such as Iphikles, brother of Herakles, at Pheneos (Paus. 8.14.9–10),⁹¹ self-consciously rustic symbolism (e.g. bronze shepherds from the shrine of Pan near Berekla),⁹² and unusual ritual, notoriously the human ‘sacrifice’ on Mt Lykaion, pushing the wild and unacceptable away from the civilised centre of Megalopolis.⁹³ Yet this is very different from the material variation evident during the eighth and seventh centuries. Study of the nature and distribution of Arkadian shrines founded before 600 (on haphazard excavation evidence) permits us to look behind this regional pattern (see Figure 14.10).⁹⁴

In Arkadia, relationships between town and *chora* vary greatly, and the evolution of complex ritual ties falls beyond our period. One should emphasise, however, that in a region mostly too high for easy wheat and olive cultivation and reliant on herding and barley and garden crops, and where cities often lay in close proximity to their neighbours, the variability of what constituted territory for particular purposes has rarely been considered.⁹⁵ Thus Madeleine Jost has warned against simple distinctions between urban and rural shrines, highlighting instead geographical imperatives such as the avoidance of flood zones.⁹⁶ Equally, since late Archaic and Classical Arkadian political rivalries were often constituted in terms of outside powers, it is worth considering the extent to which this may also be true of earlier sanctuary location, if only in the indirect sense of heightened self-awareness encouraging elaborate display combined with access to imported goods.




Figure 14.9b Archaic settlement in Phokis

On present evidence, the earliest shrines appear in the north, south-east and south-west of Arkadia. To begin in the south-east, the shrine of Alea at Tegea lies in the south of the Tegean plain, close to major routes into Lakonia and the Argolid.⁹⁷ In Pausanias' time (8.45.1), the local population was divided into nine demes. Tegean synoicism is usually dated between the end of the seventh and the mid-fifth century (Strabo [337.8.3.2] puts it *c.* 478–473),⁹⁸ but most public building is fourth-century, including the city walls which probably encompassed the Temple of Alea, and there seems much to commend the view that the town annexed the shrine after synoicism.⁹⁹

The early origins of the Alea cult were revealed by votives found in Charles Dugas' excavations in the 1920s.¹⁰⁰ More recently, the 'first', late-seventh-century, temple has been shown to rest on the debris of a series of earlier structures (see Figure 14.11).¹⁰¹ Two successive buildings of the second half of the eighth century have been investigated, and further pestholes exist beneath them.¹⁰² In addition, there is evidence of unusually elaborate provision probably for the display of offerings.¹⁰³ Sacrifice and dining are represented by burnt animal bone and a pottery assemblage focused on open shapes and pouring vessels,¹⁰⁴ so some form of meeting seems to have been combined with dedication. Votives include pottery plus lead figures similar to those from the shrine of Artemis Orthia at Sparta, but small bronzes form by far the largest category. A massive range in a variety of local, Peloponnesian and central Greek styles is related iconographically to the cult and the interests of dedicators:¹⁰⁵ animals (mainly horses and deer), humans, pendants (including some which may have served as seals, perhaps to mark goods passing through the shrine), jewellery, and an eclectic collection of miniatures, notably arms and armour (fewer and less realistic than the later hoplite equipment from Bassai, but an early representation of military interests).¹⁰⁶ Since Geometric metalworking pits have been found in the area of the Classical temple *pronaos*, much may have been made *in situ*.¹⁰⁷ Only monumental bronzes (especially tripods) are absent, and most terracotta figurines date from the late sixth or fifth centuries onwards, following the assimilation of Alea to Athena.¹⁰⁸

Cult activity at Tegea dates back to the tenth century, but there was a major increase in the volume and range of dedications from *c.* 750.¹⁰⁹ External pressure may have been a catalyst, but it cannot explain the richness of the votive symbolism or the long building tradition which must answer to local needs. More persuasive is a link between the late-seventh-century temple,¹¹⁰ the rise of Lakonia, and perhaps also Tegean synoicism. Certainly, the temple as local history store, containing the




Figure 14.10 Arkadia 800–600 BC

hide of the Calydonian boar, the Spartan fetters and Endoios' sixth-century wooden cult statue (Paus. 8.46.1, 4, 8.47.2; Her. 1. 66.4), would make a more impressive statement than the small bronze votives which were by then slipping out of fashion.

Slightly later is a shrine on the summit of Psili Korifi above modern Mavriki, which may be that of Artemis Knakeatis mentioned by Pausanias (8.53.11).¹¹¹ The first temple here is sixth-century, but Late Geometric finds show close links with Alea and probably came from the same workshops.¹¹² Historically, the shrine lay in one of the villages of synoicised Tegea, although its status when founded is unclear. Yet if Mavriki did belong to an independent community, it would be unique (the next evidence, a seated female statue probably from a Demeter shrine at Hagiorgitika, dates c. 630)¹¹³ and its votive record exceptionally restricted. It therefore seems that it should be related to Tegea, stressing its location by a major route of communication.

Since the plain of Mantinea and its *acropolis* (Gourtsouli) lie immediately north of Tegea within the same plain complex, it is perhaps not surprising to find evidence of a shrine here, again probably dedicated to Artemis.¹¹⁴ Unlike Tegea, however, where the Alea shrine was separate from the *acropolis*, here the Mycenaean *acropolis* (Ptolis) was adopted for cult after a long hiatus. Just as there is no evidence for settlement here thereafter, so no rural shrines have yet been found before the end of the Archaic period.¹¹⁵ The peak of dedications at Ptolis in the late sixth to mid-fifth century, including such offerings as unique large terracottapepophoroi, coincides with the most likely (if disputed) date for the synoicism of Mantinea.¹¹⁶ Yet walling of the late eighth or early seventh century on the west slope belongs to the first of a series of five cult buildings,¹¹⁷ and early offerings include local pottery (stylistically distinct from that of Tegea), Archaic terracotta figurines and personal items, such as jewellery.¹¹⁸ Unfortunately, there is no evidence for the nature of cult practice. Theodora Karagiorga may be optimistic in referring to the aristocratic character of dedications before the formal foundation of the city, and the range of




Figure 14.11 The Sanctuary of Athena Alea at Tegea.

interests expressed may be more restricted than at Tegea, but as she stresses, this is no rustic shrine.¹¹⁹ So although there is a clear rationale for self-expression via cult at both Tegea and Mantinea, it varies in nature between the two communities.

In northern Arkadia the picture differs again. Lousoi, in the Chelmos mountains, is best known for its Hellenistic settlement and sanctuary of Artemis Hemera.¹²⁰ Here too, although the first temple dates around the end of the seventh century,¹²¹ bronze votives begin during Late Geometric, and most, as Ulrich Sinn and Mary Voyatzis have argued, are probably products of a local workshop.¹²² The range of Late Geometric and Archaic jewellery and figurines echoes that at Tegea, but styles vary and numbers are lower (although the site has been plundered). Local terracottas, mostly dating from the seventh century onwards, include distinctive subjects such as dance groups, which raise questions about the role of performance in local ritual.¹²³ By contrast, Late Geometric and Archaic pottery is rare, and there is no direct evidence for ritual conduct.¹²⁴

Why a shrine should have been established here at this date is problematic, especially as there is scant evidence of local settlement.¹²⁵ The geography of the marginal territory of Azania and southern Achaia may, however, be significant, in terms of communications and expressions of communal identity. It is interesting to compare Lousoi with the Achaian roadside shrine, perhaps of Apollo and Artemis, established by c. 750 at Ano Mazaraki-Rakita beside the Meganeitas valley.¹²⁶ Here an

extensive votive deposit included granary models, imports like scarabs, and personal items like stamps, jewellery and weapons, reflecting a range of gender, economic, and status interests close to that at Tegea. The deposit also includes pottery, and a concentration on open vessels combined with burnt bone implies sacrifice and dining. This is no simple roadside altar; whether there was a local settlement is unclear, but links with sites to north and south are evident in the ceramic record.¹²⁷ Most striking, however, is the temple, which may tentatively be dated to the second half of the eighth century,¹²⁸ and which continued in use, with no radical alteration, until its destruction by earthquake and fire early in the fourth century. Thereafter activity continued until the third century AD, but if a temple was built elsewhere it remains to be found, and the pottery distribution indicates continuing activity beside the ruin.

The shrine's primary link with Aigion is clear¹²⁹, and its location, close to the southern border of this *meros* along a busy road, seems significant. This is, however, the only case of territorial use of cult in eighth- and seventh-century Achaia, an interesting absence in a region whose organisation into twelve *mere* might imply concern with internal divisions. The other possible early sanctuary, on the Aegira/Hyperesia *acropolis*, is quite different in appearance and at least until the construction of Temple B, c. 650, less securely identified as a shrine.¹³⁰ Within Aigion itself, no evidence of cult pre-dates an inscription on a bronze oinochoe of c. 450–440 which may refer to a local hero.¹³¹

Ano Mazaraki lies north of two flanking and politically distinct zones, the Pharai Valley in Achaia, and the plains of Manesi and Kalavryta in Arkadian Kynaitha; to the south lies Lousoi, and the area is cut by main roads. That its temple shows such continuity and conservatism through a period of expansion at Aigion and probably synoicism too, surely reflects particular concerns surrounding marginal territory. The archaeological records of these intervening zones contrast markedly; indeed, the environmentally circumscribed conditions of inland valleys are liable to produce extreme responses in terms of integration or demarcation of local identities. In the Pharai valley, the form and contents of eighth-century burials, and the grouping strategies employed, are highly eclectic. Of all areas of Achaia, the marking of local identities in burial is most complex here, and the sharpest discontinuities in the quantity and form of material evidence occur here also, since Archaic and Classical evidence is very slight indeed. It is possible that the synoicism of Pharai happened early, but further exploration is required to test this idea. By contrast, scattered burials are found on the plains around Manesi and Kalavryta from c. 700 onwards, some, like the renowned Ag. Konstantinos panoply burial, rich in offerings. Clearly, these two systems constitute a marginal zone for materially different groups. In such an area identity could matter greatly, and the coincidence of the establishment of the Lousoi shrine and the Kalavryta-Manesi burials is suggestive. In time, Lousoi acquired a range of functions (pasturing flocks from Chelmos, for example),¹³³ but we cannot tell when these originated.

In south-west Arkadia, votives at the sanctuary of Apollo at Bassai, by contrast, date from c. 700 onwards, but increase in quantity only from c. 650. At this time, local and Elean pottery appears, and the first temple dates to the late sixth or early fifth century.¹³⁴ In its early years at least, the shrine appears isolated, and as Nicholas Yalouris suggests, the predominance of lead and iron figures may reflect locally available materials.¹³⁵ Miniature arms and armour are the most plentiful and iconographically significant bronze dedications, and whether one sees them as offerings by Cretans or by local mercenaries, they reflect the strongest single interest at any Arkadian shrine of this date.¹³⁶ Elsewhere in Phigaleia, although Late Geometric pottery is found at Cretea on Mt Lykaion, most dedications here, as at the nearby altar of Zeus Lykaios and Pan, are seventh-century and later; the shrine of Pan at Berekla dates from the sixth century, as do the earliest offerings on Mt Lykosoura.¹³⁷ Likewise, at the shrine of Athena in neighbouring Alipheira, an isolated hill site north-west of Andritsaina on the Triphylian border, a few small bronzes date to the late eighth century, but the majority are contemporary with the construction of the temple c. 550.¹³⁸ The relatively late date of shrines in south-western Arkadia is striking, and it may be that a special interest served as a catalyst for their expansion if not establishment—mountain sites are favoured, for example, and the military interest at Bassai is notable.

As this brief survey shows, both the diversity of material expression and the geographical distribution of early shrines in Arkadia seem significant. All are in border areas of sorts, so may reflect external pressure, although at least at Tegea, the complexity of votive symbolism and early date of cult activity demand wider explanation. Given the limitations of excavation, negative argument is unwise; the lack of evidence in central Arkadia may, however, be significant. At present, the only early evidence, a unique eighth-century bronze group of masked dancers, comes from the probable shrine of Poseidon Hippios at Petrovouni; this may depict a ritual performance, and if, as Voyatzis suggests, the masks represent horses, a cult link seems likely.¹³⁹ The next secure evidence comes from the late seventh- or early sixth-century shrine at Glanitsa in the *chora* of Tripolis, where the dominant iconography of shepherds and hunters echoes earlier observations about the expression of rusticity within the Arkadian sacral landscape.¹⁴⁰ Clearly, there is no correlation between the existence or date of shrines, the presence of Geometric settlement, and the date of appearance of city ethnics.¹⁴¹ Equally, the majority of new seventh-century shrines cluster around the areas noted, but remain distinctive in form; Temple A at Pallantion, for example, is perhaps the strongest candidate for a *bouleuterion* temple on the Greek mainland.¹⁴² Only from the sixth century onwards can one trace the formation of a structured cult landscape encompassing the whole region.¹⁴³

CONCLUSION

In summary, the manipulation of individual shrines and the evolution of regional cult systems are diverse processes, and the interests involved in shrine location and patterns of dedication complex. Nothing fits easily into simple models. Indeed, if, the most common trait is local idiosyncrasy, this throws new light on the few cults, notably that of Demeter, characterised by greater material uniformity.¹⁴⁴ It is often argued that the *polis* forged its identity through religion.¹⁴⁵ Yet if *poleis* are perceived simply as basic unitary states, then, by comparison with *ethne*, one might expect their domestic religious organisation, and codes governing access between *poleis* (*xenia*) and between *poleis* and inter-state sanctuaries,¹⁴⁶ to have been relatively simple. *Ethne*, by contrast, are multi-tiered, and their cult development fits complex processes of community and state evolution. Indeed, the evidence presented here runs directly contrary to the notion of the *ethnos* as *Stammstadt*.¹⁴⁷ Clearly much more could be said; the role of shrines in synoicism varied greatly, for example, and the absence of certain cult forms is interesting. Thus the absence of ancestor cult has been cited as an argument against kinship as central to political structure in early *ethne*, but cults, as ideological statements, say less about the existence of aspects of structuring and identity than their politicisation, and in this respect, the absence of ancestor worship is less revealing than its presence in certain *poleis*.¹⁴⁸ Above all, it is characteristic of *ethne* that the complex expressions of identity which they require are not necessarily made via cult alone or even primarily. Under such circumstances, we are forced to consider the complexity of the total ideological context and its evolution through time, issues equally relevant to the *polis*.¹⁴⁹

NOTES

- 1 I am grateful to Peter Rhodes and Lynette Mitchell for their invitation to the Durham conference and for editorial assistance, to Blanche Menadier for helpful discussion, and to the British Academy for a Research Leave award which assisted my work on this topic. Detailed examination of the issues raised will appear in my book, *Ethne: Early Greek States Beyond the Polis*.
- 2 Notably bronzes: A.G.Bather, *JHS* 13 (1892–3), 232–71. C.Rolley, *Fouilles de Delphes*, v.3, 135 n. 7; E.Touloupa, *AM* 87 (1972), 57–76; Touloupa, in Buitron-Oliver (ed.) *New Perspectives in Early Greek Art*, 241–69.
- 3 Most recently, I.Ström, *Proc. Dan. Inst. Ath.* 1 (1995), 37–127.
- 4 Dickey, ‘Corinthian Burial Customs, ca. 1100–500 B.C.’, 101–8.
- 5 E.R.Gebhard and F.P.Hemans, *Hesperia* 61 (1992), 9–22; Morgan, *Isthmia*, viii, forthcoming.
- 6 I.Kilian-Dirlmeier, *Πελοποννησιακά* 19 (1985–6), 369–75.
- 7 For an overview, see A.Mallwitz, *AA* (1981) 599–642. B.Wells, in Γ’ Συν. Πελ. Σπουδ. ii. 349–52.
- 8 A.C.Brookes, *Hesperia* 50 (1981), 285–90; R.Rhodes, *Hesperia* 56 (1987), 229–32.
- 9 Hera Akraia: Payne *et al.*, *Perachora*, i. 27–32, noting E.H. remains pp. 51–3; Menadier, ‘The Temple and Cult of Hera Akraia at Perachora’. Hera Limenia: Payne, *op. cit.* 110–15, 187; R.A.Tomlinson, *BSA* 72 (1977), 197–202; Menadier, *op. cit.*, states fully the case for this chronology; Immerwahr, *Attic Script*, 16.
- 10 For example, A.Schachter, in Schachter (ed.) *Le Sanctuaire grec*, 8–10; Snodgrass, *Archaic Greece*, 33–4; de Polignac, *Cults, Territory and the Origins of the Greek City-State*, Chapter 1, and pp. 152–3 for summary.
- 11 C.A.Morgan, in Hellström and Alroth (eds) *Religion and Power in the Ancient Greek World*, 41–57.
- 12 For example, Alcock and Osborne (eds) *Placing the Gods*.
- 13 For example, Schachter, *op. cit.* (n. 10).
- 14 Some are discussed in Morgan, *Athletes and Oracles*.
- 15 Snodgrass, *op. cit.* (n. 10), 42–4; Ehrenberg, *The Greek State*, 3–25; Daverio Rocchi, *Città-stato e stati federali della Grecia classica*, 107–12.
- 16 Di Salvatore, *La città tessala di Fere in epoca classica*; Béquignon, *Récherches archéologiques à Phères de Thessalie*; A.Dougléri Intzesiloglou, in Θεσσαλία, 71–92; O.Apostolopoulou Kakavoyianni, in Διεθνές Συνεδρίο...Δ.Π. Θεοχάρη, 312–20.
- 17 Béquignon, *op. cit.* (n. 16), 43–55 (attributing the temple to Zeus Thaulios); E. Østby, *O.Ath.* 19 (1992), 86–8. P.Chrysostomou, in Θεσσαλία, 339–46.
- 18 Béquignon, *op. cit.* (n. 16), 50–5; P.G.Kalligas, in Διεθνές Συνεδρίο... Δ.Π. Θεοχάρη, 300 fig. 1.
- 19 Béquignon, *op. cit.* (n. 16), 87–8, no. 52.
- 20 Chrysostomou, *Η Θεσσαλική Θεά Εν[ν]οδία ή Θεραία Θεά*, (see, e.g., West Cemetery, 62–8); O.Apostolopoulou Kakavoyianni, in Πρακτικά του Α’ Συνεδρίου Φεραί—Βελεστίνο—Ρήγας, 57–70.
- 21 Béquignon, *op. cit.* (n. 16), 57–74; Kilian, *Fibeln in Thessalien*, 6–8; Chrysostomou, *op. cit.* (n. 20), 29–61.
- 22 I.Kilian-Dirlmeier, *JRGZ* 32 (1985), 216–25.
- 23 Kilian, *op. cit.* (n. 21), 8–10, 168–9; and *PZ* 50 (1975), 105–6.
- 24 Apostolopoulou Kakavoyianni, *op. cit.* (n. 16), 313–17.
- 25 Two rich P.G. tholoi with multiple burials, north-east of Chloe near Velestino, may, however, reflect a pre-sanctuary pattern of investment. Alternatively, the practice of burying wealthy citizens beside roads leading out of town (and in a different grave-type) may have early origins. We cannot yet determine whether they were isolated cases: P.Arachoviti, in Θεσσαλία, 125–38; Dougléri Intzesiloglou, *op. cit.* (n. 16), 78–9 n. 44; V.Adrymani Sismani, *AAA* 16 (1983), 23–42.
- 26 Vansina, in *General History of Africa*, i; Antonaccio, *An Archaeology of Ancestors*, 252–3.

- 27 Chrysostomou, op. cit. (n. 20), 29–75, part B section 2.1; Moustaka, *Kulte und Mythen auf thessalischen Münzen*, 30–6; S.G. Miller, *CSCA* 7 (1974), 231–56.
- 28 With the possible exception of a late Archaic/early Classical temple at Pharsalos (*AD* 19 [1964], β. 261; Chrysostomou, op. cit. [n. 17], 94–9), an inscribed stele of the third quarter of the fifth century from Larissa is the earliest attestation elsewhere: Chrysostomou, op. cit. (n. 17), 80–8; *IG* ix.2 575.
- 29 M. di Salvatore, in *Θεσσαλία*, 93–124.
- 30 Phthiotic Thebes: *PAAH* (1907), 166–9.
- 31 Philia: *AD* 43 (1988), β. 256–7; 22 (1967), β. 295–6; 20 (1965) P. 311–13; 19 (1964), β. 244–9; 18 (1963), β. 135–8; Kilian in Hägg (ed.) *The Greek Renaissance of the Eighth Century B.C.*, 131–46; A. Pilali-Papasteriou and K. Papaeuthimiou, *Anthropologika* 4 (1983), 49–67. Athena Itonia: N. Papahatzis in *Διεθνές Συνεδρίο...Δ. Π. Θεοχάρη*, 321–5; C. Bearzot, *CISA* 8 (1982), 43–60.
- 32 Kilian-Dirlmeier, op. cit. (n. 22), 216–25.
- 33 Chrysostomou, op. cit. (n. 17), 47 n. 44, suggests commercial exchange at the festival; K. Kilian, *AKB* 3 (1973), 431–5, offerings of transhumant pastoralists. Metalwork: Dougliri Intzesiloglou, op. cit. (n. 16), 78 fig. 8.
- 34 Béquignon, op. cit. (n. 16), 73–4; Kilian, op. cit. (n. 21), 186 notes Protocorinthian pottery.
- 35 Morgan and Hall, in Hansen (ed.) *Introduction to an Inventory of Poleis*, 164–232, for pre-Classical Achaia.
- 36 Ellinger, *La Légende nationale phocidienne*.
- 37 M. Jost, *REA* 75 (1973), 241–67; Jost, *BCH* 99 (1975), 339–40; Jost, *Sanctuaires et cultes d'Arcadie*; Jost, in Alcock and Osborne, op. cit. (n. 12), 217–30; Rizakis, *Achaie*, i.
- 38 R.C. S. Felsch, in Hägg and Marinatos (eds) *Sanctuaries and Cults in the Aegean Bronze Age*, 81–9; Felsch, in Hägg, op. cit. (n. 31), 123–9; Felsch, in Etienne and le Dinahet (eds) *L'Espace sacrificiel dans les civilisations méditerranéennes de l'antiquité*, 85–91; R.C. S. Felsch, H.J. Kienast and H. Schuler, *AA* (1980), 38–123; R.C. S. Felsch *et al.*, *AA* (1987), 1–99.
- 39 See Ellinger, op. cit. (n. 36), for discussion and analysis of the sources.
- 40 For example, in the coin assemblage: Ellinger, op. cit. (n. 36), 32, citing Felsch, personal communication.
- 41 Felsch, Kienast and Schuler, op. cit. (n. 38), 46–7; Felsch, op. cit. (n. 38, 1981); Felsch *et al.*, op. cit. (n. 38), 3–5, 26–40.
- 42 Hope Simpson, *Mycenaean Greece*, 78–81; Felsch, op. cit. (n. 38, 1981), 81–2; Ph. Dasios, *Φώκικα Χρονικά* 4 (1992), 18–97; *AD* 34 (1979), β. 186.
- 43 In addition to reports in *AD* from 1970 onwards, see F. Dakoronia, *Φώκικα Χρονικά* 5 (1993), 25–39; Schachermeyr, *Die ägäische Frühzeit*, iv. 319–22.
- 44 F. Dakoronia, in *2nd Symp. Ship-Construction*, 117–22; Felsch *et al.*, op. cit. (n. 38) figs 50, 51.
- 45 Dakoronia, op. cit. (n. 43).
- 46 F. Dakoronia, in *Διεθνές Συνεδρίο...Δ. Π. Θεοχάρη*, 292–7; Felsch, Kienast and Schuler, op. cit. (n. 38), 54. Pottery styles belong with a common local tradition, but open shapes dominate at the shrine and closed in graves: Felsch *et al.*, op. cit. (n. 38), figs 55, 56.
- 47 *AR* 29 (1982/3), 32.
- 48 Morgan, op. cit. (n. 5), ch. ii.4.
- 49 Demakopoulou, *Τό Μυκηναϊκό Ιερό στο Αμυκλαίο και ή Υ.Ε. ΙΙΙΓ Περίοδο στη Λακωνία*; Morgan, op. cit. (n. 11).
- 50 Ellinger, op. cit. (n. 36), 27, 33.
- 51 Morris, in Hägg and Nordquist (eds) *Celebrations of Death and Divinity in the Bronze Age Argolid*, 149–55.
- 52 S. Müller, *BCH* 116 (1992), 445–96 on L.B.A. Delphi and environs (the relationship between S.M. and later finds is unclear); Vatin, *Médéon de Phocide*. Material similarities exist between Kalapodi and Delphi (e.g. Felsch, op. cit. [n. 38, 1981], 84), but are not strong.
- 53 Ellinger, op. cit. (n. 36), 34, 36–7, rightly doubts that Artemis' link with frontiers and military victories was a Classical creation, but there is no reason to push it back this far at Kalapodi.
- 54 Felsch, Kienast and Schuler, op. cit. (n. 38), 47–63; Felsch *et al.*, op. cit. (n. 38), 5–13.
- 55 Felsch, Kienast and Schuler, op. cit. (n. 38), 54–63; Felsch, op. cit. (n. 38, 1983); Felsch *et al.*, op. cit. (n. 38), figs 13–14, 15–19.
- 56 Felsch, op. cit. (n. 38, 1983), 123–4; C. Risberg, in Linders and Alroth (eds) *Economics of Cult in the Greek World*, 36, 39–40. Cf. Philia: Kilian, in Hägg, op. cit. (n. 31).
- 57 Felsch, Kienast and Schuler, op. cit. (n. 38), 65.
- 58 Felsch, Kienast and Schuler, op. cit. (n. 38), 48 (comparing Lefkandi); Felsch *et al.*, op. cit. (n. 38), 41–9.
- 59 Agandi: *AD* 25 (1970), β. 235–7. Amphikleia: Dasios, op. cit. (n. 42), site 12. Kalapodi area: *AD* 42 (1987), β. 234–5.
- 60 *AD* 29 (1973/4), β. 582–3; 34 (1979), β. 193–4; 43 (1988), β. 233; 36 (1981), β. 221–2; Paris, *Elatée*.
- 61 Dasios, op. cit. (n. 42), sites 51, 90, 100, 115 (site 66?); Vatin, op. cit. (n. 52), 59–68. Delphi: L. Lerat, *567/85* (1961), figs 40, 41; *BCH* 117 (1993), 619–31: secure settlement from the mid-tenth century onwards, twelfth- and eleventh-century sherds in lower layers.
- 62 For example, Tragana: A. Onasoglou, *AD* 36 (1981), a. 1–57; 41 (1986), β. 74; 38 (1983), β. 157; Fossey, *The Ancient Topography of Opountian Lokris*, 50–1. Atalante: *AD* 42 (1987), β. 226–8; F. Dakoronia, *Hesperia* 62 (1993), 119–20; Fossey op. cit., 68–74. Veryki Megaplatanos: *AD* 39 (1984), β. 135–6.
- 63 Megaplatanos: *AD* 36 (1981), β. 221; *AD* 33 (1978), β. 140; Dakoronia, op. cit. (n. 62), 123–4; Fossey, op. cit. (n. 62), 22–6, 33–5, 44–5, 62–5, 79–80. Kyparissi: *AD* 34 (1979), β. 187; 33 (1978), β. 139–40; C. Blegen, *AAA* 30 (1926), 401–4; Dakoronia, op. cit., 117–19; Dakoronia, *Hesperia* 59 (1990), 175–80. Halai: H. Goldman, *Hesperia* 9 (1940), 381–514; H. Goldman and F. Jones, *Hesperia* 11 (1942), 365–421; J. Coleman, *Hesperia* 61 (1992), 265–77; *AD* 42 (1987), β. 228–31. Catalogue of Ships: Dakoronia, op. cit. (n. 62).

- 64 See Dasios, op. cit. (n. 42).
- 65 Amphikleia: *BCH* 78 (1954), 132–3. Polydroso (Souvala): X. Arapogianni-Mazokopaki, *AAA* 15 (1982), 76–85.
- 66 Paris, op. cit. (n. 60), 73–118, 139–77, 257–98; for the dating of 286 no. 8 see Felsch, Kienast and Schuler, op. cit. (n. 38), 57.
- 67 *AD* 27 (1972), β. 384–8; P.G.Themelis, *ASAA* 61=n.s. 45 (1983), 227–8.
- 68 V.W.Yorke, *JHS* 16 (1896), 298–302; contra Philippson, *Die griechischen Landschaften*, i.2, 716–17; Felsch, Kienast and Schuler, op. cit. (n. 38), 39; Ellinger, op. cit. (n. 36), 25.
- 69 J. -M.Luce, in Bommelaer (ed.) *Delphes*, 263–75.
- 70 *Antre corycien*, i-ii.
- 71 W.Oldfather, *Philologus* 67 (1908), 411–72; Fossey, op. cit. (n. 62), 7; schol. *Il.* 2.517b (Erbse); *Or.* 1094 (Schwartz).
- 72 Felsch, Kienast and Schuler, op. cit. (n. 38), 63–7; Felsch *et al.*, op. cit. (n. 38), 13–9; Felsch, op. cit. (n. 38, 1991), 86.
- 73 Ellinger, op. cit. (n. 36), 34.
- 74 Felsch, Kienast and Schuler, op. cit. (n. 38), 66; Felsch *et al.*, op. cit. (n. 38), 54.
- 75 Ellinger, op. cit. (n. 36), 34.
- 76 Felsch, Kienast and Schuler, op. cit. (n. 38), 67–8, 78–83, 112–14; Felsch *et al.*, op. cit. (n. 38), 19–25, 54–5.
- 77 Felsch, Kienast and Schuler, op. cit. (n. 38), 83–5; Ellinger, op. cit. (n. 36), 18–21.
- 78 E.French and E.Vanderpool, *Hesperia* 32 (1963), 213–25; P.Ellinger, in Felsch *et al.*, op. cit. (n. 38), 98.
- 79 Felsch, Kienast and Schuler, op. cit. (n. 38), 84–5.
- 80 *Ibid.* (n. 38), 68–70, 85–99; Felsch, op. cit. (n. 38, 1991), 88–91.
- 81 See also Felsch, Kienast and Schuler, op. cit. (n. 38), 98–9.
- 82 A related issue is the impact of Delphi's inter-regional role, culminating in the First Sacred War: Morgan, op. cit. (n. 14), ch.4.
- 83 Morgan, op. cit. (n. 5), Part III.
- 84 Federal interpretation of fifth-century Arkadikon issues: Williams, *The Silver Coinage of the Phokians*; Kraay, *Archaic and Classical Greek Coins*, 97–8; contra T. Heine Nielsen, in Hansen, and Raaflaub (eds) *More Studies in the Ancient Greek Polis*, 39–61. Confederacy, e.g. Dušanić, *The Arcadian League of the Fourth Century*, J.Roy, *Phoenix* 26 (1972), 334–41.
- 85 J.Roy, *A. Ant Hung.* 20 (1972), 43–51.
- 86 T.Heine Nielsen, in Hansen (ed.) *Introduction to an Inventory of Poleis*, 117–63, especially 132–43.
- 87 M.Moggi, *RFIC n.s.* 119 (1991), 59–62.
- 88 *AD* 22 (1967), β. 217; 37 (1982), (β. 118; Holmberg, *The Swedish Excavations at Asea in Arcadia*, 112–13; S. and H.Hodkinson, *BSA* 76 (1981), 291–4; Jacobsthal, *Greek Pins*, 7–9.
- 89 I.A.Pikoulas, in Β' Συν. Πελ. Σπουδ. ii. 269–81; M.Petropoulos, *Horos* 3 (1985), 63–73.
- 90 F.E.Winter, *EMC* 10 (1991), 193–220; E.Østby, in Δ' Συν. Πελ. Σπουδ. ii. 65–75; Jost, op. cit. (n. 37, 1985), 368–70; Voyatzis, *The Early Sanctuary of Athena Alea at Tegea*, 239.
- 91 Jost, op. cit. (n. 37, 1985), 534–40.
- 92 U.Hübinger, in Palagia and Coulson (eds) *Sculpture from Arcadia and Laconia*, 25–31; Jost, op. cit. (n. 37, 1975); W.Lamb, *BSA* 27 (1925/6), 133–48.
- 93 Cf. Burkert, *Homo Necans*, 84–93; Hughes, *Human Sacrifice in Ancient Greece*, 96–107; Jost, op. cit. (n. 37, 1985), 258–67.
- 94 Voyatzis, op. cit. (n. 90).
- 95 Hodkinson and Hodkinson, op. cit. (n. 88); Fields, 'The Anatomy of a Mercenary', 52–6.
- 96 Jost, op. cit. (n. 37, 1994).
- 97 Voyatzis, op. cit. (n. 90), 10–20; Callmer, *Studien zur Geschichte Arkadiens*, 109–35.
- 98 Voyatzis, op. cit. (n. 90), 11 and n. 14; Moggi, *I sinecismi interstatali greci*, i. 131–9.
- 99 V.Bérard, *BCH* 16 (1892), 547–9; Voyatzis, op. cit. (n. 90), 12–13. Theatre: R. Vallois, *BCH* 50 (1926), 135–73. Agora: Pausanias 8.49.1; Voyatzis, op. cit. (no. 90), 13–14; Jost, op. cit. (n. 37, 1985), 146–7 (if, as she speculates, Athena Polias' was an open-air cult, it would contrast markedly with that of Alea). Gymnasium (at Palaio Episkopi): V. Bérard, *BCH* 17 (1893), 16–23; Callmer, op. cit. (n. 97), 121. Pausanias (8.47.4) describes the stadium as close to the Alea temple. The citadel is not securely identified, although later votives come from the hill of Ag. Sostis: Voyatzis, op. cit. (n. 90), 16–17; Jost, op. cit. (n. 37, 1985), 154–6.
- 100 C.Dugas, *BCH* 45 (1921), 335–435; Voyatzis, op. cit. (n. 90), *passim*.
- 101 E.Østby *et al.*, *O.Ath.* 20 (1994), 98–107.
- 102 E.Østby, personal communication.
- 103 Østby *et al.*, op. cit. (n. 101), 101, 111–12.
- 104 Voyatzis, op. cit. (n. 90), 62–84; Østby *et al.*, op. cit. (n. 101), 99 n. 46, 101, 126–32.
- 105 Voyatzis, op. cit. (n. 90), *passim*; Østby *et al.*, op. cit. (n. 101), 117–32; M.E. Voyatzis, *BSA* 87 (1992), 259–79; Kilian-Dirlmeier, *Anhänger in Griechenland*, 40–1; Dugas, op. cit. (n. 100), 369–74 (votive loom-weights or amulets).
- 106 Voyatzis, op. cit. (n. 90), 198–202.
- 107 Østby *et al.*, op. cit. (n. 101), 133.
- 108 *Ibid.* (n. 101), 117–19, 123; Voyatzis, op. cit. (n. 90), 239–42.
- 109 E.Østby, personal communication.
- 110 E.Østby, *O.Ath.* 16 (1986), 75–102.
- 111 Jost, op. cit. (n. 37, 1985), 159–61; Voyatzis, op. cit. (n. 90), 28–30.
- 112 Voyatzis, op. cit. (n. 90), 300–3, 305–7, 315, 317, 339.
- 113 Athens, N.M. 57; Jost, op. cit. (n. 37, 1985), 163.

- 114 T.Karagiorga Stathakopoulou, in *Δ' Σύν. Πελ. Σπουδ. ii*. 97–115. Topography: Hodkinson and Hodkinson, op. cit. (n. 88).
- 115 Karagiorga Stathakopoulou, op. cit. (n. 114), 108–9. Voyatzis, op. cit. (n. 90), 101 n. 177 (P.G. and G. from the *chora*). Archaic cult: Jost, op. cit. (n. 37, 1985), 132–4, 136; Fougères, *Maritime et l'Arcadie orientate*, 106; K.Lehmann, *Hesperia* 28 (1959), 153–61.
- 116 Karagiorga Stathakopoulou, op. cit. (n. 114), 107–8 figs 3, 4; Moggi, op. cit. (n. 98), 140–56 (c. 478–473).
- 117 Karagiorga Stathakopoulou, op. cit. (n. 114), 101–2, 104–5.
- 118 Voyatzis, op. cit. (n. 90), 87–9, 220–2; *AD* 18 (1963), p. 89.
- 119 Karagiorga Stathakopoulou, op. cit. (n. 114), 107.
- 120 Reports of the Austrian Institute excavations appear in *JOAI* from 1981/2 onwards; W.Reichel and A.Wilhelm, *JOAI* 4 (1901), 1–89; Jost, op. cit. (n. 37, 1985), 46–51; Voyatzis, op. cit. (n. 90), 35–7.
- 121 Dating based on acroteria: Reichel and Wilhelm, op. cit. (n. 120), 61 fig. 128; Cooper, *The Temple of Apollo at Bassai*, 197–8.
- 122 U. Sinn, *Jb. Ku. Samml. Bad.-Würt.* 17 (1980), 25–40. Voyatzis, op. cit. (n. 90), 104–217 *passim*; cf. M.Weber, *Städte-Jahrbuch I* (1967), 7–18. The long-known Lousoi-Olympia group of animal figurines is often attributed to Olympia, but Lousoi may have been a centre: Heilmeyer, *Frühe olympische Bronzefiguren*, 99–109, especially 103; H.-V.Herrmann, *JDAI* 79 (1964), 22–4; cf. Zimmermann, *Les Chevaux de bronze dans l'art géométrique grec*, 91–113.
- 123 These also occur at Petrovouni and Olympia: Voyatzis, op. cit. (n. 90), 242–4; *AD* 18 (1963), β, pl.146a.
- 124 C.Schauer, in *Ε' Σύν. Πελ. Σπουδ.*, forthcoming.
- 125 Known Geometric sites probably lay in Kynaiathan territory: Petropoulos, op. cit. (n. 89), 65–6.
- 126 M.Petropoulos, in *Γ' Σύν. Πελ. Σπουδ. ii*. 81–96.
- 127 A.Gadolou, personal communication.
- 128 M.Petropoulos, in *Δ' Σύν. Πελ. Σπουδ. ii*. 141–58.
- 129 See, for example, the distribution of impressed ware from Aigion: *PAAH* (1982), 187–8 pl. 125b; I. Dekoulakou, *ASAA* 60=n.s. 44 (1982), 230 figs 20–1; P.Amandry, *BCH* 68–9 (1944/5), 37 fig.3; M.Petropoulos, personal communication.
- 130 For summary, S.Gogos, *JOAI* 57 (1986/7), 108–39; W.Alzinger, *Klio* 67 (1985), 394–426.
- 131 D.Robinson, *AJA* 46 (1942), 194–7.
- 132 For details, Morgan and Hall, op. cit. (n. 35).
- 133 U.Sinn, in Hägg (ed.) *The Iconography of Greek Cult in the Archaic and Classical Periods*, 177–87.
- 134 N.Yalouris, in Coldstream and Colledge (eds) *Greece and Italy in the Classical World*, 91–6; Voyatzis, op. cit. (n. 90), 125–6, 138–9, 156–7, 201, 203, 206–7, 217, 244; N.Kelly, *Hesperia* 64 (1995), 227–77.
- 135 *Ergon* (1959), 109.
- 136 Voyatzis, op. cit. (n. 90), 218–20; A.M. Snodgrass, in Levi, *Antichita cretesi... in onore di D.Levi*, ii. 196–201; Jost, op. cit. (n. 37, 1985), 487–9; Cooper, op. cit. (n. 121), 17–28; N.Fields, in Sheedy (ed.) *Archaeology in the Peloponnese*, 101–12.
- 137 Voyatzis, op. cit. (n. 90), 43–4; cf. Jost, op. cit. (n. 37, 1985), 180–1, 185–7.
- 138 Voyatzis, op. cit. (n. 90), 37, 198, 201, 203–4, 207, 213; Orlandos, *Η αρχαία-δική Αλίφειρα και τὰ μνημεία της*.
- 139 Voyatzis, op. cit. (n. 90), 118 pl. 65.
- 140 Jost, op. cit. (n. 37, 1985), 217–19.
- 141 I.A.Pikoulas, *Horos* 4 (1986), 99–123; Pikoulas, *Horos* 8–9 (1990–1), 135–52; Heine Nielsen, op. cit. (n. 86).
- 142 Østby, op. cit. (n. 90); Østby, *ASAA* 68–9 (1990–91 [published 1995]), 109–18.
- 143 Noting here the potential role of Olympia as a broker between Arkadian communities: Morgan, op. cit. (n. 14), 79–85; Østby, op. cit. (n. 110), 93–102 (Arkadian architectural links with the temple of Hera).
- 144 S.G.Cole, in Alcock and Osborne, op. cit. (n. 12), 199–216.
- 145 C.Sourvinou-Inwood, in Marinatos and Hägg, *Greek Sanctuaries*, 11.
- 146 C.Sourvinou-Inwood, *AION (archeol.)* 10 (1988), 259–74; Sourvinou-Inwood, in Murray and Price (eds) *The Greek City*, 295–322.
- 147 F.Gschnitzer, *WS68* (1955), 120–44.
- 148 Antonaccio, op. cit. (n. 26), 254.
- 149 For Athens, for example, see S.Houby-Nielsen, *Acta Hyperborea* 4 (1992), 343–74; Houby-Nielsen, *Proc. Dan. Inst. Ath.* 1 (1995), 129–91; F. de Polignac, in Viviers and Verbanck-Piérard (eds) *Culture et cité*.

THE NATURE OF GREEK OVERSEAS SETTLEMENTS IN THE ARCHAIC PERIOD

*Emporion or apoikia?*¹

John-Paul Wilson

David Ridgway, in a recent book, asks whether Pithekoussai, an eighth-century community on the island of Ischia in the Bay of Naples, is best regarded as an *emporion* or an *apoikia*.² He wonders whether such terms of analysis were at this stage too ill-defined to make this a useful question. An *apoikia* was a creation of the *polis* in its own image; and yet, in the eighth century, the concept of the *polis* was itself in its infancy, not yet fully-formed, and certainly incapable of spawning a child of its own. Thus the relationship between Pithekoussai and the two Euboean cities of Eretria and Chalcis, to which tradition attributes its foundation,³ was rather that of siblings than that of child and parents. Indeed, Ridgway suggests that perhaps it was Pithekoussai that grew up the quicker; that the crystallization of the *polis*-concept was accelerated by its example.

Equally, Ridgway has his doubts that one could usefully describe Pithekoussai as an *emporion*. Ridgway seems, however, uncomfortable with his conclusions, almost apologetic, that he is unable to categorize Pithekoussai. Thus, rather than emphasizing the inutility of such categories, he chooses to emphasize the uniqueness of Pithekoussai. In his introduction to *The First Western Greeks*, Ridgway voices his dissatisfaction at the title given to the original, Italian version of the book, *L'alba della Magna Grecia*: 'The Dawn of Magna Graecia'. For him this was misleading, since he regarded the Euboean activity at Pithekoussai, rather than being the precursor to the Greek colonization of southern Italy which came later in the day, as being 'apart from subsequent Western Greek history' in time, space and intention.⁴ In Ridgway's analysis, Pithekoussai defies categorization as a *polis* or an *emporion*, essentially not because these terms are inappropriate at this stage of history, but primarily because Pithekoussai is always exceptional.

While there is no doubt that Pithekoussai is an extraordinary community, it seems to me that the terms *emporion* and *apoikia* are too closely bound up with later notions of the *polis* to be informative with regard to earlier settlements; that Ridgway might have been better served to emphasize this fact rather than the uniqueness of Pithekoussai. It is therefore the aim of this chapter to explore the *emporion*—*apoikia* opposition.

What was an *emporion*? In a recent book, concerned with this very question, Casevitz simply suggests that 'l'emporion... est à l'origine le lieu où s'exerce l'emporion'.⁵ In contrast to this, Bresson presents a complex and wide-ranging model of the *emporion* which defines it in political and juridical terms as well as economic.⁶ The problem with his approach is that one can take a community from the Roman Imperial period and fit it into this model alongside one from the Archaic Greek period, exactly the sort of process I would hope to avoid in this chapter. The Casevitz definition is, to me, a far more attractive one essentially because it reflects the generic sense of the word, and avoids questions of the political and juridical status of a community, questions which ultimately have little or nothing to do with the early Archaic period. Indeed, I will suggest below that even during the Classical period one can detect a development in its meaning: that even up to the mid-fifth century one could have defined any community involved in commerce as an *emporion*, regardless of any other status it held, but by the fourth century to call a community an *emporion* was to place it in a very firm political, juridical and even social context.

For the fourth century our image of the *emporion* is fundamentally dependent on the Attic orators, and on Plato and Aristotle, and it is therefore no surprise that it is the Athenian *emporion* of which we know most. The *emporion* occupied an area of the Piraeus clearly delimited by a series of boundary stones, since Demosthenes mentions in one of his speeches that a ship docked at a place called the 'Thieves' Harbour' which lay 'outside the *semeia* of our *emporion*'.⁷ Further, such *semeia* have in fact been found: two *horoi* inscribed, 'boundary of the *emporion* and of the road'.⁸

Within the *emporion* at Athens foreign merchants were free to go about their business, but only under the watchful eye of a group of ten specially elected magistrates, known as the *epimeletai tou emporiou*, the supervisors of the *emporion*.⁹ Principally, these officials were concerned with ensuring that any corn which came in to the Piraeus was bound for the Athenian market. On a broader level, however, they may have been responsible for the general welfare of the foreign merchant. The *epimeletai* of the *emporion* at Miletus, for example, as a consequence of an agreement with several Cretan cities, had the specific task of preventing the sale of these cities' citizens as slaves.¹⁰

The Athenian *emporion*, however, was more than just an institutionally and juridically defined commercial zone. In one speech, Demosthenes states that a defendant has recourse to a special plea if no contract was made either 'at Athens, or in the Athenian *emporion*'.¹¹ Demosthenes may be making this differentiation from a legal perspective—contracts drawn up in the

emporion may have taken a different form from those made elsewhere at Athens. It is possible, however, that he is making a distinction that both he and the jury were aware of from a social, rather than a juridical perspective. In Demosthenes, the Athenian *emporion* is represented as a small, self-contained community: in one speech the speaker disputes that his opponent ever repaid a particular loan since ‘when he was repaying such an amount, and indeed more than the loan, surely it was fitting to make it a talked-of event in the *emporion*, and to call every man to be present’.¹² The fact that Phormio’s transaction is not public knowledge is presented as more than a little suspicious by the speaker. This is interesting since it reveals the *emporion* as a community where everybody knew everybody else’s business, where you could expect rumours to spread quickly, indeed, rely on it.

It is the disdain with which this community was regarded, however, that is particularly significant. One passage in Demosthenes reads almost like a tabloid revelation, when the speaker reports to his audience that ‘there exists in the Piraeus a gang of scoundrels closely leagued with one another; you should know them at once, should you see them’.¹³ The reference here is not specifically to the *emporion*, but to the port area as a whole, but the association of these ‘scoundrels’ with foreign merchants at least implies a more direct connection with the *emporion* itself. Aside from this fairly explicit statement of what Demosthenes thought of the sort of people who frequented the *emporion*, he implicitly represents it as a rather unsavoury place, ‘full of tricky foreigners’.¹⁴ This is taken further by Vélissaropoulos, who describes the *emporion* as a ‘demi-monde’, a twilight world of criminals and prostitutes.¹⁵

There appears then to have been a ‘compartmentalizing’ of foreign trade in fourth-century Athens, on one level institutional and juridical, but on another, social and even moral. This ‘compartmentalizing’ had a definite economic function: the *emporion* clearly enabled the efficient regulation and administration of foreign trade. That this was of increasing concern to Athens in the fourth century is reflected by the introduction of the new *dikai emporikai* around the middle of the century.¹⁶ These *dikai* specifically dealt with cases where a written contract had been made at Athens, which provided for the transportation of goods to or from the port.¹⁷ The important point with these mercantile law-suits is that they were categorized as *dikai emmenoi*. The exact meaning of *emmenoi* is not clear. It has traditionally been assumed that such cases had to be settled within thirty days. Cohen, however, has disputed this, suggesting that *dikai emmenoi* were introduced monthly,¹⁸ and, while they did not have to be settled within a month, it made sense for the magistrates dealing with these cases to resolve one month’s cases before the next month’s were introduced. Either way the system ensured the swift settlement of these *dikai emporikai*, and such ‘rapidity’ would have appealed to any foreign merchant, with little desire to spend long months embroiled in a legal dispute. It is interesting to note that Xenophon in the *Poroi* suggests as an incentive for foreign merchants to come to the city that prizes be offered to the magistrates of the *emporion* for the ‘just and quick settlement of disputes, so that sailings are not delayed’.¹⁹ This sits alongside relatively minor incentives like front-row tickets for the theatre, but is followed by the suggestion of a large-scale building programme, for the construction of hotels and merchant lodging-houses, and of ‘convenient places of exchange’.²⁰ One could relate Xenophon’s call for rewards for *emporion* officials to the introduction of the *dikai emporikai*, or at least their inclusion in the *emmenoi* category. One wonders to what extent other aspects of Xenophon’s plan were initiated. Were the hotels and lodging-houses built, or the ‘convenient places of exchange’? If so, was there a general move towards organizing the area of the port where foreign merchants gathered? Clearly an *emporion* had existed, along with its officials, prior to 355, but it appears implicit in Xenophon that it was a relatively disorganized area, and it is not unreasonable to suggest that it was at this point that its economic and administrative function was more explicitly defined.

It is plain then that the *emporion* had a distinct economic function, but I think that it had a social function that went beyond this. It was in the course of the fourth century that the failure of the *polis* ideal became increasingly probable, and perversely the concept of the *polis* became most clearly defined. Plato and Aristotle saw the ideal *polis* as a completely self-sufficient entity, a body of citizens that was able to feed and protect itself using only the resources of its own territory.²¹ The desirability of *autarkeia* was two-fold. On one level it was a guarantee of political independence: a city that did not rely on another for its food, its mineral resources and so forth, could never be held to ransom. *Autarkeia*, however, was more than just an economic concept. Manville emphasizes that Aristotle’s concept of *autarkeia* implied the achievement of a moral ‘good life’.²² Similarly, Plato warns of the dangers for a *polis* that was not self-sufficient:

A nearby sea is sweet for daily use...but by filling its *emporion* with money-making and with petty trading, and by breeding deceitful and troublesome ways in men’s souls, it makes the city faithless and unloved, not only to itself, but also to other men.²³

Of course, one doubts that any city could ever have hoped to attain this philosopher’s ideal. Rackham in a study that explores the agricultural potential of the ancient, and indeed modern Greek landscape notes that ‘nature has intended Greece to be a land of trade rather than self-sufficiency’.²⁴ By the fourth century Athens was furthest away of all from the concept of *autarkeia*: indeed, it had become a bustling international market place.²⁵ And yet the vast numbers of foreign merchants that had been attracted to Athens as a result, not just for trade but to live and work, were a distasteful vision for the citizen.

Writing in the final quarter of the fifth century, the so-called Old Oligarch can grumble about how it had become impossible, in terms of their clothes and general appearance, to tell the metic and the citizen apart.²⁶ These may only be the complaints of a bitter aristocrat, but the resident alien was regarded as a big enough threat to the social, and more importantly, political order, to ensure that his role in society was sufficiently marginalized: the metic was prohibited from owning land, and was forced to pay a special tax, the *metoikion*, while he was expected to perform the less desirable duties of the citizen, such as serving in the army, or rowing in the fleet. Such legislation had a dual effect, in so far as it not only marginalized the metic, it also defined the privileges of citizenship more acutely. The problem remained, however, that no matter how inferior the position of the metic, he, and more generally the foreign merchant, firmly symbolized the failure of the *polis* to fulfil its own needs. Unquestionably this problem was exacerbated in the fourth century. Pečírka, in an article examining the ‘crisis’ of the Athenian *polis*, suggests that an economic expansion, resulting from the development of an extensive commercial network during the fifth century, had disturbed the institutional/social structure.²⁷ He says, ‘The economic and political evolution of Athenian society outgrew the framework fixed by the *polis*...the framework of its economic and political principles, the framework of its social structure and inherited moral values and political behaviour.’²⁸ It is here then that the role of the *emporion* becomes clear. The *polis* could not survive without foreign trade—even Plato admitted this²⁹—but as long as goods had to be imported it would be on its own terms. By isolating foreign trade and traders within a single, controlled area the *polis* was, in a sense, establishing its purity.³⁰ The Athenian *emporion* came to exist because of the *polis*, not in spite of it. There may always have been a particular area of the Piraeus where foreign merchants gathered, but it was the moment when this area was formally marked out, and officials were specifically elected to regulate it, that it became an *emporion* in the terms in which the orators of the fourth century spoke of it. At exactly what moment this occurred it is difficult to say. As noted above it is possible that the introduction of the *dikai emporikai* around 350 was part of a wider commercial plan, which may have involved the reorganization of the Athenian *emporion*. A passage from Plato’s *Laws* is potentially significant. He is discussing the manner in which the various categories of visiting *xenoi* should be dealt with, the first being the foreign merchant: When he comes to the city,

he must be received at the markets, harbours and public buildings outside the city, by the officials in charge thereof; and they shall have a care lest any such strangers introduce any innovation, and they shall duly dispense justice to them, and shall hold such intercourse as is necessary with them, but to the least extent possible.³¹

The important question is whether Plato’s idea for the separation of foreign trade was, if in a somewhat different form, already in place at Athens, or whether he is in fact pre-empting the Athenian experience. Unfortunately, however, one cannot know the answer.

If the fourth-century evidence from Athens suggests that an *emporion* was an institutionally, juridically, economically and socially defined zone, then that of Herodotos writing in the second half of the fifth century presents a somewhat different picture. Herodotos makes nine references to *emporion*, four of which are to settlements on the Black Sea. The first of these is to the ‘*emporion* of Borysthenes’, otherwise known as Olbia.³² Olbia was a Milesian colony at the mouth of the River Bug, well placed for trade with the Scythians. That the original purpose of this settlement was to exploit this trade is very likely. Prior to Olbia’s foundation, there was a small community on the island of Berezan (which may in fact have been a peninsula in antiquity) that received Greek pottery from the late seventh century,³³ and probably also Greek colonists at the same time, or shortly after.³⁴ This site, while not apparently blessed with the best of harbours, was a typical starting place for the establishment of good trading relations with the natives, and one might suspect that Olbia was founded soon after, from Berezan. Olbia’s initial role as a trading settlement would seem likely, but in the course of the sixth and fifth centuries, it seems to take on the look of a traditional *polis*, more than the traditional notion of the *emporion*. The architecture of the town was more than functional: a story of Herodotos himself relates how a Scythian prince, Scales, built an elaborate residence in the city,³⁵ and actual finds have lived up to this.³⁶ Beyond the architecture, it is noted by Boardman that ‘a proper “grid” town plan was laid out by the end of the sixth century’;³⁷ and by the early fifth the town was minting its own rather unusual coins—some were cast in the shape of dolphins. These are not activities that one would associate with an *emporion*, and by Herodotos’ time Olbia had clearly developed into what one would call a *polis*. Yet still Herodotos has no problems with calling it an *emporion*, nor, indeed, the other colonies on the Black Sea to which he is probably referring when he mentions the ‘other Pontic *emporion*’;³⁸ nor indeed Naukratis, which is described as both *polis* and *emporion*.³⁹

Also significant is Herodotos’ description of Tartessos, an aristocratic kingdom in Southern Spain, chanced upon by the Samian merchant Kolaïos, as an ‘untouched *emporion*’.⁴⁰ The nature of the community at Tartessos is not significant in this description, only its role in the silver trade from which Kolaïos profits so greatly.

Herodotos then does not use the terms *emporion* and *polis* to describe two distinct entities. Rather he uses them in a relatively neutral, perhaps even interlocking sense. When he calls Olbia a *polis*, it does not carry with it the baggage of fourth-century philosophy or rhetoric; and to describe a *polis* as being also an *emporion* only emphasizes the importance of trade to that city.

It is perhaps possible then to distinguish a fifth-century definition of the *emporion* from that of the fourth century, which broadly suggests that the *emporion* became increasingly formalized—a clearly distinguished entity, separate from the *polis*—in the course of the Classical period; that prior to this an *emporion* was any settlement involved in commercial activity.

I will now consider, more briefly, the range of meanings associated with the term *apoikia*. Literally translated it means ‘home away from home’: a community created by another community in its own image but on foreign soil. It has often been assumed that the ‘image’ was that of the *polis*: a primary defining feature of a fully-developed *polis*-concept, one might argue, is its ability to be neatly packaged and exported abroad. The ideal of self-sufficiency, *autarkeia*, discussed above, defines the *polis* as an agricultural community, and hence the *apoikia* might also be regarded as first and only an agricultural community. Further, since an *apoikia*, so the argument runs, was unencumbered by the geographical and political limitations facing the *poleis* of the Greek homeland, it might pursue this goal of self-sufficiency more freely. As already suggested, however, there is some doubt that there was even a *polis*-concept to be exported as early as the eighth century: the Greek communities in Italy and Sicily were if anything a catalyst for the development of such a concept, rather than one of its products.⁴¹ It was also suggested above that the ideal of *autarkeia* only really developed during the fourth century, as a reaction to the increasing problems of the *polis*, at a time when the majority of Greek city-states, particularly Athens, had become heavily reliant on foreign trade. Prior to the fourth century, commerce appears as an integral aspect of the city-state: thus Herodotos can describe a community as both *polis* and *emporion*.

An *apoikia* is also defined by the formality of its foundation. The consultation of the Delphic oracle, the designation of an official founder of the city, the *oikist*, the transfer of sacred fire from the hearth of the founding city to the new community and the maintenance of relations with this mother city are all regarded as part of the process of a formal foundation. Any community seen to be involved in such processes is thus identified as an *apoikia*. An *emporion*, by contrast, is regarded as having an informal foundation. The danger of using these criteria, however, is that virtually everything we know about the formal foundation of a colony comes from the Classical period. There is evidence to suggest that foundation stories, including the name of the *oikist*, were, at least on occasions, manufactured as political propaganda.⁴² No *oikist* is recorded for Pithekoussai: does this mean that Pithekoussai was a less formal foundation than, say, Cumae for which we have the name of the *olkist*?; or, since the community fell into rapid decline in the seventh century and was decidedly insignificant thereafter, that there was never any political impetus to remember or, to take it further, ‘create’ an *oikist*? One has to suspect that Classical concerns about political and cultural relationships would have led to a redefinition of relationships in the past: Athens sought to emphasize her role as mother city of the Ionian *poleis*, but there is little doubt that this was being used as a justification for her empire.

It would seem that the *emporion*—*apoikia* opposition is ultimately a creation of the Classical period, and reflects the concerns and desires of that era. The opposition appears not to have existed, at least not in so rigid a form, even in the mid-fifth century—Herodotos can call a community both *polis* and *emporion*—and one must recognize the potential inutility of this terminology for the eighth and seventh centuries, when the Greek ‘colonisation’ of Sicily and Italy was at its height.

Even if the line between *polis* and *emporion* was distinctly blurred in the Archaic period, it remains true that different settlements were created with very different motives in mind. A more subtle typology of early communities is required, which avoids the rigid classification of the *emporion*—*apoikia* division, and which takes full account of those factors which might indicate the nature of a settlement: the internal and external geography of a site; relationships with the indigenous populations; and the way in which a settlement evolved, i.e. whether there was a planned or unplanned development of the site. Only within such a typology can the full range of motives for the foundation of a settlement be understood.

NOTES

- 1 Many thanks to Prof. M.H.Crawford, Dr R.Thomas, Dr J.Rowlandson, H.C. Van Bremen and Dr M.M.Austin, who have offered numerous helpful comments on this chapter in its various forms.
- 2 Ridgway, *The First Western Greeks*, 107–8.
- 3 Strab. 247.5.4.9; Livy 8.22.5–6.
- 4 Ridgway, op. cit. (n. 2), quoting himself in the introduction, xviii.
- 5 M.Casevitz, in Bresson and Rouillard (eds) *L'Emporion*, 20.
- 6 A.Bresson, in ibid., 163–226.
- 7 Dem. 35.28.
- 8 *IG* i³ 1101. A, B.
- 9 [Arist.] *Ath. Pol.* 51.4.
- 10 For the treaty of Miletus with Phaestos: *I.Cret.* i §xxiii.1; with Knossos: *I.Cret.* i §viii.6; with Gortyn: *I.Cret.* i §iv.16.
- 11 Dem. 34.4.
- 12 Id., 34.29.
- 13 Id., 32.10.

- 14 This is the image suggested by Demosthenes to McKechnie, *Outsiders in the Greek Cities*, 183–4. C. Mossé, in Garnsey, Hopkins and Whittaker (eds) *Trade in the Ancient Economy*, 53–63, also emphasizes the scorn with which those who frequented the *emporion* were regarded.
- 15 J. Vélissaropoulos, *DHA* 3 (1977), 61–85. She relies heavily for this description on the definition of Pollux, 9.34. Pollux himself, however, was drawing on Hypereides, the fourth-century Attic orator.
- 16 The first reference to ‘monthly’ *dikai emporikai* comes in [Dem.] 7.12, and is datable to c. 342.
- 17 See specifically Cohen, *Ancient Athenian Maritime Courts*; but also Todd, *The Shape of Athenian Law*, 334–7, for a less detailed but clearer appraisal.
- 18 Cohen, op. cit. (n. 17), 23–40.
- 19 Xen. *Poroi* 3.3.
- 20 Ibid., 3.4.
- 21 Aristotle expands this at *Pol.* 7.1328b6–15. He lists six *erga* that must be fulfilled in order to achieve *autarkeia*: *trophe*; *technai*; *hopla*; provision of material wealth; establishment of religion; and a deliberative/judicial structure.
- 22 Manville, *The Origins of Citizenship in Ancient Athens*, 41–3.
- 23 *Laws* 4.705a.
- 24 O. Rackham, in Murray and Price (eds) *The Greek City*, 106.
- 25 Isok. 4.42.
- 26 [Xen.] *Ath. Pol.* 1.10.
- 27 J. Pečírka, *Eirene* 14 (1976), 5–29.
- 28 Ibid., 19.
- 29 *Laws* 9.918b–c.
- 30 The idea that a city might in some sense be impure, indeed ‘barbarised’ without an *emporion* is something that might be noted from a passage in Isokrates. He suggests that Cypriot Salamis had become barbarised under Phoenician rule since it ‘was neither welcoming to Greeks nor familiar with arts, nor did it possess an *emporion*’ (9.47).
- 31 *Lam* 12.952e–953a.
- 32 4.17.1.
- 33 J. G. F. Hind, *AR* (1992/3), 92–6.
- 34 Boardman, *The Greeks Overseas*, 3rd edition, 250: he suggests, ‘The presence of a Chian storage jar of a type with a wide mouth which could hardly have been used for the carriage of wine or oil, rather suggests the presence of a Chian family here soon after 600.’
- 35 4.78–80.
- 36 Boardman, op. cit. (n. 34), 251; Hind, op. cit. (n. 33), 94, for detailed bibliography of Olbia’s architectural characteristics.
- 37 Boardman, op. cit. (n. 34), 251.
- 38 4.24.
- 39 2.179.
- 40 4.152.
- 41 As Murray, *Early Greece*, 2nd edition, 103, notes, this is becoming ‘increasingly probable’.
- 42 Malkin, *Religion and Colonisation in Ancient Greece*, 115.

SERVIUS TULLIUS, CLEISTHENES AND THE EMERGENCE OF THE *POLIS* IN CENTRAL ITALY

Christopher Smith

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter I wish to apply the sorts of questions which we ask of the Greek *polis* to the communities of Central Italy. This is not a new idea, but the task of understanding Rome, for instance, through a comparative context is still incomplete.¹ I will concentrate here on an appraisal of some similarities between the programmes of Cleisthenes of Athens and Servius Tullius of Rome, after first outlining the context of the rise of the city-state in archaic Central Italy.

THE EMERGENCE OF THE CITY-STATE

There is a wealth of evidence and interpretation regarding the emergence of a city-state in Central Italy, which is presented here in a summary form.² In Etruria around 900, communities of scattered diffuse settlements coalesced into several major units such as Veii and Cerveteri, though there is little evidence at this stage that they were densely populated. Rather they seem to have come together into large areas which were well defended, and settled unevenly inside the walls. The shift to this new settlement pattern is contemporary with the development of what we know as Villanovan culture, which is a cultural assemblage of bronzeware, ironware and pottery with recognisably coherent features different from what had preceded and from the cultural assemblages developing elsewhere around 900, for instance in Latium.

Stoddart has indicated the importance of this moment in the history of the region, and also the importance of contextualising it properly within the longer history of Etruria. This development must be regarded as having happened independently of the Greek presence, exiguous in the Mycenaean period, absent through the Dark Ages, and not due to return to Italy until the eighth century. The history of the development of urban form must be seen as an aspect of internal social articulations.³

Latium follows a quite different trajectory. In contrast to Etruria, there is no radical resettlement at any stage in the early Archaic period. What we see is a gradual growth in size and prosperity of sites, and the dramatic appearance of well-fortified and planned sites from around 600, often overlaying previous habitations. In some instances, one can see a kind of synoecism operating around about 600. One crucial instance is the site of Gabii, which was created from the scattered communities around the Lago di Castiglione, amongst them Osteria dell'Osa.⁴ Detailed fieldwork seems to pick up similar kinds of development north of Rome at sites like Fidenae and Crustumerium.

The creation of larger communities in Etruria was not accompanied by the total demise of the scattered form of settlement which had preceded it. In fact the opposite is clearly true. Rendeli has shown the possibilities for seeing the cultural and political imperialism of the large Villanovan sites with regard to smaller neighbouring sites: the absorption of Luni sul Mignone and San Giovenale into the orbit of Cerveteri is a well-known example.⁵ Etruscan sites also grow in size and prosperity in the seventh century, bringing smaller settlements into their orbit.

There are two different processes which can be identified, again taking the issue rather crudely. First there is the independent development in Etruria of large articulated communities in the early Iron Age. Second, there is the creation of more recognisably urban sites in the seventh and sixth centuries across Central Italy in Latium and Campania, and the extension of the Etruscan sites. Drews sets the point at which urban form may be said to have arrived in Italy: it comes with stone-built houses and it happens because the Greeks have arrived.⁶ I would like to pursue an alternative approach in the context of the reforms of the city of Rome which were attributed to Servius Tullius, canonically king of Rome from 578 to 534.

It seems to me necessarily true that urban culture could not have found a place in Central Italy if the Italians themselves were not prepared for it. Parts of Greece remain non-urban in nature into the fifth century; parts of Gaul which were also receiving Greek imports in the sixth century make slight progress towards urban form. The late-sixth-century wall at Heuneburg, probably built by foreign Mediterranean craftsmen, has not been used in that context as a proof of urban form. That

urban culture finds a spiritual and cultural home in Etruria, Latium and Campania, but less so in other parts of Italy at this time, such as Samnium, is indicative of structural aspects of those societies.

We should not be surprised to discover in areas with comparable agricultural potential, comparable populations and comparable climatic conditions that there are also comparable social structures. Urban form finds a place in Central Italy as it does in parts of Greece because it is the social form which best suits the conditions. It permits relatively intensive exploitation of resources of labour, mineral wealth and agriculture. It crystallises certain structural inequalities and permits their perpetuation beyond a generation or two, whilst at the same time offering a potential and partial brake on the arrogant drive for power and wealth by a privileged few. One can see the value of such a society to the Etruscans or Latins who had developed hierarchical social structures long before the arrival of the Greeks, and who, in the case of the Etruscans, were capable of making independent decisions about the kind of society in which they wanted to live.

The hypothesis is that rather than seeing the emergence of recognisably urban settlements in Central Italy as driven solely by emulation of the Greeks, we should regard it as also a solution to similar problems and opportunities in the two regions. How might we test this hypothesis? First, it is crucial to recognise that we are not discussing odd settlements existing in isolation, but the existence of an urban society. This shows that the conditions prevailed across a region, and were not unique to a particular site. The autarchy of the *polis* is in practice a later philosophical and political ideal, which ignored the necessity for trade and contact, and the existence of other competing *poleis*. A *polis* needs a *chora*, and a *polis* may also need other *poleis* with which to interact. The very fact that in Archaic Greece we can contemplate the existence of a sort of international aristocracy, most clearly represented by the tyrants and the international sanctuaries and games, indicated the value of regarding Greece as an urban society, with areas that stand outside this development. The same can be said for Central Italy. Carmine Ampolo some years ago developed the concept of an open society with regard to Central Italy: society at the top level was permeable. We see the movement of aristocrats (for instance, the Tarquins to Rome, or the presence of one Rutile Hipukrates, a man with a name half-Latin and half-Greek, and perhaps with a significant Greek name too, since horse-riding is an archetypal province of the aristocrat, living in Tarquinia in Etruria).⁷ The interconnectedness of the urban settlements of Central Italy is demonstrated by the leagues at a religious and a political level which existed both in Latium (for instance, the Latin League, or the meeting of the Latins at the shrine of Jupiter Latiaris) and in Etruria if we are right to see the later league of twelve Etruscan cities as having an Archaic precedent. It is also demonstrated by the phenomenon of the wealthy graves at Praeneste in Latium and Cerveteri in Etruria which contain almost identical assemblages of material imported from Greece, Syria and Phoenicia, and also by the exchange of goods and techniques between the regions; architectural terracotta decoration has been found at Veii, Velletri and Rome which appears to have come from the same mould.⁸ Central Italy became an urban society because urbanisation suited the prevalent social and geographical conditions.

My second test is this. If we are right to see the urbanisation of Central Italy as parallel to developments in Archaic Greece because of similar social conditions in both societies, might we not expect to see similar problems and perhaps even similar solutions to those problems at a political level? Whether the Italians copied their urban forms from the Greeks or not, it is not necessary for them to have similar difficulties, but if they do, then we have a further strengthening of the hypothesis, and another reason to pursue the endeavour of a systematic comparison of the two areas, with a view to being enlightened about both.

SERVIUS TULLIUS AND CLEISTHENES

The obvious objection to my method is that it assumes the value of the sources for early Rome.⁹ We are well aware that no Roman history exists uncontaminated by a profound knowledge and acceptance of the forms of narrative which were used in Greek historiography. To argue that Tarquinius Superbus was very like a Greek tyrant ignores the obvious counter that Livy makes him so, because his best model for writing the history of a wicked king expelled by a member of the commons who proceeded to establish a more democratic form of government was the narratives of the fall of tyrants in the Greek world.

So we should expect early Roman history in some ways to mirror early Greek history. One way out of this is to focus on the institutions of the Roman constitution, for instance, the development of the assemblies, or of written legal codes. The problem here must be that to date the transformations can only be done for the early period on the basis of the suspect literary accounts. Is it conceivable that the reforms attributed to Servius Tullius were in fact passed at a considerably later date, in the Republic for instance, and retrojected to the period of the sixth century to make Servius Tullius look like the kind of reforming politician that the ancients knew from Archaic Greek history?

It is, I think, unlikely that the tradition of a major reform of Roman society in the sixth century is unreliable. First, the archaeological evidence shows beyond a shadow of doubt that sixth-century Rome was radically different from eighth-century Rome. It was larger, and more densely populated, like all Latin sites of the period; it was more open to and influenced by artistic and religious forms from Etruria and Magna Graecia; and it was developing a completely different and completely new physical setting for indisputably political activity in the forum.¹⁰

Second, the antiquarian sources preserve scraps of information which for a variety of reasons we might consider as early.¹¹ Priesthoods and political institutions mentioned in the antiquarians may not all belong to the sixth century, but many of them probably do. For instance, the *rex sacrificulus* acting as representative of the deposed king preserves tasks, such as the proclamation of the calendar, which may date back to the sixth century. The Twelve Tables may refer by the phrase *comitatus maximus* to the *comitia centuriata*. At the same time these sources preserve information about the *comitia curiata*, which by its nature as a form of assembly that is based on a small settlement cannot postdate the *comitia centuriata*.

The sources preserve the tradition of great upheavals in the sixth century because that is what happened, though the form of this upheaval, and the individuals involved, might be spurious in part. Moreover, as I have indicated, it would be astonishing if the dramatic development of Rome and Latium in the sixth century was in no way reflected in political changes. Without any literary evidence, we are very content to see the shift to proto-urban settlement in Villanovan Etruria as a major political and social transformation; if one did not have the literary evidence one would infer the same for sixth-century Rome. Now let us see if the literary evidence is at all illuminating.

The central drive of the Servian reforms may be described as a deliberate attempt to create new groupings within the city and for Rome's territory, which reflect the expansion that I have mentioned above. He enlarged the city area, created the basis for the rural tribes, and created the centuriate military organisation. Many other reforms were attributed to him, as perhaps they were to Solon, at a later date, which now appear anachronistic, such as his introduction of coinage, or his institution of doles of corn and money to the poor, and cancellation of debts.¹² I will focus simply on the reorganisation of territorial units.

The Romulean city was divided into three tribes, the Tities, Ramnes and Luceres. The names were preserved, together with the organisation, through the *equites* of the Roman army. One presumes that this early cavalry were more important at an early stage as a fighting body than they became with the expansion of infantry armies, a feature of the Greek world too. Six of the equestrian centuries were called after the three tribes with the addition of the words *priores* and *posteriores*. These centuries have been identified as the *sex suffragia*, which were still known in the late Republic.

Whilst the threefold division of the city was retained for the cavalry, the city itself, and the infantry, were organised, allegedly by Servius, around four tribes. These tribes were the Suburana, Esquilina, Collina and Palatina. It is perhaps not by accident that the first two tribes represent the new areas of the city which Servius Tullius favoured, first by living, as Tarquinius Superbus was to do, on the Esquiline outside the old Quirinal and Palatine areas, and second by drawing the *pomerium*, the sacred boundary of Rome, to include them.

We must also consider the reform of the expanded territory of Rome. Cornell shows convincingly that the tradition is correct to assign to regal Rome an ever-expanding empire, until the battle of Lake Regillus, when the advance was temporarily halted (despite the Romans' triumphalist approach to this battle, and the apparent translation of the Dioscuri from Lavinium to Rome). Some of the sources do assign to Servius an expansion of the number of tribes by the creation of rural tribes; the problem is that there is a dispute over their number and date. Other interpretations, such as Richard's, suggest that the four urban tribes extended out into the *ager Romanus*, providing an undifferentiated space that counteracted the power of the patrician *gentes* in the countryside.¹³

Richard's interpretation does not wholly convince, partly because of the evidence which he himself gives of the patricians. From his own account, Richard has been able to show, in line with other recent interpretations, that the patriciate is not an institution with a history reaching back into the most distant origins of Rome, but one which has its roots most likely in the sixth century itself. That Servius Tullius was taken by later writers as a defender of liberty and an opponent of entrenched privilege does not therefore make him an opponent of the patriciate as we understand it at the beginning of the Republic.

What did the tribal reform replace? The three Romulean tribes are described by Dionysius of Halicarnassus as *genikos*, which perhaps refers to the importance of birth and kinship within them. They were divided each into ten *curiae*. Laelius Felix claims that the *comitia curiata* was the Roman people voting by *genera hominum*; this is usually taken to mean that each *curia* was a group of specific families, or possibly *gentes*. This assembly voted on magistrates' power and on various issues such as inheritance and the movement between patrician and plebeian orders. The *curiae* did survive, perhaps becoming more geographically based within the city, but the major organ of decision-making became the *comitia centuriata*, which was hierarchically structured into classes, though the description in Livy reflects a much later situation. The development of this new assembly cannot readily be dissociated from the army reform.

To what extent therefore did Servius Tullius shake up the city, in the way that Cleisthenes is described as doing? The major problem with the presentation of Servius as countering the power of the patricians is that we do not know how firmly set that order was. One line of argument would be to say that Servius Tullius tried to overlay local, particularly rural, power bases with a city-based system; whilst maintaining the power of wealth, he reduced the power of birth (through the diminution of the influence of the curiate assembly), but was ultimately unsuccessful, since the kingship in the form of the tyrannical Tarquinius Superbus was overthrown by a clique including the patricians, who began to exert authority as an oligarchic form of government.

I would like to offer an alternative approach. The fragmentary papyrus from Oxyrhynchus (*P. Oxy.* xvii 2088) has the phrase *pagosque in tribu*, which fits well with Dionysius of Halicarnassus' account. The *pagi* are always connected in the

sources with the rural tribes and in *P.Oxy.* 2088 with military levies (*exquepagis milites conquierebantur*[r]). I think that, as Rome's territory increased, these *pagi* or small settlements in the rural area were converted into the rural tribes, and one strong piece of evidence for this is the fact that the name Lemonius is found of both *apagus* and a tribe.¹⁴ Now since some of the tribes have gentilitial names, one is tempted to connect the rural tribes with the power bases of certain major clans in the sixth century. The creation of the gentilitial rural tribes seems to me to be the time when the full patriciate emerges into power.

Thus Servius Tullius either began this system or came too soon for it, and the urban tribes in that sense would be an incorporation of defeated territories and therefore of the power base of this putative localised *pagus* elite into the political system of Rome. If this is true, the shake-up relates to the city. Who was Servius Tullius trying to control? The answer must lie in the old city elite. The new tribal system, both in terms of the four urban tribes if they cover the entire *ager Romanus* at any stage, and the system of the rural tribes, actually reduce the power of the city significantly, as does the 'wealth not birth' basis of the *comitia centuriata*.

I believe that what we are seeing is a set of myths of ancestry and the creation in the sixth century under the kings of a wider-based patriciate through the conquest of parts of Latium—Rome's great internal colonisation, which Rendeli has shown to be not unique. The reforms attributed to Servius Tullius are of enormous importance in this context since they provided the institutional framework whereby the expanding elite of Rome could deploy their resources of patronage within the city context. For although the centuriate assembly gave no visible encouragement to the creation and use of a local power base, the incorporation of the rural areas of Rome into the city was a necessary step in the long and quintessentially Roman practice of involving conquered territories in the processes of citizenship and rule. Moreover, although there is no proven connection between the tribal reforms and the army reforms, I personally think that Siewert's analysis of the Cleisthenic reforms as being connected with the army is by no means unthinkable in the Roman situation; in fact, if Stanton is right to stress the geographical problems of the Attic system, then one is struck by how much easier it would be to use the Roman tribal system, which preserves geographically coherent units.¹⁵ We may go back to the crucial evidence of *P.Oxy.* 2088 on this point, that the *pagi* were both the administrative nucleus of the new tribes and also the levying point for soldiers. The intimate connections between tribes, *gentes* and *clientelae* are strengthened, not weakened, by the sixth-century reforms.

With this in mind, are there lessons here that might apply to the Cleisthenic experience in Athens? That the Cleisthenic solution to Athens' internal problems shook up some local associations and overlaid them with new ones is indisputable, I suspect, but it is much harder to sustain a belief that the new system was not itself capable of allowing the exercise of power at a local and higher level. Indeed, this is the assumption which underlies the belief that the Alcmaeonids were significantly assisted by the reform. What the Cleisthenic reform upset was the oldest divisions of the Attic territory, which reputedly go back to the synoecism of Theseus, and are thus directly comparable in a number of ways with the Romulean organisation of Rome. If the Cleisthenic reforms show a greater awareness of the changed social and political situation of late-sixth-century Attica, then they are not unlike the Servian reforms.

CONCLUSIONS

The problem I have tried to address here is the comparability of a Greek and an Italian experience of urbanisation. I hope in the first section of this chapter to have shown that the Italian experience was not copied slavishly from the Greek, that, although there are direct links with the colonies of Southern Italy and Sicily, there is no reason to assume that the Central Italian *poleis* are not as natural to their environment as the Greek *poleis* to theirs. There is a process of conscious decision-making, not rote learning.

The consequence of this is that one is dealing with a phenomenon of Mediterranean and not simply Greek importance, and, if that is so, one can compare the experiences. In the particular instance which I have chosen, the comparison is a difficult one, because the Servian and Cleisthenic reforms are both known only in the most fragmentary detail, and I am certainly guilty of trying to explain *obscurum per obscurius* in juxtaposing them. In order to indicate the fact that these urban settlements do share similar sorts of problems, I could have chosen the much more straightforward issue of debt bondage—hektemoragē at Athens, *nexum* at Rome.¹⁶ The example I have used, however, interests me because it focuses our attention on what must have been the most pressing difficulty which the Archaic *polis* had to face up to at some stage, which was its physical growth.

Attica and Latium are of roughly the same size as regions. Attica becomes united and focused on a single centre earlier than Latium, and the Romans never employed as elaborate a system of regional division as the Athenians did. In the sixth century, however, the sources indicate that they were both going through something of a similar crisis.¹⁷ After the internal colonisation of Attica, four tribes, presumably dating back some way into the past, were not adequate either for the representation of the population or, for that matter, for the expression of the power of a new elite. As Rome's population grew and her territory expanded, the preservation of the Romulean system was a block on the development of popular representation and the new patricians. In both instances, one of the major reasons for reform was the development of new military tactics, and a larger

army. In both cases the solution was an overlaying of old associations and groupings with new ones, more numerous and infinitely more flexible. In Athens, the ultimate result was the enablement of a radical democracy, but the complexity of the organisation did not permit the enfranchisement and incorporation of new territory and new populations. Paradoxically, the Roman centuriate organisation was expressly hierarchical, and nothing like the Athenian system was ever possible, but the tribal organisation, although in my opinion it began as an expression of gentilitial power, eventually permitted Rome to incorporate Italy and the Italians into her orbit, until Augustus set about another organisation of Italy into the fourteen new *regiones*.

NOTES

- 1 K.A.Raaflaub, in Raaflaub (ed.) *Social Struggles in Archaic Rome*, 1–51, is a fundamental statement of the value of this approach. I am particularly grateful to Professor Raaflaub for his helpful suggestions at the conference.
- 2 More detailed surveys in D.Ridgway, in *C.A.H.*, 2nd edition, iv. 623–75; Holloway, *The Archaeology of Early Rome and Latium*; Cornell, *The Beginnings of Rome*; Smith, *Early Rome and Latium*.
- 3 S.Stoddart, in Champion (ed.) *Centre and Periphery*, 88–101.
- 4 Bietti-Sestieri, *The Iron Age Community of Osteria dell'Osa*, with full bibliographical details.
- 5 Rendeli, *Città Aperte*.
- 6 R.Drews, *AJAH* 6 (1981), 133–65.
- 7 C.Ampolo, *D.Arch.* 4–5 (1970–1), 37–68.
- 8 Holloway, op. cit. (n. 2), 156–60, for Praeneste; for evidence of terracotta relief decorations, see Rystedt, Wikander and Wikander (eds) *Deliciae Fictiles*; Smith, op. cit. (n. 2), 137, 147, 159.
- 9 Cornell, op. cit. (n. 2), 1–30, and in Raaflaub, op. cit. (n. 1), 52–76, for a defence of the sources. Raaflaub himself lays greater stress, as I do here, on the antiquarian sources: see especially *ibid.* 23–5.
- 10 Holloway, op. cit. (n. 2), 81–8; Cornell, op. cit. (n. 2), 92–7; Smith, op. cit. (n. 2), 166–78.
- 11 See n. 9, above.
- 12 Thomsen, *King Servius Tullius*, for a complete account.
- 13 For the details of the various social groupings, see Cornell, op. cit. (n. 2), 173–97; for the expansion of Roman territory see M.Humbert, *Municipium et Civitas sine Suffragio*, 45–84; J.-C.Richard's account is in Raaflaub, op. cit. (n. 1), 105–29. I was pleased to discover after I had written this chapter that Cornell has come to a similar position: see Cornell, op. cit. (n. 2), 194–7.
- 14 Cornell, op. cit. (n. 2), 178, denies the priority of the *pagus*, on the grounds that the tribes' names were all gentilitial, and toponyms were derived from them. This assumes that Lemnius is a toponym, which cannot be proved.
- 15 Siewert, *Die Trittyen Attikas und die Heeresreform des Kleisthenes*; G.R.Stanton, *Chiron* 14 (1984), 1–41, and now 24 (1994), 161–207. See M.Ostwald, in *C.A.H.*, 2nd edition, iv. 303–46, for a general account of Cleisthenes' reforms with bibliography.
- 16 For hektemorage in Athens see Harris and Foxhall, pp. 103–12 and p. 129 above.
- 17 Corinth and Phleious may have had similar organisations: see G.R.Stanton, *CA* 5 (1986), 139–53, but also Salmon, p. 64 with p. 72 n. 16 above. The Corinthian organisation may be the work of the tyrants: see Salmon, *Wealthy Corinth*, 205–9, and p. 64 with p. 72 n. 17 above. There were two reorganisations at Cyrene, one under Demonax in the sixth century (Her. 4.161), one in the fifth century (Arist. *Pol.* 6.1319b11), which was perhaps more Cleisthenic.

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Note For the sake of consistency within the index, spellings of Greek proper names have been latinised, although contributing authors may use other spellings. In addition, only selective reference has been made to modern authors.

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